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Editorial Note 
Ali English quolations or Spinoza arc l'rom Curley (1985-201 G). 1 have 
retainecl his use or Ùle italics lo indicate whcn "or" translates the Latin sile or 
SCL!. Generally, sil c and seL! mark an equi"alence, raÙlCr Ùl<lIl an alternaLÏ,·e. 1 
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SpÙJOZ,7 'S Thco/~' Orlhe Hl/lI/cUI .llùld: COlIsr/OiiSl/cs.,; .llcl/lOl.' ; :/1/(/ f(caSOI/ 
have omilled the use of capilallcllers lor lerms as "mind", "body", "thoughL", 
"exlension" and "individual" (which, in Curley's edition, is meanl lo 
reproduce Ùle capilalisation founel in Ùle OP, yet only inconsistently presenl 
in the NS), in ail cases in which il elid nol appear necessary lor the general 
cumprehension of Ù1e text quolecl. 1 haye suosLÏluled personal pronouns and 
possessive c1elerminers rclerring lo God wilh the neuter "It" and "ILs" 
(capilalisecl) . Ali oÙ1er c1eparlllres from Curlcy's lranslation are specilically 
signalled. Corresponcling lerms or passages from the original Latin are 
inserlecl in Ùle quoL.-1.LÏons belween square orackels. Ali rclcrences to Ùle Latin 
"ersion of Spinoza's works are lo Gebhardl (1925). 
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Introduction 
Spinoza famously contcncls lhat "lhc orclcr and connccLÏon of idcas is thc same 
as Ù1C ordcr and connccLÏoll ofthillgs" (E2p7; C l , 451 / G II,89). Based on 
ùlis daim, hc draws lwo conscqucnccs: Ùlal "noÙlillg can happcn in a body 
which is nol pcrceiyccl hy thc minci" (E2p 12; C l, 457 / G II ,95), and that ail 
Ùlings, "Ùl0ugh in dillcrcnl clcgrccs, arc nCYCrÙlelcss animatc" (E2p 13s; C l , 
458 / G II, 96). Il rcmaills unclcar, howcycr, whal il mcans lor any existing 
Ùîing lo havc a mimi which pcrcci\"cs c\"crylhing Ùlal happcns in Ù1C relevanl 
body. In parLÏcular, il is unclear whal role is playcd by consciousness in thc 
defïnition of an indiyidual's mcntalilY, since, agaillst ùlis panpsychist 
background, cycn simple Ùlings such as sloncs can bc conceivcd of as being 
conscious of whal happcns in [hcm (Ep 58; C II , 428 / G IV, 266). 
ln ordcr lor Spinoza's philosophy to bc a crcdible Ùlcory Ùlal "can lead 
us [ ... 1 lo Ùle knowlcdgc of thc human mincI and ils highest blesscdness" 
(E2Prd; C l , 446 / G II , 81/), il is ncccssary lhcrclorc lo prm-idc answers lo 
Ù1C following qucsLÏons: whal is consciousncss, and whal arc ÙIC causes Ùlat 
dctcrminc Ù1C prcscncc or consciousncss in nalurc? How can human and non-
human individuals bc disLÏnguishcd on accounl or ùlcir menlalily, if thc 
prcscnce of mcntalily and consciousncss is a lCalurc Ùlal can cxlcnd lo ail 
cxisting cnLÏLÏcs? How can Spinoza conccivc or ÙIC human minci as a nctwork 
of idcas cOllsisLÏng cnLÏrely of conscious pcrccpLÏonsi) And how, according lo 
Spinoza's mimi-body parallelism, is thc colltcnt or consciousness dClcrminecl 
so Ùlat it rcllccts in ÙlOught ÙIC order and connection or Ù1C acLÏons and Ù1C 
passions or ÙIC body? By addressing Ùlcse quesLÏons, Ùus sludy is an inquiry 
illlo Spinoza's accounl of lhe conscious mind and its opcraLÏons. 
The research huilds on the hypothesis Ùlal Ùle implicaLÏons of Spinoza's 
apparenl panpsychism should nol he clismissed, WiÙlOUl lurÙler analysis, as 
Spinoza's Tlleorv OFllle HI/JlJan J/ùJ(l: CO/lsl'iOI/.I'/lCS.I', .1!c1J101.1' aJ/{1 f{caSO/l 
"mcrc spin-ofls of an Q\'erly oplÎmislÎc prctcnsion to argumcntalÎYc rigor" 
(Wilson [1999[ 1999c, 193, n. 23). QuiLc thc oppositc, 1 arguc that Spinoza's 
panpsychism can bc intcrprcLcd as a rigorous, self-consistcnt philosophical 
posilÎon. To demonst:.rate this hypOLhcsis, 1 dctcrminc whaL Spinoza's nOlÎon 
of "consciousness" is and how hc uscs iL Thcn, 1 inycstigatc whcÙlcr Spinoza 
has a thcory capable of accounlÎng rOI' specilically human bchaviour and 
menLality. Further, 1 analysc Spinoza's descripLion or the human mind as a 
nctwork of conscious ideas and cxaminc Lhc role played by mncmonic conLenL 
in shaping the framework or human conscious ùlOughL. Finally, 1 look for an 
accounL of discursive reasoning, capable or cxplaining Ù1C cxisLcncc of 
activitics of thc mind ùlat, by opcralÎng on Ù1C contcnL providcd by mcmory 
and accessible to consciousncss, prcscrYc thcmselves ùlrough lÎmc and 
changc. 
ln inLerpreting Spinoza's Lexts and Ùlcorics, 1 allcnd to a kw lundamcntal 
premises, drawn l'rom Spinoza himsclr, which Ù1US deLerminc Lhc main 
featurcs and limils of Ùle ÙlcorclÎcal l"r,uncwork cxplorcd by ùlis rescarch: 
L. Spilloza's ilieory ol" ùl0ughL-cxLcnsion parallclism,t according Lo which 
"Ù1C order and conncclÎon or idcas is thc samc as thc order and 
conncction of ùlÏngs" (E2p7; C l , 45 1 / G II , 89) ancl "thc orclcr oraclÎons 
and passions or our body is, by naLurc, aL onc WiÙl Ù1C ordcr or aClÎons 
and passions ol"the minci" (E3p2s; C l, Il.91\'; G II , 11\.1); 
2. Spinoza's rcjection or minci-body interaclÎonism, such ÙlaL "Ù1C body 
cannoL deLermine Ù1C minci Lo ùlÏnking, ancl Lhc minci cannoL clcLcrminc 
Ùle body to mOlÎon, Lo rcsL or Lo <1nYÙli ng clsc (ir there is <1nyÙlÏng elsc)" 
(E3p2; C l , 494 / G II, 1/\.1). 
1 ln thc I"ollowing pages, 1 will usc Ù1C cxprcssion "ùloughl-cxtcnsion p;u-allelism" lo gcncrally l'cle r 
to thc correlation wiùlout causation thal cxists bCllVccn idcas in ùlOughl ,Uld bodics in cxlcnsion; by 
"mi nd-body p;u-allelism", inslcad, 1 rcfCr morc spccilically lo lhc correlation wiÙloul causation ùlal 
cxiSL~ bClwccn mcntal stalcs in an indiùdual's mimi ami corporcal stalcs in Ù1C corrcspomling body 
of Ù1C indi,idual. 
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1111 rodl/rl iOIl 
To Ù1CSC lwo daims, commonly mainl.1Ï ncd by Spinoza seholars, 1 add a third 
onc, which - as wc have sccn - sccms lo follow dirccùy l'rom Spinoza's 
ÙlOughl-cxlcnsion parallclism: 
3. Spinoza's panpsychism, according lo which ail indiyiduals exisling III 
nalUF~, "though in dilTcrcnl dcgrccs, arc nC\-CrÙlcless animalc" and 
posscss a rclcyant mind (E2p [3s; C l , 1[.58 / G II , 9G). 
1 cons iclcr Ù1C valiclily of thc inlcrprcla.lÏon ollerccl by ùlis rcscareh, lhcrclorc, 
lo clcpcncl on ilS capacily lo cohcrcnùy cxplain Spinoza's accounl or lhc 
human mincl in accorclancc WiÙI ail of Ù1CSC ÙU"Cc daims, WiÙlOUl allowing 10r 
any conclusion lo comc inlo conl1icl WiÙI Ùlcm. 
H cncc, wiÙlin ù1Ïs framcwork, ancl compatible WiÙI lhese prcnllSCS, 
Ùlrough Ù1C analyscs ouùinccl abo\'c 1 aim al proyiding an inlerprelation of 
Spinoza's accounl or thc human mind cohcrcnl WiÙI his panpsyehism and 
capable, al Ù1C samc time, of making scnsc or his cxplicil willlo "eoneei\'c lhc 
soul 1 ... 1 as acting accorcling lo cerlain laws, likc a spirilual aulomalon 
lconcJpcrc rWJmam ... sccundum CCI 'las Icges agcn/cJlJ} c/ quasi aiJ'quod 
auLoma spù1lualcl" (riE §85; C l , 37 / G II ,32). In olhcr words, 1 aim al 
oflcring a faiÙlful rcacling of Spinoza's ùlcory of ÙIC hun~an mill(l, by I1lcans 
of which ÙIC nalurc, functions, and spcci fi e bcha\-iour or ÙIC human minci can 
bc consislcnÙY conceivcd as cntircly dClcnnincd by ÙIC sum or ils conscious 
pcrccptions and mcnlal opcrations. 
Methodological Note 
ln carrying oul Ùle rcscarch, 1 adopl ÙlI"CC main slralcgies: 
1. Lexical analysis: kcy lcnns arc lraeed ùlroughoul Spinoza's lexIs and 
analyscd2 in bOÙI thcir lcxlual and hislorical conlcxls; 
2 By '';Ulalys is", 1 illlcnd hcrc Ù1C sludy aimcd al asccrlaining and isolating unimcal Illcanill).,'S and 
consislcnl uscs l'or gi\·clllclms. Thc salllc is lo bc undcrslood ,~iùl regard lo ÙtC 'Ulalysis or conccpts, 
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.s/JÙIOXiI:\' ThcOJ~ ' or/hc H ll/1Jall .Ilù/d: COllsào/lSIlCSS, .I1CI110ll ', ;Uld f{msoll 
2. Conceptual analysis: complcx concepLs arc unpackcd and analyscd , 
where uscful by making use of conlempo rary disLÏncLÏons - such as those 
bcLwccn "physical", "inlenLÏonal", and "phcno mcnal" slance (Dcnnctl 
1198 11 1987; Robbins and J ack 2006), or ÙlOse belwccn "proccdural", 
"episodic", and "scmanLÏc" nrcmory (Tuh'ing 1972; Cohcn and Squire 
1980; Squire 2009) - as hcurisLÏc de\'ices; 
3. RcconstrucLÏon o r argumcnl: Spinoza t..'lkcs many o f his assumpLÏons as 
axio maLÏc or sclr-c\'idcnl; somcLÏmcs, some of his d aims arc only 
jusLÏliablc WiÙl rclc rcnce lo premises o r Ù1cories Ùlal arc cxpoundcd or 
skctchcd in oÙlcr lexts; 1 Ùlcrclo rc considcr apparcnl miss ing slcps in 
Spinoza's argumcnlaLÏo ns and procecd lo lay thcorcLÏcal grounds apllo 
makc sense of his d aims and prcsupposiLÏons. 
Outline of the Chapters 
Thc Lcxl is di, 'cd inlo four chaplcrs. T akcn a lLogcÙlcr, Ù1CY arc mcanl lo 
describe ccntral lCaturcs of Spinoza's accounl o r Ù1C eonseious mind . Eaeh 
chaptcr, howc\'cr, can also bc Lakcn as a st..1.ndalo nc sludy on iLs spccifie lopie. 
ln lhe lirsl chaplcr, enLÏùed "Co nsciousncss, Idcas o f Idcas, and 
AnimaLÏon in Spinoza's i'-l hics)',3 1 loeus on Spinoza's \'ocabulary rclaLcd lo 
"consciousncss". 1 argu e Ùlal, lo r Spinoza, Ù1C no LÏon or "consciousncss" 
amounts lo lhc knowlcdgc lhal wc may ha, 'c or our mind "as a modc of 
lhinking WiÙlOut rclaLÏon Lo iLs o~jccl" (E2p2 1s; C l, if,68 / G II , 109) -
mcutioucd iu Ù1C fo llo\Viug poinl: a bas ic couccpl is gajucd \Vhcu its mcalliug appc;u's uui\'Ocal aud 
its usc consislcul ùl l'Oughoul Ù1C lcxls cousidcrcd , 
3 T hc chaplcr is au cXlcudcd \'crsiou of ;U1 ;u,tidc publishcd undcr Ù1C s;unc Liùc in Ù1C llniù h 
J oumalli-Jr th c H is/Of)' oIPhil0.5oph)' 25, ua, 3, 506-525 Cvhm-ama 20 17), Pro\'isioual , 'crsious of 
Ù1C articlc \Vcrc prcscnlcd al Ù 1C l ' ui\'c rsily of Vcroua (20 14, :vIay 2 1, al Ù1C Philosoph)' 
Pos/gl'adua/c Scmùw]'s), al Ù1 C C ui\'c rsily Homa T rc (20 1 l" Dcccmbcr 22, al Ù1C Firs/ .llcc/j/lgo f 
Ù1C SOclc/as SpÙI07.;UW) , al Ù1C l 'ui\'crsily o f Abcrdccn (20 15, :vIarch 4, al Ù1C PluJosoph)' 
fJq);lIùnclI/ PhfJ ScmùwJ'S), ami allhc l lui, 'crsilé du Q uébcc à Trois-Hi\'ièrcs (20 15, April 11 , al 
Ù1C Colloque Fod;/I) , 
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considcrcd, thaL is, as somcthing which can bc concci"cd scparalcly from Ù1C 
body ancl indcpcndcnlly of il. I show ÙlaL ùlis usc o f Ù1C noLion of 
"consciousncss" has Lwo purposcs: to cxplain our falsc bclicf in Ù1C cxislcncc 
of frcc will, and lo rclcr to thc knowlcclgc Ùlal wc ha\'c or our minci as 
somcÙling clcrnal. I disLinguish bcLwccn Spinoza's lcchnicaJ usc of Ù1C no Lion 
of "consciousncss" and thc "dillercnt dcgrccs of animaLion" Ùlal hc also 
c\'okcs in Ù1C El.hic~' Œ2p1.3s; C I, 1/,58 / G II,96). On Ù1CSC grounds, 1 arguc 
Ùlal Spinoza's accounL or consciousncss is nol inle ndcd lo cli!1erenLialc kinds 
of minds in lcnns or awarcncss or lhcir rcspccLi\ 'c idcas. 
In Ù1C sccond chaptcr, cntitlcd "'A Thing Likc Us': Human Minds and 
DccciLful Bcha"iour in Spinoza",1 I qucsLion whcÙlcr, dcspilC his 
panpsychism, Spinoza allows l'or dillercnccs bclwccn human and non-human 
mcnLalily. I analysc Spinoza's rclercnccs Lo mincllcss auLomala and spirilual 
auLomaLa in Ù1C Trcafùc OIJ fliC ]<;IllCIJd;ll.ioIJ of" Uzc IJJl.cllccL: 1 arguc Ùlal 
Spinoza rclers Lo individuals as "mindlcss" in ordcr lo capturc a kind of 
mcnLalily WiÙl which wc cannat idcnLify. I conLcnd thal, for Spinoza, Ù1C 
possibilily or impossibilily or rccognising Ù1C prcscncc of a similar mcnLalily in 
oÙlcrs is groundcd on bcha\'ioural bascs and originalcs in Ù1C mcchanism ÙlaL 
hc néuncs "imitation orthc allccts" (E3p27sl; C I, 509 / G II,1(0). I add Ù1al 
Ùlis could bc onc or Ù1C rcasons l'or Spinoza's uncompro mising posiLion 
againsl dcccitfui bcha\'Îour. 
In Ù1C Ùlird chaplcr, cntitlcd "Nclworks or idcas: Spinoza's ConccpLion 
or McmOty",s I unpack his thcOl-Y or mcmory and asscss ils luncLion WiÙl 
1 l-:IcmcIIL~ or SCCtiOIlS 3 alld 7 or ùli s chaplcr appc;u'cd ill a blog pOSl, ulldcr Ù1C tiùc " Ir a robol 
licd lo us", ill Ù1C Blog or Ù1C Crollù/g('11 CCllur 101' , 'vlediCI ;i/ ;U/d E1J/)' . 'vlodcm 'l7lOughl ('vl ;uT,Ulla 
2018) . 
5 Pro\'isiollal \'c rsiolls or ùlis chaplcr \\'crc prcsclIlcd al Ù1C l ' lIi\ 'c rsily or CrollillgCIl (2017,.J uly 13, 
al ÙIC SÙ'lh JJcdù/-CroIlÙlgcII-HaJl ;lld-Torolllo 1 J'orkshop 011 .'vlcdit .. ' l a} ;U/d E;Il/)' ,\IIodcm 
PluJosoph)) , al ÙIC l ' lIi\ 'c rsily or Durham (2018, April 11" al Ù1C BSHP.IIlIJUa} Conlèrcllcc), alld 
al ÙIC { ' lIi"c rsilé du Québcc il Trois-Ri\'ièrcs (2018, 'vlay 31, al ÙIC 8" Qllcbcr ScmùJaJ' Ùl Lad)' 
,\IIodcm PluJosoph)). 
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respecL Lo !lis accounL of the humall minc\. 1 analyse the clclinitions of memory 
ÙlaL Spinoza pro\'ides in Ùle 1}'catisc Oll thc j ';Il1clldatJoll o/tiJC Illtelleet and 
in Ùle Athies. 1 use the distinction oelwccn "cpisoclic memory" and "semantic 
memory" (Tuh'ing 1972) as a heuristic dc\·icc. 1 dcmonsLrale ÙlaL, when 
Spinoza relCrs Lo cases of episoclic mcmory - whieh ill\ulyc a lemporalizalÏon 
of Ùleir oqjects - he dismisses Ùlem as dislinct from, and incompatible WiÙl, 
Ùle inLellecL and ils order and conncction of ideas. COll\'crscly, he seems Lo 
consider inst..1.nccs of semantic mcmory as cascs which allow for a seeming 
inLeraction beLween inLellecl and memory. 1 show Ùlal Spinoza considers 
memory as a neLwork of conscious synchronie idcas lor Iwo reasons: 10 explain 
Ùle impacL ÙlaL memory has in delennining our currcnL appetiLes, and Lo 
dcline Ùle specLrum of ideas Lo which Ùle inlellecL can apply ilself. 
ln Ùle 10urLh chapLer, entiùed '''The Habil ofVirlue': Spinoza on Heason 
and Memory",6 1 rocus on Ùle way in whicll me\110ry inleracls wiùI reason, in 
Spinoza's sysLem . 1 argue Ùlal Ùlis intcraction gi\'es risc lo wllal wc \11ay call 
"discursivc reasoning", ÙlaL is, Ùle unlOlding in lime of reasoning processes. In 
Lurn, reasoning is underslood as a sorl of habit, which gcnerales \'irtuous 
bcha\'iour. 1 darily what Ùle notion of "habil of \'irluc" (Ep 58; C II , tI.30 / G 
IV, 267; TfP III, 12; C II , 11 3 / G III , 11·6) signilies lor Spinoza. 1 summarise 
!lis accounL of memory ancl show how reason can be undersloocl as an acti\'ity 
by which mnemonic associations arc reconligured. 1 poinl oui how Ùlis acti\'iLy 
of Ùle mincl rclies on me\11ory to preserye itsclf in Lime, deLermining Ùle 
yirluous habils, or "(inn and constanl disposition of Ùle soul" (Ep 58; C II, 
430 / G IV, 267), Lo which Spinoza alludcs. 
6 A prO\isional \'crsion or ùlis chaplcr \Vas prcscnlcd al Ù1C l 'lti\'crsilé du Québcc il Monlréal (2018, 
Junc 7, al Ù1C CPA-ACP / lJJ/Jual COl/gres.> 2018) . Thc ;ugumcnls in scctiOll fi wcrc scp;mllcly 
prcscnlcd al Ù1C l' ni"crsilé du Québcc ;1 Trois-HiYièrcs (201 6, Fcbru;u'y 19, allhcjou/1/('es d 'élude 
sur la p/l1Josophie m oderne} , al Ù1C Erasmus l 'ni"crsilY Hollcrd;ml (2016, M;u'Ch 21, al Ù1C Du/ch 
Semù/;u' in Sui)' ,'v/odC/1l P/uJosoph)' ll/) , ;Uld al Ù1C l ' lti\'crsily or Calg;u'y (2016, Junc l , al Ù1C 
CPA-ACPAJlJJUa/ COl/gress 20!fJJ. 
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Chapler 1 
Consciousness, Ideas of Ideas, and Animation in Spinoza's Ethics 
Chapter Abstract 
In ÙIC fo llowing chaptcr, I aim to elucidalc Ù1C mcaning and scopc of SpinOl~\ 's , 'ocabulary 
related lo "consciousncss". I arguc ù\al Spinoza, al !cas t in his Nhio', uscs lhis no tion 
consislcntly, aJù lOugh rarely. He inlroduces il la accounl fo r lhc knO\dcdgc lhal 'I"C may 
havc of ÙIC mind considered alonc - considcrccl , lhal is, as somclhing which can hc 
concc i\'ccl scparalely l'rom Ùle bocly ancl indepcndcntly of il, as a modc o f lhinking wilhout 
relation la ilS o~iecl. I show lhal this specific usc of ÙIC nolion o f "consciousncss" SClVCS 
lwo purposcs in Spilloza's Ed1Jc's; o n Ù1C one hand , il is uscd lo explain our I;t!sc belicf in 
the exislence of free will; on Ùle o Ùlc r hand , il is usccl lo l'cle r la lhc know!cdgc lhal we 
havc of our minci as someùlillg clernal- Ùlat is, somclhing which is nol cnlirely dcstroyed 
wilh lhe death of the body. I conlencl , ùlc rcfo rc, Lhal \l'C should nol confusc Spinoza's 
tedlllical use o f lhe notion of "consciousness" lI'ith the "dilkrenl degrees of animalion" 
thal he also evo kes in tlle ~-,t1l1c's, ancl which arc meanl to characlerise ail dilkrenl 
inclivicluals existing in nalure . Ne iùle r is consciousness, 10 1' Spinoza, a function or capacily 
resulting fi'om a partieular facully of tlle human mind , no r is il a properly specilic only LO 
certa in minci s or icleas. FurÙlermo re, consciousncss cannol bc said lo comc in dcgrccs. 
Indcccl , Spinoza's accounl o f consciousness is not inlcndcd LO dillàenliale kinds of mincis 
in lcrms of all'arcncss of thcir respcctivc idcas. 
1. Introduction 
Thc clcbalc arouncl Spinoza's unclcrslancling o f conscio usncss has reccnùy 
allraclccl a grcal clcal o f allc nLÏo n. Thc main qucsLÏons raisccl by scho lars 
conccrn how Spinoza jusLÏfics and ex plains Ù1C cxistcncc of co nscio lls lilc in 
Ù1C worle!. whcÙlcr he scparalcs sclf-co nscious c ntiLÏcs from non-selt~consciolls 
cnLÏLÏes, and , I"llrÙlcr, whcÙlcr hc acknowlcdgcs Ù1C cxistence 01" unco nsciolls 
icleas wiùlÏn Ù1C human mind . The issucs sllrrollnding Spinoza's accollnl of 
conscio llsllCSS sccm lo fo llo \V from l\Vo Il.lllclamcntai principlcs 01" his 
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mclaphysics: namcly, his Ù1COry o f Ùlo ughL-cxLcnsio n parallclism and his 
dclinilion o f Ù1C human mind as Ù1C idca o f Ù1C human body. By Ù1C 
co mbinalio n o r Lhcsc Ù1CSCS, Spinoza sCClns Lo gi"c shapc Lo ,m accounL o r 
naLurc which can bc dcfined as a ro nn of "panpsychism" - a vicw according 
Lo which ail Ùlings arc somchow animaLc and IXO\'idcd WiÙl a minci ÙlaL musL 
pcrcci"c c\'crylhing ÙlaL passcs inLo Ù1C rclC\'aI1L bod y. This conccptio n o r 
nalurc sccms lo makc it dilliculL- ir no L OUlrighL impossible - Lo clistin!:,'1.li sh 
bclwccn conscious ancl no n-conscio us bcings, ancl Lo distinguish bcLwccn 
conscious and no n-conscious idcas in an individual's mind. Thc purposc o r 
lhis chaplcr is Lo addrcss Ù1CSC qucs tio ns and solvc m any, if noL a il, o r Ù1C 
issucs rclaLcd WiÙl Spinoza's panpsychisL accounL of naLurc and his conccption 
o r consciousncss. 
1 will bcgin Ù1C chapLc r by sununarising som c bcdrocks o r Spinoza's 
mclaphys ics - in scctio n 2 - WiÙl Ù1C a.im o f highlighting Ù1C rools o f Ù1C 
problem dcbalcd and ils ramificatio ns. Thc n, in scctio n 3, 1 will prO\'idc an 
O\'cr"icw of Lhc vario us posilio ns hcld by scho lars rcgarding Ù1C problem aL 
slakc, and suggcsL an alLcrnati\'c rcading ÙlaL hin ls Lo a possible solution. In 
scctio n 1, 1 will cxplain Ù1C m CÙlodo logical guidclincs ÙlaL 1 will lü llow in my 
analysis o f Spinoza's undcrsLanding and usc o f Ù1C no tio n o f "conscio usncss", 
po inting o uL Ù1C lexical iLcms, in Spinoza's l-üuCs, ÙlaL will bc spccilic objccls 
o r my cnquiry. In scctio ns 5 and 6 1 will GUTy o uL my analysis o f Spinoza's 
rclercnccs Lo co nscio usncss . Spccilically, 1 will idcntify Ù1rCC scls o r rdcrcnccs 
lo co nscio usncss wo rÙl bc ing analyscd . 1 will analysc Ù1C li rsLLwo scLs in scctio n 
5, whcrcas Lhc Ùlird will bc approached in scctio n 6. Thc cnsuing rcsulls will 
allow mc lo o uùinc my positio n as a ddcncc o r Ù1C cohcrcncc o f Spinoza's 
panpsychism - al IcasL as I~u' as his lrcaLmcnL o r conscio usncss is conccrncd . 
ln scctio n 7 1 will dcfcnd m y inLcrprcla tio n o f Spinoza's accounL o r 
consClousncss rro m poss iblc oqjcctio ns, addrcssing somc o r Ù1C mosl 
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commo n criticisms mO\'ccl againsl his panpsychism. 1 will wrap up and 
co ncluclc Ù1C chaptcr in scction 8. 
2. Two issues conceming Spinoza's panpsychism 
Thc problcms surrouncling Spinoza's accounl o f conscio usncss can be seen as 
a conscqucncc of his gcncral conccptio n o f nalurc. This conceptio n is bascd 
o n a parallclistic conccption o f ùloughl and cxtcnsio n - Ù1C fo rmer 
undcrslood as thc clomain of mcnlal cvcnls, and Ù1C latlcr as thc do main of 
physical c\'cnls - combinccl WiÙl his subscqucnt idcntilicatio n o r Ùle human 
mimi WiÙl thc idca of Ù1C human body. Spinoza dclincs "thought" and 
"cxlcnsio n" as allributcs of God (in E2pl and E2p2, respectivcly). God, in 
lurn, is dclincd as "a bcing absolutcly inlinilc, i.c., a subslancc consisting o f an 
inlinily of allribulcs, o f which cach onc cxprcsscs an ctcrnal and inlinitc 
csscnce" (El dG; C l , 409 / G II , 45) and , c\"cnlu ally, is idcntilicd by Spinoza 
WiÙ1 Ù1C wholc of cxisting nalurc.1 
Thc mctaphysical pillar undcrpinning Spinoza's idcntilîcation o f God 
WiÙl nalurc is Spinoza's so-callccl "subslancc mo nism", accOI-ding to which "in 
nalurc Ùlcrc cxisls o nly onc substancc" (E 1 p lOs; C l , 4 16 / G II , 52) .2 lndeed , 
Spinoza allinns Ùlal " lclxccpt God, no subslancc can bc o r bc conccivcd" 
(E1pL 4; C l, 420 / G II , 5ei) , and lhal " Iwlhatc\"cr is, is in God, and nothing 
1 Scc also KY 1, 2, 12: "From ail of ÙICSC it lo llows Ùlat of :\alUrc ail in al l is prcdicatcd , ,md ÙIat 
ÙIUS l\aturc consisls of inlinitc atui hutcs, of IVhich cach is pcrfcc t in ilS kind . This <lb'TCCS pcrfccùy 
lViùl ÙIC dcliniLion onc b>l\'cS of C od" (C 1, 68 / C l , 22). For Spinoza's disLincLion between Cod 
considcrcd as Sallim lIallU;/IIS;Uld Cod as .Yalll/a IIfllll/ ;1&7, sec E lp29s. T hc L,Lin exprcssion D Clis 
scu .Yalll/a is la und in 1·>/.I'ref (C II , 206). This docu'inc is somcLimcs rc/crrcd to , LS Spinoza's 
"PaJIÙlcism" (sec, lo I' cx;mlplc, Gucroul t 1968, 6;!.; Paucn 20 II , H2-H1). T herc is sLiIl discussion 
among scho lars, howc\'cr, eonccllling ÙIC exact telms in which Spinout's idenLilicaLion o f Cod aJl cL 
nature is to bc undcrstood (incLuding ilS possible limil;\Lions ;md exccpLions). Regarding ùIis to pie, 
sec Cucroult 1968, 223,295-299; Bcnnctt l 984, 32-35; Curlcy 1988,36-39; :\adlcr 2008b, 64-70. 
2 For somc uscful studics ahout Spin07;\'S dcmonsu'aLion o f subst;mcc monism, sec Charlton 198 1; 
Kulslad 1996; Del la Rocca 2002 and 2008, 46-58; L-c rkc 20 12. 
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can be o r be concci,'ec\ WiÙlOUL C od" (ElpI5 ; C l, ;[.20 / CIl, 56) . Basec\ on 
Ù1ese pre mises, Spinoza cOIl('ludes: 
ParLicular ù1Îngs are nothing bUL alfcctions o r God 's aLLribuLes, or 
mo c\es by which God's aLLribuLcs arc cxpressed in a certain and 
deLerminate way. 
(Elp25c; C 1/1.31/ CIl, 68) 
IL lûllows, ù1crclûre, Ù1al any Lhing exisLing in naturc must be undcrstood as a 
modilicaLion, or aOccLion of Cod, concci"cd under onc o r anoÙler of Its 
infïl1Îtc attributes. In parLicular, any possible mode or ùunking - any 
conccivable idea, in oÙ1er tenns3 - exists as a modilicaLion, o r alTecLion, o r 
Cod, inso rar as Goc\ is concci\'cd undcr ILs attribute or ùlOughL, as an inliniLcly 
ù1Înking being. ~ Accordingly, ail possibly exisLing bodies - ail physical enLities, 
Ù1at is , whose essence and beha\'iour arc dclinable and dcscribable ù1Tough 
laws or movement and rest'; - arc noùlÏng but modilicaLions or God concei"cd 
under Ù1e alLribute of exLension, as an inlinitcly eXlcnded, corporeal be ing.6 
Wiù1În ù1Îs general framcwork, "ùlOught-cxtension parallclism" can bc 
considcred a parLicular case or Spinoza's so-callcd "p,1Tallclism" ùleory/ 
which, in iLs broadest rormulaLion, includes ail or God's infinite aLtribuLes and 
Ù1eir respecLi\'e modcs: 
3 According lo Spinoza, Ù1C idca is "prior illllalm c" 10 ail modcs o r ùlillkillg (E2p Ild; C 1,456 / C 
II ,94). 
~ "For Cod", Spinoza IHilcs, "GUl Ùlillk illlillilcly mally lhillgs ill Î'lIlillilell' m;UlY modcs" (l-:2p3d; C 
1,449 / C II , 87) . 
.1 For an in-dcpùl studl' conccming Spillom's ac('()ulIl or hodics; scc 5allh'Îacomo 201 3a. 
6 COIICCllIillg Ù1C cqui\'a1cncc bCllVCCII Ù1C 1I0LÎoIIS or "c:\lclldcd" alld "corporcal" wh Cil rclc rrcd lo 
Cod's lIalm c, sec Cudcl"s nolc lo Elpl5s (e l , 1.2 1, Il . (6), whcrc Spilloza dclc llds Ù1C ùlcs is lhal 
illlillilC cXlcllsio n pCrlains lo Cod's CSSCIICC. 
7 T hc lcrm "parallelism" was IIC\'cr uscd hl' Spilloza himsel r; :\1;u'LÎal Cucroull (l 9H, 61, II. 39) 
and Pic rrc :\1achcrcl' 0 997,72, n. 1) l'cler ÙIC lirsl llsc orùlis 1I0LÎOlllo Lc iblliz, spccilically in his 
lcxl- dalcd 1702 - COllsidcr,Iu'OI/S sur la doclJùlC d 'lIIl l~:~pJ1i [ 'Ilil 'Crsel [iliquc (1, 556 / Cc VI , 
533). Ch,ullal J aqllcl has \'Ïgorollsll' qll csLÎollcd ÙIC aplllcss or ùlis lahel "iùl rqç.U'<1 lo SpiIl07A'l'S 
docui llcs (2004,9- 16). 
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IvVlhether wc conccive nalure under the allribulc o r cXlcnsion, or 
undcr the allribulc or ùloughl, or under any olhcr allribulc, wc shal\ 
lind one and Ùle same order, or onc and ÙIC samc conncclion of 
causes, i.e., Ùlat ÙIC same ùlÏngs fol\ow onc anolhcr. 
Œ2p7s; C l, ;(.5 1 / G II, 90) 
Rcstricting Ù1C case lo Ùle lwo allribulcs of ùlOughl and cxtcnsion (and lhcir 
relcvanl modes, o r aflections), howc\'cr, is a mandalory stcp, sincc, according 
to Spinoza Œ2a5; see also Ep 6;(.), wc only pcrcci"c modcs or ùlinking (i.e., 
ideas) and modes of cxtcnsion (i.c., bodics).8 
In general, Spinoza conlends Ùlallû r cach lhing cxisling in nalure Ùlcrc 
is in God 's atlribute OfÙl0ughl ÙIC corrcsponding idca (E2pa), and lhal "Illhc 
o rdcr and connection of id cas is Ùle same as ÙIC orclcr ancl conncction of 
ùlings" Œ2p7; C l , 45 1 / G II , 89). Hc also argucs Ùlal cach idca includes 
knowlcdge o f cveryÙlÏng Ùlal happens in ils ol~jccl , mirroring ÙIC orclcr and 
conncclion of Ùle modilicalions by which ils ol~jccl is alTcclcd Œ2p9c and 
E2p9d2) , WiÙlOUl allowing, howc"cr, for any causal inlcrplay bclwccn idcas 
and Ùleir ldcata.9 
8 For discussions concerning Ù1C p;u~llielism bCllVcell modes o r ùle aluibutc or ùlOughl ;Uld ÙIC rcsl 
o r Cod 's inlillilc alu'ibulCS, see Pollock 1880, 171-173; Curlcy 1969, 11\ . .'i- l l\.9; Fricdmall 1983; Ricc 
1999, 49-5 1; Ylel;uned 20 13a. T he d aim aecording lo which, l'o r Spinoza, ùlere would Ilcccssarily 
cxisl an inlinile number or altribules or Cod, bcyolld ÙlOughl alld cxtcllsioll, unknolVl l lo hum;Uls, 
is qucsrioned by some scholars; sec, in ù1is rcgard, w olr (1 927) 1972,2/1.-27; Kline 1977,34 1-347; 
Donab'dl1 1980, 93-94; Bennelll 984, 75-79. 
9 T he so-c;llied "causa! barrier", which pre\'ents ;Uly illleractioll belweell modes or dillc rclll 
awi bules, is a consequence or Ù1c "roneeplua! b;mier" Ùlal separales Cod's alu'ibules in Ùle lirsl 
place (see Della Rocca 1996a, 9-1 7), silice Spilloza scems lo equale causal relatiolls Ili ùl conceplua! 
relations (as su'essed, lo I' examplc, by his use OrÙle Latilll0 ll11Ula / ; IÛOSCU (;1USa ill E lpll d2; C Il 
52-53). III E lpl O, Spinoza d aims Ùlal " Ielaeh alu'ibule o r a subslallce musl be collceil'ed Ùll'Ough 
itse!1" (C 1,416 / C Il , 5 1) . Based on ùlis, he eOlldudes: 
T he modes o r each alu'ibule hal'e Cod loI' ùleir cause ollly insol;tr as IL is cOllsidcred 
under Ù1e alt:ribulc o r which Ùley are modes, alld Ilol illsol;tr as Il is cOllsidercd under 
any oÙlcr aluibule. 
(1-:2p6; C l, 1.'iO / C II , 89) 
l l io llows Ù1al only ideas G UI cause oÙler idcas lo exisl ill a mind (E2p9), alld ollly bodies ean cause 
oÙ 1er bodies to cxisl, or pUl OÙ1er bodies illto motion o r lo resl (E2lcma). 
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H cncc, so long as things arc considercd as moclcs of ùlinking, wc 
must cxplain ÙIC orcier o f ÙIC wholc o f nalure, orÙle conncclÎon o f 
causcs, Ùlrough Ù1C allribulc of ÙlOughl alonc. Ancl inso l~lr as Ùlcy 
arc considcred as modcs of exlcnsion, Ùle orcier o f Ùle wholc of 
naturc musl be explained ùlrough Ù1C aUribule o f cxlcnsion ;tlonc. 
1 undcrstand Ù1C samc concerning ÙIC oÙlcr allribulcs. 
(E2p7s; C l , 452 / CIl , 90) 
Spinoza also daims Ùlal, for any cxislÎng ùling, Ù1C corrcsponding id ca cxisling 
in Cod's atlribuLc of ÙlOughl can bc rcgarclccl as its "minci" (E2p 12d). In 
E2p12d, hc writcs: 
1\I\f lhatcycr happcns in ÙIC o bjecl o f any idea Ùle k.nowlcclgc of lhat 
Ùling is nccessarily in Cod, insolar as IL is consiclcrccllo bc allcclcd 
by ÙIC idca of Ùle samc ol:!icct, i.c., insol~u- as Il consLÎtulcs ÙIC mind 
of some Ùling. 
Œ2p 12c1; C l, 457 / C II , 95) 
Accordingly, ÙIC iclca of an cxislÎ ng hum;.m bocly musl indudc knowlcdgc of 
c"cryÙling lhal happcns lo its oqjccl. Bul Ù1C minci o f a human indiYidual is, 
in l ~lC t, nOÙling oÙlcr Ùlan ÙIC iclca o f hcr human bocly - ÙIC former cxislÎng 
as a particular moclificaLÎon of Cod's allribulc of Ùlought, and ÙIC lattcr as a 
modc of Cod concci"ccl unclcr ÙIC allribulc o f cxlcnsion. lo On lhese grounds, 
10 Spinoza idcnlilics ÙIC hum;U1 mind WiÙI an idca in ['2pll , bascd on Ù1C ;Lx ioms Ùlal "Imlan 
ùIinks" (1-:2a2; C J, tf.l~8 / G II , 85) ,U1d Ùlal Ùlcrc is no modc of Ùlinking WiÙloullirsl Ùlc rc hc ing 
an idca 0-:2a3). Thcn, bascd on ÙIC ax ioms Ùlal " Iwic Iccl Ùlal a ccrlain body is allcclcd in m,UlY 
\\"ays" Œ2atf.; C J, l~tf.8 / G II , 86), and Ùlal " Iwlc nciÙlcr fccl nor pcrcci\"c ;Uly sillh'1J lar ÙIings, cxccpl 
hodics and modcs of ÙIinking" (E2a5; C J, tf· I.8 / G II , 86), hc daims: 
Thc ohjccl of ÙIC idca constiluling Ù1C hUl11iUl mind is ÙIC body, ora ccrt...'li n modc of 
cXlcnsion which aclually cxisLS, and no ÙIing clsc. 
Œ2p1 3; C J, 457 / G II , 9G) 
Spinoza concludcs by allill11ing Ùlal "111 rom ùIis illûllows Ùlal m;Ul consislS o f a mind and hod y, 
and Ùlal ÙIC hum,Ul body cxislS, as wc ICcI il Iproul ipsum scnlimusl" (E2p 13c; C J, tf.57 / G II , 96. 
TranslalÎon modilicd). This dcmollsu'alÎon sccms illlcndcd lo ;ùlirm Ùlal ÙIC exislcncc of scnsc 
pcrccplÎon in ÙIC mind musl reler, bcyond ,Uly do ubl (,Uld ('onù;1 Dcsc;u'lcs), lo ;UI cxislÎng body, 
and lo dcny Ùlal ÙIC o bjccl of our pcrccplÎons may bc anYÙling dilfercnlli'om Ùlal body Ùlalwc 
SCCl1l lo Iccl as ours. Spinoza also adds Ùlal ÙIC samc dcmonsu'alÎon should cnahlc us ln undcrsland 
"nol only ÙJal ÙIC hum,Ul minci is unilcd lo ÙIC body, bul also whal should bc uJl(!crsloocl by ÙIC 
21j. 
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Spinoza draws lhc conclusion ÙlaL ÙIC human minci "musL percci\'c" 
c\'cryùling lhat OCCUl-S lo ils oQjccL - i.c., ÙIC exisLÎng human body - accorcling 
Lo thc ordcr and connccLÎon of ÙIC afTccLÎons ÙlaL acLl.lally in\'ol\'c ÙIC human 
bocly. ThaL is to say, in Spinoza's Lcrms, thaL in ÙIC human mind Ùlcre musL 
bc idcas of c\'c rylhing Ùlal happcns in ,hc body. Hc wriLcs: 
\ Vhalc\'cr happcns in lhc object or Ùle ie!ea consLÎtuting ÙIC human 
minci musl hc pcrcci\'ce! by ÙIC human minci [ab humana mente 
rlcbct jJCUïjJII, or lhcrc will nccessarily be an iclca or that thing in 
ÙlC minci; i.c., ir ÙIC OQjcCl or thc iclea consLÎtuting a human mind is 
a body, nOùling can happcn in Ùlat body which is noL percci\'ce! by 
ÙlC minci. 
(E2pI2; C l , 456-457 / G II, 95) 
Thc samc conclusion, Spinoza adds, can bc e!rawn regarcling ail exisLÎng ùlÎngs. 
ln E2p 13s, hc claims: 
Thc ùlings wc ha\'c shown so rar arc complclely gcncral [ad111odu111 
rOllllllUnla sunl[ ancl do noL pcrtain more lo man than to oÙlcr 
indivicluals, ail or which, ùlOugh in elilTcrcnl c1egrecs, are 
nC\'crlhclcss animalc [olllnla, (jUiUJJl Ù Chl 'Crsis gTadibus, anlma{a 
{;Ullcn sunl[. For or cach ùlÎng Lhcrc is ncccssarily an ielca in Goel, 
or which God is ÙlC causc in ÙIC samc way as IL is of ÙIC ielca of thc 
human body. And so, whalc\ 'cr wc havc saie! or ÙIC idca of ÙIC 
human body musl also bc saicl of ÙIC id ca of any ùling. 
(E2pI 3s; C I, 458 / G II,96) 
ln a nUlshcll, nOÙling can happcn in a body Ùlal is not PCITCi\'cd by a 
corrcsponding minci, or idca. This ùlcsis , somcLÎmcs e!ubbce! Spinoza's 
union or mimi ;Uld hody" (E2p 13s; C J, 457-158 / G II , 96). l ' rsula Rcnz ;u'gucs lhal Ù1C aim of Ù1C 
scl or propositions running fi'om E2pll lo E2pl3s is lo cxplain "lVhy IVC perceil c oursch'cs as 
numcrically dillc rcnl subjccL~" (RcllZ 2011, 11 0. Jlalics in orihrina/) - subjeclS, ùlal is, whosc 
cxpclicn('c or Ù1C 1V0rid and lhcmsch'cs is nc('css;uily scp,u'alc ,md distincl l'rom Ùlal or oùlcr 
indi\iduals. Rcgarding ùtis, scc a/so Mc1amcd 2013h, 168-1 70; Rcnz 20 17, 2 11-21 5. 
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"panpsychism", 1 1 prcscnls lhc rcadcrs wilh lwo dilTcrcnl, albcit intcrrelatcd, 
conundrums, First, lhc daim Ùlal lhc human miild must pcrcci\'c cverYÙling 
Ùlal happcns in the human body is al O(lds wilh ordinary cxpcricnce. Sccond, 
few scholars secm willing lo conccdc lhal ail bodics may ha\'c a mind and 
knowlcdgc of thcir bodily slalcs - cspccially if ùlÎs knowlcdgc is lo bc 
undcrslood in lcrms of consciousncss and sclr-awarcncss. Thc sccming lack 
of a "selecLÏvc thcory or conscious awarcncss" in Spinoza's philosophy of 
mind, to borrow J onaÙlan Bcnnclt's words (1981, 181),12 is Ùlereforc regarded 
as a serious, twofold problcm. 
Michael Della Rocca (1996a) providcs clarilicalory cxamplcs fo r cach of "' , ' 
the lwo aspecls of Ù1c problcm, highlighLÏng why and how bOÙl cascs sccm lo 
poinl lo Ù1c absencc of an accounl or sclccLÏvc consciousncss as a "dcfcct" 
(1996a, 9) in Spinoza's O\'crall syslcm. As lo lhc lirsl issuc - Ùlal a mind must 
pcrceivc cvcryùlÎng Ùlal passcs inlo an indi\'idual's body - Dclla Rocca wriles: 
Spinoza says Ùlal human mill(ls havc idcas or, lor cxamplc, all Ù1C 
changcs Ùlal lakc placc in Ù1C human body. 1 ... 1 whalcvcr Ù1C 
strcngùl of Spinoza's rcasons l'or ùlis vicw, il is highly 
counlerinllliti"c. IL. ccrlainly sccms lh,\l 1 ha"c no idca or whal 
chemical reactions arc currcnùy laking placc in my pancreas, lor 
cxamplc. One way lo solkn ùlis inluiLÏ"c rcacLÏon againsl Spinoza's 
position hcrc mighl bc lor Spinoza lo daim Ùlal my idcas of Ù1C 
changcs in my pancrcas arc nol conscious oncs. 
(Della Rocca 1996a, 9) 
Regarding Ù1C sccond issuc, COnCCrIllllg Spinoza's doctrinc of uni"crsal 
animaLÏon and Ù1C possibilily Ùlal ail cnLÏLÏcs may cnlcrlain a kincl or conscious 
lifC, hc exemplilics Ù1C problcmalic point as such: 
II Sec, for cxamplc, Bcnncll 1984, 137; Della Ru"a 1 996a, 7-9, ;Uld 2008, 11 0; Mascarcnhas 1998, 
98, n, 9; Wilson (1 999) 1 999c, 191; Miller 2007, 212; PauclI 2011, 84; Hübner 2014, 126; 
j orgcnscn 2014; Pcrlcr 20 14,231; Lc Bullc 20 17, 9/k 
12 Sec also LeBullc 2010b, 532, 
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Spinoza holds thal such objccts as rocks and hammcrs arc, in somc 
scnse, animalc and posscss mcntal statcs. Thc countcrintuiti,'c forcc 
or this ù1csis mighl bc lesscncd il' Spinoza could cxplain why, 
alù10ugh rocks havc mcntal stalcs, nonc or Ihis mcnlal slatc is 
conscious. On such an accounl, c\'cn il' rocks do ha,'c Ihoughls, ùlcy 
would nol ha,'c ùlOughls in ÙIC samc, spccial way that wc ((uilC oflcn 
do. 
(Dclla Rocca 1996a, 9) 
Thc scholarly conscnsus is Ùlal a Ùlcory capabk or distin/:,ruishing conscious 
minds and idcas l'rom unconscious oncs could help sol\'c bOÙI ÙICSC issucs. 
Howc\'er - as wc will sec in ÙIC rollowing scclion - Ùlcrc is still no conscnsus 
among scholars as lo wheÙ1cr a sclecti,'c Ùlcory or conscious awarcncss can bc 
cohcrcnùy infcrrcd from Spinoza's lcxts, bascd on his sparsc rcmarks on 
human consciousncss. 
3. The CUITent debate 
To a good approximation, wc may di, 'idc lhc participants in Ihc currcnl dcbatc 
around Spinoza's accounl of consciousncss into two main groups. Thc firsl 
group daims thal Spinoza's systcm laeks ÙIC conccptual rcsourccs ncecssary 
lo dclivcr a consislcnl ù1cory or consciousncss. Among ùlcm wc may eounl 
Margarcl Oauler Wilson, who, in a scminal arLÎcle conccrning Ùlis lopie, 
condudcs Ù1at "Spinoza's syslem pro\'Ïdcs no plausible, ckar or rcasoned , 'icw 
on ùus fi.ll1damenlal aspcct or lhc lraditiol\al mind-body problem" (119801 
1999a, 133). Along Ù1C samc lillCS, JonaÙlan Bcnnctt contcnds Ùlal Spinoza 
"urgenùy nccds a ùlcory or awarcncss, and unlorlunately tllc EUJJ('!; does nol 
contain onc" (198/1" 189). Michael Della Rocca's lirst takc on thc samc issuc 
was also quilc sccptical: "dcspitc ÙIC nccd l'or a cohcrcnt Ùlcory of 
eonsciousncss in Spinoza", he \VI-ilcs, "hc docs nol prO\'idc onc. 1 ... 1 Spinoza 
has no principled basis on which to daim lhat not ail mcntal statcs arc 
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eonsCious OIlCS" (1996a, 9), Similarly, J on Millcr \vrilcs: "1 rcgard thc 
prospccts [or a robusl and cohcrcnl Spinozistic thcory or conseiousncss as 
dim", cvcn lhough, hc also adds, "lhc cohcrcncy or al leasl Ù1C plausibitity or 
his systcm dcmandcd it" (2007, 203). vVc can includc inlo Ùùs group also 
Michael LcBufrc, who argucs Ù1al "Ù1C sc, 'crily o f Ù1C problem - logclhcr wilh 
o Ù ICI' prcssing conccrns - pushcs rcadcrs lo fincl a dirccl accounl o r sck ctiyc 
consciousncss in Spinoza's rcmarks aboul consciousncss whcrc Ùlcrc is nonc" 
(20 10b, 533). 
Thc Largcl of LcBufle's po lcmical rem;u'k arc scholars of thc sccond 
group - "sympaÙ1ctic scho lars", as he also dubs thcm (201 Ob, 532) - who 
instcad argu c fo r Ù1C prescnce o[ al leasl Ù1C suflicicnl clemcnls, in Spinoza's 
philosophy, lo account fo r Ù1C phcnomcnon o f human consciousncss and lhc 
dilTcrcncc bclwccn conscious and unconscio us idcas. Ach'ocatcs o r ùlis vicw 
arc many. Thcy havc nol rcachcd unilo rm agrccmcnl, howc, 'cr, sincc thcy 
cmploy distincl argumcnts ;md rcach conclusio ns Ùlal o rtcn sccm lo eonllicl 
with cach OÙICr. So, fo r example, carticr in his carecr, Edwin Curlcy held Lhal 
Spinoza's accounl of human consciousncss was proviclcd by his ÙICOI)' or thc 
"idcas of idcas",13 conlending Ùlal "ÙIC cxislcllCC o f idcas o r idcas is proycn 
only fo r human mincis" (1 969, 126-128). H c lalcr rclincd his position and 
suggcslcd Ùlal blurrcd pcrccptions o f many bodily stalcs cou Id bc accountcd 
ror by Spinoza's ÙICOry o f confuscd knowlcdgc (Curlcy 1988, 72-73) . Lcc Riec 
(1 990) basically agrccs WiÙI Curlcy's lalc r positio n, whcrcas Christophcr 
Martin (2007) proposcs to cmcnd Curley's lirsl inlcrprctation byeonsidcring 
lhc complexily o r Ù1C human mind and body as ÙIC ncccssal)' condition 
rcquircd fo r ha\'ing ideas o r ideas. tticnnc Balibar eonlcnds Ùlal 
"co nsciousncss" in Ùle EIJllC'S has lwo dilTcrcnl mcanings: ÙIC li rsl would 
belo ng lo ÙIC lirsl kind or kllowledgc "and iL is practically idcntical WiÙl mo ral 
13 1 will beller explain whallhis Ùleol)' ,UllounlS lo in senion 5 or ùlis chapler. 
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conscicncc", whcrcas ÙIC sccond would conccm whal Spinoza calls lhc "ùlird 
kind or knowlce!gc" (119921 2013, 138).1 ~ MorcO\'Cr, and dcspilc his initial 
sccpticis1l1, Dclla Rocca successi\-cly argucs lor a Ùlcory or dcgrccs or 
consciousncss in Spinoza, which would parallcl e!cgrccs or "animation" and 
clcgrccs or adcquacy or idcas (2008, 115-116). Don GéUTCll conlcnds ùlal 
consciousncss, 101' Spinoza, is cqui\'a!cnl lo "dcgrccs or powcr of Ùlinking" 
(2008,23). Slc\'cn Nad!cr, inslcad, argucs lhal consciousncss, in Spinoza, is lo 
bc rcgardcd as "a runction of (bccausc idcntlcal wiùJ) a mind's inlcrnal 
co1l1plcxily" (2008a, 592). For Andrca Sangiacomo (20 Il a) Ù1C conditions (or 
ha\'ing conscious acti\'ily, on Spinoza's accounl, are to bc lound in bOÙI ÙIC 
comp!cxily or ÙIC body and ÙIC adcquacy or Ù1C iclcas. Sylianc Malinowski-
Charlcs (200;(,a) and Eugcnc Marshall (201;(.) tic Spinoza's conccption or 
consciousncss wilh his ùlcory of hum an allcctiYilY, arguing ùlal, lor Spinoza, 
ÙIC prcscncc or consciousncss dcpcnds on ÙIC cxislcncc or idcas ùlal Gm 
gcncralc allccls of joy and sac!ncss in ÙIC human indi\'idual. 
Among ùlis group or commcnlalors, a kw also suggcsl Ùlal Spinoza's 
pcrspccti\'c on consciousncss can inform Ùlcorics and discussions pcculiar lo 
conlc1l1porary cognili\'c scicnces and philosophy of mind. Frcdcrick Mills 
(2001), lor cxa1l1p!c, aq,'1JCS Ùlal Spinoza's mctaphysics, bascd on subslancc 
11l0nism and Ù\Oughl-cxtcnsion parallclism, can !cac! lo a solution lo ÙIC so-
callcd "hard problcm" of consciousncss - conccrning Ù1C rclationship 
bclwccn lhc conscious cxpcricncc onc may ha\'c or oncscU' and ÙIC world, on 
ÙIC onc hane!, and ÙIC physiological processcs unclcrlying such conscious 
c\'cnts, on ÙIC oÙlcr hand.1.3 Hcidi Ra\ycn holds Ùlal man y Spinozisl daims 
conccrning human psychology - including somc lhcscs aboul ÙIC scopc and 
nalurc or human conscious lik - "now SCCI1l lo bc supporlcd by subslantial 
1 ~ 1 Ilill analysc Spinoza's accollnl or Ù1C "ùlird killCl or kllolVlcdgc" and ilS rdaLionship Iliùl his 
llndcrSlanding or consciollsncss in sccLion 6 or ùlis chaplcr. 
15 For a canonicallo lllllllaLion or Ù1C "h;ml prohlcm or consciOllsncss" scc Chalmcrs 1995. 
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cvidcncc l'ro m Ù1C ncuroscicnccs" (2003, 259).16 SLc\'cn N adler cn\lsagcs 
commo nalitics bcLwccn Spinoza's "bcginnings o r an accounL o f 
conscio usncss" and som c or Ihc cUlTcnl approachcs Lo mcnlal phc no m cna 
Lakcn by sLudics in "cmbodicd cognilio n" (2008'1,597).17 
In Ù1C rcsL o r ùlis chaplcr, 1 aim 10 co nLribuLc Lo chis rich and lo ng-
sL.:1.nding dcbaLc by e1ucidaLing Ihc m caning and Ù1C scopc o r Spinoza's 
vocabulary relaLcd 10 "conscio usncss". '1'0 anticipaLc hc rc Ù1C main po inls o r 
m y analysis, 1 will arguc Ùlal Spinoza, al kasl in his i'-Lhics, makcs a limiLcd , 
ycL consisLcnL usc o f somc crucial Lalin lc rms, broadly Lrans laLable as 
"conscio usncss" or "bcing conscious (o r som cÙling)" - namely, Ù1C no un 
conscienù'a and ils cognaLcs, such as Ihc \'c rb cOllscius esse. As 1 will show, hc 
introduccs Ù1 CSC Lcrms Lo rcle r 10 Ihc knowledgc ÙlaL wc m ay ha\'c of our mind 
considercd aJo nc - considcrcd , Ihal is , as somcÙling ÙlaL can bc conccivccl 
scparaLelY l'rom and indcpcndcnùy o r our cxLcnclcd body, "as a m odc o f 
ùunking WiÙlOUL relatio n Lo Ù1C ol~jccL" (E2p2 1 s; C l, 468 / G II, 109). Such a 
pcculiar undcrslanding o f "co nsciousncss" SC ITCS Lwo purposcs in Spinoza's 
i'-I.hics. FirsL, iL is Illllctio nai Lo cxplain our illusio n o f Ù1C cxislcncc o r a Ii"CC 
will, capable o f acting upo n Lhc body and indcpcnclc nÙy of Ù1C bod y. Sccond, 
il is uscd lo rclà lo Ù1C kllowledgc Ihal wc hayc o r our minci as som cÙling Ùlal 
is e Lcrnal ancl Ùlal "canno l bc absolulely dcslroyccl WiÙl Ù1C bod y" (E5 p23; C 
l, 607 / G II , 295). In conclusion, 1 will conlc nd Ùlal wc sho uld nol confusc 
Spinoza's lcchnical usc o r Ihc no lio n o f "co nsciousncss" WiÙl Ù1C no tio n o f 
16 Ra\ycn mainly rclers hcr illlcrpl"C (;\LÏoll or Spilloza lo Ù\C Ù\corics ofî ~'lkofi' ;U1d Jo hllson (1 999), 
AnLollio Oamasio (1 99/1. and (999), alld Villo rio Gallcsc (200 1) . 
17 Regardillg ÙJÏs, i\ adler \Vl'ilcs: 
Like Spinoza, embodied milld Ù\CoriSL~ r~jccl lVhal has becll called 'bod y nculra li ly', 
o r Ù\C idca Ù\al Ù\e llalu re o r ù\C milld and cOllscioUSllCSS G UI bc explai llcd wiÙIOUl 
any rclercllcc Lo Ù\e h;mhv;u'c wiù\ which il is COl ll lcclcd . 
C\ ad lc r 2008a, 598). 
To supporl his daim, \'adlcr mCll lio ns Ùle \\'orks o r 1 ;\I~Tcnce Shapiro (2003), as wcll as Lakolr 
;uxl.lo hnson (1 999) alld O;U11as io (1 99 1. and 2003) . 
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"animation" of a lhing Ùlal hc c\'okcs in E2pl:Js - and Ùlal hc ascribcs, 
"ùlOugh in dillCrenl dCgTCCS", lo ail cxisling indi\'iduals. For ÙIC cxislcnce of 
consciousness in nature, according lo Spinoza, is nol dClcrmincd by lhe 
supposed "degrcc of animation" or an individual, nor can lhc presence or 
abscnce of consciousncss dClcrminc, in lurn, any dcgrcc or animation of a 
bocly. On my reading, as we shall scc, nciÙlcr does lhe capacily lo hc conscious 
of one's own menta.l stales resull li'om a particular l~lCully or lCalurc of Ùle 
human mind, nor is it a propcrly spccilic only lo cerlain mincis or iclcas. 18 
Furdler, consciousncss is nol somcÙling lhal comcs in dcgTccs. In fact, as 1 
wiU clemonstrate, Spinoza's accounl or consciousncss and ils relevant 
vocabulary are not intendcd lo dilfcrcnlialc bclwccn kinds or mincis in tenus 
of awareness of their respcctivc idcas. 
4. The tenninological gap: conscientia as "consciousness" 
Many of dlC commenlators who ha\'c lookcd lor a lhcOl-y of consciousncss in 
Spinoza's Ed7ics, havc aiso nolcd Ùle scarcily or passagcs whcrc ÙIC conccpt 
of "consciousncss" sccms lo bc broughl Up.19 Disappointingly, in nonc ofÙlesc 
places docs Spinoza sccm lo providc a conclusi\'c dclinilion of whal 
consciousncss is, or an explanation or how il originalcs in nalurc. Part of Ù1C 
rcasons for such a paucily or dirccl rclCrcnccs lo consciousncss can bc 
ascribcd to somc conceplual and lerminological conSlrainlS, which conccrn 
18 Su'icùy speaking, consciousness c;ulIlol be considered runcLion or a 1;\Cully or ùle hum;m minci, 
sincc Spinoza's philosophy of minci does nol seem la allolV lin 1;\cuILies or ùle mind al all (sec 
E2p48s). On ùle oùler h,md, 1 do nol exclude Ùlal ùle capabilily or heing conscious or one's OIVII 
mental stales coulcl bc lrealecl, in Spinoza's lerms, as a properly or ùle hum;m mind, as long as ùlis 
capabilily can be consislenùy cleduced l'rom ùle dcliniLion or ùle hum;m mimI as lhe idea or ùle 
human body, Yel, if il is a properly, il is nol specilic ln human minds only, since (as 1 arh'lle in 
secLion 5 of Ù1is chapler) ùle ;u'gumenl by which Spinoza dcduces ùle exislence or consciousness in 
nalure cxlencls la all minds, or icleas or boclies, 
19 Sec Balib;u' (1992) 2013, 129;.Jaquel2005, 109-110; :vIarLin 2007, 269; :vIiller 2007,207; LeBulk 
2010b, 532; :vI;u-shall 2014, 106. 
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lhc Ycry objccl o f our invcsLÎgaLÎo n. Fo r, whcn Spinoza wrolc Ù1C ]'.,/JJics/o lhcrc 
was no spccifie LaLÎn cxprcssio n ayailablc lo clcarly dcnolc whal wc might 
cl 1· b Ù " . " 21 AMI Il ." nowa ays rc c r Lo y l e Lcrm conSClo usncss . . s ars la puls Il , no o nc 
lcrm in Spinoza's wriLÎngs can bc casily cquaLcd WiÙl our co nccpt o r co nccpls 
of consc iousnc~s" , sincc " [ ... 1 Ù1C Lcrmino logy o f eonscio usncss as wc know il 
had no l rcally so licliliecl in Ù1C philosophical discoursc in Spinoza's limc" 
(201 4, (07). 
In ùli s scnsc, Ù1C bcsl candidalc fo r a syslcmaLÎc cnquiry inlo Spinoza's 
accounl o f consciousncss is rcprcscntccl by Ù1C raÙlcr limilcd and quilC 
scallcrcd usc Ùlal hc m akcs o f somc kcy lc rms: namely, Ù1C Lalin no un 
consclenlù ancl ils cognalcs, such as Ù1C acljccLÎ' ·c consclus and Ù1C relcyanl 
ycrb COllSclUS esse. Inclccd, wiÙl in a philosophical conlcxl which \Vas bcing, by 
lhcn, hcavi ly inOucncccl by Ù1C progrcssivc sprcacling and cslablishing o f 
CarLcsianism, Ù1CSC lc rms \Vcrc undc rgoing a scmanLÎc translo rmaLÎo n which 
madc Ùlcm po lcnlial vehiclcs lo r rclc rring lo pcrcepLÎo ns o f o nc's lho ughls or 
mcnlal acls o f any sorl. U nLÎI Ùlcn, Ù1C LaLÎn nOLÎo n o f consàcn{la had 
lradiLÎo nally bccn uscd to rcler Lo a hUmaIl agc nl's capacily lo e1abo ralc sc ll~ 
oricnlcd no rmaLÎ, ·c aIlc1 m o ral judgm c nls - a faculLy o lk n associalcd wilh Ù1C 
scho lasLÎc nOLÎo n o f synderes/s, and whosc m caning is co nycycd in English by 
20 AeÇQrding to Mi6'lüni 's chronol06'Y, Spinoza hac! alrcady SI.1.rtcd to writc a lirst \·crsion of ÙIC First 
Part of ÙIC t lJJirs by ÙIC spring o f 1662 (Mignini 2007, XCII) . In his Ep 68 to Hcnry O ldcnhurg, 
Spinoza rcports Ùlat, by Ù1C summcr o f 1675, he was rcady to conunit a \·crsion of his m;l~ lcrpiccc 
to ÙIC prcss, bul hc dccidcd lo hal l ÙIC publication bccause 0 1" e\·cr-increasing hos tilities and 
suspicions lOlVards ÙIC content o f his tcxt. 
21 Sec also 8 alibar (\ 19921 20 13, 127- 129), :\1iller (2007, 20 ~-207) , and Marshall (20 11, 106- 108) . 
It may be worÙl no ting Ùlat ÙIC English word "consciousness" is a ncolo/,>lsm, which \Vas inu·oduced 
in Ùle philosophie;)1 \·ocabulaIY during Ù1C second hall" o f ÙIC 17" ecntu ry. The palcmi ty o f ils 
philosophic;ù use is usually ascribcd to Ralph Cudwo rÙI (1 678, in nie Truc Il/tcllcctual System oF 
ti/(, l Tl/il ·crse); sec, 10 r eXaJ11plc, Balibar (1 992) 20 13, 128; Hcin;imaa ct al. , 2007, 6; :\1illcr 2007, 
201; ÇQnccming ÙIC hislo rical rClc\·,ulCC of CudworÙI 's account 01" consciousness, scc Thiel 199 1. 
For aI l eaI·ll' modem dclinition 0 1" "consciousncss", bCaI·ing a c;monieal use fo r such a nelV no tion 
in its o riginallaI l/,'llagc, ÙIC traditional rclcrcncc is to ÙIC onc prO\·idcd byJohn Lockc (1 689, in his 
l~:üay COl/ccl111ilg HU/m U} l Tl/derslal/dùIg· II , l , 19 / \V l , 95): "Conseio llsness is ÙIC pcrccptio ll of 
whal passcs ill a m;Ul's own mind". 
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thc wonl "conscicncc". 22 In his LaLin wriLings, howcycr, Dcscartcs scldom -
albcil stratcgically - uscs Ù1C noun cOIlsà enlla and, mo rc promincnÙY, Ù1C 
rC\c"ant yc rb cOIlsàus cssc lo addrcss Ù1C cogniLion Ùlal wc hayc o r ail o f our 
ÙlOughts - inc\uding "aU opcraLio ns o r Ù1C will, Ù1C inlcllcct, Ù1C imaginaLion 
and Ù1C scnscs" (CSM II , 11 3 / AT VII , 160).23 
Thcrc is lcxlual c"idcncc lo suggcsl Ùlat Spinoza was acquainlcd wiù\ 
both ways o r using Ù1C LaLin cxprcss io ns cOllsà cIl/Ja and cOllsàus esse: on Ù1C 
onc hand, Ù\C lradiLio nal scholasLic usc, rclalcd lo mo ral inlrospccLio n; on lhc 
o lhcr hand, Ù1C usc thal D cscarLcs makcs o r Ùlcse lc n ns Lo rcl'cr to Ù1C 
cognition lhal wc hayc or our ùlOughLS, i.c., our mind and its idcas. Conccrning 
Ù\C lattcr, in his t.rcaLisc DCS("'7JtCS~5 "Pnlwiplcs or P/1JJosophy" Spinoza 
proyidcs an almosl ycrbaLim quo taLion o r Ù\C deliniLio ns o f "ÙlOughl" and 
"iclca", as lhcy arc o rigi nally fo und lowarcl s Ù1C cnd o f Dcscarlcs's Secolld 
RefJ/ics. 2 ~ Closcly fo llowing D cscarlcs's wo rding, Spinoza dclincs "ÙlOughl" as 
"cycrYÙ\ing which is in us and o r which wc arc immedialcly conscious IcOllSCIÏ 
22 For ,Ul carly modcrn scholastic dcfinition of conSclcnlla as "conscicncc" onc (,Ul consuil 
Coclcnius's Le.ricon Plnlosophicum (Cockel 16 13, ~47). 
23 Ex;mlp1cs of ùlis usc o f Ù1C L, tin lClms consclenù~1 imd COI/SclUS csse C;Ul bc lo unel in Dcsc;ut cs's 
M er/Iii/lions ami RqJlies (AT VII , 49, 107, 160, 176, 246-2 ~7 , 352, 4(3), in his PnilcliJ/cS or 
Plnlosophy (l\.T VIllA, 7,20,4 1,54), iUld in his corrcspo ndcncc (AT III , 429; AT V, 160, 221 -
222). F~Jr a rcccnl sllldy o f DCSGutcs's accounl of consciousncss, sec Simmons 20 12: "in bcing 
conscious", shc milcs, "1 ;un conscious of my ÙloughLs ;md so of myself qua ùl inking ùling" (20 12, 
5). BOIis Hcnnig (2007), by conlrasl, conlcnds Ùlal Ù1C occurrcnces abo,'c lislcd do no l all o\V lo I' 
;U ly inlcrprctation o f DCSGutcs's lCll11inology in lcrms o f "consciousncss". T hc ra1c Ùlal Dcsc<utcs's 
tnL~ may ha,'c had in suggcs ting a ncw usc lo I' Ù1C Frcnch word conscicnce is morc conuu "crsi;ù 
;uld , apparcnùy, morc limilcd (scc Balibiu' 11 9921 20 13, 127-128, and 2000, 297). Thc inu'oduction 
of Ù1C Frcnch conscience as an cqui,·alcnt o f "conscio usness" was mosÙY pramptcd br Picrrc 
Costc's inllucntial Frcnch u';ulslatio n o f Lockc's l:.sSi/F (1 700, lirsl cditio n; rqç.mling Ù1C 
philosophic,ù rcb ,mcc of Coste 's u<lnslation, scc 13alib;u' 2000 iUld Poggi 20 12, 9 1-160) . Ciutesi;m 
philosophcrs, howc"cr, had iùrcady startcd to usc a simil;u' lcrmino logy, by oftenn;ulling consclence 
;1Il immcdiatc, intcrior knowlcdgc o r fe eling (senùil/enl ùl/e'n"ct,,) of eYcryù1ing whidl passcs into 
oursch·cs . Instances of such a usc c,m bc lo und , for cxamplc, in Louis dc L';l Fo rgc's 7i,JiIe' r/e 
l'e.;pIi! r/e l'holllllle (1 666, 54), in Mald mulchc's /Je Iii recherche de la a 'nie' III , 2, 7 (1 67 tf- 167 5, 
l , 376-382), and in Picrrc-Syh-ain Régis's Sp;!L'llIe de Plulosophic (1 690, l, 68). For a sluely 
collcclllillg Ù1C c"olutioll of Ù1C usc of ÙIC notio ll of conscience ill Friulcc durillg Ù1C 17" ami 18" 
ccnturics, scc Glyn Da"ics 1990. \ Viù l specilic rqç.u·d to iLs usc in Ù1C Carlcs i,ul conto t, sec T hiel 
20 II , 36-54. 
2 ~ Spccilic;ùly, in Ù1C short appclldix cntiùed ".\rI,'UmC IILs prOl·ing Ù1C cxislcllce o f Cod ;Uld Ù1C 
distinction bCl\Vccn Ù1C soul and Ù1C body ill gcomeu'ic order" (CS M II , 11 3 / AT VII , 160) . 
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sumusl", and "idea" as the "lorm or each thoughL ùlrough Ùle immediaLe 
percepGon or which 1 am conscious 1 cOllsàus suml or Ùle ùlOughL ilsell" 
(pPCldl-2; C l, 238 / G l, 11.9).2.\ 
Ir wc lum, now, lo lhe Latin \'ersion or lhe i'-Üu'C5 (G II ,43-308), wc can 
consider ail passages lhal in\'olve the expressions cOllsàcJlÛn and ('onsàus 
essc, and scparaLe Ù1C occurrences thal seem lo display a purcly psycho logical 
use or lhcsc lerms - a use, thal is, broadly hinGng al o ne's capabilily or 
perCClVll1g her mental states. For, in some cases, Ùle word consà en/ia 
apparenùy relains its traditional moral and normaG"e sense, and is Ù1US 
correcùy translaLed inlo English as "conscience".26 Thc rcmall1ll1g 
occurrences, which seem inslead lo allow l'or a broad translation in lerms or 
"consciousness" and "being conscious (or someÙling)", can be groupcd inlo 
tlu'ee sels, according lo the dilrerenl conlexls in which Ùle lcrms appear. By 
25 Malinowski-Charlcs (200tl.a, 126, Il. 252) ;Uld M;lI'shall (20 14, 106, n. 10) no ticc ùlis passagc, bUl 
qucstion ils imporl;Ulcc, bascd o n il, dcri"ati" e nalurc. Therc mal' be, howc"cr, somc inle rpreti"e 
suggcstions Ùlal wc C,UI dralV l'rom Spilloza's biùlful rcporl of Dcscarlcs's dclinitions of "Ùloughl" 
and "idca". Thc mosl impo rlanl, as 1 mcntioned abm'c, is Ùlal ÙICSC quolations show Ùlal Spinoza 
was cxposed lo ÙIC pcculi;u'ities or Descarlcs's philosophical \'Ocabul;u)' ,U1d his lCIl11inolo!,>ical 
innova tions. i\'ow, il' Spinm;1 (c"en parlially) deri"ed his OlVn lVay o r using ÙIC Latin rcl'crences lo 
"consciousness" li'om ùle ledlllicai usage displayed by Descarles's dclinitions, Ùlen wc mal' cxpccl 
ùlis no tion lo re lain allcasl parl or ils original Carlcsian meaning in Spinoza Loo. 1 Ùlink ÙJal ùlis is 
ùle case. For examplc, a common clemenl Ùlal C,UI be emisaged is Ùlal "consciouslless", boÙl ill 
Spinoza alld in Descarlcs, specilically denolcs perceptions Ùlal L,.'l.ke ÙIC Ùlinking - i.e., o ur milld 
alld idcas - as ùlc ir propcr objec[. l ,~ill pro\'ide ,u'h'1lmenls lo suppo rl ùlis c!,ùm (al leaslwiÙI rcgard 
lo Spinoza's O"~I usc or ÙIC nOlion) ill sections 5 ,U1d 6 or Ùlis chaplcr. 
26Scc E.'3pI8s2 (G II , (55), E3Adl7 (G II , (95), and E4p47s (G II , 2tl.6), IVhere Spinoza addresscs 
Ùle allccl o r remorsc by means o r Ùle 1 ;Itin express ion cO/lScù .. '/lIia· m orsus Oilerally, Ù1C "bile o r 
conscicncc"). Etl.App32, inslead , presenls us ,~iùl a usc o r ùle "e rb (,O/lseius esse IVhich IS 
,unbiguously inlc rprclablc in bOÙI a nOl'l1lati" e and a descripti"e scnsc: 
l'vYic shall bcar calmly ÙIOSC Ùlings which happcn lo us conlrary lo IVhal Ù1C Plinciple 
of o ur ach'anlagc del1l,Ulds, il' IVC ;U'C conscious lhallVc ha,'c donc our duly Isi cO/lseii 
simus /1005 fù/lclos /lOSÙV oflicia fùùsc! , 1 ... 1. 
(Etl.App32; C l , 594 / G II , 276) 
This occurrcncc ('<UI bc cxc!uded l'rom a lisl or usclill rclercllccs, sincc il could eas ily be a cryplo-
quol<ltion from Ciccro , who indillerenùy uscs ÙIC lIoun cOlIscic/lù;/ ;U1d ÙIC adjccti,·c cOl/scius wiùl 
reICrclIcc lo o ne's "dutics" or "sClyiccs" (ollin;/). Sec, lor ex;U11plc, Epislu/;r ad FamIlùu'C.\' V, 5, 1 
(Ciccro 200 l , l , 511.) ,U1d - wiùl rclercncc lo ÙIC plcasurc (/;l..'Ûlù) Ùlal accol1lp;U1ics Ciccro's 
"consciousncss" or his dulics (oflicioJ'lIIlI {'()IJsc/C/lÙ;/) - l oiJ/slu/ir ad Fiumliarcs V, 7, 2 (Ciccro 
2001, l,50-5 1). 
Chap/cr l, COnSciOllSnCSS, Idcas ol'fdcas, ;'1/(1 Allillla/ùJ/I ÙI SPùJOZ;"s "l:ihics" 
looking l'or a syslcmatic usc or ÙICSC nolions, wc can darily wllcÙlcr Ùlcrc is a 
unilicd scnsc Ùlal can bc ascribcd 10 Spinoza's re/crcnccs lo "consciousncss" 
in Ù1C l-lJûcs, By Ù1C samc mcans, wc (';111 also , 'cril)' whclllcr any or Ù1C ways 
in which Spinoza addrcsscs "cons('iousncss" may relalc lo a Ù1CO[)' accounLing 
for Ù1C dilrcrcncc bclwccn conscious and non-conscious mcnlal slalcs, or l'or 
Ù1C cxislcncc or dilTercnl dq,'TCCS or ('ons('iousncss in nalurc. 
ln Ù1C ncxl sc clion, 1 will analysc lhc re/crcnccs lo conSCIousncss 
indudcd in Ù1C lirsl lwo scls: rcspcclj,'cly, Ihosc conccrning Spinoza's 
argumcnl againsl rrcc will, and ÙIOSC ('on('crning his cxplanation or wlly wc 
concciyc or our appetilcs in lcrms or , 'olilions and dccisions or our mind. In 
sccLion 6, 1 will moyc Oll lo analysing ÙIC lhird scl or occurrcnccs, which deal 
WiÙl Spinoza's Ù1CO[)' or ÙIC clcrnily or Ihc mind. 
5. The illusion of free will and the theory of the "ideas of ideas" 
ln Ù1C firsl scl or use/ul occurrcnccs wc can indudc ail Ù1C rclercnccs lo 
consciousncss Ùlal arc l'ound in passagcs conccrning Spinoza's rcbulLal or rrcc 
will. In ordcr lo com1ncingly dcny lhc cxislcncc or Crcc will, Spinoza musl 
providc a plausible cxplanaLion as lo why human bcings belic\'c Ùlcmselvcs lo 
bc rrcc, and how Ù1CY arc led lo crroncously ascribc lo ùlcmsckcs a liTc lacully 
or will, capable or acting upon ÙIC bocly and indcpcndcnlly or Ù1C body. As 
parl or a rcply addrcsscd lo Ù10SC who al1inn lhal "Ù1Cy know by cxpcricncc, 
Ùlal il is in Ù1C mind 's powcr alonc bolh lo spcak and lo bc silenl, and lo do 
mally oÙlcr ùlings which lhcy Ùlcrcrorc belic,'c dcpcncl on Ù1C mind's 
dccision" (E3p2s; CI, 1(,95 / G II, 1/1,2), Spinoza milcs: 
E.xpcricncc ilselr, no !css ('learly Ihan rcason, lcachcs Ùlal mCIl 
bclic\'c ùlcmscl\'cs rrcc bccausc ÙICY arc conscious Isunl conscù] or 
ùlcir own acliolls, ancl igllOranl or ÙIC ('auscs by which Ù1CY arc 
dClcrmincd, Ùlal lhc clccisions or lhc minci arc nOùling bUl lhc 
SpÙ/OZf/ ~5 ThcO/v or,he H JJJlI;JJJ .lIù/d: COIIscio IlSIICS5, ,IICllJO/.l ; aJl(I H"asoll 
appeti tes Ùlemselves, which Ùle rcfo re \'ary as Ùle disposition o r thc 
body \'aries. 
(E3p2s; C l , 1.96-1,97 / G II , 11.:3) 
The same thesis, fo rmulaled WiÙl almosl identical wo rding, can also bc found 
in E IApp (C l , 1·LW / G II, 78), E2p35s (C l , 473 / G II , 117), and E1.Prcl' (C 
1,51.5 / G II, 207). Spinoza's choice o f words does nol seem casual, since ùley 
invoh-e Ùle no tion o f someone "being conscious" of her actions, \"()!itions, and 
appetiles in each o f Ùlese rclcrences. 
As we have seen, Ùle passage jusl quoled ell(ls by establishing a 
correlation belween decisions of Ùle mind, appetites, and dispositions of Ùle 
body. Spinoza su-esses this correlatio n a kw lines laler in the same scholium: 
BOÙl Ùle decision o f Ùle mind and the appetile and the 
c\elermination or Ùle body by nalure exisl logeùler - or rather are 
one and Ùle sam e Ùling, which we cali a decision whcn il is 
considered under, and explained llu-o ugh, Ùle alu-ilmte of ùlought, 
and which we cali a c\elerminatio n when il is considcred under the 
allribule o r extension and cleduced li-om Ùle laws or motion and 
resl. 
(E3p2s; C l, 1.97 / G II , 1/1.1.) 
WiùI lhis remark, Spinoza is bOÙl restating a melaphysical Ùlcsis and making 
a lerminological po inl. vVhal we usually distinguish as decisions (o r m litions) 
in our minci , and delerminations (or dispositions) of Ùle body, are really one 
and Ùle sa me ùling (human appetiles, namely), alÙlOugh concei\'ed and 
explained under dilkrenl aLlributes - ÙlOughL and extension, respecti\-cIy. "By 
nature", Spinoza allirms, Ùley "exisl LogeÙler" andlü llow the same order and 
co nnection of causes because, according lo Spinoza's thought-exlension 
parallelism, "Ùle o rder or actio ns and passio ns of our body is, by naLure, al 
one wiùI Ùle o rder or actions and pass ions o r Ùle mind" (E.3p2s; C l, 1,91./ C 
II , 11.1) . 
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This conclusion, hmvc\'cr, poses an o b,io us problem. Ir our mind and 
our body arc so closcly joincd to cach oÙlc r, how do wc gcllo co ncci, 'c or our 
appclitcs scparalcly rrom and indcpcndcnLly o r our bodily dri, 'cs - lonning 
c\'cntually thc lalsc idca or an aulo nomous and unconslraincd spiritual racully, 
namcly our "will", capable or l'l,king dccisio ns ÙIal arc indcpcndcnl l'rom (and 
c"cn opposce! lO) ÙIC dclc rminaLÏo ns o r L1IC body?27 Spinoza pro\'ie!cs ÙIC 
answcr III passagcs which arc includcd in, o r rclatce! lo, ÙIC sccone! scl or 
occurrcnccs. 
Thcsc occurrcnces arc rrom ÙIC ThinI and Fourlh Parls or ÙIC 1~'th/c5'. 
Thcy can bc groupee!logeùIcr since they al! rclc r lo a scrics o r propositions in 
ÙIC Sccond Parl (E,2p20-23), whcrc Spinoza cxpounds his so-callcd L1ICOI)' or 
ÙIC "ie!cas or ie!cas".28 
To bcgin WiÙI , in E3p9, Spinoza a11irms: 
27 Thc quo Lcd scholium ro llows a scmillal propositio n o r ÙIC 1-uucs Œ3p2), which marks one o r 
ÙIC m;uor poinls o r disscnl bc lwccn Spinoza's philosophy and Dcscar lcs's Ùlcolics o r ÙIC rreedom 
or ÙIC "ill ami "ÙIC powcr o r Ù1C soul wiÙI rcspcct lo Ù1C body" (sec Dcscarlcs's Passiolls o/til(' Soul 
1,1 1; CS\II 3/~3 / AT XI , 359-360), In L3p2 Spinoza d aims: 
Thc body c;umo l dClcrminc Ù1C mind lo Ùlinking, and ÙIC mind canno l dClcllllinc ÙIC 
body lo motion, lo rcsl o r lo anYÙling clsc (il' Ùlc rc is ;ulyÙùng clsc). 
Œ3p2; C 1,191/ G II , 11 1) 
In ùIis proposition, Spinoza expliciùy pULS [o nvard his dClclm inistic ami p;u-allclistic accounl o r ÙIC 
mimi-body rclationship againsl Dcsc<u'lCS'S \'o lunLalisl ;Uld inlc ractionisl modc!. T hc rclCrcncc lo 
Dcsc;u'lcs's philosophy is also c\'idcnl l'rom ÙIC PrcI;ICc Ùlal inu'oduccs ÙIC P;U'l o r ÙIC Lill/CS whcrc 
Ù1C proposition is lo und . Spinoza IVI'ilcs: 
11'1 hc cclcbratcd DCSGu'lcs, alÙ lOugh hc Loo bclic\'cd Ùlal ÙIC mimi has absolutc powcr 
QI'cr ils OlVlI actions, nc\'crùlclcss soughl lO explain hum;m aflccts Ùl rough Ùlcir lirsL 
causcs, aJl(I al ÙIC sarnc timc lo show ÙIC \\,1)' by which Ù1C mind can ha\'c absolutc 
dominion QI'cr ils alTCcls, But in my opinion, hc sho lVcd no ùJing bUl ÙIC clc\'c lllcSS o r 
his undcrs[;U1ding. 
(I-:3 Prcr; C I, 19 1-1,92 / G II , 137- 188) 
28 As soon as ÙIC exprcss ion cOllsàus cssc is pUllo lth, ÙIC dcmonsu'ations o rboùl E.'lp9 and 1-:3p30 
rcler to E2p23, Thc usc o r cOlIsà clllJa in E.3Ad 1 exp expliciùy mirrors E3p9s, ;U1d also rclers to 
1-:2p23, Thc dcmonsu, ltion o r E4p8 l'ciers to bOÙl E2p2 1 ;uld E2p22, " i ùl ÙIC purposc o r 
addrcssing our kllowlcdgc o r good ;U1d c\'il (such knowlcdgc bcing, according to Spinoza, noÙIing 
o Ùlcr ÙI;lIl our consciousncss or ÙIC aJTCcls o rjoy ;U1d sadness), whilc [ /IV 19d and E1V61,d rcl'cr in 
LUlli lo E4i>8 . E2p20 is nCI'cr expliciÙy c\'okcd , bUl il pm\'ides ÙIC grounds lo r E2p21-23. 
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Bolh insorar as lhc mind has clcar and c1isLÏncl idcas, and insorar as 
il has conrusccl idcas , il slri\'cs, for an indclinilc cluraLÏon, lo 
pcrscvcrc in ils bcing and il is conscious of lhis Slri,'ing il has [hujus 
su/ e'Olla/us cs/ cOllscùl. 
(E3p9; C 1 499 / G II, 1/1,7) 
To bcllcr undcrslancl ùlis rclcrcncc, iL may bc uscl'ul to quickly rccap Ù1C main 
passagcs Ùlallcacl Spinoza lo his final slalcmcnL "Each ùung", according Lo 
Spinoza, "slrivcs lo pcrsc\'crc in ils bcing" (E3p6; C 1,498 / G II, 146). This 
"slriving" is idcnLÏlicd by Spinoza wilh ÙIC powcr or Ù1C Ùung itsclr and ils 
csscncc (E3p7).29 Finally, in E3p9d, Spinoza asscrls Ùlal Ù1C minci "is 
ncccssarily conscious or ilsclr Imclls .. . llcccssano sui sil cOIlscùl" and 
"conscious of ils slri\'ing Imells su/ conalus COllSo;ll", through Ù1C "id cas or ÙIC 
bocly's alIccLÏons" (C l, 499-500 / G II, 147) . This conclusion, Spinoza nolcs, 
is cnlailcd by E2p23, which slalcs: 
Thc mind clocs nol know ilsclr, cxcepl insofar as il pcrcei\'cs Ù1C 
iclcas or ÙIC allccLÏons or lhe body. 
([2p23; C l, 468 / G II, 110) 
Whal il mcans lor Ùle minci lo know ilsclr ([2p23) - or, c\'cn, Lo "bc conscious 
or ilsclf" ([3p9d) - by pcrcciving ÙIC iclcas or ÙIC allccLÏons or thc body is 
cxplaincd in ÙIC lhrcc precccling proposiLÏons ([2p20-22), whcrc Spinoza 
inlroduces ÙIC noLÏon or "idea or an idca" Ur/ca /dex). 
As prcYiously mcnLÏonccl, Spinoza asscrls Ùlal God musl ha\'c idcas or ail 
or ils modcs, or allccljons (E2p3) - including, Ùlcrclo rc, ÙIC moclcs 
comprchcndcd in ÙIC allribulc or ùloughl, i.c., ail cxisLing idcas. Bcnce, hc 
concludcs Ùlal in ÙlOughllhcrc musl also cxisL Ù1C idcas or ÙIC idcas - among 
29 According lo Spinoza, " Illhc pOlVcr o r c<!ch Ùling, orÙlC su'i\ing Ipo lclIÙ;1 s il 'C COII;/IU.l1 by which 
il (ciÙlcr alonc or wiùl olllcrs) docs anyÙting 1 ... 1. is noÙüng oul ÙIC gi\'cn, or aclual, csscncc o r ÙIC 
ù1ing iLScll" (E3p7d; C 1,499 / G II , 11\,6). Gi\'cn OOÙl Ù1C ccnll'alily or ùtis notion in Spinoz;\'s 
philosophy, ;Uld Ù1C dillicully lo lind suilahlc lranslations, Spinoza schol;u's usually rcler lo such 
"su'i\ 'ing" by rClaining lhc original Latin Lerm, COlla/us, 
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them, lhe idea of ÙIC human mind (E2p20d), sincc, as wc havc seen, thc 
human mind is dclincd as lhe idea of lhe human body. In linc WiÙI Ùle general 
formulation of paralklism, according lo which thc ordcr and conncction of 
idcas is Ù1C samc as ÙIC order and conncclion of Ùlings, in E2p21 Spinoza 
maintains that " Itlhis idca of lhc mind is uniled lo ÙIC mind iD thc same way 
as the mind is unilcd to ÙIC body" (C l , IHi7 / G II , 109). 
ITlhe mind is unilcd lo lhe body l'rom ÙIC facl Ùlal ÙIC body is thc 
objecl of Ùle mimi; and so by lhc samc rcasoning Ù1C idca of Ù1C 
mind musl bc unilcd WiÙI ils own objcCl, i.c., WiÙI Ùle mind ilself, 
in the same way as Ù1C mind is unilcd WiÙI lhc bocly. 
(E2p21d; C l , 467 / G II , 109) 
Thc idea of thc human mind, in olher words, "cxiSlS logcÙlcr" with its objcct 
(namely, Ùle mind), min-ors lhc samc ordcr of causes and clTccls of ils oQject, 
and is relatcd to Ù1C human mimi in ÙIC samc way as Ù1C laller is relatcd to ils 
own OQjccl (Ùle human body). In E2p19, Spinoza dcmonstratcs Ùlal Ùle mind 
knows Ùle body "ùlrough ici cas of aflcctions by which Ù1C body is aIrecled" (C 
l , 466 / G II , 107). In an analogous manncr, in E2p22 hc clcmonslrales Ùlat 
the mind has "idcas of Ù1C idcas of lhc aflcctions lallècLJoJlu])] idcarum Ide,rl" 
of Ùle body (C l, 468 / G II , 109). Thcsc iclcas of idcas accounl for our 
knowkdgc of our minci and ils idcas (as pcr E2p23 and ils dcmonslration, to 
which E3p9 refers). Along ÙICSC lincs, in thc scholium of E2p21, Spinoza 
points out wh al il means lo havc an iclca of onc's own minci: 
The idea of ÙIC minci, 1 say, and ÙIC mind ilself lûllow in Gocl l'rom 
Ùle same powcr of Ùlinking and by the same ncccssily. For ÙIC idea 
of Ù1C mind, i.e., ÙIC iclea of ÙIC idca lùka Idcirl, is noùùng bul ùle 
lûrm of Ù1C ide a insofar as lhis is considercd as a mode of ùunking 
WiÙlOUl relation lo Ù1C oQjCCl. 
(E2p21s; C l, 467 / G II,109) 
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This passagc discloses the answer lor which wc havc bccn looking. Thc "iclcas 
or iclcas" accounl lor thc possibilil)' or concciving of our minci , along WiÙl ail 
Ù1C iclcas by which il is afTeclecl, as "moclcs or lhinking wilhout relalion 10 Ùlcir 
objcct", in Spinoza's worcls. This cxplains, among oÙlcr lhings, how hum;ms 
can conccivc or Ùleir wills as someùling clisLÏncl fi'om thc clclcnninalions of 
Ùlcir bodies - alùlough Ù1CY, "by naturc, cxist logclhcr, or ralhcr arc onc and 
Ù1C samc ùùng" (E3p2s). Tlùs possibilily, combined wiùI our ignorancc OrÙ1C 
causcs fuat ncccssarily clelerminc our minci lo will or cio anYlhing/o is Ù1C 
source of an error - i.c., Ù1C crror or concciving us as enclowccl wilh a fi-cc 
will, capable or acting upon Ùle body and indcpenclcnlly or ÙIC bocly. 
As we have seen while analysing Ù1C firsl scl or occurrcnccs, Spinoza's 
goal is to defend some pOlenLÏally conlroversial Ùlescs, slcmming l'rom his 
Ùlought-cxtcnsion parallelism Ùlcory: Ùlat Ù1C order or lhc clecisions of Ù1C 
mind mirrors the samc neccssary orclcr OrÙ1C dispositions ofùlc bocly, WiÙIOUl 
allowing l'or any frccclom of Ù1C will and WiÙIOUl allowing for any causal 
inlcraction bclwcen fue mind and Ù1C bocly. Thcrcforc, as nolccl abo\'c, in 
E3p2s Spinoza d <u-ifies thal Ù1C clecisions of lhc mind, ÙIC appcLÏles, and Ù1C 
dclcrminaLÏons of fuc body arc onc and Ù1C same Ùling, alÙlOugh cali cd by 
difTcrcnt namcs accorcling to Ù1C allribulc lhrough which ùlcy arc concci"cd-
whcÙler as modes or ùlought or moclcs of cxlcnsion. ·Indccd, Spinoza makcs 
a similar point in E3p9s, aller having clcmonslralcd Ùlal ÙIC mimi is conscious 
or ils slriving, or romllus (i.c., or ils csscncc), ùlrough Ù1C iclcas of ÙIC idcas of 
ÙIC aITccLÏons or Ùle body.31 ''YVhcn ùlis slriving is rclaled only lo lhc mind", 
30 ln El p32, Spinoza aHÏIms Ùlal " Ill hc will GUlIlOl bc l'allcd a li'cc causc, bul ollly a lICl'CSS;UY OIlC" 
(C l, 435 / G II, 72). In E2p48 hc dcmollslralcs Ùlal " Iilll ÙIC mimi Ùlc rc is 110 ahsolulc, or frcc, 
will , bul Ùle mimi is delermincd to will ùlis or Ùlal by a causc which is also dc lcllllillcd by alloÙlcr" 
(C l, 483 / G II, 129). For a rcccnt analysis conccrning Spilloza's o\"crall cx]>lanalio ll of our bclid 
illli'cc will, see Mcl,U11cd 2017. 
31 To bc surc, in E3p9d Spinoza wrilcs Ùlal "Ù1C mu\(1 (by 1-:2p23) is IIcccss;u'il)' colIscious of ilsclf 
ùlrough idcas of Ù1C body's allcctions", WiÙlOUl mCllliollillg idcas of idcas. Spilloza's rclercllcc lo 
E2]>23 clalilics ÙIC mc,ming of ùlis slalcmcnL Thc milld is " lIcccssaril)' colIscious of il';clf ùlrough 
idcas of Ù1C body's affections" (E3p9d) sillcc ÙIC milld "pcrl'e i\'cs ÙIC idcas of ÙIC ancl'liolls of ÙIC 
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Spinoza rcmarks, "il is callccl wil!''' (C l, 500 / G Il , 147), Con\'crscly, whcn 
applicd lo bOÙl Ù1C mind ancl Ù1C body, il is callcd "appclÏlc": 
This appclÏlc, ùlcrdorc, is nOùling bUl Ù1C , 'cry CSSCIlCC or man, 
rrom whosc nalurc Ù1CIT ncccssarily !ollO\,y ÙlOSC lhings lhal 
promolc his prcscryalÏon. And so man is dclcrmillcd lo do Ù10SC 
ùlillgs. Bclwccn appclÏlc ancl dcsirc Ùlcrc is no cliŒcrcllcc, cxccpl 
Ùlal clcsirc is gcncrally rclalce! lo mcn insorar as Ù1CY arc conscious 
or ùlcir appclÏlcs. So dcsù'c can bc cle/incd as appc/JLc loge/l}(:}' lVùh 
ronse/ousllcss a/'Ule appc/JLc 1 flppc/JLus CUI1J ejusdcl7J cOIl's'('Jc:llûal. 
(E3p9s; C 1,500 / G Il , 147-148. Ilalics in original) 
Thc mcaning or Ù1C last clcfinilÏon is clarifice! in E3Ad 1. Firsl, Spinoza cle/incs 
"dcsirc" difTcrcnùy, as "man's ,"cry CSSCllce, insorar as il is concci,'ccl lo bc 
clctcrminccl, l'rom ally givcn affcclÏon or il, lo cio somclhing" (C l, 5::31 / G Il, 
190). Thcn, hc proviclcs an cxplanalion as lo why "dcsirc" has rcplacccl 
"appclÏlc" ill ouùining a "human's vcry csscncc". Followillg Ù1C samc schcmc 
firsl cll\'isagccl in E3p2s, and Ù1Cll Ilolccl in 1'::3p9s, hc slrcsscs how "impulsc", 
"appclÏlc", "will", and "clcsirc" arc only diflcrclll namcs by which wc aclclrcss 
Ù1C samc slri,'illg, or CSSCllce or a human bcing, concei,'cd ullclcr clif1'crclll 
allribulcs: 
Wc saicl abo"c, in E3p9s, Ùlal clcsirc is appclÏlc logclhcr wilh Ù1C 
cOllsciousllcss or il [cupidùfl/CI7J cssc appc/JlUJJJ ('Lml qLtsdcJJJ 
rons(')clllial . And appclÏlc is Ù1C ,"cry csscnce or man, illso!;u' as il is 
clclcrmillce! lo cio wh al promolcs his prcscr\'alÏon. 
Bul ill Ù1C samc scholium 1 also warnccl Ùlal 1 rcally rccogllizc 
110 difl'crcllce bclwccll humall appclilc ancl clcsirc. For whcÙlcr a 
man is COliS cio us or his appclÏlc or Ilol, Ù1C appclÏlc slÏll rcmaills 
onc and Ù1C samc. And so - nol lo sccm lo commil a laulology - 1 
clicl Ilol wish lo cxplain clcsirc by appclÏlc, bUl was anxious 10 so 
body" (1':2]>23), As IVC hayc sccn, howc\'cr, "la pcrcci\'c ;Ul idca", on Spino/,;l's accounl, l11cans la 
ha\'c ÙIC idca of il, la ha\'c knowlcdgc o f il ami, lin;ùly, lo bc "conscious" of il. 
.5jJÙJ07.:I 's 'Illcoly oFthe HIIlIIi1l1 ,Ifille/: COIIsciollsness • . 11c1llOIV. illld RCiiSOII 
<lclinc il lhal I would comprchcnd logcùlcr all Ù1C SLrivings o f 
human nalure Ùlal wc sig11ily by ÙIC namc or appcLÏlc lapfJcLÙusl. 
willll'OluIltasl. desire lrupùlùasl, or impulsc limpcLusl. 
(E3Adlcxp; C I, 53 1 / G II , 190) 
As wc ha\ 'e sccn, thc namc "appcLÏlc" rcl'crs lo Ù1C human stri"ing 
simullancously concei\'ed undcr lhc all.ributc or cxlcnsion (as an "impulsc" or 
ÙIC body) and under ÙIC allribulc or ùlOughl (as our "will"). Thc dcliniLÏon of 
"dcsirc" as "appeLÏle wùh consciousncss or il" lappctJLus cum çfusdcm 
COIlscÎcIltJal. lirsl round in E3 p9s and Ùlcn rccallcd in E3Ad 1 cxp, is mcanllo 
includc ÙIC slri"ing or bolh ÙIC body and Ù1C mind plus thc knowlcdgc Ù1al Ù1C 
mimi has or ils own slri\'ing, as a modc of ùlÏnking, ù1rough Ù1C idcas or Ù1C 
id cas of ÙIC alTecLÏons or ÙIC body.32 This aCCüunls, lor examplc, lo r ÙIC [~lCt 
Ù1alnol only do wc want somclhing, or stri\'c lor il, bUl wc also know Ù1al wc 
wanl somclhing or slri\'e lor il - in onc word, wc "clcsirc" il.33 lJ ndcrslood in 
ùlis way, Spinoza concludcs, lhc noLÏon or "dcsirc" im'olvcs ail manncrs in 
which ÙIC human csscncc can bc concci\'cd. 
32 \ViÙlOUl rclcrence lo one's alICeLÎons, Spinoza points oullaler in E3!\cl 1 exp, "il woulcl nOl fo llow 
Ùlal Ùle mimI could he cons('ious of its desi re, or appeLÎle Isua:, cupiditrllù sin: appcÛlus cssc 
cOI/S(ùl " (C 1,53 1 ! G 1 l, 190), l'or Ùlcre \l'oulcl he no idea al ail Ùlal a minci coulcl percei"e. Spinoza 
recalls llvice E2p23, acconling lo which " Illhe minci cloes nol know ilself, excepl inso!;u' as il 
pelTeil'es Ùle ideas of Ùle aJlccLÎons of Ùle hody". Spinoza's simultaneous rclCrence lo one's 
anccLÎons ;Uld E2p2:3, in order lo "inl'Oh-e Ùle cause or ùlis conseiousness 1 !Jqius cOlIsclcnll;C: 
caus,1J/l1" (E3!\dlcxp; C 1, '53 1 ! G II , (90), seems lo mirror ùle demonslraLÎon of E3p9, where 
Spin07A'! also I-dCrS lo E2p23 lo daim Ùlal Ùle mimI is "necessarily conscious of ilself" - hence, 
"conscious o f its stri"ing" - ùlrough Ùle "ideas of Ùle hody's allccLÎons" (C 1, 499-500 ! G II , 147). 
ln oÙ 1er words, E2p23 and Ùle umleq linning "ideas o f ideas" ÙleOl-Y ensure lhaL, if a body is 
;ùkcled , Ùle mind has ideas of whi('h il is cons('ious, ,Uld Ùlrough which il is conscious of iL~c1f qua 
mode of ùlÎnking. Lia 1-<:11' l'oŒses on Ùle l'Ole o f Ùle aflc('LÎons wiÙl respecllo Spin07 ..a 's rclCrence 
lo "Ùle cause of ùlis conseiousness", ùlereby d aiming Ùlal " Icionsciousness is ÙluS, in Spinoza's 
l'ielV, a phenomenon stri('ùy rclaled lo exislence in duraLÎon" (2017, 199). Il remains undear, on 
her reading, Ùle role of ail of Spinoza's rciCrenccs lo consciousness, insoliu' as conscio usness is 
rclaled lo Ùle kllowledge Ùlal one indil'idual has of Ùle elemal parl of her mind ancl its ideas. 1 will 
l'o(,us on Ùlese rciCren('es in Ùle nexl secLÎon of ùlÎs ('hapler. An insightful commentar)' ('oncerning 
Ùlese poinls (,;Ul he l'ound in Jaquel 2005, 109- 125. See also Jaquel2004, 11 3- 11 9. 
33 See r:2p21s ,Uld Ùle use ÙlalSpinoza makes of E2p20 in E2p43c1, lojusLÎly Ùle I;LCl Ùlat "he 1 ... 1 
who kllOIVS a ÙlÎllg truly, musl al Ùle S,Ulle lÎme hal'e an adequale iclea, or U'ue kllowledge, o f his 
own Knowledge" (C l, 479 / G II , 123-12 1.). 
Chi/pIC/" l, COIISclOI/SIICS,\; fe/Cils ol'fe/cas, i//I(1 Alli/lmllr)/} in SpùlOza 's "Eilul's" 
On this reading, Spinoza's clarification thal "desire is generally rclaled to 
men insorar as Ùley are conscious or their appelÏtes", round in E3p9s, cloes 
not imply anyùùng about the possible existence or unconscious stales or minci 
or icleas.3 ~ Accordingly, Spinoza's claim that the appelÏLe is slÏll one ancl Ù1e 
same "wheÙler a man is conscious or his appclÏle or 110L" , in E3AcI 1 exp, 
cannot be t-1.kcn as alluding to a difTerencc belween kinds or appelÏles - those 
Ù1aL emerge Lo consciousncss and those Ùlal do nol.35 Spinoza is only 
remarking Ùlal our "desire" - understood as ÙIC slriving of bOÙ1 our body ancl 
minci, rel1eclccl inlo a second, parallcl ordcr or idcas or icleas - is only one 
way in which to conccive or one's appelite or csscncc.36 Incleecl, wheÙ1cr we 
concei\'e or an inclividual as bcing conscious of her slriving, or wheÙ1er we 
conceive or hcr as uniqucly determincd by hcr bodily impulses, "thc appetite 
still remains one and ùle same", Spinoza asserts. Thus, Ù1e racL Ù1aL we also 
conceive and havc knowledge of our appelÏlcs in Lerms of desirc and 
awareness or our will - as modcs of thinking and afTeclÏons or our minci -
shaH not lead us lo bclic\'e that our will is frce. 
3·~ Millcr (2007, 217) follows Wilson (i 19801 1 999a, 131,) in rcading ùlis stalcmcnl ,L<; suggcsting 
such a distinction. Scc also Shapiro 2017, 211. 
35 Balibar reads ùlis passagc as il11plying Ùlal consciousncss is "ÙIC spccilic difTcrcncc", or "Ù1c 
spccilic dq,'Tce or <]ualily which lr,UISf0ll11S appctitc inlo dcsirc", which also means Ùlal "some 
appctilcs ,u·c \'olunlary, oùlcrs nOl" (119921 2013, 13 1-1 32). By conU'asl, 1 cxc\udc Ùle possibilily 
Ùlal Spinoza is hcrc rcducing conscious or mlunt;u-y appctilcs lo a subscl of ail appctilcs, 101' that 
secms lo mc ÙIC ùlcsis Ùlal Spinoza inlcnds lo rdulc. Indecd , ail of Spinoza.'s arguments analyscd 
so liu' ,U'C aimed al dcmonslrating Ùlal, alùlOugh wc arc conscious of our appctiles ,Uld bodily 
impulscs as \'Olitions of ÙIC l11ind, Ùlerc is noùling in nalure likc a l'l'CC, \'Olunlary appctilc, go\'emed 
by a conscious mind, which GU\ acl upon ÙIC hody ;U\d imlependcnùy o f ÙIC body, MoreO\'er, ,Uld 
morc import;U\ùy, Spinoza is nol conlem!ing Ùlal an appctilc may "lranslorm" ilsclf inlo a \'olunl;u-y 
one, by me;U\s of consciousncss, RaÙler, il is U'ue Ùlallor Spinoza ail appctilcs ,u'e (also) \'Olitions 
of Ùle mind, ;uld Ùlal Ù1C mimi is ncccss;U'i ly conscious of il, \'Olitions by mc,U\s of Ùle ideas of Ùle 
ideas of Ù1C ;ùlcctions of Ù1C body, Hcncc, Ù1C mimi is also said lo "desirc", WiÙl respecl lo Ù1C 
objects of its will, of which il is conscious, 
36 Com'crscly, if desircs, or conscious appctiles , \Vcre only a subscl of hum;U\ appetiles (as 
conlended by Balibar 119921 2013 and I..c\-y 2017) , \Ve should also concedc Ù1al Spinoza is 
inconsislenÙY using Ùle notion of "esscncc of m,ul" in E3p9s ,U\d E3!\d 1, rcspecti\-cIy, by Ersl 
dclining il as hum;Ul appctile, and l.hen reslIicting illo hUl11an dcsi re (or conscious appctiles) , 
1f.3 
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6. Animation, etem.ity of the mind, and the "third kind of knowledge" 
The rciCrences to conscio usness analysecl so 1 ~lr do Ilol seem lo pro\'ide any 
crile rio n lo dislinguish be lween cOllscious and UIlCOllscious ideas. 011 Ùle 
conlrary, the uni"ersali lY o r lhe demo llslral.Ï ons employccl by Spinoza seCIns 
lo entail Ùlal ail bodies ha\'e a correspollding mimI, alollg wilh Ùle idea, o r 
kllowledge, o f il37 - Ùlat is, whal Spinoza rcle rs lo as "collsciousllcss". Ha\'illg 
noted ÙLis, Spinoza commentalors cOllcernecl aboul Lhc ensuing paradoxes 
rclaled Lo panpsychism ha\'e o lk n dismissed the "idcas or idcas" Ùleory as an 
unsuitablc candidaLe lo r an accounl o r human cOllsciousncss .38 EiÙler Ùle 
ùleory of the ideas o r ideas is no t meant to pro\'idc a higher-order accounL o r 
human consciousness, Ùley mainlaill , o r cise il rails lo rcach ils goal.39 As a 
consequence, Ùlere have recenùy becn some illleresling allempls lo look lo r 
a dilICrent understanding o r "consciousness" in Spinoza's l~/JlJ(:s'. These 
aLlempLs have rocused on passages inc\uc\ed in our Ùlird, and lasl, set of 
occurrences. 
37 Scc E2p 13s, quolcd in sccuon 2, as wcll as E2p l,3d, whcrc Spino;-AI c1 "u'aclcriscs lhc 
dcm01lstrauon of E2p20 as " uni\'c rsall ullil 'cl ,.a!t:~I " (C l, 1j,79 / G II , 123; ÙIC 1\S \'crsion n pliciùy 
adds !llal Ùle dcmonstrauon o f E2p20 "can bc applicd to aIl idcas"; scc :\S 90). 
38 Seholars who ne\'erÙlcless ha\'c prcscnlcd Spino;-; I's Ùlcory of "idcas of idcas" as a Ùlcory of 
sclceu\'c eonseiousness are Curlcy (1 969), Hiec (1 990), Marun (2007), ;Uld , more rcccnùy, 
S;U1giacomo (20 11 a), Hc argucs Ùlal idcas of iocas G UI o nly bc adcCJuatc; hcncc, hc m 'iles, 
conseiousness in Spinoza on Il' rcfcrs lo adcCJualc knolVlcdgc (20 11 , 82-8Ij,; scc ;ùso San!,riacomo 
20 10). Building 011 Ù1C samc hYPoùlcsis - i.c., Ùlal idcas o f idcas ran onl)' he adcCJuatc - Syli;ulc 
Malinowski-Ch;u'les reecnùy ;u'gucd for Ù1C OpposilC conclusion, n,U1lel)', Ùlal idcas of idcas GUlno l 
aecounl for hum;Ul conseiousness (20 16, Junc 17, "On ÙIC DilICrcncc bclwccn Consciousncss ;uld 
IdciI Ir/ca.: in Spinoza", papcr prcscnlcd al McGill l ' ni\'c rsil)'). 1 lind bOÙI rcadin!,'S dillicul l lo 
rcconrilc \Vilh Spinoz.-.'s p;u-allclism, Sinec ÙIC ordcr and COllllccUon o fùlc idcas ncrcssarily lo llows 
ÙIC o rdcr ;U1d eonnccuon of ùlcir ol~jcets, ail ÙIC clcmcnLs Ùlal accounl lo r ÙIC inadcCJuaey of ÙIC 
iclcas of ml' bodily alICcuons (Ùlal is, incomplclcncss, parualil)', ami pass i\"Ïly) shall ;ùso bc u'ackcd 
in ÙIC o rclcr of Ù1C id cas of ÙIC idcas. Indccd, Spin07AI's ÙICOl)' of ÙIC idcas of idcas sccms ;ùso 
inlcndcd lo suppo rl Ù1C d aim Ùlal Ù1C awarcncss Ùlal onc mal' ha\'c o f hcr mimI ;Uld ilS all 'ceuons, 
ùlrough ÙIC idcas of tllC ideas o f tllC body's allccuons, can dd i\'c r a grcal dcal o f (consrio us) 
inadcCJuate knowlcdge aboul ils objcct - to tl lC S;UllC n tcnt and in ÙIC S;U11C wa)' as idcas of bodily 
alICcLions dcli\'cr inadcquate knowlcdgc about onc's OlVll body (scc, in p;u'ucul;u', E2p28s, E2p29, 
ils dcmo nsu-aLion ;u ld coroll;u)'), 
39 "II: tll is \Vc rc a tllCOI)' o f eonsrio llsncss o r aw;u'cness 1 .. ,1", Bcnnclt l;U1lOUsl)' contcnds, "il \Vould 
bc absurdly necss i\'e" (1 984, 188). Sec also Wilson (1 980) 1 999a, 135; :\ad lc r 2008a, 58Ij,-585; 
Lc Bull'c 20 1 Ob, 556; M;u'shall 20 14, III . 
Chaplcr 1. COllscJousness, Idcas of Ideas, and .'I11II11i1110n ÙI SpùlOxa 's "l~ihlo; " 
These occurrences <u-e ail givcn in ÙIC Filih Parl of ÙIC L'thin', Most of 
ÙIC refcrcnces lo consciousncss incluclecl in Ù1C Ùlird sct arc relatecl to 
Spinoza's accounl of Ù1C eLcrnily of Ù1C minci and his Ùlcory of the "lhinl killCl 
of knowledge". 10 ln not onc of Ù1cm docs Spinoza mcntion or explicilly recall 
Ùle "idcas of i-rlcas" Lhcory. 
First, in ESp31s, hc characteriscs thc abiliLy of Lhc minci lo auain 
knowleclgc of thc Lhircl kincl in lcrms of consciousncss of Ùle self and Goc!. 
"Thc morc each of us is able lo achicvc in this kincl of knowleclgc", Spinoza 
wriles, "the more he is conscious of himself <md of God 1 co mc/ius sui cl Dei 
conse/us esLI" (C l, 610 / G II ,300). Then, in ESp39, he relatcs thc clel1lal 
parl of a minci lo Ù1e capabilities of Ù1e corresponding body. Spinoza al1irms 
Ùlal "[hI e who has a body capable of a greal many ùùngs has a mind whose 
greatest part is eternal" (C l , 6 14 / G II, 304). This correlation is rephrased, in 
Lhe following scholium, in lerms of a mind's capacily lo be conscious of itscll~ 
God, and thc things accorcling lo Ù1C capabilitics of Ùle bocly: 
H e who, like an infanl or chilcl, has a bocly capable of "cry /CW 
things, ancl very hea\'ily depcndenl on exlernal causes, has a minci 
which consiclerecl solely in itself is conscious of almosL 1l0Ùlillg of 
·10 Spinoza pro\'idcs a delinition of thc "third kind or knolVlcdge", a1so namcd "intuiti,·c knowlcdgc" 
(sciellù;1 ÙJLWÛ1<1), in E2p40s2: 
ITI his kind of knolVing proceeds l'rom an adcqualc id ca or Ù1C lè:lJll1aJ cssencc or 
ccrtain allribules or Cod 10 Ù1C adcqualc knowlcdgc or Ù1C csscncc of Ùlings 
(E2p40s2; C !, 478 / CIl, (22) 
Only Ù1C occurrcnccs 10 consciousness lound in E5p42s do nol immedialcly rcfcr 10 Spinoza's 
Ù1C01;CS of inluitil"e kllowlcdge ,md Ù1C clernily or ùle mind. Thcy seem 10 do il mcdialcly ÙlOugh, 
by rclcn;ng lirst Lo blessedness 1 beatiludol, "which ;u'iscs l'rom Ùle ùlird kind or knowledgc" 
(l':Sp42d; C ! , 616 / CIl, 307), ùlen 10 Ù1C opposition bclwccn Ù1C "ignoranl" and Ù1C '\,isc man" 
- whom "being, by a certain elemalnccessily, cOllScious of himsclr, ;Uld or Cod, ami or ùlin!,'S Isui 
cl Dei cL rerum a.'Lenla quadam JJcrcssltale cOllsciusl" , Spin07~'l IIl'iles, "nel"cr ceascs 10 be" ;Uld 
"ahV'.lys posscsscs truc peace of mind 1 mil/ni arquicsrcnù;11" (E5p42s; C 1, 6 17 / G II , 308) , Scc also 
E4App4: "blcsscdness Ibcilù/udol is noùling bul Ùlal pcace or Ùle mind lanùni acquicscCJlù;11 Ùlal 
slcms li'OIn Ù1C inluiti"e knowlcdge of Cod" (C l , 588 / C II, 267 . Translation l11odilicd). The 
me;Uling or Ù1C expression "conscious or oncselr, Cod and Ù1C Ùlings" - IVhich, \\';Ùl sorne 
modilications, also appe;u's in E5p31s ,md in E5p39s - and its rcfcrcncc 10 Ùle idcas Ùlal an 
imhidual has or ilS mind, Cod, and sin!,'Ular Ùlings Ùlrough kllowlcdgc or Ùle Ùlird kind, is analyscd 
bclow in Ù lis scction . 
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.s/Jù/U/.,, :S 1ï/C0/., · uF/he H l/m:1lI ,llùld: COllscio llSl7ess . . 1/emuIV. aJld Rmsoll 
ilself, or of C od, or o f Ùlings [menLem habcL~ qua: ù] sc sola 
cOllsidera/a wllli 1ère sui n cc D ci JJec rerum sIL cOllsoizl. On Ùle 
oÙler hand, he who has a body capable of a greal many Ù1.Ïngs, has 
a mimi which considered o nly in ilself is very much conscious o f 
ilse ll~ and of God, and o f Ùljngs [menLem habeL, qua: in se soja 
(,ollsù1era/a muhum sui cl D ei et rcrUJ7J sIL conscùd. 
(ESp39s; C I, 6 14 / G II, 305) 
This lasl paragraph, in parLicular, has ofi.cn been read in connectio n WiÙl 
Spinoza's cont..royersial remarks on universal animaLio n - found in E2p1 3s, 
and quoled above in ùlis chapler - l'rom which Ùle whole problem of Ùle 
slalus of consciousness in Spinoza's l-UlICS originates. 
Indeed, in lhe second parl of E2p 13s, Spinoza procecds lo exp Iain how 
we should undersland his daim Ùlal ail individuals are animate, "ÙlOugh in 
difTcrenl dcgrees": 
W e 1 ... 1 cannol deny Ùlal ideas ditTe r among Ùlemselves, as the 
ol~jecls Ùlemselves do, and Ùlal o ne is mo re excellenl Ùlan Ùle other, 
and con l'lins more realilY, jusl as Ù1C objecl of lhe o ne is mo re 
excellenl lhan Ùle objecl o f Ùle oÙler and contajns more reali ty. 1 ... 1 
1 say ùlÏs in general, Ùlal in proporLion as a body is mo rc capable 
Ùlan oÙlcrs of doing many ÙlÏngs al once, or being acled on in mally 
ways al o nce, so ils mind is more capable Ùlan othcrs of perceiving 
many Ùlings al o nce. And in proportion as thc acLio ns o f a body 
dcpcnd more on ilself alo ne, and as oÙler bodies concur with il less 
in acLing, so ils mind is morc capable of understanding distinctly. 
(E2p 13s; C l, 458 / G II, 97) 
Thc similarily bclwccn E2p1 3s and E5p39s has prompted scholars lo 
ass imilale Spinoza's rcfc rcncc lo "dcgTces of animatio n" lo a Ùleory im plying 
Ùle exislcnce o f diflercnl dcgrccs of consciousness in nalure. 
Don Garrett, fo r examplc, cqualcs clcgrces o r consciousncss WiÙl degrees 
of powcr of lhinking expressecl by cli f1Crent mincis or ideas (underslanding, by 
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Chap/cr 1, COIISOlJIISIICSS, Ir/cas o/Ir/cas, allrlAllli7Ja//oll Ùl Spù/Oza 's "Eth/cs " 
Ùle "power of thillkillg" or all idca, its degree of perfCction and realilY, U and 
its e1Tcctiveness ill dcLcrmilling all illdi"idual's sLri,·ing). "This identification", 
Garrell argues, "is almosl irrcsistibly implied by lhe conjunction of E2p13s 
WiÙl ESp39s" (2008, 2.3). Stc,'cn Nadlcr Lakes Ùûs proposai a slep furÙ1er, 
grounding ÙIe degrces or powcr or thillking enler{ainecl by an indi,'idual's 
minci and ideas illto corrcspolldillg degrees of bodily complcxily: 
"[c]ollsciousness far Spilloza, 1 ... 1 is a certain complcxity in Ùlinking ÙIal is Ùle 
correlate of ÙIe complcxity or a body" (2008a, 575). He thus condudes: 
[Llhe more conscious a milld is, ÙIe more acli,'e and powerfùl it is, 
nol because consciousllcss is idcllLical WiÙI power bUl because bOÙl 
of Ùlese features or thc milld arc grounded 1 ... 1 in Ùle same f~lCl 
aboul ÙIe body, namely, its complcxily. 
(Nadlcr 2008a, 594) 
Still WiÙl rderence to E2p13s, Michael Della Rocca daims Ùlat "Spinoza's 
notion of degrees of animation can usclully be underslood in terms of degTees 
of independence or outsidc causes and lhus in lerms or degrees or confusion 
and aclequacy". He ÙIereby af1inns that "Spinoza similarly tics degrees of 
consciousness lo a mind's degrce or inclcpendence or outsicle causes 111 
ESp39s" (2008, 115-116). 
Unf'orlunately, such an "almost irresistiblc" connection belween the two 
sc ho lia, on which ail ÙIese intcrpretations arc based, is in facl un justifie d, if 
ùlis connection is meanl to equatc clcgrces or animalion or indi\'Ïduals wiili 
corresponding degrces or awarelless or their own menLal stales - wheÙler such 
degrees arc concei,'CC1 or in terms or power or lhinking, complcxity or Ùle 
body, or aclequacy or icleas. ~2 As wc cali sec l'rom E2p 13s, Spinoza pro"ides 
U "By rcalily and pcrfection", Spinoza IITiles, "1 lIndersl;U1d Ùle same Ùling" (E2d6; C 1,447 / G 
II , 85). 
~2 Ali Ù1CSC inlcqJrclations , mOl"c()\'cr, seem lo rc\ 'cal somc inncr inconsislcncics, or lo cncollntcr 
dilliclIltics whcn conrronlcd \\iÙl oÙlcr rllnd;mlClllal Ù1CSCS or passages lakcn l'rom Spinoza's lo:ls, 
SpÙIOZII 'S TheO/y orll,c HlI/lIi/lI ,Ihm/: COI/sc/o //s//css, .\fel/ IOI ); ;///(/ f{Ci/SOI/ 
two dilrerenl crileria on which lhe degrcc of animation of an incli"idual is 
grounded . The firsl crilerion rcle rs to the gcncral capability of Ùle mind of 
"percei\'ing many ùlings al oncc" - i.e ., o f ha\'ing icleas of any killCl - and il 
depends on Ùle corresponding capabilily of ÙIC body "of doing many ùlings al 
once, o r being acled on in many ways al once". In olher words, Ùle firs l 
criLerion depends on the general capabiliLy of a body of bc ing alTecLeci and 
undergoing various modifications aL one Lime, including ail its actions and ils 
inLeractions WiÙl exLernal bodies. Sincc a mind musL percei"e e"eryùling Ùlat 
happens in ils objecL, the more a body is allected and undergoes dillerenL 
modificatio ns aL one rime, Ùle more ideas of bodily allCctions, in parallcl, musL 
also exisl al Ù1e same Lime in Ùle corresponding min(!. A hcalùlY human body, 
which is capable of allecring, and being al1ectcd by, extclllai bodies in many 
For cxamplc, G;UTCtL'S identilication of dq,rrccs of consciousncss with dq,rrccs o f powcr of lhinking 
prcscnl~ problems which hal'e becn po inlcd out hl' LcBullc: 
\ ViÙl0Ut lurÙlcr qualilications on Spinoza's Ùtcory, what is to slop us from conccil'ing 
of a morc pOlVcrlul mind al! of whosc idcas arc less conscious Ùt;Ul thosc in a Icss 
powcrrul mind? In such a casc, onc might wo ndcr what il mcans to say ùtat ÙtC morc 
pOlVcrlul mind is morc conscious, 
(LcBullc 20 10b, 557) 
Furùlcrmorc, GalTctt's intcllJrclatio n SCCln s to makc inexplicable how ÙtC mimi can hc conscious 
or ;my airect of sadncss and pain, which, acconling to Spinoza, arc rclalcd to a diminishmCnl of ÙtC 
mind 's power of ù1inking and perfectio n (scc E3p II and ÙtC rclel'ant scholium, as wcll as E3Ad3), 
Dclla Rocca's account (2008), instcad, sccms 10 cnlail Ùtal ÙtC morc conluscd an idca is, ÙtC lcss 
Ù1C mind is conscious o f il, which conclusion is al odds wiùt Spinoza's d aim Ùtat ÙtC human mind 
is conscio us or its stril'ing insof;u' as it has boùt adcqualc and inadcqualc idcas (E3p9d), Hcgarding 
\'adlcr's l'icw, il c,mnot cxplain consciousncss by suggcsting Ùtat a ccrtain complexity o f ÙtC body is 
dirccùy rcsponsiblc lo I' Ù1C emcrgcncc o f conscious mcnlal slatcs in ÙtC mimi (sec also Bcnnclt 
1984, 136- 139). T his option, indced , is corrccÙY exdudcd hl' :\adlcr himscll': " Illhis would l'iolale 
Ù1C causal and cxplal1atory scparation Ùtat exisls bclwccn ÙtC allribulcs o fThought ;utd Extcnsion 
in Spinoza's p,u-;ulelism", hc writcs (2008a, 59 1) . YCl, if consciousncss was on Il' ùte exprcssion in 
ùlOught of a ccrlain hodily complexity - i,c" "a lunction of (hccausc idcntical wiùt) a mind 's illlcrnai 
complexity" (2008a, 592) - it would, as a rcsuh, bc impossiblc lo r a mind to isolalc and bc conscious 
or ;uty id ca conccil'cd of as "simple", sudt as primitil'c, non-analysable notions, Howcl'cr, ÙtC 
capacity of Ù1C human mind to conccil'c and altcnd scp;u'alcly to simple idcas secms to hill'c had 
an imporuutt rolc in Spinoza's e;u'ly cpislcmology (scc 'l'lE ~~63-65, §68, ~72) . Against o ùter simil;u' 
l'icws, which morc gcncr;uly COl1l1CCl ÙtC exislcncc of scnticnt li IC in ,Ulimals wiÙt ÙtC cxistcncc of 
ccrUlin degrccs of complcxity in a body - sudt as Gcnclicl'c Lloyd's (1 980, 295, and 199 1" 45-46) 
- scc also \Vilson's insighllul rcmarks (11 9991 1 999c, 182-183), who corrccùy poinl<; out Ùtal 
" ISpinoza'sl obsclyations abo ut rclatil 'c 'cxcellcnce' ami ' realily' cI'idcnùy do not amoulll to, nor 
dirccùr enlail, an asscrtion Ùtat 'scnticncc' is corrclatil'e l~i Ùt ' rcquisile dcgrcc o f complcxily' in a 
gil'cn ' idea's' body" (Wilson 11 9991 1999c, 182). 
Chaplcr 1. COIISriOllSIICSS, Idc,1s o/ldcas. <1l1d .1l1illWioll ill SjJ/tI07.a:, "i'.ihin" 
ways al one time (E2posl3 and E2poSl6), will ÙlercJore entertain a n ;ry high 
c1egree of animation accorcling lo ùlis firsl crilerion - that is to say, that the 
corresponding minci will be populalecl by many perceptions and ideas, 
reOecling Ùle orcier and connection of Ùle affections imd"ing the body. 
The second criterion of an incliùdual's clegTee of animation, insteacl, 
rcfers to the capabilily of a mind of "understanding c1istinctly" lhe Ùlings - Ùlal 
is, lo ils capability of having adequale icleas. 13 According to Spinoza, the more 
Ùle atlcctions and actions of a body de pend on lhe nature of the body alone, 
Ùle more ils mincl, in parallel, can be considerecl Ùle "adequate, or lormal, 
cause" (ESp31 cl; C I, 610 / G II, 299) of Ùle corresponcling icleas. Adequate 
ideas, therefore, are icleas in the mind thal Ùle minci can clearly and distinctly 
percci"e as enccts of its own nalure, ~~ raÙler Ùlan ellccts of exterual causes:15 
Hencc, in E2p 13s, Spinoza relales Ùle capabilily of Ùle minci of unclerstancling 
clistincÙy and ha\ing more aclequale ideas - i.e., of heing more animaled 
according lo the second criterion - lo bodies whose actions depencl more on 
Ùlemsclyes, raÙler tllan on Ùle influence of exlerual bodies allccting Ùlem. 
Regarcling bOÙl criteria, howcver, clq,'Tees of consciousness of one's ideas 
- wheÙler Ùley are aclequale or nol- are nol mentionecl, nor is lhere anything 
in E2p13s which may suggest Ùlat Ùle transparency of a mode of Ùlinking 
actually constiluting a minci may clepend on, or he alfeclecl by, Ùle same lwo 
parameters clefining tlle degree of animalion of lhat indi"idual. 
13 See E2p38c, where Spinoza equales adequale ideas wiùJ ideas ÙJal are "d early and distincÙy" 
percei"ecl (C 1,474 / CIl, 119). According lo Spinoza (E2p40s2), adequale ideas C,UJ he eiùJer or 
properties of Ùlings (such as Ùle ideas which constilule reason, or knowlcdge or ÙJe second kiIH!) , 
or of essenccs or singul;u' ùJings (as proclucls or illluiti"e kllowledge). 
~~ Sec E3p Ici ; Spinoza delines ùJe notion or "adequate cause" ill E3d 1: 
1 cali Ùlal cause adequale whose clrecl cali he cbu'ly ,UJd distillcùy percci"ed ÙJrough 
il. Bull cali il p,u·tial, or inadequalc, il' iL~ ciree!. cannol he underslood ÙJrough il ,dolle. 
(E3dl; C 1,492 / G Il , 139) 
ij Ideas depending on eSlernal causes ,U"e accorclingly called "illadequalc". Spinoza rcm;u'ks in 
E3plcl ÙJal " Iiln each human minci sorne iclcas are adequalc, huloÙJers ,u'e mutilalcd and conrused" 
(C l , 493 / C II , 140); he slresses ÙJe same concepl in 1;;''lp3d ,UJd , in 1-:3p9<1, he desnihes ÙJe 
essence or ÙJe minci as "constituled by adequale ,UJd by inadequale ideas" (e l , 499 / G II , l /t7). 
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.si)tilO7.:t~s 171C01.1' otlllC Hllm;UJ .I/tild: COllsciollSlleSS, .I/Cl1JOJ1~ ;UJd ReasOll 
\ Vhy, lhcn, docs Spinoza adoPl ÙlC tcrminology relalcd lo consciousncss 
in lhc Firth Parl or ÙlC JEUl1"cs? 1 believe Ùlal Ù1C answer can oc found al ÙlC 
cnd or E5p20s, whcrc Spinoza dedarcs Ùlal hc will hcnccforÙl "pass lo lhosc 
lhings which pcrlain lo ÙlC mind's duration widloul relation lo Ù1C body" (C l, 
GOG / G II, 291.). Sincc Spinoza is now focusing on Ù1C mincl and ÙlC 
knowlcclgc lhal wc may haye or ils cternity, hc lurns to thc vocabulary or 
consciousncss, which hc still uses lo address dlC knowledge dlal we may ha\'e 
or ÙlC mind "insofar as Ùùs is consiclcrecl as a modc or dlinking WiÙlOul 
relationlo ÙlC o~jccl" (E2p21s). u; 
Accorcling lo Spinoza, il is lrue Ùlal "[tlhc human mind cannol bc 
absolulely clcslroyccl WiÙl Ù1C bocly, but somcd1Ïng of il remains which is 
clcrnal" (E5p23; C l, G07 / G II, 295). lncleccl, Spinoza allirms dlal wc "l'cel 
lhal our mincll ... 1 is clcrnal" (ESp23s; C I, 608 / G II, 296). Howcvcr, Spinoza 
also aclcls lhal wc muslnot conrusc whal we reel as ilic clcrnity or our mincl 
WiÙl lhc lraclitional accounl or dlC immorlalily of ilic soul - Ù1C lallcr ocing 
oascd, according lo him, on ÙlC l'al sc belicf in a prolongccl cluration or our 
mcmory ancl imagination artcr all corporcal activities have ceasecl. ~7 For 
cxamplc, in E5p34s, Spinoza daims: 
Ir wc attcnd lo ÙlC common opinion or men, wc shall scc Ùlal ÙlCY 
arc indcccl conscious or Ù1C clcrnity of Ùlcir mincl Isua:' mentJs 
;L'lemÙalls esse qU/dem COIlSclOSI, bUl Ùlal Ù1CY confusc il WiÙl 
cluration, ancl allrioulc illo ÙlC imagination, ormcmory, which dlCy 
bclic"c rcmains alter dcaÙl. 
(ESp34s; C l, 611-612 / G II, 301-302). 
~6 Along ÙIC samc lincs, artcr his considerations on ÙIC knowlcdgc Ùlat Ùle mimi has of ils OIVlI 
ctcmity, Spinoza condudcs, in ESp-l.Os, by writing: "Thcsc arc ÙIC Ùlings 1 hayc c1ccidccl to show 
conccrning ÙIC mind, insol;u' as it is considcrcd wiÙ10ut relation to Ù1C bocly's cxistcncc" (C l, GI5 
/ G II, 30G). 
~7 In 1<:5p21 , Spinoza cxcludcs ÙIC possibility Ùlat ÙIC mind nUl ciÙlcr imaginc ,U1YÙling or rccollcct 
past Ùlings, cxceptwhilc ÙIC body cndures (C 1,607 / G II, 291) . 
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ChafJ/cr 1. Consclollsness, IdCils of Idca5; and Anima/ion iii Spinoza ~s· "Etllics " 
Oncc agam, Spinoza sccms 10 lurn 10 ÙIC "ocabulary of consciousncss to 
addrcss lhc cognilion lhal wc hayc of our minci, as a mode of lhinking, 
indepcnclenlly ofÙle body. And again, Ùlis "consciousncss", or knowleclge of 
our mincl, secms 10 be lhc origin of somc confusion: in this case, as wc havc 
secn, il may incluce us lo wrongly assume an in clclïnilc cluration of functions 
of lhc mind (such as lhose rclalcd 10 mcmory and imagination) that, by 
conlTast, only clcpcncl on lhc capabilily of Ùle body to bc aITecled cluring ils 
exislencc. 
To prc"cnllhis confusion, which would conlradicl thc Ùloughl-cxlcnsion 
parallclism, Spinoza rcsorls 10 ÙIC samc slralcgy lhal he also acloptecl to 
dcbunk ÙIC falsc bclicl' in fi'cc will: hc grounds Ùle iclea Ùlal constilutcs thc 
elernal parl of our mincl - of which "wc arc conscious" - in its corporeal 
counlerparl. Hc ;u-gucs lhal whcn "wc !Ccl ancl know by cxpcricnce [scllLùnus 
cxpcnillll1'(jucl Ùlal wc arc clcrnal" (17.5p23s; C l , 607-608 / G Il, 296), whal 
our mind rcally pcrcei\'cs as clcrnal is in facl thc iclca "Ù1al exprcsses thc 
csscnce of ÙIC human bocly, unclcr a spccics of clcrnity" (E5p22; C l, 607 / G 
II, 295). k'l Thcn, Spinoza proccccls lo dcmonslralc Ùlal thc minci is always 
conscious of Lhis iclca whcn il coneciycs of' thc Ùlings inLuitivcly, or "by d1C 
dlircl kiml of knowlcdgc". 
If wc turn lo Spinoza's accounL of ÙIC Ùlircl kind of knowlcclge, we can 
noticc Ùlal, in E5p29, hc af1ïnns Ùlal " lwlhaLc\ 'cr our minci undcrslands undcr 
a spccics of' clcrniLy iL unclcrslancls [ ... 1 l'rom lhc f'aeL Ùlat iL conecives ÙIC bocly's 
csscncc undcr a spccics of clcmiLy" (C l , 609 / G II,298). Thcn, in E5p3 1c1, 
Spinoza clclïncs lhc iclca of Lhe csscnce of' ÙIC body eoncciycd unclcr a species 
of clcrnily - whieh idca, as wc hayc jusl sccn, is ÙIC clcrnal parL of ùle mind 
- as "ÙIC aclcqualc, or formaI, causc of Lhc ùlÏrcl kind of knowlcdgc" (C l, 610 
k'l ln E5p23s Spinoza dclines ùlis idea as a "certain mode o r Ùlinking, which per[..,ü lls Lo Ùle essencc 
or ÙIC mimi, ,U1d which is IIcccss;u'ily demal" (e l , 607 / G Il, 295), 
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/ C II , 299). Thc third kind 01" kJlowlcdgc is, in lUrIl, dclinccl by Spinoza as 
"adcquatc knowlcdgc of Ù1C csscncc ol"things" (E5p25d; C l, 608 / CIl, 296). ~9 
Bascd on Ù1C fact Ùlat "Iplarticular ùlings arc nothing but affcctions of Cod's 
attributcs, or moclcs by which God's attribulcs arc cxprcsscd in a ccrtain and 
dctcrminatc way" (E 1 p25c; C l, 431 / G II, (8), Spinoza assimilatcs acl quatc 
knowledgc or particular ùlÏngs WiÙI knowing God itscll". Hcncc, in E5p2/1., 
Spinoza writcs ll1at "Itlhc morc wc undcrstand singular ùlings, ÙIC morc wc 
unclc rsL-'1nd God" (C l, 608 / G II, 29G). This assumption allows Spinoza to 
concludc, in ESp25d, ùlat Ù1C morc wc adcqualcly undcrsLand singular ùlÏngs 
ùlrough knowledgc of Ù1C ùlircl killCI, "ÙIC morc wc undcrsLand Cod" (C l, 
608 / CIl, 296). 
To sum up, Ù1C knowledgc 01" ÙIC lhircl kind dcpcncls on ÙIC cLcrnal parL 
of Ùle mind as iLs adcquaLc causc, and iL in\'oh'cs acicquaLc knowledgc (i.c., 
aclcquaLc idcas) of ÙIC minci iLsclf~ of thc csscnccs of singular ùlings and, 
ùlcrcforc, of Cod.50 This is why Spinoza can allirm, in E5p31 s, ùlaL "ÙIC morc 
each of us is able Lo achic\'c in tllis kind of knowledgc, ÙlC morc he is 
conscious or!ümsclf and of God". For ÙIC samc rcason, 1 arguc, in E5p39s hc 
also aflirms ÙlaL "hc who has a body capable of a gTcaL many ùlings, has a mind 
which considcrcd only in iLsclf is vcry much conscious of iL'iclf~ and of Cod, 
and of ùlÏngs". Spinoza's sLaLcmcnLs arc nol inlcndcd Lo rdcr Lo Lhc O\'craU 
dCgJ-cc of awarcncss of a minci WiÙI rcspccL Lo ils own mcnlal slaLcs, nor do 
Ù1CY conccrn Ù1C dcgrec or LnUlsparcncy of any idca to thc mind ÙlaL pcrcci\'cs 
iL RaÙlcr, Ù1CY conccrn Ù1C kind of idcas lhal a mind rclatcd lo a \'c ry capable 
body (a body, ÙlaL is, whosc actions do not dcpcnd on cxtcrnal causcs) can 
~9 Rccal l Spinoza's dc1inition of Ù1C ùlinl kiml of knowlcdgc in E2pl\.Os2; scc also l'~5p36s: " Ù1C 
knowlcdgc of sill/,rular ùlÏngs ! ha\'c callcd inLuiti\,c, 01' knowlcdgc of ÙIC Ùlird kind Il'crum 
sù/gU/,1l11l111 (vg1lùio, qu;un 11I{1JI'ti1;lIn .5/1 ·C ICI'IJÏgt'lIc/ù appcl/alll" (C !, 6 13 / CIl, 303). 
50 According Lo ESp30, Ù1C minci kno\Vs bOÙl iLsclf and Ù1C body ulldcr il spccics o f cLcrnily. 
"H encc", SpinoZ<l concludcs, "insobr as our mind concci\'cs iL,clf ;Uld ÙlC bo dy undcr a spccics of 
cLcmiLy ilncccss<u'Ïly has knowlcdgc o f God, anel kll<)\\'s ÙlaL iL is in Cod ;Uld is concci\'cd ùlrough 
Cod" (E5p30d; C ! , 6 10 / C II , 299). 
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alla.in and be COllSClOUS or, uU'ough kIlOWledgc or UlC third kind: namcly, 
adequale idcas o f itsclr, o r singlllar UlÎngs and, ulcrcforc, or C od:>l And thcsc 
arc U1C idcas that U1e mind Lruly pcrcci"cs whcnc\'cr il is sa id to ICcl ils own 
clcrnily (ESp23s) and bc conscious o r il (E5p3/j.s). 
Indccd, as wc have sce n, U1e mo re a body is capable or aclÎons and 
modilicatjons which depenel o nly on ils own nalure, the more modilicalÎo ns 
in the minel can be conccivcd as depeneling o n Ule nature or lhe mill(1 alone, 
"conside red o nly in itseU" (E5p39s) - WiUl the ctental parl or the mind being 
the cause o r its mVTl adequatc ielcas o r ilsclr, o r Cod, and or oUlcr singular 
U1ings. Converscly, a body whose attjo ns arc heavily dependenl o n extcrnaJ 
caus cs must bc rclaled Lo a mind Ulal only inadcqualcly knows ilsclr and UlC 
things, by pcrceiving idcas o r alTcclÎons o r UlC body caused by "Iortuilous 
cncounlers" with cxternal U1ings (E2p29s; C l , 471 / C II , 11 if.) - ideas, Lhal 
is, which, likc "conclusio ns WiUlouL premises" (E2p28d; C l , if.70 / G II , 11 3), 
only represent Ù1e c1TecLs and modifïcalÎons produced in o ne's body by Ule 
cxtcrnaJ objects, WiU10ul explajning Ùle nalure or essence or any or UlC Ulings 
responsible l'o r U1cse modilicalÎons.52 
Still, wc scemingly ha"c no soliel basis o n which lo daim Ulal minds 
rclaLed Lo less capable, Jess powcrrul , o r !css co mp!cx bodies Ulélll Ule human 
body shall aJso necessarily be Jess conscious o r Ule ideas that actually exisl ili 
5 l This has bccn a1so pointed oul by LcBull!:, who makcs a similar rcmark: 
Spinoza docs nol wrilc al E.5p39s ùlal mo rc pOlVcrful mimis ha,"c a highcr dcgrcc of 
consciousncss. He m"ilcS ùlal such minds arc mo rc conscious of',hclllsc" cs and of' 
Cod and o f' tllli l[J'S. 1 ... 1 Spinoza is characlclizing a mind 's w nscio us knowlcdgc -
underslood on a corrcspondcncc ÙICOI')' o f U'UÙ I as in parl a relaLion bclwccn ils 
conscious ideas and ùleir objcclS - ;Uld nol a qualily of cxpcricncc, likc inlcnsily, Ùlal 
mighl plausibly bc ùl0ughl lo indicalc conscio usncss or dC/,'TCCS of conscio usncss 
wiÙlOul furùlcr discussion. 
(Le Bull!: 20 1 Ob, 559) 
52 In ùüs scnsc, 1 belic, 'c ùlal il is approprialc lo rcad Spinoza's rcmarks in E5p39s rcg;mling 
consciousncss o f oneself, Cod , and Ù1ings, as ùle counlerp;ut of E2p29, ilS coroll;uy ;Uld scholium, 
wherc Spinoza deals WiÙl Ù1C idcas of bodily ;tfi'ccLions, ;Uld ÙlC rClc'";Ull idcas of idcas, inso!"ar ;l<; 
ÙlCY only del i\"cr a muLilalcd ;md conluscd knowlcdgc of our mi ]]( l, our body, a]](1 ÙlC CxtClll;Ù 
ùüngs. 
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them and constilule Ùlem. To be sure, if an individual's body can undergo 
only a kw modificaLÏons, of which even kwer are delennined by the solc 
nature of thal body, Ùle corresponcling minci wi ll have kw ideas (or 
percepLÏons, in general) and, among Ùlese ideas, even fcwer adequaLe (i.e., 
clcar and dislinct) ones. As a resull, Ùlal individual can be said lo possess a 
very low degree of ";mimaLÏon" according to both criteria expressed in E2p 13s. 
Neverthcless, noùùng prevenls us from regarcling such a scarccly animaled 
individual as perlccÙy conscious of those few, very confusecl icleas of its hodily 
af1cctions Ùlal actually consLÏtute its mind. 
7. Two issues conceming Spinoza's panpsychism solved 
Based on the clemenls pul forÙl, 1 am com'incccl Ùlal Spinoza's way of 
accounLÏng for consciousness in the }:Ü1JCS is coherenl. Y cl, the limits of such 
an accounl arc also evidenl, making Spinoza's Ùleory barcly palalablc, if 
assumed oulsicle iLS original conLexl.53 To reply Lo Ùle quesLÏons raisecl aLlhe 
heginning of Ùle chapler, Spinoza explains the exislence of consciousness in 
nalure in Ùle sa me way as he also explains the simulL-1.neous existence ofhodies 
and mincis: lor any exisLÏng Ùling, minds included, Ùlere musl exisL a 
corresponding idea in God's ùlOughl, which perccives everyÙling lhal occ·urs 
lo its o~iecl WiÙl Ùle same orcier and connecLÏon of causes. On such grouncls, 
Spinoza's ùleory does nol allow for any disLÏncLÏon beLween human ancl non-
human mincis yia Ùleir consciousness, as il does nol clisLÏnguish belween 
cOllscious and unconscious icleas or mincls al aIl. \ t\1hal are we Lo do, Ùlen, 
aboul Ùle paradoxes ensuing from panpsychism? 
53 1 considcr, lor c:x;unplc, Ùlal ÙIC way in IVhich Spinoza sccms lo conllalc basic distinctions which 
arc nOlVadays ,ommonly acccplcd - such as ÙIOSC bClIYccn scll~kllowlcdgc ami cons,iousncss, or 
bclwccn phcnomcnal ,U1d a,ccss consciousncss (sec Block 1995) - may rcprcscnl an obslaclc in 
ùJis scnsc. 
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Hcgarding ÙIC problem of non-human minds, 1 am pcrsuaded Ùlal 
Spinoza would conccde co nsciousncss lo any incli"ic!ual body o r singular Ùling 
Ùlal ('<Hl bc saidlo maintain an csscnLial slruclurc o r unily bctween parts while 
pcrlorming a dctcrminate action - according to his de/in ilio ns o f "singular 
thing" and "individual" (scc E2c!7, anc! E2c\ afkr E2p1 3).51 In ùlis rcgard, ir 
wc look outsidc Ùle j ') }J1rs, wc scc Spinoza himselr pro fiLing from Ù1C universal 
applicabilily or his thCOl"y, WiÙI ÙIC purposc, o nce again, o r dcmo nstraLing thc 
o rigin or thc human illusion or rrcc will. In Ep 58, hc asks his rcader to 
conceiyc or somcùling "\'cry simple", such as a sto nc scl in mo Lio n by an 
cxlcrnal causc. H c statcs that what hc is aboul lo conc\ude aboul Ùle stonc 
must also be conc\udcd aboul "any singular Ùling, howcvcr compositc it is 
conceivcd lo bc, and howc\'cr capable o f c!o ing many ÙlÏngs", since everything 
in nalurc is causally dctcrmincd to cxisl anc! proc!ucc e/rccts in a fi xed manner. 
Concei, 'c now, ir you will, Ùlal whilc Ù1C slone conLinucs to mo\'e, il 
Ùlinks, and knmvs Ùlal as rar as il can, it slriycs to conLinuc moving. 
or course, sincc thc slo nc is conscious o nly o r ils Slri\'Ïng [sui 
La/lLullllllodo COlla/us esL COllSc/OLlS[, anc! nol al ail inc!ifle renl, il will 
bclic, 'c Ùlal it is \'cry rrcc, and ÙlaL il pcrseyercs in mo Lion fo r no 
oÙlcr causc Ùl,lll bccausc il wills Lo . This is thal f~lmous human 
fi-ccdom c\'cryonc brags or ha\'ing, which consisls only in thi s: Ùlat 
mcn arc conscious o r ùlcir appclilc [homi/lcs sui appeùLus SÙJ{ 
cOllscùl and igno ranl or ÙIC causcs by which Ù1CY arc c\clcrmincc\. 
(Ep 58; C Il, 428 / G IV, 266) 
51 ln E2lcnvl-G Spinoza c;ùls such "csscnt.i;ù str uclurc" ÙIC "Io rm" o r ÙIC bocly (C l, 46 1 / G II , 100-
10 1) . \ Vc ha\'c also sccn Ùlal Spinoza dclincs Ù1C idca o r lhc minci as "Ù1C (o rm or Ù1C iclca, inso!;lr 
as ùtis is considcrcd ;l~ a modc or ùtinking \\1ÙIOul relation lo ÙIC objccl" (E2p2 1 s). \IV c may 
ùlcrc!orc concludc Ùlal, as long as ÙIC body rclains ilS lo rm whi lc sl!i"ing lo pcrSC\'c rc in ilS bcing, 
Ù1C minci also rclains ilS 101lll , in parallcl , which is in lurn ÙIC objccl o r Ù1C iclca or Ùlc minci , o r 
consciousncss or such sl!-iùng. Dclining ÙIC cxact lcrms in which Spinoza's no tio n o r "Io rm" is lo 
bc underslood , hOÙI as a mode o r Ù\Oughl and as a mode or exlension, sti ll remains a problcmatic 
task lo r Spinoy;\ scholars. Rcgarding Ùlis, see lo r cxample L-r rke 20 16, 279. 
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One of Ù1C purposcs of a Ùlcory of selccti"c consciousncss is to cxcludc Ù1C 
possibility, rcgarded as absurd, that bodics much simpler Ùlan humans may 
be somehow conscious of Ùlcir (potcntially vcry limitcd) corporeal aITcctions 
and relevant mental slatcs. For Spinoza, howcvcr, to hYPOÙlcsisc Ùlal nOIl-
human minds could be conscious of Ùlcmsch"cs, and to draw conclusions l'rom 
such a hypoilicsis - conclusions lhal apply to ail indi"iduals, however 
composile and howcvcr capable of doing many ùlings Ù1CY may bc, including 
humans - is apparcntly a viable option:>5 
The main concern Ùlal SCClns lo prc"cnl many scholars From ascribing 
such a radical view lo Spinoza is, in Margarcl Wilson's words, tllC common 
expcctation "that mcnlalily is rccognizable l'rom bchavior of a cerlain sorl, and 
Ùle absence of menlalily from 'bchavior' of othcr sorts" (119801 1999a, 130). 
Spinoza cxplicitly argucs for thc oppositc thcsis. Wc shall nol cxpcCl Ùle 
actions of an individual lo bc dillcrcnl, whcÙlcr wc conccive il uniquely as a 
body - and explain ils csscncc, appctilCS, and conscqucnl bcha"iour ùlrough 
thc.laws of cxlension alonc - or whclhcr wc concci,'c il as also providcd WiÙl 
a .<&.lriving mind, conscious or ilself ùlrough Ù1C relcvanl idcas or ils body's 
affcctions. For Spinoza, Ù1C prcscncc of consciousncss docs Ilol accounl for 
any spccilïc difrercnce in bchaviour, sincc a body's way of bcha"ing docs not 
depclld on thc prescncc or consciousncss al ail:>" 
55 Conccrning lhis point, scc also :YIclamcd 20 Il, IGI-IG2. 
56 Heg;mling lhis, sec again E2p7s: 
So long as Illinh'S arc considcred as modes of 1l1Înking, we musl cxplain Ille order of 
Ille whole of nalurc, or Ille cOllllecLÎon of causcs, IllroUgh IlIC alu'ibulC of 1l1OUghl 
alone. And insofar as IllCy arc considered as modes of cxlcnsion, IlIC ordcr of IllC 
wholc of nalure musl bc cxplained IllroUgh lhe alllil>ule of exlension a.lone. 
(C J, tf.52 / G Il,90) 
To be prccisc, Illis is a !Calure of Spinoza's philosophical system Illal has bccn somchow noLÎccd 
by vVilson herseU; who - in spile of her niLÎrism of Spinoza's acmunL, of mind and consciousness 
- in a lalcr articlc Wlilcs: 
Spinoza mainlains Illal ail physica.l phenomcna Il"h;llSOC\'er, including (one musl 
suppose) whal we Illink of as ' inlelligcnl l>cha\ ior', ;11"e suscepLÎble of cxplanaLÎon 
willlin Ille l'calm of physical causes cxclusi\-cly. :YIenlal 'delerminaLÎon' of anylllÎng 
56 
Chi/plCr l , COlIsciollSIICSS, Ir/ci/s oFl dc:J5; ;11/(1 i l llilllalùJ// ill S"ùlO/.a\ "Nhics" 
Thc sccond problem rclalcd lo Spinoza's panpsychism is Ùlat ÙIC mind 
musl pc rceiyc and bc conscio us o r c\'cryÙlÏng that happcns in thc boely. Sincc 
wc cannot re ly o n an y disLÏncLÏo n bclwccn consciolls and unco nscious 
pcrccpLÏo ns o f bodily stales and alreclio ns, il ro llows thatlo r a possible soluLÏon 
wc may o nly lurn lo what is significd by "c\'crything thal happcns in ÙIC body", 
in Spinoza's lcrms. This is also suggcs tcd by thc 1;H't that, in Spinoza's 
framcwork, bo ùl Ù1C limils and co nlcnts o r our cxpcricncc o r oursch'cs and 
Ù1C cxlcrnal world arc prO\idcd by ÙIC all'ccLÏo ns o r our bo ely. Sol\'Ïng lhis 
problem, Ùlc rclo rc, rcquircs cxplaining whal accounts ro r an allc cLÏo n of ÙIC 
body and what consLÏtules ÙIC aclual csscnce o r a body, o r its slri\'ing (E3p7) .57 
This is nol a p roblem relalce! lo Spinoza's philosophy or mimi <tnymo re, buL 
Lo his accounL or bodily indi\'iduaLÏon. 
malc rial is, according lo his syslcm, inconccin lhlc, (.\nd , likcllisc - aJl(I pcrhaps Icss 
aUractiyely l'rom a prcsenl day pcrspccti\ 'C - hc holds Ùlal matcrial expl;Ulatio n of 
mcntal occurrcnccs is rulcd OUl. ) 
(Wilson 11 9991 1999c, 178) 
A conscqucnce o f ùtis ù cw is thal, WiÙl ÙIC S<UllC lcgitim acy \ ~i th which wc can rcgard allminds as 
"spiritual aUlomaw", in Spinoza's lc rms CrI E §85; C 1,37 / G II , 32), Ùlc ir corporcal corrclalcs c;m 
bc cohercntly concei\'cd of as "zombics" - lo borrow a conlcmporary exprcss ion - capablc of 
pcrlo rming ail actions <Uld bcha\Ïours Ùlal Ùlc ir bodily Itllletio ns allolV, WiÙ10Ul ha\Ïng any eonscious 
cxpcricnce o r themsch-cs <Uld ÙIC c:\:tcm al world (scc Chalmcrs 1996, 9/1,-9.)), 
57 By rcrcning lo E3postl , \1a.linowski-Ch;uks (200'la, 68-70) and \1arshall (20 11\" 138- 139) arguc 
Ùlal, fo r Spinoza, only aflcclS counlas cOllscious idcas - assuming, hy Ù1C no tion of ";ùlc<t" , <U l idca 
cOlTcsponding lo an aJlcction im'ohing an incrcasc o r a dccrcasc in onc's hody's pOll'cr of acting 
(E3d3) <Uld , hcncc, a rclC\'<Ull scnsatio ll of joy or sadllcss in Ù1C m iJl(I o-:''3p II s), This ill lc rprcta tiOl\ 
COITCCÙY poinlS al ÙIC spcct:rum of <U l indi\'idual's couati\ 'C li iC lo lind Ù1C boulldarics of hcr 
conscious lire, Illdccd , Ù1C stri\i ng whieh dclincs ÙIC a<tual csscncc of cach ùtillg - alld o f IVhich 
Ù1C millcl is said lo bc cOllseious - is dcli llcd by Spilloza as ;UI alICet, i,c " "dcsirc" (E3p9s; 
E3Ad 1 exp) , HCllcc, wc C<Ul rcasonably expcel ail aIlCctio lls o f whieh Ù1C milld can bc eonscious al 
a ccrla.ill time, lo bc rclalcd lo a ce l'lai Il O\'crall ;ùICcti\ 'c stalc, or dcsirc, which dclillcs ÙIC aclual 
su'i\i ng of Ù1C indi\i duaJ, "insofar as il is cOllcci\'cd lo hc dClcrmillcd , l'rom ally !,>l \'CIl ;ùICctio ll of il, 
lo do somcùl ing" (E3Ad l ; C I, .53 1 / G II , 190), :\c\'c rùlclcss, 1 also lilld ùtis inlcrprclatio ll a bil 
rcducti\,c, as long as il is inslcad mc<utllo su'aightJo rwardly idclltily cadI and ail conscious idcas Ùlal 
c;m bc simultancously pcrcei\'cd bya mi lld "iÙl aIlCc tions iIlH)h-illg a dccrcasc o r illcrcasc in OIlC'S 
powcr o f acting, 1 GlIl concciyc, 10 1' cxamplc, of m;Ul}' lVays ill IVhich my body's acluaJ su'i\'illg o r 
impulscs C<U l undcrgo Ch<UlgCS Ùlalmy milld GlIl cOllsciously pcrcci\'c, lIi Ùlo ul llcccss;u'ily in\'Oh'illg 
<U ly allecl ofjoy o r sadncss, o r ;Uly apparcnl nu'iatio ll ill my hody's O\'crall powcr o f acting (c.g" 1 
lUIll my hcad lo Ù1C lcfl, Ùlcn to Ù1C righl, in a d;u'k room), ln E3p1 5d, Spilloza himsclf cOllccdcs 
Ùlal idcas and alleclS Ùlal do no l im'Oh-c ;lIly ch;lIlgc ill onc's powcr GUI nOllcÙlclcss hc concci\'cd 
in association WiÙl oÙ ICI' idcas im'o h i ng ;ùICcts ofjoy and sadncss, 
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As far as 1 can infe r from Spinoza's skc lchy rcmarks on ùlis lopic, an 
indi\'idual, o r any complex body, can bc concciycd of as a functional unit y o f 
parts, and il is clcfïncd each timc by ÙIC way in which Ù1CSC parts coopcralc in 
thc production of a single cnccl (scc again E2cl 7 and E2d ailer E2pI 3).58 From 
this poinl of "icw, nol c\'cryù1Îng lhal cxisls ancl occurs undcr ÙIC skin of a 
human body, so lo spcak, ncccssarily accounls for an aIlcctio n o r modilication 
of ÙIC body's currenl SLri\"Ïng, nor clocs lhc clclinition o f ÙIC body's actual 
slri\'ing ncccssarily dcmand Ù1C simullancous im-ol"cmcnl of ail ÙIC organic 
parts (and subparts) Ùlat we usually associalc WiÙl our corpo rcal architcclurc. 
For cxample, Spinoza rcgards mcmorics as Ù1C mcnlal corrclatc of 
corporcal "impressions, or lraccs li171prcssiones seu lC'sugÙiI " (E3poSl2; C l, 
Il.93 / G II, 139) of pasl aflc ctio ns Ùlal a body rclains ancl carrics along WiÙI 
ilsclf, as il wcrc .59 y cl., ÙIC prcscncc o f such traces clocs no l always co ncur in 
dclcnnining a body's currcnl slr i\ 'ing o r impulscs. In such cascs, lhcrc is no 
("ompclling rcason to considcr Ùlcm as characlerising Ùle aclual csscncc of ÙIC 
body, since ils clclinitio n docs nol dcpcnd on thcm or im'o lyc Ùlcm. By 
co nlrast, whcn ÙIC body's currcnl appctilc and impulscs arc c llicaciously 
modilicd ùU'ough ÙIC mcdiatio n o f pasl corporcal imagcs, Ùlcir corrcsponding 
idcas will also cxisl in Ù1C mincl ancl will bc pcrce i\"Cd by il. In Ùlal casc, lhc 
mind will bc said lo "rccollccl" pasl ùlÎngs (E2p 18) .60 ln sho rt, Spinoza's 
funclional accounl o f Ù1C human body sccms prime? làcic sullicicnÙy llcxible 
lo adjusl, al éUly timc, ÙIC rangc o f our csscntial bodily actiyitics to lhosc 
58 For a simil;u' characlerisation of Spinoza's accounl of ùle body as a "Iünctional unily", see Lenz 
20 12,1.9. 
59 "The human body G U! undergo many changes", Spinoza IHiles, "and nelu 'ùlcless l'cLain 
impress ions, or tl'aces, of ùle objecl'i, ,Uld consequenùy, ùle SiUl1e images of lhin!,,," (1-~'lposl2; C l, 
193 ! G Il , 139). See ;uso E2posl5 (C l, 162 ! G Il , 102· 103). 
60 ln E2pl 7d2 Spinoza proposes a hYPoùletical ouùine of how ùle general process o f impress ion 
and recollection of images may happen in human bodies. ln E2p 18, il, delllOnSLl'ation iUld 
scholium, Spinoï'_a desniocs ùle particuliU' process of recollection by association of images ùlal he 
calls "memory". Spinoza's accounl o f memory will oc ilnalysed iU ld discussed in chaplers :1 and 1. 
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perceivcd by the mimI, WiÙlOUl necding lo resorl lo Ùle exislcnce of 
unconsciolls idcas,ol 
8. Conclusion 
'1'0 concllldc, c\'cn ùlOugh 1 hardly bc\ic\'C Ùlal wc COli Id evcr succced in 
tracking do\Vn an accounl of sc\ectivc consciousncss in Spinoza, 1 do nol 
impute the reasons lor surh failure lo Ùle way in which Spinoza conslrucls his 
ùlcory in Ùle EUJù:s'. Any dillirully lound in ùlis scnsc, rathcr, dcpcnds on Ù1C 
unjustilied assumption, sccondcd by many scholars, Ùlal "WiÙlOUl Ù1C abilily 
to distinguish conscious l'rom nonconscious individuals, Spinoza's Ùlcory 
cannol bc a dcfcnsiblc accounl of consciousncss" (Martin 2007, 270). As 1 
ho pc lo havc sullicicnÙy dcmonslratcd, li-om Spinoza's poinl of view, and lor 
Ù1C sakc of his immcdialc purposcs, nol only did hc nol nccd lo rcsorl lo a 
sc\ccti\'C accounl of consciousncss - hc sccmingly ncycr inlcndcc\ lo, CiÙ1Cr. 
Secn undcr ùlis lighl, panpsychism should nol causc much concern for 
Spinoza rcadcrs. As 1 mcntioncd abO\'c, Spinoza's panpsychism is a 
conscqucncc or somc morc fundamcnLal Ù1CSCS, on which much of Ù1C 
Spinozisl syslcm is groundcd: ÙlaL for cach cxisting Ùung Ùlcrc is in God's 
altribulc or ùlOughl Ù1C corrcsponding idca, or mind, which mirrors in ÙlOughL 
c\'cryùling that happcns in iLs oqjcct, and Ùlal c\'cryÙling is l'ully dctcrmincd lo 
cxisl and lo act, in cach of God's allribuLcs, according Lo Ùle clernal necessily 
or nalurc's laws. Ir wc arc willing Lo concedc such alypical prcmiscs, Ùlcn wc 
can also acrcpl Ù1C quitc unusual conclusion Ùlal cach linilc bcing - as it may 
hc ligurcd wiÙlin a Spinozist li-amc\Vork - can bc consislcnùy concci\'cd of as ' 
61 Consequently, 10 tlle CXlenl 10 which cxlemal objects become more ,mcl more instrumental in 
tllC way IVe percei\'e and ael in tlle world, tlley call eoherently be consiclerecl inlegTal parts of our 
bodies. This aecounl seems 10 ha\'e some aJlinily \\~Ih tlle "cxlenclecl minci" tlleOl)' (see Clark and 
Ch;ùmers 1998), 
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a "spiritual aulomalon" ('l'lE ~85; C l , ::~7 / G II , 32), cndowccl WiÙl a 
corrcsponcling minci and rC!c"<lnl consciollsncss of ilsclL 
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Chapler 2 
"A Thing Like Us": Hmnan Minds and Deceitful Behaviour in 
Spinoza 
Chapter Abstract 
[n Ù1C lo llowillg chapLcr, [ qucs tio n whcLhe r, despile his panpsychisll1 , Spinoza allows IOr 
clilTc re nces beLween human anclno n-human menlali Ly, [n Lhe l'l'cf/tisc 0 1/ thc Emel/datiol/ 
of'lhe Jnlcllccl, Spinoza wriLcs ÙlaL radical sceplies, \l'ho pcrsiSl in denying ha\'ing any ace'css 
Lo a true iclea in d1Cir minci , shall he regarded as "aulo mala, complcLcly lacking a minci " 
cnE §48), [n d1C r,' hics, Spinoza also rclers Lo cases in \l'hich lhe nalure o f Lhc inLernal, 
suqjectivc po int o f view o f ano Lhcr individual's mind mighL appear ulle rly incompre hcnsihle 
Lo us, Spinoza m cnLio ns bruLes, animais (1-'.3 p57s), suicide victill1s, childre n, fools, ancl 
maclmen (E2p49s) as inclivicluals \l'hose pheno me nal cxperience o f lhemseh-es ancl ÙIC 
worlcl is complctely impc nclrablc - a llhough lhey musl surdy he regarded as having a 
minci , capablc o f scnsatio ns, desires and al1i.:els, [ arh'1le, lherclè:)re, lhaL Spinoza rcle rs Lo 
inclivicluals as "mincllcss" in o rde r Lo capLure a kind o f menla liLy \l'ilh \\'hich Il'C cannoL 
iclentity, [ conlencl LhaL, lo r Spin07A'l, lhe possihilily o r ill1possihiliLy o f recognising Ù1e 
presence o f a similar mcntaliLy in o Ùlc rs is grounded in hehaviour and o riginales in thc 
mcchanism lhal Spinoza names "imitatio n o f lhe al1i.:cls" (Glp27s 1), [ also ;U'h'1lC Ùlat Lhe 
clepenclc nec o f ù1is mcchanism - hy which \l'e e mpalhise I\'ilh "things like us" - o n spccilic 
bchavio ur ÙlaL we rccogllise as Lypically human , and \l'hich \l'e associalc \\'iLh Lhc prcse ncc 
of mc nl..'l l sLaLcs \ViLh which Il'e a re acquainled , could he o ne o f the reasons lo r Spinoza's 
uncompro mising positio n againsL decc itfu[ heha\~our. 
1. Introduction 
Spinoza's daim Ù1al "ail indiYiduals, ùlOugh in dilrcrcnl dcgTees, arc animale" 
alld Ù1e relevanl clemo nslralion arc based 0 11 "co mplclely general" premises 
(E,2pI 3s; CI, 458 / G II,96), These premises l'ollow rrom Spilloza's ùlOughl-
cxlcnsion parallelism, according lo which " Ill he orclcr and COllIlcclio ll of idcas 
is Ù1C samc as Ù1C ordcr and conncclio ll o r ùlillgS" (E2p7; C l , /(,5 1 / G II , 89) , 
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allcl I"rom tllC idcntilicatioll tllal hc makcs bctwccn id cas 01" tllÎlIgs allcl millcls 
of tllillgS Œ2pll-12). On tllis basis, hc condudcs, firsl., tllal tllC humallmilHl 
is Ihc id ca 01" tllC human body Œ2p 13) and, scconcl, tllal: 
For cach thing tllcrc is ncC'Cssarily an iclca in God, 01" which Gocl is 
tllC causc in thc samc way as IL is 01" t11C idca 01" tllC human bocly. 
(E,2pI3s; C l , 458 / G II , 96) 
Thcsc tllCSCS commil Spinoza lo a panpsychisl accounl of nalurc: lor cach 
cxisting body tllcrc is also a corrcsponding minci, capable of" mirroring in 
lhoughl c"cryt11Îng tllal passes inlo tllal body, according lo tllC samc orclcr allcl 
cOllllcction 01" causcs and cO'ccls. Morcovcr, Spinoza's accounl of" 
consciousncss - which is bascd on tllC cxislcncc 01" "idcas of iclcas lidc;Uï/lll 
idCr:d" (E,2p20-23; C l, 467-1{·68 / G II , 108-110) - secms lo commil him Bol 
only lo tllC position tllal ail tllÎngs ha"c a minci, bUl also lo tllC position tllal ail 
Ihings arc somchow conscious of tllC mcnlal slalcs tllal constilulc allcl 
characlcrisc tllcir mincis. For, again, o f" cach tlling - induding, tllcrdorc, iclcas 
and mincis - Gocl can form tllC corrcspondiIlg iclca, which imd"cs knowleclgc 
of" c"crytlling tllal passcs inlo tllC corrcspondillg objecl, accordillg 10 tllC samc 
ordcr aIlcl connection 01" causcs and cflccts.1 
Thcsc daims, howc"cr, sccm lo conl1icl Witll otllcr passagcs 10ulIcI III 
Spinoza's corpus of pilliosophical lcxls. So, lor cxample, in lhc TrcatJsc Oll 
tiJC EmcIldalJoIl OFtilC IIltellect, Spinoza suggcsls l.rcating radical sccptics as 
"aulomala, C'Omplelcly lacking a minci" (rIE §48; C l, 22 / G II, 18). Furtllcr, 
ill tllC Thcological-PoliLical Trcalisc, hc cqualcs aulomala alld bcasls ClTP 
XX, 12), asscrting tllal., whcn parrols imilale human languagc, lhcy spcak as 
aulomala - i.c., "wilhoul a mind" (Trr XIII, 17; C II, 261 / G III , 170). Thc 
1 ln 1-:2(>I\-3d, Spinoza strcsscs Ùlal Ù1C dcmonslraLion of E2(>20, by which il is dcmonsu·alcd ùlal 
"lllhcrc is ,ùso in Cod an idca, arknolVlcdgc, OfÙ1C human mind, IVhich follolVs in Cod in Ù1C S;UllC 
lVay and is rclalcd 10 Cod in Ù1C S;UllC lVay as Ù1C idca, or knolVlcdgc, of Ù1C human body", is 
"uni,·crsal IUllil ·c/;-;zJùl" (e l , 479 / C II, 123). Thc '\S YCrSiOll of Ù1C l~ülI(-s also adcls ùlallhc 
dCIl1011sU·aLion of E2p20 "can bc applicd 10 all idcas" C\S 90). 
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lattcr daim, in particular, cannol bUl sound slriking if wc considc r Ùlal, in Ù1C 
l~{h/('s, Spinoza is aclamant about bcasls and Imvcr animais ha"ing Ùlcir own 
mincis, capable o f rclc"anl scnsatio ns, alTccls, ancl appctilcs (E3p57s; 
E1.p37s l) . YCl, still in Ù1C l"ÜlJcs, Spinoza also d aims Ùlal animal scnsatio ns, 
alTccts , ancl appctitcs, dilTcr from Ù10SC o f human bcings, sincc animais "cio 
nol agrce innaturc WiÙl us" (E/1.p37s 1; C l , 566 / G II ,237) , and " lclach aflccl 
of cach indi"iclual cliffe rs from Ù1C anccl o f anoÙlcr as much as Ù1C csscnce o f 
Ù1C onc from Ù1C csscncc o f lhc oÙlcr" (E3p57; C 1,528 / G II , 186). 
'1'0 makc scnsc o f Ù1 CSC apparcnÙY co ntradiclo ry d aims - and rcco ncilc 
Spinoza's panpsychism WiÙl his occasio nal cquatio ns bclwccn mindlessncss, 
automata and bcasls - 1 argu e Ùlal wc musl sl..:·u l by considcring Spinoza's 
lurÙlcr charactcrisation o f raclical sccptics, in Ù1C TIf., as syslcm atic li;u·s. 
According lo Spinoza, sceptics of Ùus sorl "spcak conLrary lo Ùlc ir own 
consciousncss" ('l'lE §1.7; C l, 22 / G II, 18): Ù1C things Ùlal Ù1CY say cio nol 
allow us lo associatc any o f Ùlcir wo rds lo whal Ù1CY may o r may nol lhink. 
Thc qucs tions lhal wc will ha, 'c lo addrcss, Ùlcrdo rc, ;u-c Ù1C fo llowing: o n 
whal basis, acco rding lo Spinoza, cio Ù1C Iics o f Ù1C sccptics clcscryc Ù1C samc 
Lrcat.mcnt Ùlal wc would gi,'c to inanimalc objccts ? And , mo rc imporl;mÙY, 
whal clocs il mcan lo trcal somco nc o r somcÙling as an inanimalc o qjccl -
and lo rcgarcl il as ;m "aulomal..:1., complelcly lacking a minci" - in a wo rld 
whcrc, according lo Spinoza himsclf, ail ùlÏngs "arc nC"c rÙ lCless animalc" ancl 
providcd with a conscious minci ? 
Thc answcr lo Ù1CSC questions, 1 shaH ar/,ruc, is lo bc lo uncl in Spinoza's 
Ùlcory of lhc "imitation o f Ù1C alTccts" (E3p27s l ; C 1,509 / G Il , 1(0), which 
also pro\'idcs Ù1C grouncls fo r a Ùleory o f human rccognition. Abscnce o f 
mcntalily, in Spinoza's tcnns, is to hc inlcrprclecl as rclerring lo our inabilily 
lo cmpaÙlÏsc WiÙl o lhc r incli"iduals, and lo ascribc lo Ùlcm Ù1C killCl o f mcnlal 
slatcs, ùlOughts ancllCclings Ùlal wc wo uld ascribc lo oursch·cs. Insofar as lics 
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and dcccitlul bchaviour aim al prc,'cnting us from underSlanding whal may 
pass into somconc elsc's mind, they may bring about an c11ccti,'c incapability 
to associatc thc cxtcrior acts of an individual witl! corrcsponding feelings and 
Lhoughts with which wc arc acquaintcd on ÙlC basis or our own pcrsonal 
expcricncc. In Ùle most cxlrcmc sccnario, lies and c1cCl~ itlul bcha,iour may 
rcsull in Ù1C tolal incomprchcnsibilily of onc's bcha,'iour and Ù1C conscquent 
impossibility of cmpaùlÎsing WiÙl ÙlC dccciycr - of considcring her, Ùlal is, as 
a hum;m bcing, cnclowed with a mind, /Celings, ancl allccts cqual to ours. As 
wc will scc, providing answcrs lo lhcsc qucstions will also help us to aclclress 
aIl0Ùler lunclamental problem, raiscd by Margarct \Vilson, conccrning how 
wc can clistinguish spccilically human bchayiour aIlcl corrcsponcling mcnl..-:1.liLy 
from thcir non-hUmaIl counlcrparls, in a uniycrsc whcrc all Lhings arc 
concci,'ccl or as "animale" and prO\'idcd WiÙl a rclevanl conscious minci 
(Wilson 119801 1999a, 130). 
ln orclcr to bcllcr elaboralc lhc conccpLual li-aITIcwork skeLchecl abovc 
aIld adclrcss Ù1C challcngcs Ùlal il poscs, 1 will bcgin, in scction 2, by 
summarising ÙlC main trail,> or Spinoza's panpsychist accounL of nalurc. In 
section 3, 1 will analysc Spinoza's charactcrisation of radical sccptics as 
mincllcss aulomata. In section 11., 1 will consider passagcs, louncl in Spinoza's 
Thcological-Poliûcal Trca/ùc, whcre hc cqualcs aulomala ancl bcasts, on Ù1C 
onc haIld, and opposcs lhcm lo humans, on thc oÙlcr hancl; 1 will comparc 
Ùlcse cascs to inslanccs, lound in lhc ]"l!Jics, whcrc Spinoza sccms to trcat 
oÙlcr sccmingly human bcings as individuals whosc bchayiour ;md mcnlalily 
arc incomprchcnsible and impcnclrable. In scction 5, 1 will cxplain Spinoza's 
Ùlcory or ÙlC "imitation or ÙlC alrccts", by which wc "juclgc ÙlÎngs lo bc likc 
us" (E3p22s; C l, 507 / G II, 157) and ascribc Ùlcm aflccts idcnticallo Ù10SC 
lhal wc /Cel in ourseh-cs. In scction G, 1 will analysc Spinoza's clclinition of 
"humanily" as an allccl sharcd by people capablc or cmpaÙlising WiÙl cach 
GIj, 
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o Ù1er, and will conside r Ù1e reasolls that lcad humall beillgs to mi~judge each 
o Ù1er's allective slales and ÙlOughts. In scctio ll 7, which cOllclueles Ù1e chapler, 
1 will suggesl how Ù1e mechallism o f thc imitatio ll o f affecls characlerises 
specifically human beha\'iour anel mClltality, strcss ing Ù1C challenges and risk 
lo which ù1Îs mechanism is exposed whcll faccd wilh syslematic ckcciŒul 
behavio ur. 
2. Spinoza's panpsycrusm 
As we have seen in Ù1e previous chaplcr, ill his philosophicalmaslerpiecc, the 
EtJ1ics, Spinoza seems lo lcan lowards a panpsychist accounl of nature. H e 
conlends Ù1al fo r each corporeal Ùlillg cxistillg ill naturc - cach body, Ùlal is, 
existing as an affectio n o r modificatio ll of C od illsofar as Il is an inlinilcly 
extended ù1Îng - there is a corresponding idea, which exists as a modification 
o f God 's allribule o f Ù10ughl (E2p3). This idea, Spinoza argues, acts as Ù1e 
mind of Ù1e body: everYÙling Ùlal happens in thc ol~jccl of Ù1e ielca - Ù1al is, 
in Ù1e body - musl be somehow "percci\'ed" (E2p 12; C l , 456-457 / G II, 95) 
by the correspo nding idea, o r mind. 
For whale"er happens in Ù1C ol ~jccl of ally idea, lhe knowlcdge of 
Ù1al Ù1ing is neccssarily in C od, inso!;tr as Il is considcred lo be 
afleclecl by Ùle iclea of Ùle samc ol ~jecl, i.c., inso!;lr as Il consLilules 
Ù1e mincl of some Ùling. 
(E2pI2d; C l , 1.57 / G II ,95) 
This clemonst.ratio n, Spinoza holds, is "co mplctcly gcncral ladmodUJll 
C0I71111UJ1J'a I , ancl do lcslno t pcrlain morc to man thall to oÙlcr individuals, ail 
o f which , lhough in clifle renl dcgrccs, arc nC\'crthclcss animalc" (E2pI 3s; C l , 
458 / G II ,96). 
A problcm somctimcs alt.ributcd to Spilloza's accoulll of naturc is Ùlal il 
lca\'cs unanswercd Ù1C qucstio n as to whcther ùlÎs panpsychisl framcwork also 
6r: ,) 
Spil/oza 's Tl/coi1' ot/hc Hllm,UI .llil/d: COIISe/OUSIICSS, .llcm o!.l ; afl{l f(caSOIl 
implics lhaL ail indi\"iduals ÙlaL cxisL in Ù1C phys ical rcalm arc conscious of 
lhcmsclvcs (o r of anyÙ1Ïng in gcncral) , so long as Ù1CY arc ail prO\·idcd wilh a 
mind and pcrceptions o f Ùlc ir own bodily aflcctions. This is a common 
qucstion l'or any advocaLc o r panpsychism2 and, indccd , il was cxpliciùy 
addrcsscd by Leibniz, who sta rLcd Lo dcvclop his own philosophy whcn 
Spinoza's sysLcm was basically accomplishcd.3 
Leibniz mainta.ins ÙlaL ail simple substanccs cxisting in naturc, o r crcalcd 
monads, havc pcrceptions and appctitio ns and ÙlaL "Iilf wc wish 10 call soul 
c\·cryÙung ÙlaL has p crccpûolls and nppclJlcs 1 ... 1 Ùlcn all simplc subslanccs o r 
crcaLcd monads can bc called souls" (Nfo/lndology§ 19; AG 21 5 / Gc VI , G 1 0). 
Hc also conLcnds thaL "Ù1crc musL bc simple substances c\·crywhcrc" and Ùlal, 
" lai s a rcsulL, ail of naturc is full o f life" (PnilcIplcs or N a/un ..: ;uJ(1 Gracc § 1; 
AG 207 / Gc VI, 598). Y cL, Lcibniz also distinguishcs ucLwccn pcrccptions 
ÙlaL arisc Lo consciousncss in a monad - which hc namcs "appcrccptions 
lappcrccplJO/l ou /. . ./ c01l.S'Ocnccl " (Nfonadology § 14; AG 2 11\. / Gc VI, (08) 
- from unconscious pc rceptions, which arc "similar Lo whcn wc rainL o r whcn 
wc arc o\'crwhclmcd by a dccp, drcamlcss slecp" (Mo/ladolo,gy §20; AG 21 5 
/ Gc VI , 610) . Thus, hc c\'cntually o pts fa r limiting Ù1C usc o r Ù1C tcrm "soul 
2 Thom,l> :\agcl (1 979, 195), fo r example, acknowledges Ùle relcl,ulce of Ùle qucslion, hullci\\·cs 
il un;Ulswered , bri\"en Ùle dillicullics rclalcd WiÙl IJrO\·iding ,Ul cxplanalion of consciousness as a 
phenomenon emerbring fi·om bas ic properlies of maller ,Uld bodies. By conlras l, ùtinkcrs such ,l> 
l)'I\·id Chalmers (20 13) ,Uld Calen Slrawson (20 17) seem lo allow fo r a dclini lion of "panps)'chism" 
which slraightJo n vardly ,lSsociales basic ph)'s ical slales of alliti r \\;ÙI fOlms o f menlal acli\·il)', ,Uld 
menlal acli\'ily wiùl subjecli\'e, conscio us cxperienlial slales. Chalmers m·ilcs: "For presenl 
purposes, 1 ... 1 1 will underSlr1.nd p,U1psychism as ule ulcsis ulal somc IÙ]](!;unenlal ph)'s ical enli lies 
arc conscio us: Ùtal is, ulal ulere is someuling il is like lo be a qu,u·k or a pholon or a mcmher of 
some oUler fun(!;unenlr1..l phys ical lype" (20 13, 1) . Sce also colr 20 17. 
3 The lcxls of Leibniz lo which 1 cxpliciuy rcler here, namcly ule Pni/u iJlcs of'Xaiurc ;II/rl Gra('(~ 
Based 0 11 Reasoll and 77/c Pnilâplcs o f'PhilosopfJ; ; 0/; Il/e .. l1olladolo!J)', \Vc re boul \\l;llen in 
1714, low,u-ds Ule end o f his li lC. For a deutilcd accounl of Leihniz's reccplion of Spinoza's 
philosophy, see L-crke 2008. 
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IrÎJlJcI " lor ''Lhosc substances 1 .. . 1 whcrc pcrccptio n IS mo rc distinct and 
accompanicd by mcmory" (Nl ollad%gy § 19; AG 216 / Gc VI, 61 0) . ~ 
Spinoza, by contrast, docs not sccm to prm'idc any distinclio n bctwccn 
conscious and unconscious idcas, minds, or pcrccptio ns wiÙlin a mind.5 As a 
mallcr or f~lct, Spinoza's usc or ÙIC notio n o r "consciousncss" - to which hc 
somclùncs rc1c rs by mcans o r thc Latin noun cOllsclelll.ù and thc rcle, 'anL vcrb 
COllScJUS esse ("to bc conscious") - sccms to suggcst Ùlat conscio usncss, or 
awarcncss or onc's own pcrceptio ns o r bodily and mcntal statcs, is somcùling 
connalural to ùlOught and cocxtcnsi,'c WiÙ1 iL Co nsciousncss, Ùlat is, is a 
l'calurc or ùloughl, which is capable or mirroring and cncompassing ail lhc 
aspccts or thc mcntal lirc or an incliùdual's minci - just as much as a ccrtain 
ki\l(l or mcnlallif'c is assumcd, in Ùle first placc, to min'o r ÙlC who le rangc o r 
phcnomcna Ùlat occur in ÙIC phys ical rcaJm o r bodics. 
Thc daim Ùlat ail Ùlings ha, 'c a mincI, fo r Spinoza, Ùlc rc10 rc cntails Ùlat 
ail Lhings arc conscious.6 What a Ùling may bc conscious or, howcycr, and in 
which ways, dcpcnds on whal Spinoza caUs ÙIC "dcgrcc o r animaLio n" or a 
~ III Ihe Pni/oil /cs al' . \ ~1IuH: and C /;ICC 31\" Leibniz allilll1S ùlal " appcrcqJùo lI, which is 
COIISn'OllSIICS!l', is "someù1ing nol gi\"ell 10 ail souls, Ilor al alltimes 10 a !,>Î\'ell soul" (A G 208 / Ge 
VI, 600). III ùle same leH, by ùle Ilo tion or "sensatioll" (sclIlùncII1, ill Frellch) , Le iblliz dclilles a 
perceptio ll which is sulIiciellùy distincl ;Uld accomp;Ulied by memOl}' - "a perceptioll o f whieh 
ùlere remaills;Ul eeho lollgenoughlo make ilsclfhe,ml o ll occasion" (PniJ('li}lcs O{ ,\ ;1Iurc al/d 
C racc 31; AG 208 / Ge VI , 599) - distillguishillg il li"om ùle sla le or "simple mOllads", :\Ol i· 
eonscious perceptio lls are, ùlerclore, ùlose which ch;u"aclerise ùle slale o f simple, or e\'ell "hare 
mOllads Imollades loulcs lIuesl" - as he also miles ill ùle :vIo lladolo!,'Y (§24; AG 216 / Ge VI, 6 Il) 
- "ill whieh lloùlÎng is distincl" (Ylollad%gy 321; AG 2 16 / Ge VI, 6 10), For some sludies 
eOllcel'llillg Le ilmiz's accoulll o f hum,ul alViu'elless and ùle relatioll belweell perceptioll alld 
collsciouslless, see \Vilson (1 992) 1999b, Gennaro 1999, ;Uld Jo rgensell 20 II. 1 disagl'ee WiÙI o lle 
or \Vilsoll 'S collclusioll, accordillg 10 which "boùl Spilloza ;Uld Leiblliz radically di\ 'OITe Ùle IlOtiOIl 
o f perceptioll fi 'om ùlal o f conscious, n plicil awarelless" (\ Vilsoll 11 9921 1 999b, 336), since 1 see 
no lrace or such a "radical di\"OlTe" o r no tions in Spinoza's lexL<;, 
5 FurÙlermore, and dillc renÙY l'rom Leihlliz, Spillo~;t seems lo cOllsider ùle lerms "perceptio ll 
Ipcn"q l liol " alld "sellsatiolll sclIsaùOl ", alld ùle rele\, Ull \'erbs "lo percei\'e Ipcro iJCrd " ;Uld " 10 !Cel 
ISCIIÙi'd ", as equi\'alclll ill m;UlY cases, ,Uld capahle o r rclc lTing lo bolh adequale ;Uld illadequale 
ideas (see, lor ex;unplc, 1-:2p49s; C 1,487·188 / G II , (33), Fo r sludies collcerning similarities and 
dillercnces belween Spinoza's and Leibniz's ùleorics of a who lly ,U1imaled uni\'crse, sec Bo U\'eresse 
1992 and l'i ro 199/1., 
G Concerning ùlÎs poinl, see also :vIclamcd 20 Il , 1 (j 1·1 62, 
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body. IL depends, Ùlal is lo say, on lhe capabiliLy o f a body Lo be aflceled and 
modilied by exlelllai bodies, and lo ael and produce modiIïcaLÏo ns by ils own 
power alo ne. Indeed, aecording lo Spinoza, Ùle more a body can be disposed 
and alTecled in a greal many ways - eiÙler by exlelllal ùlÏngs o r by ils own 
power alone - Ùle more a mi\l(1 is also capable o f being allccLed by and 
percei\'ing many Ùlings in l11any ways.7 The mechanism Ùlal underlies Ùle 
lo rmaLÏon o r ideas and percepLÏons in an indi"idual's mincl is, in Ùus sense, 
meanl lo relleeL Ùle number, "ariely and complexity o r modilicatio ns ÙlaL a 
body is capable o r produeing and underLc"lking, eiÙler simultaneously o r 
ùlrough LÏme, aulonomously o r under lhe impulse of exlernal bodies, wiilioul 
losing ils essenLÏal inlegTily.8 
The quanLÏly and Ùle qualiLy o r ùle conscious experience enlerLc"lined by 
each indiviclual's mind may vary, Ùlerclo re, in o rder lo re llecl in ùlOught Ùle 
peculiar consLÏluLÏon or eaeh body and Ùle ellccLÏve inleracLÏons lhal each body 
has WiÙl exlernal bodies during ils exislence. No Ùlreshold lo conscious life is 
ever menLÏoned or considered by Spinoza, however, since Ùle reason fo r lhe 
exislence or consciousness ilsclr does nol clepencl on an y o r Ùle parLÏcular 
fCatures Ùlal may dcline an individual's bocl y o r mincl , bUl is grounded on Ùle 
mere racllhal lo r any exisling ùling Ùlere musl be an idea, in God, capable of 
7 See, lo r example, E2p 1 4, acmrding lo which il is in "irlue of Ùle 1;\Cl Ùlal Ùle hum;U1 body is 
capable o f bcing an'ccled in m;UlY ways by eXlel1lal bodies, ;U1d disposed Lo a1kcl exlernal bodies 
in m;UlY ways, Ùlal Ùle human mind is also capable of percei\ing man y Ùl ings . 
8 Henee, in E2p 13s, Spin07;1 d aims: 
IT lo delermine " 'hal is Ùle dil1ercnce belween Ùle human mimi ;U1d Ùle oÙlers, and 
how il surpasses Ùlcm, il is neccss;lI)' lo r us 1 .. . llo kIlOw Ùle nalure of iLs object , i.e., 
of ÙIC hum;Ul body. 1 ... 1 1 say ùlis in general, Ùlal in proportion as a body is more 
capable ùlan oÙlers of do ing many ÙJinh'S al once, or being acled on in many ways al 
once, so iLs mind is more capable Ùlan o Ùlers o f percei,ing m;U1Y ùlings aloncc. And 
in proportio n as Ùle actions of a body depend morc o n iLscl f alone, and as oÙlcr bodies 
concur WiÙI it less in acting, so iLs mimI is more eapablc o f underslanding distincÙy. 
(E2pI 3s; C Il, 458 / G Il , 97) 
Spinoza's dclinition of body, his ÙleOl)' o f indi"iduation o f bodies in exlension ;U1d his accounl of 
holV bodies preSelye Ùleir identi lY, or nalure, ùlrough ch;U1ge, ;u·e lopics still debaled by Spinoza 
sehol;u"S. For a recelll discussion of Ùlese Ùlcmes, sec l'elerm;U1 20 17. 
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cxprcsslllg 111 LhoughL C\'cryLhing that passcs inlo Ùlal Ùling - if and whcn 
anyÙung occurs inLo Ùlal lhing - ancl lhal any iclca can bc, in lurn, pcrcei\'cd 
byan individual's mind by I11cans or otlicr idcas (E2p20-23). 
This Ùlcsis has raisccl cycbrows among Spinoza scholars. Onc of Ù1C 
mosL SLraightforward and apparcnlly dccisivc motivcs lo rcsisl such a swceping 
Ù1COry of minci is Ùlat, in our common undcrstanding, "Ihla\'ing a minci is 
associaLccl WiÙl Ùunking and bcing conscious" and "mcnlalily is rccogluzablc 
l'rom bchavior or a cerlain sorl, ancl thc abscncc or mcnlalily l'rom 'bchavior' 
of oÙlcr sorls," as poinLccl oul by Margarct \J\1ilson. From such a pcrspcctivc, 
Spinoza's ovcrall Ùlcory or minci woulcl simply "rail lo makc scnsc or Ù1C 
specifie phcnomcna orhuman mcntalily" (\'Vilson 119801 1999a, 130). 
Objcctions basccl on such an argumcnl - according lo which Ù1C 
altribution or mcnlalily, inasmuch as it also implics Ù1C prcscnce or 
consciousncss, shoulcl accounl l'or thc cxistcncc or a spccific kincl or bcha\'iour 
in naturc, charactcrising a limilccl scl or indi\'icluals (namcly, humans ancl, 
possibly, a kw oÙlcr spccics or animais) - sccm howcvcr lo miss Ù1C largcl, in 
Spinoza's casc. Spinoza r~iccls lhc cxislcncc or rrcc will: lhcrc is nOÙling Ùlal 
a mind can do lo changc lhc lrain or ils lhoughts, which (ûllow onc anoÙlcr 
accorcling lo clcrnal nccessily (E2pl/.8), Icl alonc to changc Ù1C coursc of Ù1C 
cvenLs Ùlaloccur bclwccn bodics illlhc physical domaill. Indccd, Spilloza also 
r~iecls any minci-body causal inlcraction, whilc maintaining al Ù1C samc timc a 
slTicl, nccessary correlatioll bclwcclI mClllal alld bodily slalcs. According lo 
his so-callcd minci-body parallclism, "Itlhc ordcr alld conncction or iclcas is 
Ù1C samc as Ù1C orclcr and conllcction or things" (E2p7; C l, /(·51 / G II, 89) 
and "Ù1C orclcr of actions alld passions or our body is, by nalurc, al onc WiÙl 
Ù1C orclcr of actions éUlcl passions or thc millcl" (E::3p2s; C l, 1/-9/(. / G II, 141). 
Morco\'cr, Spinoza argucs lhal "ILlhc body call1lol clclcrmillc Ù1C minci lo 
Ùlinking, ancl Ù1C millcl cali IlOt dclcrmillc Ù1C body lo motion, lo rcst or lo 
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anYÙung elsc (if Ùlcrc is anyÙlÏng clsc)" ([.3p2; C l, 4~)i1. / G II, 11.1), Modcs 
of diflerent aU.ributcs (such as boclics in cxtcnsion and idcas, or minds, in 
ùlOught) can only havc moclcs of lhcir samc atlribulc as lhcir proximalc causcs 
(E,2p6 and E2p7s). In oÙlcr worcls, only a body can pul anolhcr body into 
moLion or lo rcst, and only an idca can causc anoÙlcr iclca lo cxisl. Thcrc/orc, 
Spinoza claims: 
ISlo long as Ùlings a.rc consiclcrcd as modcs of ùlinking, wc must 
cxplain ÙIC orclcr of lhc wholc of nalurc, or Ù1C connccLion of 
causcs, ùlrough thc aU.ribulc of ùloughl alonc. And insofar as Ù1CY 
arc considcrcd as modcs or cxlcnsion, Ù1C ordcr of Ù1C whole of 
nature must bc cxplaincd ùuough Ù1C allribulc of cxlcnsion alonc. 
(E2p7s; C 1,452 / G II, 90) 
l3ascd on thcsc premiscs, il follows Ùlal whalc\'cr wc may concludc rcgarding 
Ù1C bchaviour of an indiviclual by analysing hcr statcs of mind (if ùlis is 
possible), musl cvcnlually corrcspond and lead to Ù1C samc conclusions Ùlat 
wc may also draw, rq,ra.rding ÙIC samc individual, by limiling our analysis lo an 
in-dcpÙl survcy of hcr bodily funclions and ÙIC way in which Ù1CY ncccssarily 
inlcracl WiÙl ÙIC exlcrnal cll\'ironmcn1.9 WhcÙlcr or nol 1 concci\'c of il as 
providcd WiÙl a conscious minci, a body in moLion will always and ncccssarily 
acl in ÙIC samc way, according lo ÙIC laws of physics. Hcncc, l'rom a SpinozisLic 
stand point., wc havc no nccd lo disLinguish bclwccn eonseious and non-
conscious cnLiLics in ordcr lo disLinguish in nalurc "bcha\'ior of a ccrlain sorl 
1 ... 1 l'rom 'bcha\'Îor' of oÙlcr sorts", as Wilson would ha\ 'c us do, sincc nonc 
of lhc pcculiariLies which charaelcrisc spccifie human bchaviour - and which 
9 ln Ùüs rcgard , Margarcl 'vVilson COITCCÙY W!'ilcs: 
ITlhc mcntal aspccl of finilc Ùlill!,'S is, likc ÙIC matcrial , a ' p;ut of naturc ': minds 
ÙIcmsch'cs bclong lo 'nalurc's orclcr', 1 .. ,1 ÙIC changcs of ÙIC idcas lhal composc mimIs 
;U'C subjccllo dClcrministic cxpl;matioll in somc lVay parallcllo cxplallatioll of malcrial 
rh;Ulgc according lo Ù1C laws of maucr-ill-motioll, 
(Wilson 119991 1999(', 178) 
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wc arc uscd lo associating WiÙl somc spccilic human mcnlal phcnomcna - arc 
dctcnnincd oy lhc prcscncc o r conscio usncss p cr sc, or by Ù1C prcscncc or 
mcntality, in gcncral. lO 
y cl, ùlis answcr lo vVilson's ol~jcction providcs a lu rÙlcr scnsc in which 
hcr obscryation occomcs rclcyanl. For, cycn ir Spinoza's ùlOughl-cxlcnsion 
parallclism prc"cnls us [rom concluding Ùlal Ù1C p rcscnce of mcntality as such 
may dClcrminc any spccilic bchayiour in nalurc, Ù1C sarnc ùlOughl-cxtcnsion 
parallclism rcquircs us to admil Ùlal dilTcrcnl kinds o r corporcal bchayiours 
muslncccssarily bc accompanicd by Ù1C prcscncc o r dillc rcnl, corrcsponding 
kinds or ùlOughl actiyitics . H cnce, il' Ù1CIT is a spccific kind o[ bcha\"Ïour thal 
wc may cali "human", thcn wc can associalc Ùlal bcha\'iour WiÙI ÙIC prcscncc 
o r a spccilic kincl o r mcnla llilc which is also dcfinable as pcculiarly "human". 
Vicc "crsa, ÙIC prcscncc o r a kincl o r mcnlalily which wc can dcfinc as lypically 
"human", musl cxprcss ilsclr, in Ù1C corpo rcal domain, in a kil1(1 or ocha\'iour 
Ùlal wc shall also rccognisc as pcculiarly "human". 
Wc arc Ùlcrc[orc lcfl wanting an answcr lo Ù1C lû llowing qucstion: how 
do wc dclinc spccilically human bchayiour and mcnlalily? As wc shall scc, 
Spinoza docs nol prO\'idc any conclusi\'c delinitions of ÙICSC." Raùlcr, whal 
Spinoza sccms lo providc, in his l ..,üu'cs, is Ù1C dcscriptio n or a sophisticalcd 
mcchanism by which wc, from a lirsl-pc rson po inl or \"Ïcw, acknowlcdgc 
humanily in indi\'iduals by rccogllising, in natu rc, somcllting "similar lo us". 
10 As poinLcd o uL in ÙIC prc\'ious chapLcr (chapLcr l , IOOll lOLC 56), \ Vilson rcco/,'l liscs ùlis pcculiar 
conscqucncc or Spinoza's parallclistic conccption o r mcntal ,md corporcal c"cnLs: 
Spinoza maintains ÙlaL ail phys ical phcnomena whatsoc\'cr, induding (onc must 
suppose) wh aL wc ùJink or as ' inLc lligcnl bcha\'ior' , ;U'C susccptible o r cxpl;ulation 
wiÙlin ÙIC l'calm or phys ical causcs cxdusi"cly. Mcntal 'dClCIll1 ination' o r anYÙling 
malcrial is, accord ing lo his sysLcm, inconcci\·able. (. \nd , likcwise - and pcrhaps lcss 
atll'acti\·cly Ii'om a prcscnL day pcl'spccti"c - hc ho lds Ùlal malc l;al cxplanation or 
mental occurrcnccs is l'ulcd OUl). 
(\ VilsonI1 99911 999c, 17H) 
I l T he abscncc or such dclini tions in Spinoza constituLes ÙIC main problem im'cstigalcd by J ulien 
Bussc (2009) . Scc ,ùso MaÙlcron (l97H) 20 II a; Sh,uTJ 20 Il b, 9 ~ ; Sangiacomo 20 1 :~b , 85-87 . 
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ln Ùle rest of Lhis chaptcr, thcrclorc, 1 will cxplore ancl Lry Lo make sensc or 
Lhis mechanism. 1 will bcgin, howc"cr, by analysing Ùlose cases in which 
Spinoza dcnies the prescncc of ÙIC basic fcaLurcs Ù1aL characLcrisc human 
bcha"iour - cascs in which hc, dcspiLC his panpsychism, secms Lo cleny 
menLaliLy Lo indi\'iduals ouLrighl. 
3. Mindless automata and spiritual automata in the TIE 
There is a passagc, in the Trcaf.J:5e aIl tJ1C r.Jl1cndau'on OrtJ1C Intellcct, whcrc 
Spinoza daims Ùlat, under certain circumsLances, somc indi,'iduals "musL bc 
rcgarded as auLomata, compleLcly lacking a minci" (TIE §48; C l, 22 / G II , 
18). Spinoza is addrcssing thcrc some supposcd radical sceptics who, in 
opposition Lo ÙIC philosophical method ÙlaL Spinoza is cxpounding, arc wi lling 
Lo deny ÙlaL onc may know any truÙI whaLsoc\'cr -leL alo nc dcducc onc t.rUÙI 
l'rom anoLher. 
BuL pcrhaps, ancrwards, some sceptic would still doubL bOÙ1 Ù1e 
fïrsL LrUÙI itsclf and c\'cryùlÏng we shall deduce according Lo Ù1C 
sLandard of ÙIC ErsL LruLh. Ir so, Ùlcn eiÙ1cr he will spcak conLrary Lo 
his own consciousncss IcOIlf.J~1 cOIlso'cnf.J;ul1 Joqllclwi, or we shall 
confcss ÙlaL therc arc men whosc minds also are compleLely blinded 
IpcJJùlIS ... ;UlJ/JJO occiL'calos!, eiÙlcr rrom birÙ1, or fi'om prcjudices, 
i.c., bccause of somc cxternal chance. For ù1ey (UT noL e\'cn awarc 
or Ù Icmscl\'es Il lCqllC SCliJSOS SCI lu'W 111 . 
(rIE §1.7; C l , 22 / G II , 18) 
Examples LhaL employ soullcss automata - mosùy rcl'crrccl Lo as "zombies" -
arc commonly uscd in contemporary philosophy or minci. In philosophy, 
zombies are concci"ed or as beings virLually identical Lo Ù1cir conscious 
counLerparL<; in c"cry aspecL or Ùleir beha,'iour and rele"(U1L physical runctions, 
"buL lacking conscious expcricnces alLogeÙler" (Chalmcrs 1996, 94) . Their 
role in ÙlOughL experiments is usually lo supporL thc daim Ù1al Ù1crc is no 
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ent..1.ilmcnL l'rom physical bels lo lilets rcgarcling consClousncss: ÙIC 
conceivabi liLy of philosophieal zombics, lhal is, sccms lo prO\'iclc argumcnts 
in favour of ÙIC ùlcsis aceording lo whieh lhc prcscncc of conscious cxpcrience 
cannoL be inferreclli'om any of Lltc pltysieal, funclional, or bcha\"ÏourallCatlli"cs 
o f a li\'ing bcing, nor can il bc eauscd by ÙICSC ICaturcs, or ascribcd to ÙIC 
prescncc or abscncc of any of Ùlcm. 12 
Spinoza's relCrcncc lo soullcss aulomala IS, howcvcr, dilTcrcnl from 
contcmporary ÙlOugltL cxpcrimcnls cmploying zombics in aL leasL two 
imporLant rcspc(ts. FirsL, dcspitc ÙIC ltypolltcLical siLuaLÏon ÙlaL hc dcseribcs 
in Ù1C quoLccl passagc, Spinoza docs nol sccm Lo rcler Lo lieLÏonal, 
philosophieally uscful cnLÏlics. Ratltcr, Itc points aL poLcnLÏally real pcople -
pcople, morco\'er, wlto lakc SOIl1C prccisc pltilosophieal sLances - and 
prescribes Lo rcgard Ùlcm and lrcal [ltcm as individuals dc\"oid of any 
menlaliLy. Sceond - and morc imporlanÙY - dillercnùy from eonLcmpor;.u-y 
philosophical zombics, Ùlcrc is a spccilic killCl of bchaYiour Ùlat givcs 
Spinoza's supposcd ll1indless automala away, rC\'caling and dcnoLÏng Ù1CSC 
particularly slubborn sccpLÏes as indi\"iduals wlto, in Spinoza's lcnns, "are noL 
cven awarc or Ùlcmscl\'cs". Indccd, Spinoza sccms ... vi lling to concludc roI' Ù1C 
laek of any form of sclr-awarcncss bascd on a scrics of obscryaLÏons concerning 
Ùleir bchaviour: nall1cly, rrom wltal ÙICSC secpLÏes say. In ÙIC lüllowing lincs, 
Ite wriLcs: 
If Ùley allirm or doubL somcthing, tltcy do noL know Ùlal Ùley alEnn 
or doubL. Thcy say lhal ÙICY know nOÙling, and ÙlaL Ùlcy do not 
CVCI1 know ÙlaL ÙICY know noÙling. And c\'cn Lltis ÙICY do 110L say 
absoluLcly. For ÙICY arc arraid lo conlCss ÙlaL ÙICY cxisl, so long as 
12 For a s ul .... cy 011 ÙIC philosophicaluse of ùle 110ti011 of "zomhic", sec Kirk 20 l5. 
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lllcy know nOùlÎng, In ÙIC cnd, ÙICY musl bc specchless, lesl by 
chance Ù1CY assume someüùng Ùlal mighl smell or lrulh. 
('l'lE ~;j.7 ; C l, 22 / G II, 18) 
Faccd with ùlis kind o f respo nses, Spinoza considers lwo possibilities. On ùle 
on<.: hand, il could bc the casc Ùlal Ùle words or such scepLics sim ply do noL 
dcpicL Ù1C LruÙl: Ùleir asscrtions sysLematically la il Lo describe any o f their 
actual bcliefs (anyùùng dley may lakc lo kIIOW or nol Lo know, Ùlat is, abouL 
Ùlcm scl"es and dle wo rld).13 In ùlis lirsL scenario , Ùlese radical sccptics are 
ccrLainly conceived of as human bcings - endowec\ wilh a human soul and 
conscious acccss to aL !casL som c of ùleir menlal slales, Ùlal is lo say. H owc"cr, 
ÙICY rq ,'l.Jlarly and sLubbornly lie when inquired abo ut whalthey know o r scem 
lo know. Thcse sceptics, III Spinoza's words, "speak againsl ùle ir 
consciousness".1 ~ 
13 By building o n lhc lhcsis Ùlal id cas, in Spinoza, GUl bc uscfully equaled lo ÙIC conlcmpor;uy 
notion of "propositional altiludcs", \1;u'tin Lcnz ;u'hrues Ùlal Spinoza 's ol"c l, ùl conccption o f idca 
C;Ul bc rcduced lo Ùlal of "beliel": "according lo Spinoza, for human bcings e\'cry idea is a bclicl" 
(Lenz 20 13, 42), Scc also S,mdlcr 2005, 75: "Ali idcas, qua frlca, inmh-c ;ùlilma tion or negation 
and ;U'C Ùlereby bcliefs", A problcm rclalcd \\~ÙI a slr;ùghlforward idcntilication olïdcas and bclicfs, 
in Spinoza, is Ùlal il wo uld make il diniculllO undersland ÙIC nalure of \Vhal he calls "alfcc lS" ofjoy 
and sadness: in which scnsc do my fcclinh'S ofjoy ami sorrow, plcasurc ;Uld p;ùn - whidl Spinoza 
cqualcs lo idcas (E3pll s) - correspo nd lo bclicls? Sandlcr OI'CITomc lhis prohlem by poslulating 
Ùle exislcnce of a "dual nature" of ideas: "an alTecti\ 'c o nc and a rcprcscnlational onc", Affccl~ of 
joyand sadness, on his rcading, would COITes pond Ùlcrclo rc lo Ùle "a.llceti\ 'c aspccl" o f our bcliefs 
(S<U1dlcr 2005, 76, n, (7), Lenz, inslead, ch;u<lclcriscs Spinoza's accounl of ideas qua bclicls in 
lerms o f "ùlick bclicfs" (ÙIC no tion of "ùlickness" is borrowcd l'rom \Villiams 2006, 129 101.), "in 
ÙIC sensc Ùlat ÙICY arc inhcrenÙy emotio n;ù ;Uld c\';ùuatil"c" (Lenz 20 13, 50), As wc will sec in 
sections 5, 6, ,Uld 7, ÙIC capacily 10 ascribe 10 oÙler bcings nol only inlcntional slates - such as 
bclicls - bUl also allectil"e stalcs of joy and sadncss - undcrslood ;L~ phcno l11cn;ù slales of mind, 
such Ùlal our comprehcnsion of Ùlem is inscp;u'ablc l'rom ÙIC knowlcdgc of '",vhal il is likc 10 ha\'e 
Ùlcm" - is fund;uncnlal fo r Spinoza's Ùlcory o f hum;Ul reco/,'llition and fo r Ùle building up of a 
sh;u'cd no tion o f "hum;mil)'" , 
1 ~ Thc L, tin cxprcssion uscd by Spinoza (cOIlU;1 cOlIsC/C:llu;1/11loqucrd could aIso hc tr;ulslaled as 
"speaking againsl Ùlcir conscicnce", '11lere arc no SU"Ollg moti\'es lo ha\'e a propensily lo r one 
U'<U1Slationl, IÙler Ùl;Ul ;moÙler, in ùtis casc, as long as ÙICY bOÙl COll\'ey Spinoza's intentio n lo sU'css 
Ùle facl Ùlal Ùle words utlcrcd by ÙIC l<ldical sccpties, if lakcn scriously, c;ullIo l rcl1ccl ÙIC ùtinh'S Ùlal 
ÙICY rcally ùlink ;Uld fccl. \1o rcOl'c r - ,Uld mo rc impo rtanùy - ÙIC secptics' words also makc il 
impossiblc for us 10 undcrs[;uld whal kind of ÙlOughL~ may U'uly populalc Ùleir mimis, As wc sh;ùl 
scc, ùtis is Ù1C pcrspecti\ 'c from which, on Spinoza's accounl, incomprchensiblc talking, syslcmatic 
lies, ;uld dcceiÙül beha\iour GUl be cqualcd WiÙl "complele laek of mind" (and, hcncc, of 
consciousncss) - c\'cn in a uni\ 'crsc wherc ",ùl imlilidu;ùs 1.,, 1, Ùlough in diIlc rcnl dCh'l'CeS, ;U'C 
lle\'CrÙlclcss ;mimalc" (E2p1 3s; C 1, 458 / G Il , 96) ami pro\'idcd "iÙl a conseious minci, 
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On ÙIC oÙler hancl, Spinoza consiclcrs Ù1C alLcrnaLi,'c possibilily lhal such 
sccpLics may bc "mcn whosc mincis (U'C complcLcly blindcd". Thcy rcally hayc 
no awarcncss of whaL is going on insidc or oulsiclc Ùlcm. In ùlis scnsc, ÙIC 
words Lhcy uLLcr ha, 'c no mcaning aL aU and, as I ~u' as wc may know, lhcy could 
jusL as wcLl bc att<:ibuLcclLo a mincllcss machinc. 
ln bOÙl cases, Ù1C conclusion, according Lo Spinoza, must hc Lhc samc: 
"ÙICIT is no spcaking or Ù1C scicnccs WiÙl Ùlem" CrIE §Ij,8; C l , 22 / G II , 18). 
For, il' somconc pro"cs somcÙung Lo Lhcm, ÙICY do nol know 
whcÙlcr ÙIC argumcnt is a proor or noL Ir Ù1CY clcny, granl, or 
opposc, Ù1CY do noL know ÙlaL ÙICY cleny, gTanL, or opposc. So ÙlCY 
musL bc rcgarclccl as auLomala, complcLcly lacking a mind Il;UlrjUam 
;ILILomaLa, qua: menLe omnino carend . 
(rIE §48; C l, 22 / G II, 18) 
Now, noL only does Spinoza's final asscrLion - Ùlal radical sccpLics or ùlÎs sorl 
should rcally bc eoncci\'ccl as mindlcss auLomaLa - sound a biL cxaggcraLcd, il' 
lakcn aL raec "aluc, bUL iL also sccms Lo conflicL WiÙl somc ccnLral lcncls or 
Spinoza's philosophieal sysLem. For, on Spinoza's aecount, nciÙlcr docs thcrc 
sccm Lo bc anyrlung wrong in porLraying humans as "automala", nor docs 
bcing an auLomaLon nccessarily conflicL WiÙl ha,'ing a mind. Quilc ÙIC 
opposiLc: onc of Ù1C cxpliciL purposcs or Ùle TIE is Lo concci,'c or ÙIC human 
soul itsclr "as aeLing according Lo cerLain laws, likc a spiriLual aulomaton 
IserunduJJJ relias Icgcs agcnLcm, cl quasi aliquod aulomri spùiLualcl" CrIE 
§85; C l, 37 / G II, 32). Such a goal squarcs wcll WiÙl lwo or Spinoza's 
mcLaphysieal eorncrsLones: Ùlat is, his rcjccLion or rrcc will and his mind-body 
parallclism. 15 As wc ha,'c sccn, Ù1C combinaLion or ÙICSC ÙICSCS dcmands Ùlal 
Conccllling Spinoza's usc or Ù1C lcrm (,OlJ.5clcII/ù in ùlis passagc, scc also Malino\\'ski·Ch,u'lcs 
200/~a, 125, 
15 Thcsc IWO Ù1CSCS will only bc cxpliciùy lo rmulalcd , ,Uld lully (lc\dopcd, in thc Liliio', ]-]owcI'c r, 
Ù1CY bOÙl sccm 10 bc alrcady allVork in Ù1C 'l'lE. Thcrc, cI'cn ùlough Spinoza statcs ùlal conruscd 
idcas ,U'C "101ll1Cd against our will" (rIE § 1 08; C l, I[.!~ / C II , 39), Ù1C rcjcction or a lirc "ill sccms 
implicd by Spinoza's conccption or Ù1C humiUl soul "as acting according to ccrtain laws, likc a 
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cvcrylhing lhal conccllls bodics and physical objccts bc concci\"cd 111 
rigorously mcchanislù.· lcnns, lhrough Ù1C laws or phys ics alonc, and bc 
mirrorcd by scnnc sorL o r mcntal actlviLy, which is in turn Lo bc concci\'cd of 
in dcLcnninistlc tcnns. IG On ÙIC onc hand, Ùlcrefore, Ùlcrc is no complex body 
cxistlng in nalurc lhat GUillot bc concci"ctl of as an auLomaLon (or as a parL or 
il). On ÙIC olhcr hand, lhcrc is no auLomalon (or anyùung cxistlng in nalurc, 
in gcncral) Ùlal can rcasonably bc concci\'cd of as "complctely blind" or 
"Iacking a mind" .1 7 Thcsc considcratlons musL a1so conccrn ail functlons and 
possible ways ofbch;wing Lhal wc may obscrvc in and ascribc lo a human body. 
A wcll-pcrlorming human body - onc, Ùlat is, Ùlal wc would associaLc WiÙl a 
wcll-pcrlo rming human minci ancl relcvanl conscious cxpcricncc - is propcrly 
unclcrslood as a wcll-pcrlonning corporcal auLomaLon. Hcncc, wiÙlin dlc 
philosophieal l'ramcwork drawn by Spinoza himself, aeeusing somconc (or 
spilitual automaton" OlE §85). Indccd, Spinoza d;uilies Ùlat dc;u' and distinct ideas, which "seem 
to dcpcnd absolu tell' on our powcr alonc", fo llow "I"rom Ù1C neccssily of our nature", ;uld not by 
any li"CCdom of Ù1C will ('l'lE § 1 08; C l , 44 / G II , 39. :vty italics). :vtorcOl'e r, as dcmonstratcd by 
:vtaÙlcron (119871 201 lb), in ÙlC 'l'lE Spinoza cmploys a l'crsion of his p,u<ulelism Ù1COl)' tllat 
inl"olYcs bOÙl an "cxtra-co!,rita til"c" aspcct (i.c., ùlat Ù1C o rdcr ;uld conncction 01" idcas in Ùlought is 
Ù1C samc ordcr ;U\d conncction of cxtCl1lal ùJings) and ;U1 "inlra-cogi tatil 'c" aspcct (i.c. , Ùlat tllc 
onlcr ;U1d cOllllcction hl' IVhich idcas arc causcd in Ù1C soul is Ù1C s;mlC orclcr <U1c1 conncction 
according to IVhich idcas thcmsclYcs ;u'C conccil'cd by mc;U1S of othcr id cas; thc notions of "cxtra-
co!,rilatil'c" and "intra-cogitatil'c" parallclism arc lakcn fi"om Gucroultl197 1., 15-1 6,5 1,66-701) . i\ot 
only, according to Spinoza, do idcas rcprcscnl in Ù1C soul Ùle orclcr ,mcl conncction of ùlcir objccts 
(lo r "Ù1C idca is objcctil-cly in Ù1C samc way as its objcct is rcally", Spinoza lVI"itcs in 'l'lE §41 IC l, 
20 / G II , 1 GIl , but Ù1CY ,U'C also causally conncctccl to cach o Ùlc r as Ùlc ir objccts arc (sincc, as 
Spinoza lVI"itcs in 'l'lE §38, "Ù1C relation bctwccn Ù1C IWO ideas is ÙlC s;unc as Ùle relation bctwecn 
Ù1C f0l111al csscnccs of ù\Osc idcas" 1 C I, 19 / G II , 161l . Iclcas ,U"C in tUIl1 objccts of OÙlcr idcas (scc 
'l'lE §§33-3/1.; ÙlC notion oLU\ "idca o LU\ idca Ildca il/m.f ' is mcntioncd in TIE §38 IC l, 19 / G 
Il , 161l , which mirror ÙlC ordcr and conncction o fÙlcir objects ancl are causally conncclcd to cach 
oÙlcr according lo Ù1C samc ordcr and conncction 01" Ùlc ir objccts. This allolVs Spinoza to 
characlc lisc Ù1C soul as a "spiritu,ù automalon", bascd on ÙIC daim Ùlat Ù1C "objcctil 'c cllccts OfÙ1C 
idcas procccd in Ù1C soul according lo Ù1C lo rm,ù naturc o lïL, objcct" ('l'lE §85; C 1,37 / G Il , 32): 
Ùlal is, bccausc idcas in ÙIC soul inlcract wiùl cach o Ùlcr ,ulcI arc cau sc of onc ,U1OÙlcr lo llowing Ù1C 
s;unc ordcr and conncction l\,iÙl which Ùlcir objccts intcractwiÙl cach o Ùlc r ,mcl causc onc anOÙlcr 
('l'lE §/I.I , n. l'). 
IG FI~Ul<:o is Zourabidll'ili (2002, 122- 11\,5) atlcmpL, il syslcmatic intcq)rcla tion of Spinozil's 
conccption of mimi ,U\d idcas as dClcrmincd by mcch,mistic laws comp;u~lblc WiÙl, yct not rccluciblc 
to, Ù10SC 01" Ù1C phys ics 01" bodics (a "phys ics of ùloughl", or Cl"cn, a "co!,ritatil'c physics", as 
Zourabichl"ili c,ùls il). 
17 Frcclclick Ablondi ;md StCI'C Barl,o nc wrilc: "Spinoza's monistic nalUI~isl11 prcdudcs il dil"ision 
01" ÙIC world inlo minds and bodics, or pcrsons ,mcl machincs" (Ablondi and Barbonc 1994-,77). 
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cvcn, someÙùng) Or bcillg a milldless aulomalon sccms parLÏcularly 
d ' 118 para oXlCa. 
FurÙlcrmorc, Spilloza adds thal thcrc is oÙlcr cvidcncc to suggcsl Ùlal 
thc supposed scepLÏcs ha, 'c a naturc similar lo ours. In ail oÙlcr siLuaLÏons, 
Spinoza wriles, ùley exhibil normal human beha,'iour, stri\'e lor ÙIC same 
Ùlings Ùlal wc slri\'c lor, alld display a reasoned use or language, aimed al 
satisfying ÙIC llccds of Ùleir physiologicalnature. 
For as far as Ùle lIecds or liIC alld society arc concerned, nccessily 
lorces Ùlem lo suppose thal they exisl, and to seek their own 
ad\'anlagc, and ill lakillg oalhs, to allirm alld deny many things. 
CrIE §48; C l, 22 / G II, 18) 
This is Ùle kind or beha,'iour Ùl<tt wc wou Id altribulc lo, and expecl rrom, any 
human bcing, under normal circumstallces. In such siluaLÏons wc would nol 
faillo regard similar indi\'iduals as humalls and lo ascribc Ùlem a human mind 
- a mind, Ùlal is, capable or ail thc rUllcLÏons, ICclings and ùloughts or which 
our mind is also capable. III lhesc ordinal)' occasiolls or liIC, in OÙlcr words, 
wc would empaÙlise WiÙI these illdi,'iduals: as Spinoza also wriles in the Ed1JCS 
- as wc will sec - wc would imitate alld share Ùleir afrects Œ3p27). 
In conclusion, wc ha\'e good reasolls to illtcrprel Ùle whole argument pul 
fonvard by Spinoza as a kilHl or rcduc/Jo ad absurdum. Faced wiÙI radical 
scepLÏcism, wc arc cOllrrollled with a dilemma or which wc musl grasp Ùle firsl 
horn - Ùlal is, Ùlal a scepLÏc of ùlis sort cali ollly be a syslemaLÏc liar, someone 
who dcliberalcly "spcaks cOIII.rary 10 his OWII consciouslless" - silice ÙIC 
allernaLÏve hYPOÙlcsis is lo bc rcjected as absurd - lIamcly, acimilLÏng "Ùlal 
Ùlcre arc mell whose millds also arc complelcly blillcled", lo Lhe poinl ÙlaL 
18 i\ccording Lo ChrisLopher " oble, in Ùle 'l'lE Spinoza "conlrasls Lwo Lypes or auLomala as a \Vay 
orilluslrating his distinction beLween ùle ima/,ri nation ,Uld ùle inLe llect" (2017, 70), In ù1is sense, ù1e 
"mindless aULomaLon", raùler Ùl<Ul implying lack or menlaliLy iUld <Iwareness, is compiU'able Lo 
someone who "is dreaming ,~iùl open eyes" ("ollie 2017,71) , 
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Lhcy arc "no t cven awarc o r Ùlcm sch'cs".19 Sa, why docs Spinoza eonc\uc\c his 
anLi-scepLie ran L o thcrwisc, by imi Ling us ta rcgard Ù1CSC indi,'icluals as 
"auLomata, compleLely lacking a minci"? 
T a bc surc, Ùus c\aim is also intcndcd ta rhc lorieally strcss Ù1C 
stubbo rnncss o r Ù1C scepLics: Ùlc ir oosLinacy in dcnying "anYÙling LhaL mighL 
sm cll o r truÙ1" makes cngagcmcnL in m caningrul philosophical discussio n with 
Ù1em impossible. E\'cn sa, Spinoza's rhcLo rical usc o r Ù1C no Lio n o r "minclless 
auLo m aLa" achicvcs Ùus inLcnclccl c flceL oy suggcsLing o nc impo rtanL Ùling: if 
wc werc La juclgc Ù1esc sccpLies ÙU'ough Ùlc ir words alo nc, wc would ulLimaLcly 
ha"c no available criLc ria ta asscss whcÙlc r wc arc intcraeting WiÙl sclf-awarc 
human bcings, o r WiÙ1 som c o Lhcr sorL o f aulo malic dc\"i cc ÙlaL is sim ply 
meanLLo simulaLe Ù1c cxLcrio r bc ha\'iour and linguistic cxprcssio ns o f a human 
bcing, WiÙ10uL, howc\'c r, sharing any o f o ur ÙlOughls.20 As far as wc m ay inlCr 
from wh aL Ù1CY say, Ù1esc inclivicluals could ha"c no awarcncss aL ail of any o r 
Ù1e ir mc nLal statcs; if Ù1CY hac! o nc, iL musL oc o f a Lo lally dillc rc nL kil1(l - say, 
a Lo tally difTc re nL "su qjccLive charadcr o r cxpcricncc" (N agcl t97 4), as 
incomprchensible Lo us as iL m ay oc ÙlaL o f an alicn , or a bal. H owc"cr, 
Spinoza's m CLaphysieal pillars - as wc hayc sccn - cxc\udc ÙlaL anYÙung m ay 
rcally cxisL in naLurc ÙlaL has no mimi and, co nscqucnlly, no co nsciousncss al 
ail. H cncc, wc can conc\uc\c ÙlaL Spinoza is using Ù1C juxlapos iLio n o r radical 
scepLics ancl minclless auLo mala as a kind o r m ctapho r, Lo po inL aL Ù1C b eL Ù1aL 
Ù1C kind o r bchavio u r displaycd oy Ù1C scc pLics' wo rds docs no L allow us Lo 
dcduce, in Ù1c m , Ù1e prcscnce o r any sorL o f m cnlallilC which wc can idcnLily 
WiÙl o ur own. This rcading is also conlirmcc! by furÙlcr cxamples, d rawll rrom 
o Ù1cr tcxls o r Spinoza, which 1 willLurn La analysc in Ù1C nc xL sccLio n. 
19 For rUrÙ1Cr discussions conccllling Spilloza's rcuullal or sccpticism, sec DOllcy 197 1; BollOII 
1985; Dclla Rocca 1994 and 2007; Popkin 2003, 239·253; Pcrlcr 2007 alld 20 17, 
20 In o ùlcr 1V0rds, for Spinoza Ù\CSC sccptics would lIo l pass a so-callcd "Turillg lcsl" , which Alan 
T uring callcd - usillg a lerminoloh'Y ùlal, as wc shall scc, soumis partir ularly aplwiù\ rcg;ml lo somc 
of Ù\C lopics louched on in Ù1C rcsl o r ùlis chaplcr - "ù\C imitatioll gamc" (TUlillg 1950). 
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4. Automata, beasts, and other ineomprehensible minds 
Spinoza uses Lhe concepL o f "auLomalo n" Lo cxp rcss abscncc o f m cnlalily o n 
ano Ùlcr occasio n, in his 17H.:ologi caJ-Polili caJ Trcallsc. In Ihis casc, no l o nly 
clocs Spinoza associaLes auLo m aLa WiÙl lack o f mcnlaliLy, bUL he also equales 
auLom ala Lo bcasls. In T'TP XII l, 17, hc writcs: 
So m conc m ay say: inclcccl , iL's no L nccessary la uncle rsland G od 's 
aLtribuLcs, bUL iL's quilc nccessary lo bclicyc in Ùlcm , sim ply, wilhouL 
any clcm o nsLratio n. Bul anyonc who says ùlis is lai king no nscnsc. 
Invisiblc ùlings, ancl Ùl0SC which arc Ù1C o qjccLs o nly o f Ihc mind, 
can'L bc sccn by an y o Ùlcr cycs Ùlan by clc m o nsLrations. So mconc 
who clocsn'L ha\'c clcmo nsLratio ns cloesn 'L sec anyLhing al ail in Ùlese 
Ùlings. If Ùley rcpcaL som c Ùl ing Ù1CY\ 'C hcard aboul Ùlcm , il no 
morc Louchcs or shows Ùlc ir minci Ùlan cio Ù1C words o f a parrol or 
an auLo maLo n, which spcak WiÙlOUl a mind or WiÙ lOUl meaning 
1 1 "Crba psÙlaCl~ Id aulom aù; qurL' SÙJC m Cllle, cL SCllsuIO(jUUlllwl . 
( fTP XIII, 17; C II, 260-26 1 / G III, 170. Translatio n modilied) 
ln Ùus passagc, Spinoza conLcncls LhaL bclic\"Ïng in Ùlings ÙlaL we can nc iÙle r 
scc nor unclc rslancl , <Ulcl rcpcating wo rds ÙlaL wc ha\ 'c bccn laughl, WiÙ lOUl 
howcvcr bc ing able Lo grasp Ùlc ir m caning and iclcntify Ù1C ol~jeeL lo which 
Ù1CY rcler, is no L clilTcrcnL from Ù1C bcha\io ur o f parrols and aulo m ala, which 
ulLcr words WiÙl no rcal knowleclgc o f whal Ù1CY say. Thosc who ael in ùlÏs 
way, in Spinoza's Lcrm s, "spcak WiÙlOUL a minci ". Pan"o ls and automata, in ùlis 
scnsc, a rc o n a par WiÙl radical sccpties and "blind bclic\'c rs" - if wc may cali 
Ùlcm in ùl is way. Thcir bcha\ 'io ural exprcss io ns (\'c rbal cxprcssio ns, in Ù1 CSC 
cascs) cio no L allow us Lo cSla.blish any corrcspo ndc ncc bc twccn Ùle ir extcrior 
aels ancl Ù1C kincl o f ùlOughLs ÙlaL Ù1CY m ay - or may nol - hayc. 
Thcrc is a sccond passagc, still in Ù1C TTP, whcre aulo m ala arc reealled 
alo ngsiclc bcasls. Spinoza wrilcs: 
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Thc cnd or lhc rcpublic 1 ... 1 is no l to changc mcn rro m bcing 
ralional inlo bcasls or aulomala [homùlcs ex rau"onaiIbus bes/ù.5~ n:/ 
aU/OIlla/a /;/rerc! , bullo cnable Lllcir minds and bodics to pcrlo nn 
Lllcir fllllclions sarely, lo cnable Lllcm lo usc Lllc ir rcason fi'cely, and 
noL Lo clash wiLll onc anoLllcr in halrcd, angcr or dcceplion, or clcal 
incquilably wiLll onc anoLllcr. 
nTP XX, 12; C II , 346 1 GIll, 241. Translalion mocliliccl) 
In Lllis casc, LllC cmphasis is noL dirccLly puL on LllC abscnce or LllOughl LllaL 
would characlcrisc bcasls or aulomala, bUL on LllC lack o r humanity LllaL 
Lyranny brings about. Thc aim or LllC slalc, Spinoza conLcnds, is Lo "cnable 
humans lo usc lhcir rcason li·cely". Howc,,"cr, according Lo Spinoza, Lo acl 
according lo onc's own rcason is noLlling elsc bUL to aeL accorcling Lo LllC laws 
or onc's own nalurc (F,4.p24cl).21 H cncc, bcasls and auLo mala arc c\'okcd by 
21 Thc ll'aiL~ Ùlal ('haraclcrisc human l'cas on will bc bCllcr analyscd in chapler 4. Sullicc illO say, 
for ÙIC moment, Ùlal, according lo Spinoza, acting rationally is Ùle same ùling as acting \'irtuously 
(Etl-p2tl-); acting \'irluously, in lu III , is 1I0Ùling clsc bUl acting according to Ù1C laws of one's oIVn 
nalure (E/1<18). '1'0 acl according lo onc's OIVlI reason, ÙlerC!'orc, is noùling cise bUl lo be ablc lo 
bring aboul ùlings which C;U1 be undcrslood as e llccls Ùlal f'o llow li'Qln Ùle laws of onc's OIVn nalure 
alone, on Spinoza's accounl. Thc prescncc of rcason, in ùlis scnsc, GUlnol and does nol cxdusi\-cIy 
dclinc ÙIC hum;U1 csscncc, or ÙIC human nalurc, as opposed lo Ù1C nalurc of oÙlcr ,mimaIs. For 
rcason, on Spinoza's accoulll, docs nol dcnolc a supcrior cogniti\'c faculty, lO which a limilcd sClof 
indi\iduals (i. c., hum;ms) would ha\'c pri\'ilcgcd acccss. 1 am indincd, ÙlcrC!'orc, lo agrcc wiùl 
\Vilson (i 19991 1999(', 18/1 .. 187), according LO whom Spinoza has no basis (and, indccd, hc prOlidcs 
no dc;u' indication in ùlis scnse) lo dcny reason lo oÙlcr indi\'iduals ap;ut li'om humans - insol;u' 
as rcason is gcnerally dclincd as ÙIC prcscncc of adcqualc ideas, o ri!,rinating Ii'om common 
propcrties Ùlal an indil'idual sh;u'cs WiÙl Ù1C cxlcrnal cl1\·ironmcnl iU1d WiÙl oÙlcr indil'iduals (sec 
J-:2p38./I.Os2). Conccrning ùlis poinl, sec also Maùleron (1978) 20 1 la, 19·2 1.; Bussc 2009, 5 1·73; 
Sharp 2011a, 53, ;U1d 2011b, 97; Crey 20 13, 373·374. According lo Wilson (i 19991 1 999c, 192· 
193, II. 20), E<hvin Curlcy inlcrprcls ÙIC lasl passagc quolcd li'Qln Ùle 'I-rr as suggcsting Ùlal Spinoza 
dcnies rcason lo animaIs ;U1d Ùlal, ùlcrcl'orc, Ù1C prcsence of ùle facully of reason miu·ks an esscntial 
dill'crcnce belwcen animaIs ;U1d hum,uls. On ùlis basis, Curley ll';mslalcs Ù1C Latin l'ormula, quolcd 
abo\'e, homù/cs cx raûollalibus hcsûas Ill<cl'<.', as implying Ùlal humans ,u'e changed "l'rom /;1ûollal 
bcù lfP; illlo heasL~" (C Il , 3tj·6. My italics). He prOl'idcs a similar ll'iU1slation of;u1 almosl identical 
passage l'ouml in thc Prefacc lo ÙIC 'n ' p: homùlcs cx raù"olJailhus brulos rcddulJt ,n' p Prcl; 15; 
C II , 70 / C III , 8). In none of ùlese passages, hOlVe\'er, docs Spinoza clclinc hum<lns as "rational 
hein!,'S". By contrast, in ùle Ethio', ùle dclinition of "m;U1" as a "rational ;ulimallaminal laù"olJaki " 
is countcd by Spinoza ;U1lOlIg ÙIC "uni\ 'crsalnotions" - Ùlal is, confuscd imagcs of multiple ùlings 
Ùlal each one ['orms dill'crenÙY, "in accordancc WiÙl what Ù1C body has morc o [icn bccn all'ccled 
by" - and put ;ùo lIgs ide OÙICI' l1awed dclinitio lls of m;Ul, such as ";U1im;ù o f erect slaturc laminaI 
crccl;1..' slalum.'I", ";ulimal capable of laughler laminalnsibild ", or "Icaùlcrless bipcd laminai bliJCS 
SÙIC plumùl" Œ2J>'WsI; C l, 477 / CIl, 12 1) . Considcr also ÙIC l'ollowing passage, quoled [i'om 
Spinoza's Pohiic;/17Icalùe 
80 
ChaplC/" 2. uA 1ll/ilg I .ikc { :,": H I/JJJ;/JJ .lli/}{l l· aI/ri D cccù/id /3c1miolJr Ù, SpÙJOZii 
Spinoza in orde r lü slress lhe absurdily or a püliLical sysLcm Ùlal would compel 
humans lo acl agaillsl lhcir own nalure, cxpccLing Ù1em lo changc inlo 
somcùùng Ù1 CY are nol.22 
Exccrpls like lilose 1 jusl quolcd l'rom Ù1C rl~rp, whcrc Spinoza cqualcs 
aulomala and allimals, and opposcs Ùlcm lo hum,l11 beings, may gi, 'c Ù1C fai sc 
imprcssion Ùlal Spinoza is possibly embracing a Carlesian , ·icw m 'cr Ù1C nalurc 
or animais - (,ollcciying lhem, Lhal is, as purely co rpo rcai machincs, 
pOlcnLially dcmid or mind and lhinking capabiliLies.23 Thal Ùùs cannol bc lhe 
'yVhcn wc say, Ùlcn, Ùlal Ù1C bCSl statc is onc whcrc mcn pass Ùlc ir li, 'cs halllloniously, 
1 undcrstand a human lilC 11'Iiall//wlI/amlllJ ùi/cl/igol, which is dclincd no t only by Ù1C 
circulation o r Ù1C hlood , and oÙlcr Ùli ll/,'S commonto ail animais, bUl mosÙY by rcason, 
Ù1C uUC l'irluc alld lilC or Ù1C mimI. 
(Tl' V, 5; C l, 530 / G III, 296. Trallslation modilicd) 
ln Ù1C quoliltion ahOl'c, Curlcy italiciscs Ù1C tc rm "human"; ùlis cmphasis, howc, 'cr, is abscnl in 
bOÙl Ùle OP (290) ,Uld Ù1C i\'S (328). Thc spccilically hum,m li IC, delincd by rcason, lo whieh 
Spinoza alludcs in Tl' V, 5, is nolhing hut Ù1C lilC o r human bcings insorar as thcy ael aecording to 
Ù1C laws of Ùlcir naturc ,uonc, nol compcllcd by exlc rnal causcs. Hcncc, a slillc Ùlal allows hum<Uls 
to spcnd a propcrly "hum,ul li lC", in Spinoza's tcrms, is a statc Ùlal allows thcm to rrcely acl 
according lo Ù1C laws of lhcir naturc alonc - hcncc, to usc Ùlcir oml rcason. Thus, in TTl' XX, 12, 
arlc r ha,'ing claimcd Ùlal Ù1C aim o r thc slalc is nollo changc hum<Uls inlo dilfercnt bcings, bul "to 
cnablc thcm to usc Ùlcir rcason h'ccly", Spinoza co ncludcs Ùlal "Ù1C cnd o r Ùle rcpublic is re;uly 
frccdom" (C II ,31\6 / GIll , 24 1) . 
22 \ ViÙl rcg<ll'd to Ù1C absurdilY, or inconcci,'abilily Ùlal hum,ms can be ChiUlgcd into bcasls , scc 
TIE §62: 
Illrby Ch<u lCC wc should say Ùlat mcn arc 'ch;mgcd in a momclll into beasls , Ùlal is said 
l'cry generally, so Ùlat Ùlcre is in Ùle mind no conccpl, i.e., idea, or conncction of 
subjecl and prcdicale. 
(TIE ~62; C l, 28 / G II , 24) 
\ViÙl rcfc rencc lo Spinoza's laSl quo lation l'rom Ù1C l~rP, ùlis rcmark poinls al Ù1C mClilphoric,u 
usc Ùlal he is making of Ù1C equation hetwccn a hum,ul bcing sU'ipped of hcr capabilil)' lo rcason -
i.c ., he r capabiliLy lo comply ,~iÙl her , 'cr)' 01111 na lurc - and luming hcr inlo a beasl. 
23 Sce, for ex;ullple, Dcscartes's Nilles 101' tJl(' lJùrcÛo/1 o flhe .11indXII (CS:v1 1,42 / AT X, 4 15), 
his Discollrse 0 /1 the MetJ/Od 1 (CS:v1 l, 112 / AT VI, 2) ami Discollrse 0 /1 tJle .l1ctJ/Od V (CS:v1 l, 
134 / AT VI , 45-1\·6), his Nep/ies lo Ù1C FOIJJ1JI OI.ijc·c/iollS (CS :v1 II , 16 1-1 62 / .\ T VII , 230-23 1) , 
Ù1C Prelilce lo Ù1C Frcnch cdition of his PnilniJ/cs olP/uJosophF (CS:v1 l , 180 / AT IXB , 4), his 
PassiollS ortJle SoulI , 50 (CS:v1 1,3 1·8 / AT XI , :,69) iUld Passions ol'tJle SoulIl , 138 (CS:v1 1,376-
378 / AT XI , 43 1) , ;Uld his [,ellen o Henry :v1ore datccl .5 Fcbru;u)' 16 t9 (CS:v1K 365-366 / AT V, 
275-279). For a c<u'C!ül study o r Dcsc<u'les's ac'('ounl o r ,mimaI automatism, sec Kckcdi 20 15. IL is 
to be no ticcd lhalDcsc;u'les, in his Dùcoursc Oll/Ji(' .11etJ/Od V, expliciÙy mcntions "magpics <Uld 
p<UTOls" as ,Ulimals capable of imitating Ù1C lillh'lIistic exprcss ions o r hum;Uls. Yel, o n his accounl, 
Ùlcir incapability o r using lan/,'llage in a crcati" e ancl mC<Ulinglül IVay dcno tcs Ùlcm as purcly 
cOlvoreal machines, dcmid or ùtinking capac ities (CS:v1 l , 140-1 tl / AT VI , 56-58). For Spinoza, 
cOlll'crsely, Ù1C impossibilily o r associating hcha, 'iour,u and \'c rbal cxpressions of ;utim,us lo 
COlTcsponding mcnt,u states is ra lher lo he undcrstood as marking lhe dillc rcncc belll'ccn hum<Ul 
81 
SpÙIOul'S ThcOI) ' OFlllc HUllIfUl ,l/ùu!: COIIScJO/lSIICSS, ,I/CIl IOI.1; flm! f(CilSOII 
casc, howcver, resulls quilc clcéu-Iy Irom some olher passages Ùlal wc can find 
in his l!.,Lhics. 2 ~ For cXéUnplc, in E.3p57s Spinoza \Vl-iles: 
ITlhe aflc cls of Ù1C animais which are called irrational (lo r alkr wc 
know Ù1C origin of Ù1C minci , wc (,(lIlIlOl in any \Vay doubl Ùlal Ù1C 
lowcr éUlimals (ccl ÙUllgS 1 bru(a clllin sCllùi·c llcquaqu;un dubÙaIc 
p ossumus, poslquam J7Jcnu"s llolùnus onipilclllll diller rrom men's 
a(lecls as much as Ùleir nalurc dillers rrom human nalurc. BOÙl Ùle 
ho rse éUlc1 the man arc clrivcn by a lusllo procreale; bUl Ù1C onc is 
drivc n by an cquinc lusl, Ù1C OÙlcr by a human lust. So also Ù1C lusls 
and appctites of insccls , lish, and birds musl vary. 
(E.3p57s; C l, 528 / G II, 187) 
In Ùus scholium, as wc may observe, Spinoza allrihulcs mcnlalily and 
scnsations to ,uumais "which arc called irrational Iquac ùrau"ollalia 
dicunlwi ".25 Tlus conclusio n, Spinoza asserls, can he inICrred by Ùle same 
ancl non-humaIl mcnlality - thal is, ÙIC cxislcllcc ill lIoll-humall hcillgs of a kil\(l of mcnlalily lViùl 
IVhich IVC Call11ot iclentify. 1 lVill clcmonstralc ùJis ùlcsis ill lhc 1() lIowillg parl of lhis scCtiOIl . 
2 ~ IL coulcl bc objcclccl ùlaL rcfcning Lo Ù1C t-iJu'cs lo makc SCIISC of passagcs colllaincd in ÙIC rl- rP 
or in ÙIC T IE is mcùloclolobrically qucs tio llablc, gi\'CII Ù1C dilTcrclIlllalurcs aI\(l daLcs of composition 
of Ù1C Lexts, 1\ C\'Crùlc!css, 1 clo ubL ùlal Spilloza cou Id ha\'c hcCJJ inconsistclIl or could h",'c ch,UJgcd 
his minci cOllceming ùl is Lopie. As IVC ha\'c SCCII hcl()rc, Ù1C c1cmcllts ÙlaL allow him LO ascribc 
mcnlaliLy Lo all incli\icluals - ÙtaL is, his ùlOughL-Cx[clIsion parallclism alld his r~jcction of rrcc will 
as a m,u'k of mentaliLy - aI'C alrcacly prcscnl ill ÙIC TIE. FurÙlcrmorc, if IVC arc lo hclic\'c Ù1C ""ou'cc 
la tile Rcader\Vli LLcn by ÙIC ediLo rs or Ù1C O P ùlaL illlroduccs Ù1C 'l'lE (C 1,6 / G Il , 4), as wclI ;L~ 
somc leLLcrs Ùlat Spinoza exchallgecl \~iù l T schirnhaus by lhc hCbrillllillg of 1675 (Ep 59-(0), wc can 
infc r ÙlaL Spinoza ne\'cr ab;mdoncd ÙlC prq jcCllo lillish his 'l'lE and IIc\'cr rcjeclcd Ù1C idcas ùlal 
hc cxpouncls in iL, alùlough "ÙICy arclI 'L yCL \Vl'ilLclI ouL ill ail ordcrly fashioll" (Ep 60; C il , 433 / G 
IV, 27 1) . Thc ÙlCSCS conlainccI in ÙIC T IE, ùlcrc!o rc, do 1I0l dCSC1YC quick dismissal , should ÙICY 
appc;u' lo clash wiùI ÙIOSC or Oùlcr Lcxls, buL l'arcful cxcgesis, As I;u' ;L~ Ù1C Tri' is colll'c ll1cd, wc 
knolV by Spinoza's Ep 30 Lo O ldcnburg ÙlaL, by Ù1C Clld o r 1G65, hc had alrcady slaltcd IVritillg "a 
trcatisc on my opinioll abouL sniplurc" (C II , 11/, / G IV, 1(6). By ùle samc daLc, accordillg Lo 
Spinoza's Ep 28 lo Joh;u1l1cS Bou\VmccsLcr (dalcd J unc 1(65), wc ;ùso know ÙlaL ùle compos iLion 
of Ù1C AlluCs \Vas ;ùrcady in aIl ach,lIlccd slagc - possibly induding propositions ùlaL \~i ll bc laLcr 
complisccl in ÙIC Fourùl P;u'L, alùlOugh, hy ÙlaL timc, ÙIC lexl was conl'ci\'cd ;lS composcd only or 
Ùll'CC parts; in Ùlis rcg;U'CI, Spinoza mcntions Lo BOUWl1lCCSLCr ùlaL hc rcached Ù1C 80" proposition 
ofùlc prO\isional ùJird p;u'L OfÙ1C m;musCiipl (C 1,396 / G IV, 16m. Conccllling ùJis, scc also C 1, 
389, n. 20, aIld C 1,396-397, n, 25. 
25 O nce ab'ilin, iL is lo bc noticed ùlaL Spin07~1 does noL cxpliciùl' dcny rationaliLy lo ;mimals, Anim;ùs 
";u'c s;ùd IrhcunlUlI " Lo bc irrationa.l ; whcÙlcr ùJis characlcri sation al'lUall)' holds, I() r Spinoza, is noL 
infc rablc bl' ùlis scholium. 
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mcans by which hc also dcmonstralcd thc origin Or ÙIC hum an milld,2ü Thal 
' 1 "f' 1 tl ' " 1 ù' k 27 Ù " l' 1 1 Ù alllma scan cc ' llngs anc un ", lat IS, IS a cOlle USIOII t lat co lcrcn y 
rollows l'rom Ù1al scl of proposiLions and clcmollstraLÎolls that oceupy thc lirst 
sccLÎon or Ù1C Sccond Parl or ÙIC l~ülJ("s (unlil E2p1 3s, Ùlat is to say),28 and 
which Spinoza characleriscs as "comp\clcly gcncral ladJ)]odLl1l1 C(}J)]J)]LI1Jùl" 
and which "do nol pcrtain morc lo man Ùlan lo oÙlcr ill(hidllals, ail or which, 
ùlOugh in diffcrenl clcgrccs, arc nc, 'crÙ1clcss animalc" (E2pI3s; C l, 1/,58 / G 
II, 96),29 
Thcrc is no rcasoll whalsocvcr, Ùlcrcforc, to dClly allimals - as wcll as 
any oÙ1cr corporeal Ù1Î.ng, \cl us acld - millds and scnsaLÎolls or thcir eorporcal 
aITecLÏons and ilieir appcLÎlcs, insorar as ÙIC appcLÎlc is dcfincd as "ÙIC , 'cry 
csscnce" or a ùùng (E3p9s; C 1,500 / G II, 147) and is idcnLÎficd by Spinoza 
WiÙI "Ù1C striving by which each Ùling stri"cs to pcrsc\'crc ill its bcing" Œ3p7; 
C l, 499 / G II, 1/1,6. My italics).30 YCl, in [3p57 - which illlroduccs ÙIC 
scholium in thc block qllolation abo"c - Spinoza aIso mailltains Ùlal " !clach 
affccl or cach indi, 'idual diflers rrom Ù1C affect or anolhcr as mueh as ÙIC 
26 Conccrning this poinl, scc also \Vilson (1 999) 1999c, 182, 
27 1 rccall hcre thal, according lo Spinoza, lO l'ccl Ùlings Iscllùà .. 1 ,md lo pcr('cil 'c ùlings Ipc/'oiJL'/'Li 
,U'C modcs of ùlinking, characlclising minds ,md idcas, amI ÙICY G UI bc rcg;U'<lcd as synonymous, 
Scc, again, E2p49s (C 1, 487-488 / G II , 133); scc also 1::2a/l-.5 (C 1, Il,;f,8 / G II , 86), ln 'l'lE §78 r 
Spinoza dclincs <111 "idea" as "nothing bul a scnsation o f a ccrt.tin sorl ll//ÏuÏ a/iuri lIùi I;dis sClIsab'rY," 
(C 1,34 / G II, 29). 
28 Thc tiùc o f ÙIC Sccond P,U'l of thc Ethics is, indccd, "On ÙIC :\alurc and Origin of ÙIC Mind IDc 
Yalu/'a el Originc .l1cnùsl" (C 1, 4 ~6 / G II, 84). 
29 As we hal'c sccn abOl'c (sec [OOUlOlC 1 in ùlis chaplcr), also ÙIC dCl110nSU,ltion of lhc c\islcncc 
of idcas of id cas - Ù1al is, al\<u'cncss o f onc's 01\11 mind, l'cclings, scnsations, lho ughls, and ,UlY 
mcnlal slalc in gcneral- is regarded by Spinoi' ..a as "ulù\'ersallulllIcJ>alùl " (E2p;f,3d; C 1,479 / G 
II , 123). Hcnce, nol only all indil'iduals ha\'c minds and COITcsponding mcntal stalcs, bUl also ail 
indi\iduals are conscious of Ùleir ment;ù st;llcs. ConccrIling ùlis poinl, scc also :\1C];Ullcd 20 II , 16 1-
162. The rclationship belIYcen Spinoza's accounl of consciousncss and his ÙICOlY of ÙIC "idcas of 
idcas" is <IIlalyscd in scction .5 o f ÙIC prcI'ious chaplcr. 
30 Incleed , Ùle S;UllC rcasoning, a('cording lo Spinoza, c;m apply "('l>Ilcc]']]ing any singular ÙIing, 
howc\'er composilc il is concei\'cd lo bc, ,md howcl'cr capahlc of doing man)' Ùlings" - cI'cn lo a 
slonc scl in motio n, which "suil 'es lo continuc mOling" ,ul<l, Ùlcrclo rc, "is cOllscious only of iLs 
sU'il'ing, and nol al ,ùl indiOc rcnl" (Ep 58; C II , '1,28 / G IV, 2(6), This aspecl of Spin07;t'S 
p<lllps)'chism is ,mal)'sed in scction 7 of ÙIC prc\'ious chapler. Sec ;ùso :\1c1,Ullcd 20 II , 16 1-1 62, 
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csscncc or ÙIC onc rrom ÙIC csscncc or Ù1C othcr" (C I, 528 / CIl, 186). Hcnce, 
Spinoza concludcs: 
1'1'1 hough cach indi\'idual li\'cs conlcnl WiÙl his 0\V11 nalurc, by 
which hc is consLilulcd, and is glad or il, nc\'crÙlclcss Ùlallirc WiÙl 
which cach onc is conlcnt, and Ùlal gladncss, arc nOùung bUl ÙIC 
idca, orsoullùlca scu c11l1inal, or Ù1C individual. And so Ù1C gladncss 
or ÙIC onc diners in naturc fi"om Ù1C gladncss or Ù1C othcr as much 
as lhc csscncc or ÙIC onc diners l'rom thc csscnce or Ù1C OÙ1Cr. 
(E3p57s; C l , 528 / C II , 187) 
As wc can scc ahrain, Spinoza docs nol dcny Ùlal "cach individual" - induding, 
lhus, animais - has a mind and a cerlain consciousncss or ils appcLilcs and 
al1ecls, or which il "is conlcnl ]csl conlcnluml". Indced, hc asscrls Ùlal "wc 
CéUlllOl in any way doubl" iL For an individual's minci <U1c1 aIlecls arc noùling 
bUl lhc "idca, or soul lidcrI scu rUlùnrl l" or ÙIC incli\'idual, and or cach ùling 
Cod "t'an fonn ÙIC idca" (E2p3; C I, 4/1.9 / C II , 87), which "consLilulcs ÙIC 
mind" or Ùlal Ùling (E2pI2d; C l, 1\.57 / C II , 95). FurÙlcnnorc, or cach mimi, 
or idca, "Ùlcrc is also in Cod an idca" (E2p20; C l , ;\,67 / C II, 108), which 
prO\'idcs a slri\'ing indi\'idual wiùI knowlcdgc or ÙIC mind ilsclr - Ùlal is, whal 
Spinoza rclers lo as "dcsirc", or "consciousncss ]cOJJSCÙ;JJlI;/I" or onc's csscncc 
and appcLilcs (E3p9s; C l , 500 / C II , 148) . 
Thc cqualion bclwccn bcasls and aulomala, which wc lound twicc in lhc 
'ITP, is nol Ùlcrcforc mcanÙo cxdudc - as Dcscarlcs would ha\'c il- lhal 
parrols or oÙlcr animais may hayc mincis, al1ecls, and rclc\'anl consciousncss 
or lhcir inncr slalcs . Ralhcr, bcasls and aulomala arc c\'okcd by Spinoza lo 
slrcss lhc incompaLibilily bclwccn ÙIC propcr human nalurc - and ÙIC 
corrcsponding hum an mcnlalily - and ÙIC kind or mcnla.lity Ùlal oÙlcr Ùlings, 
whosc nalurc is dillercnl l'rom ours, may inslcad ha\'c. For cach onc's minci 
and allecls "diner in na turc " as ÙIC csscnces or ÙIC indi\'iduals Ùlcmsch'cs 
diner fi"Oln onc anoÙlcr. Thc mark or ùus "clillercncc in nalure", on Spinoza's 
CïJafJ/CI' 2. '~I l1l1ilg Likc { :5": !-I11Il1;/11 ,Ilillds ;Uld Dccctifili JJch ;m o lll' Ùi SpÙIOZ<I 
accounl, IS our incapabiliLy Lo comprchcnd \Vhal may characlcrisc ÙIC 
mcnlalily of non-human bcings: \VhaL passcs inLo ÙIC minds of aulomala, 
animaIs, and c"cn radical sccpLÎcs (should \VC lakc scriously lhcir words, ÙlaL 
is Lo say), is impossiblc 10 undcrsland, fi"OlIl our own point o r "icw. Hcnrc, nol 
only can ÙICY ail hc callcd "non-human", huL also, ÙlCy can bc trcalcd as 
outrighl mindlcss, rrom our o\Vn sLandpoinl. 
Whal is c"cn morc inLcrcsLÎng is Ùlal, building on ÙIC samc grounds, 
Spinoza also gcls lo ÙIC conclusion Ùlal minds and afTccls or human beings 
may diflCr in nalurc fi"Olll onc anolhcr. AL ÙIC cnd of ÙIC samc scholium, 
Spinoza wrilcs: 
[FI rom F ... 1p57 il follo\Vs Ùlal ÙICIT is no small diflcrcnce bclwccn 
ÙIC gladncss by which a drunk is !cd and ÙIC gladncss a philosophcr 
posscsscs. 1 wishcd 10 mcnLÎon ùlis in passing. 
Œ3 p57s; C l, 528 / CIl, 187) 
Jusl as human minds and corrcsponding human afTccls din'cr in nalurc fi"om 
minds and allCrLs of oÙlcr bcings, so minds and aflccls of human bcings may 
also diflCr bclwccn carh olhcr as much as ÙIC rcspccLÎœ cssenccs also dillCr. 
Thc conscqucnce is Ùlal also whal passcs inlo oÙlcr sccmingly human minds 
may c"cnlually appcar impcnctrablc [0 us, Lo ÙIC poinl Ùlal il is impossible lo 
rccognisc anymorc whcÙlcr wc arc dcaling wiùI human bcings - Lhal is, 
indi\'iduals sharing ÙIC samc hum an nalurc and rclc"anl human mcnlality -
or non-human bcings. \Vhal Spinoza "mcnLÎons in passing" in E,3p57s is nol 
rcally an isolatcd casc. For, sLÎIl in lhc EtJJics, hc rcfcrs lo oÙler siluaLÎons in 
which ÙIC nalurcs or olhcr indi\'iduals' minds mighl sccm, on his account, 
ullcrly incomprchcnsiblc and alicn Lo him, rrom a subjccLÎvc po inl of vicw. In 
E2ptl.9s, hc wriLcs: 
1 granl cnLÎrcly Lhal a man placcd in surh an cquilibrium (,·iz. who 
pcrcci"cs noùlÎng buLLhirsL and hungcr, and such food and drink as 
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are equally distanl l'rom him} will perish of hunger and ÙlirsL Ir Ùley 
ask me wheÙler su ch a man should nol be thoughl an ass, raÙler 
than a man, 1 say thal 1 do not know - jusl as 1 also do nol know 
how highly we should esleem one who hangs himsclf, or children, 
fools, and madmen, elc. 
(E2pI\Ds; C l, /IDO / G II, l ' 5) 
Spinoza is here discussing Ùle case of lhe so-called "Buridan's ass": placed in 
fronl of two idenLical and equidislanl sources of nourishmenl, an individual 
devoid or free will will necessarily die of stalTation, because of the impossibilily 
of making a sensible choice aboul where lo gel the rood. Spinoza is willing to 
accept this paradoxical consequence ensuing l'rom his r~jecLion or (ree witl. 
Yel, he also haslens lo add Ùlal he would nol clare to dclïne Ùlal incli\'idual as 
"human". Why does Spinoza fecl Ùle urge to make ùlis dari(ïcaLion, since the 
daim Ùlat "a man placed in such an equilibrium 1 ... 1 will perish of hunger and 
ùUrst" seems per!ecÙy acceplable lor him, and consislenl WiÙl lus oye rail 
philosophy? And why does he also compare an indi\'idual pul in such a stale 
or perrecl equilibrium WiÙl oÙler (seemingly) human indi\'iduals, su ch as 
suicide vicLims, dutdren, fools, and madmen? Surcly, once again, ail Ùle 
examples pul forward by Spinoza - Ùlal is, donkeys, suicide \'icLims, chilclren, 
fools, and madmen - musl be regarcled as each ha\'ing ils own mind, capable 
of corresponding sensaLions, allccts, and conscious desires. Yel, nol only cloes 
Spinoza refuse lo express any opinion conccrning Ùle place in nalure, or "how 
highly IqurU1t1 a:sti11Jandusl" he would estccm "one who hangs himsclf, or 
children, fools, and madmen, elc. Wk~ quise PCllSJ!CIll!;lrlt, cL ... puen~ sLlIJ/J~ 
l 'eSrl1lJ~ ciel"; bUl also, in Ùle case of lhe Buridan's ass situation, he says Ùlal 
he would nol be able lo disLinguish wheÙler lhat indiyidual, pul in a slale or 
perfecl equilibrium, is a human being, a donkey, or anYÙling clse. 
We GUl allempl a possible explanation. As I~l r as lhe case of Ùle 
Buridan's ass is concernecl, wc can understand Spinoza's rcluctance lo express 
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an opU110n concerning Ù1C nalurc of an indi\'idual put in a statc of pcrfccl 
equilibrium, if wc consiclcr Ùlal Ù1C lolal icllcncss and inacti\ 'ily characlcrising 
such an incli\'iclual would prc\'cnl us l'rom inlCrring anything about whal is 
going on into her or ils minci, juclging li'om hcr or its bcha\'iour - for wc would 
b" able lo obscrve no bchavioural rcsponsc al aIl. \ 'Vhcthcr thal indi\'idual has 
thc cxtcrior shapc of a human bcing or a donkcy, its bcha\'iour would in any 
casc nol be clilTercnl t'rom Ùlal of a slaluc - or wh al wc would rcgard as a 
pcrfcct, ycl "minclless", rcplica - and wc would ulLÎmatcly havc no critcrion lo 
disLÎnguish bcLwcen Ùlem.31 As a malLcr of facl, whcthcr it is a human bcing, a 
donkey, or a slatuc, an inacLÎ\'c body woulcl simply havc an idlc, cmply minci, 
on Spinoza's accounL (E3p2s)32 - so Ùlal ail or thcm could bc rightly rcgardccl 
as iclenLÎcal lo onc all0Ù1Cr, WiÙl rcspccl lo Ùlcir cqual lack of any kiml of 
mOLÎon and mcnlalily. Along Ù1C samc lincs, wc can assumc thal Spinoza is 
also slrcssing ÙlaL hc cannol ligurc al ail whal passcs inlo lhc minds of suicidc 
\icLÎms, childrcn, lools, ancl maclmcn, basccl on how Ù1CY 'let. 
If this is ilie casc, Lhcn wc ha\ 'c rcasons lo assumc Ùlat, according 10 
Spinoza, c\'en if mentaliLy and consciousllcss can bc uni\'crsally ascribcd Lo ail 
cxisLÎng Ùlings, Ù1C attribuLÎon of a spccilically human mcntal liIC and 
consciousncss clepcnds on a proccss ÙlaL builds on thc obSclTatjon and 
undCrslc1.nding of exlcrnal bcha\'iour. In Ù1C ncxt sccLÎon, 1 will locus on ùlis 
proccss, by which wc rccognisc "Ùùngs likc us" and ascribc human mcntality 
10 Ùlcm, 1 shall arguc thal ÙljS proccss - which Spinoza namcs "imitaLÎon of 
lhc alfecls" - is bascd, on Ù1C onc hand, on lhc way in which somc Ùlings may 
31 The ,Ulalogy works, or course, o nly il' we do 1I0l colIsidcr Ù1C physic<l l dcc<ly ùlal \\'ould illcùtably 
Ch,U<lClcrisc ùle stalying hum,Ul or dOllkcy, Furùlcr, ùJis ùlOughl cxperimclIl scems lO misc similar 
problcms lo ùlose posed by ùlaL of Ù1C impassi\'c ùJillkcr, c\'Okcd hr Edg;u' Sillgcr (1 9 12) as a 
coulllerex;ullple Lo his idcntification or consciousllcss and bch<l\'iour: how do wc kllow whcùler 
ùlere is conscious acti\'ity in ùle mind of a ùlillkcr, if ùle ùJillkcr is immobilc while she focuses on 
her ùloughlS? 
32 "Docs 1I0L cxpericllcc also Leach", Spilloza <lsks ill 1-:3p2s, "ùlaL if 1 .. ,1 Ù1 C body is ill<lCti\'C, Ù1C 
milld is al Ù1C same time illcapable of ùJillkillg?" (C !, 1~95 / G II , 1 ~2), 
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act and alTcct our imagination and, on Ù1C oÙlcr hand, on allributing la thc 
ol~jccts of our imagination Ù1C samc kinds of mcnlal slalcs Ùlal wc arc uscc\ to 
cxpcricncing in ourselvcs whcn wc bcha,·c similarly. 
5. Human beings as "things lik.e us": the "imitation of the affects" 
The exprcssion "a Ùling likc us", wiÙl rdcrcncc ta human bcings, lirst appcars 
inlhc Thirc\ Parl of Ù1C EU/les. In E3p27, Spinoza asscrts Ùlal "[ilf we imaginc 
a ùling like us [rcm J/obis sùm!cm[, loward which wc havc had no aOccl, lo hc 
alTectec\ WiÙl somc allcct, we arc Ùlcrcby afkcled WiÙl a likc affccl" (C l, 508 
/ G II, 160). As Picrre-François Morcau obserycs, ùlis sucldcn int.roduction33 
of a rclcrencc la "ÙlÏngs likc us" comcs as a surprise for Ù1C rcader: 
Proposition 27 introduces Ù1C exprcssion "a Ùung likc us (rcs /JaDis 
sùm!I5)", which will henceforÙl be of I"undarncnlal sigllificance; ancl, 
suddcnly, wc notice Ùlal in all Ùle pasl propositions Ùlere has bccn 
no cxplicil rdercnce ta m,ul. Thc objccts of our passions, c.g. our 
rivais or our allics, are rdcrrcd la in a gcncral way as "Ùlings" (rcs), 
anel WiÙlOUl any mcntion of Ùleir human quality. Thcy coulel hayc 
bcen inanimalc objccts, bcasls, power or glory. Thc inlcryening 
Ùlings mighl havc bccn groups or animais. Any of Ù1CSC coulel 
nalurally havc bcen humans as wcll, bUl ùlis qualily was \lcvcr a 
relcvanl factor. Hcrc, ùlOugh, il is Ù1C ccntral issuc. And Spinoza, 
who ncvcr provides a dclinition of man, assumcs Ùlal we shall 
spontancously rccogllizc whal ùlis "ùling like us" is. 
(Morcau 20 Il, 168-169) 
The absence 01" cxplicil rclCrcnccs la human beings, in Spinoza's prcnous 
discussions of human aflccts, can bc cxplaincd if wc consider Ùlal Ùle 
33 Bclorc E.'3p27, Ù1C rcfcrcncc la "ùtings likc us" lirsl appc;u·s in E3p22s - cam Ilobù stinilcm 
jlldiccmlls (C l , 507 / G II , (57) - and, Ùlcn, in E3p23s - FCS Ilobù similc (C 1,507 / G II , 158) . 
In bOlh occasions, howc,·cr, Spinoza points oul Ùlal Ù1C I11c;Uling ami ralc of ùlis cxprcssion will bc 
dalilicd in 1-:3p27. 
88 
Chi/piLT 2. "II 1I11ilg Ukc l 's": Hl/I7li/1I .llù,ds ;wd D C('cùIl/} lJeh;wiollr ù) SpillOZii 
mcchanism by which wc arc alTcetcd WiÙl afrccts Ùlat wc imaginc as also 
prcscnl in "ùlings likc us" - a mcchanism which hc calls "imitation of ÙIC 
alTccts !allè:rILlLlIll ùllliaIJo!" (E3p27s; C l, 509 / G II , 1(0) - is Ù1C samc 
mcchanism by which wc also gcl Lo '~judgc" somcdling "lO bc likc us !nobù' 
SÙlJJJcmjLldircIllLls!" (E3p22s; C l, 507 / G II , (57). Bow docs il comc aboul, 
Ùlcn, according Lo Spinoza, ÙlaL wc "judgc" somcÙling "lo bc likc us" - that 
wc judgc somcthing, ÙlaL is, Lo bc a human bcing, cndowcel wiÙI a mind likc 
ours and similar aflCcts i)3 ~ Spinoza proùdcs Ù1C answcr in ÙIC dcmonst.ration 
or &'3p27: 
Thc imagcs or lhings arc alTcctions or Ù1C human body whosc idcas 
rcprcscnL cxtcrnal bodics as prcscnllo us, i.c., whosc idcas im'oh'c 
ÙIC naLurc or our body and aL ÙIC samc timc Ù1C prcscnt naturc of 
ÙIC cxLcrnal body. So ir ÙIC naturc or Ù1C cxLcrnal body is likc ÙIC 
naturc or our body, Ùlcn Lhc idca of Ùle cxlcrnal body wc imaginc 
will imd"c an allcction of our body likc ÙIC affection of ÙIC cxlcrnal 
body. Conscqucntly, if wc imaginc somconc likc us lo bc alTcclcd 
WiÙI somc alTcct, this imaginalion will cxprcss an allcction or our 
body likc lhis allCcl. Anel so, l'rom ÙIC facL ÙlaL we imagine a ùung 
likc us to bc allcclcd WiÙI an allccL, wc arc alTcclcd WiÙI a likc alrccl. 
(E3p27d; C l , 508-509 / G II , 160) 
This dcmonst.ration rclics on ÙIC capaciLy of ÙIC human body lo bc "disposcd 
in a grcat many ways" (E2p11.; C l , Il.62 / G II , (03), by bcing ablc lo bc 
"allccLcd by cxLcrnal bodics in \'cry m;my ways" Œ2poSl3; C l , 462 / G II , 102) 
and Lo "moV'c and disposc cxtcrnal bodics in a grcal many ways" (E2poSL6; C 
l, 462 / G II , 103) . In oLhcr words, ÙIC pcculiar complcxiLy and plasticiLy of 
ÙIC human body cnablc it to intcracl WiÙI ÙIC cxlcrnal cn\'ÏronmcnL in 
numcrous ways: iL l'an bc modilicd by cxLcrnal objccLs in sC\'cral dilTcrcnL 
3 ~ Thal uy "ùlings likc us" IVC musl underS(;Uld oÙ 1er hum;Ul heinl," is dear fi 'om Spinoza's rclCrcnce 
lo "men Iholl7ù/csl " in 1-:3p29 ;Uld Ùle reb',Ullnole (e 1,5 10 / G Il , 162). 
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ways, morc or Icss pcrmallcnÙY, and, at thc samc timc, iL can perform a greaL 
\'aricLy of actions, bascc\ Oll Ùlcse inlcractions. In parLÎcular, according Lo 
Spinoza, Ùle human body can rctaill ill itsclf and reproduce ÙIC "imprcssions" 
- or even, in Spinoza's Lenns, Lhc "imagcs" - of cxLernal bodics, which arc 
produccd in iL following COli tacts and interactions wiùI Ùlesc eXLernal bodics 
(E2p1 7d2).35 The iclcas of Ùlese imagcs ill us, Spinoza conLcncls, "reprcsenL 
cxLcrnal bodics as present Lo us lco/pOl;/ cx/cm<1 ,dut JJob/s pr;r:scntù. 
reprxscnL;wLl" (E2pI7s; C l, 1·65 / G II, lOG. TranslaLÎoll mocliliecl). Hc also 
aclcls ÙlaL "whcn Ù1C mind rcgards bodies ill this way, wc shaH say ÙlaL iL 
imagines" (E2p17s; CI, 465 / G II, lOG). The bodies ÙlaL wc imaginc as bcing 
presc nL ouLsidc of us, Ùlcrc1ore, are rcally "imagcs of ùlÎngs" thaL exisL in us; 
accorclingly, ùle idcas LhaL wc ha\'c of extcmal oqjects are really idcas of ùlesc 
imagcs in us, ùlat is, ideas of allecLÎolls of our own body. This is ùle rcason 
why Spinoza int.roduces Ùle demollstratioll of E3p27, quoLed abovc, by 
stressing ÙlaL "ILlhe images of ÙlillgS are allecLÎolls of ÙIC human body whose 
idcas reprcsenL exLernal bodics as prcsellLLo us". 
Now, accorc\ing Lo Spinoza, whcll wc imagillc cxLernal bodics as prescnL 
Lo us, via our own corporeal aflecLÎolls, wc imaginc ÙICSC bodics as moying in 
spacc, as inLcracLÎng WiÙI alld bcillg modilicd by oÙler bodies, and as bcing 
arfecLed Ùlcmscl\'es in some ways - briclly put, wc imaginc exLemal bodies as 
behaving in cert..-1.in ways WiÙlill Ùle surrounding en\'ironmcnL, doing certain 
ùungs and undergoing ccrtain oÙlcr thillgs. Sillcc, as we hayc sccn, Ùle cxLernal 
bodies ÙlaL wc imagine as prescllt outside of us arc nOÙlillg buL idcas of 
affections taking place in oursch-es, Lo imaginc Ùle allecLÎons of cxLcrnal bodics 
35 Scc also E3posL2: 
Thc hum;Ul body call ulIClcrgo mall)' challgcs, ;Uld llc\'crÙlclcss rCliull impressions, or 
tl'accs, or Ù1C o bjcclS I O~J~'Clorull1 ù/lfJrcssiollcs .>cu IrS1187:11. ;Uld collsequcllÙY, Ù1C 
samc imagcs o r Ùlillgs. 
(1-:8pos12; C 1, 493 / G Il , 139) 
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is lo ha\'c, in our own body, aJTcclÎons o r imagcs that mirror ÙIC moycmcnls 
and Ù1C aClÎons o f ÙIC exlc rnal bodics , FurÙlcr, Spilloza contcnds Ùlal, if ÙIC 
nalurc o r an cxlc rnal body which is imagincd as prcscllt is sullicicnùy similar 
to Ùlat o f our body, ÙIC movcmcnts and alrcctions o r ÙIC cxtcrnal body can 
corrcspo nd, in us, lo imagcs o r affcclÎons and mO\'cmcnts o r which our body 
is also aulo nom ously capable. While our body is allcctcd in such a way by an 
cxlcrnal objecl, thcrclo rc, ÙIC alIcclÎo ns arouscd in us will bc idcnlÎcal, o r 
similar, lo ÙIOSC Ùlal can bc equally arouscd in us by our own moycmcnls, In 
this way, ÙIC idca o f an ancclÎon laking placc in an cxLcrnal body, which wc 
imagine as prcsenl, will corrcspo nd Lo lhc idca o r ;UI cqual allcclÎon lr1.king 
place in our body.36 Hcncc, Spinoza adds in thc dcmonslralio n o r E3 p27 Ùlal 
"if ÙIC nature o r thc cxte rnal body is likc ÙIC nalurc o r our body, thcn ÙIC idca 
or ÙIC exlcrnal body wc imaginc will in\'o l\'c an alTcction o r our body likc ÙIC 
afTcclÎo n o r dlC extcrnal body". 
Spinoza also d aims Ùlal among ail ÙIC allcclÎo lls by which a huméln body 
can bc aflccled , somc or Ùlcm will 'llso bc thc causc o r allccLs orjoy, whercas 
somc o Ùlc rs will bc Ù1C causc of aflccLs o r sadncss - dcpcndillg on whcÙlcr 
ÙICSC aflcctÎons respcclÎvcly incrcasc o r dccrcasc thc powcr o r aClÎng o r Ù1C 
body and, in parallcl, o r ÙIC mimi (E3p Il s). H cncc, by imagining and 
reproducing in us aflcclÎo ns Ùlal wc imaginc as taking placc in cxtcrnal bodics, 
36 From ùtis it [o llolVs Ùlat our m imi e,Ul ha\'e Ùle eapaeity to imagille our hody as replieating ùle 
beha\,iour and allCctions o r ùle exte lllai objecls which ,U'e imagilled as prescnt. l3y rcic lTing ta 
se\'eral studies in contemporary neuropsyeholo!,')', Anna BoukoU\'lla compares ùtis aspect of 
Spinoza's Ùleory o r Ùle imila tio n o f Ùle ;J lCels wiùI reecll t [indings on Ùle rolc of ùle so-eallcd 
"min'o r neurons" (sec, [o r examplc, Gallese ,Uld Goldman 1998), In p,u'tieu lar, m irro r Ileurons 
would enablc in hum,Uls a meehanism "Ùlal matches obselyed ae ls c:l:eeuted by oÙlers on Ùle 
obselyer's represenlations o f Ùle S,Ulle motor aets" (BoukoU\'lla 20 17, 101 :3), This neurologiea] 
mechanisms, she ;u-gues, "'ould be "al Ùle basis o r Ùle c:l:periential unders l,Ulding of ÙIC actions o r 
oÙlers" (she mentions Rizzolatti and Craighcro 2004, and Rizzolalti 2005) alld o r "ÙIC c:l:pcriential 
undcrslanding o r Ù1C emotio ns of oÙlcrs, whieh thi\'es lo cmpaÙly" (shc mcntio ns Gallcse 2003, 
G,Jlcsc eL al. 2004" ,Uld Gallese 2009) , so lo bring alxmL "our eapaeiLy Lo sh;u'c Ùle me;Uling of 
actio ns, in Lentions ,md cmotions wiù I o Ùlc rs, Lhus !,'ToulHling our idcntilieaLÎon ",iùI ,Uld 
connectcdness La o Ùlcrs" (I3oukoU\'ala 20 17, 1013), 
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wc can bc afTccLcd by corrcspo nding aIfects o l"joy o r sadncss.37 Y ct, sincc wc 
pcrcci\"c ÙIC affcctio n in us lo bc iclcnticaILo ÙIC ancctio n in ÙIC body thaL wc 
imaginc as prcscnt., wc wiU bc induccd Lo imaginc ÙIC cxlc rnal bod y as "a thing 
likc us", which is aIrccted WiÙI ÙIaL allc cL Loo. Thus, Spinoza concludcs his 
dcmo nsLratio n by c1aiming ÙIal " l"rom ÙIC 1 ~1Cl ÙIaL wc imaginc a thing likc us 
to bc allccLcd wiùI an aIfccl, wc arc aIkcLcd with a likc affccL". 
Thc impo rLanl Ùling Lo no Lc, hc rc, is ÙIal ÙIC aflccts ascribcd to ÙIC 
cxlc rnal things ÙlaL wc imagine as prcscnL arc rcally ÙIC aflccts ÙlaL wc /Cel as 
ours, by pcrceiving and be ing anc ctcd by ÙIC imagcs o l" ÙICSC cXLcrnallhings.:18 
Thcy arc allccts and l"celings WiÙI wllich wc arc acquainLccl , ÙlaL is, bccausc wc 
can !Cel Ùlcm in oursch·cs. Thus, ÙIC mcchanism o l" ÙIC imitatio n o r Lhc allc cts 
allows us lo rccognisc "ÙIings likc us" by ascribing Lo cxLernal bodics allccts 
and ÙlOughts ÙlaL wc fcel and cxperic nce in o ursch-es, il" ÙIC bcha\'iour o r an 
cxLcrnal body is rcpro cluciblc by us and whcn such a bcha\'io ur, il' imitaLcd 
(c\"cn imaginaLively), arouscs in us cert..'lÎn kincls o r mc nLal slc1.Lcs and !Celings. 
\ Vc will Ùlc rcfo rc bc Icd Lo associate cc rl<lÎn bc ha\"iour o r cxLcrnal bodics wiùI 
ÙIC concomilc1.nl prcscncc, in ÙIcm , o l" ccrlain a llccls ancl fe elings wiùI which 
wc arc acquainLccl , basccl o n o ur own pc rsonal, subjcctivc cxpcricncc -
37 O n Ùlese !,'Tounds, in E3p32s Spinoza also o uùines Ùle bq.,ri nning o r a Ùleol)' 0 1" de"elopl11enta l 
psychology, according to which children geL I"amilial" WiÙl beha\"ioural paLLellls and corresponding 
feelings by imitating ;lIld replicating Ùlel11, sincc ùleir bodies, when ;1Il alTcction o r image is p roduced 
in Ùlel11, musL neccssarily mirror Ùle mO\"emenls and allcctions 0 1" the e:'\lem al ohjects imagined as 
present. In Spinoza's 1V0 rds, ùl is musL happen "because, as IVe ha"e said, Ùle images or Ùlings are 
Ùle Yery allcctions 0 1" Ùle hum;1Il body, or modes by which Ùle human body is allcCled br exLernal 
causes, and disposed Lo do ùl is or Ùlat" (E3p32s; C 1,5 13 / G II , 165). 
38 Francesco TOLO mentions ùl is aspecL of Spinoza's Ùleol)' o f Ùle imit..1.tion of Ùle alTccts (ToLo 
20 13, 152, ami 20 16, 227-228, 23 1). IL is to be no Led ÙlaL Ùle s;une mechanism also explains ho lV 
IVe ascribc ùlOughts Lo oÙ 1er ùlings based on linb'1l istic Si!,'llS: we comp;u'e Ùle Ùloughts aro used in 
us bl' Ùle words ÙtaL m'e uLLered bl' Ùle speake r, be l"o re ascribing Lo Ùle speaker simil;u' ÙloughL~. 
50, in 'n ' !' l, 15, Spinoza IVriLes: 
IBJccause Ùle mo uÙl is relaLed Lo Ùle nature 0 1" ùle mml saying ùlis, and ;ùso because 
he Lo whom iL is sa id has pre,"io usly percei,"ed Ùle na tu re o f Ùle in Lellect, he easi ly 
understamls Ùle ùloughL o f Ùle man speaking by comp;ulson WiÙl his O l Vl l. 
(np 1, 15; C II , 81 / G Ill , (8) 
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ùlcrcby build ing Ù1C no tio n of "Ùlings likc us": ùùngs, ùlal is, capable of cqual 
ùlOughts and /Cclings whcn Ù1CY ael in ways which arc f~niLiar lo US.3D 
By using a co ntcmporary lcrminology, wc can say ùlal, whcn wc 'Juclgc 
somcthing to bc likc us" yia thc mcchanism o r Ù1C imi l..:1.ti on o r Ù1C af1ccts, no l 
o nly do wc takc an "inlcntio nal slancc" Lowards ùlat Ùling's bchaviour, bUl wc 
also takc a "phcnomcnal stancc" (Robbins and J ack 2006); ÙlaL is lo say, lhal 
noL o nly musl indi, 'iduals whosc bcha,iour phys ically rescmbles ours ha, 'c 
similar and prcdictable inlcntions, but Ù1CY musl also !Ccl thc sam c ùùngs Ùlat 
1 /Ccl, whcn 1 bchayc in a similar way, and cxpc ricncc Ù1C wo rld in Ù1C samc 
way lhat 1 also cxpcricncc il. W ln o Ùlcr wo rds, whcn 1 cmpaùlÎse WiÙl o Ùlcr 
39 Justin Sleinberg aQ,'lles 10 1' a "direcllransmission", o r "direcl inheritance", o r aJTccL~ li'om one 
body lo Ùle oÙ 1er (20 13, 394-396). O n ùIis bas is, he questions ho lV il is possible lo misrepresenl 
o Ùle rs' ,,!Iccts and misaltribule a!lccts lo oÙlers, ù a Ùle imi t.-"lti , ·e mech'U1ism. By contrasl, 1 conlend 
Ùlal Ùle ;ùlCcts Ùlal we aSClibe lo "ùIings like us" are ahvays and only ùle allCclS Ùlal are aroused in 
us by our OlVn alkctio ns, independenÙy o f IVheÙler a simil;u' arreCl is c1kcti\'cly taking place in Ùle 
n lelllal body Ùlal is imah>i ned as presenl - ,Uld, mosl impOr(;U1ÙY, independenÙy o r IVheÙler Ùle 
eü elllal body Ùlalll'e im<lh>ine as being present and ,ùfecled in some lVay exislS al ail. Indeed, il is 
of Ùle nalure o r our imah>iuationlo lel us regard as present bodies thal "ne iÙ1er exist nor are presenl" 
oulSide orus 0-:2p1 7c; C 1,464 / G II , 105). T his inleqJretatio n o rÙle "imitation ofÙle ,ùfeclS" is 
consislenl I~iùl ;Uloùler or Spin07À\'S d aims, <lccording lo IVhich: 
l'ri he ideas IVhich IVe hal'e of eü elllal bodies indicale Ùle constilution o r our OIVI I body 
more Ù\;UI Ùle nalure o r Ùle exlelllal bodies. 
(E2p 16c2; C II , 463 / G II , 10 1 .. T r,Ulslation modilied) 
ln ùle besl case scenario, Ùle rclore, raÙle r ÙI<U I a "direcl u-ansm ission" o r "inheri(;lI1ce" of <UI allcct, 
Ùlere C;UI be a perlccl replication in us o r <li 1 equal alkCl taking place in a body o ulSide o r us, which 
allo lVs 10 1' a correcl represen(;ltion and alU'ibution o f Ùla l a.llccl. According lo Spinoza - as IVe I~i ll 
see in Ùle nn l section - ùlis GUI happen IVhen hum,U1 alfeclS <U'e <U'oused by reason. For furùle r 
discuss ions o r Spin07ÀI's ùleory o r Ùle imitation of Ùle allCclS, see :vlaÙle ron (1 969) 1988a, 154- 155; 
:vlacherey 1995, 21 4-226; Della Rocca 1996b, 247-25 1, <U ld 2004; Green 20 17, 129-1 30. 
10 According lo Philip Robbins and AnÙlOny Jack, " Illo adoPl ùle in lentional Sl;U1ce lOlVard X 1 ••. 1 
entails aSClibing inlentional sla les (bclicls, des ires, inlentions, elc.) lo . Y and using ùl0se aSCliptions 
lo make sense o r . \'s behaliour" (2006,69). D,uIicl Dennell has c,lI1o nically dclined Ùle "inlentio nal 
slance" as lo llows: 
Here is how il 1V0 rks: lirsl l'ou decide lo U'eal Ùle objecl whose behal'ior is lo be 
predicled as a rational agenl; Ùlen you lih'llre oullVhal bc liefs ÙIal agenl oughllo h;n'e, 
h>i l'en ilS place in ùle world and its purpose. Then you !ih'llre o ul whal des ires il o ughl 
lo ha"e, on ùle same consideratio ns, <li l<llinally you predict ùlal ùIis rational agenl will 
acl lo rurùler iL~ goals in Ùle lighl o r its bcl icls. A lilÙe prac tical reasoning Ii'om ùle 
chosen sel of be lie rs ;Uld desires IIi ll in many - bUl no l ail - insta nces yicld a decision 
aboul lVhal Ùle agenl oughl lo do; ùlal is whal you predicl ùle age lll mJJ do. 
(DennellI1 98 111 987, 17) 
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people and rcgard Ùlcm as "Ùlings likc mc", in Spinoza's lcrms, I know "whal 
il fecls likc lo bc Ùlcm" - or, beltcr still, J bclicyc Ùlal J know wh al il !Ccls lo 
bc likc Ùlcm. 
6. "Humanity" as a shared affect 
According lo Spinoza, Ù1C capacity lo empathisc WiÙl "ÙlÏngs likc us" is Ù1C 
source of an alTcct in us Ùlal hc names "humanily Ihumr1nÙr1sl " (E3p29s; C I, 
510 / G II, 162. Translation modilicd). He also clubs il "courlcsy Ihumr1nlUls 
scu modcsLial" and dclincs il as "a desirc to cio wh al pleascs mcn and Ilol do 
whatdispleascs Ùlem" (E3i\d,1.3; C J, 51/,1 / G II, 202). lndccd, Spinoza argucs 
Ùlal il is or Ù1C naturc of cach onc's appctitc - which hc idcntifics (in ['3p9s) 
WiÙl "desirc" and "Illhc Slriying by which cach Ùling stri\'cs lo pcrsc\'crc in ils 
Insol;u' as, 10 1' Spinoza, all lhin!,'S musl acl ac('()nling lo laws or naturc which ncccss;u'ily dClclminc 
a thing "lo cxisl and producc ;UI cllccl in a ccrlainway" (Elp29j C 1,433 / G II , 70), and insolill' as 
dlc bcha\'io ur of all ùIin!,'S is dclincd as csscntially goaJ-oricnlcd - sincc Ù1C csscncc or a ù1ings is 
nOÙ1ing elsc bul "Ù1C slri\'ing by whieh caeh ùIing slri\'cs lo pcrsc\'crc in ilS bcing" (E3p7j C l, 499 / 
G II , 146), ù1is sui\'ing bcing, in lUI1l, noùIing clsc bul a ùIing's "appctilc", o r c\'cn, ilS "dcsirc" 
(E3p9sj C 1,500 / G II , 11\,7-148) - ÙIC inlcntionaJ sl;Ulec, or "inlcntional SU-alC!,'Y" 101' prcdicting 
and inlcrprc ting onc ù1ing's bch;l\iour applics lo yirlually ail cxisting ù1ings - WiÙ1 no distinction 
bclwccn "ù1ings likc us" ,U\d oùlcr ùIings, sueh as ;U\im;ùs or, c\'cn, rocks (Ep 58) , Furù1crmorc, il 
lollows li'om Spinoza's ùloughl-cxlcnsion p;u,lllclism ùlal, sincc " Illhc orclcr ancl conncction of 
iclcas is Ù1e S;U11C as ÙIC ordcr ;U\d COllllcction o rùIin!,'S" Œ2p7 j C l, 45 1 / G II , 89), Ù1C rcsullS Ù1al 
wc may oblain by aclopting an inlcntional sl;ul('c on somcùIing shallnol bc dillercnl l'rom ÙIC rcsullS 
obtainccl by laking a ph)'sicaJ sl;Ulcc on ÙIC samc ùIing - a SU, llC!,'Y which Dcnncll dclincs as lo llows: 
1 Il l' you \v;Ulllo prcdicl ÙIC bcha\'iour or a syslcm, dClcrminc iL~ physieal constitution 
(pcrhaps all Ù1C way down lo ÙIC mierophysieal bd) and ÙIC physical nalurc o r Ù1C 
impingcmcnlS upon il, and usc your knowlcdgc or ÙIC laws of phys ics lo prcclict Ù1C 
oulcomc 101' ;U\y illput. 
(DcnncllI1 98 111 987, 16) 
By conu'asl, Robbins and Jack </clinc ÙIC "phcnomcnal slancc" in ÙICSC lCJll1S: 
1'1'1 0 adoPl Ù1C phcnomcu;ù sl;Ulcc loward . Y is lo undcrsl;U\d . Y as a 'phcnomcnal 
syslcm', ùlal is, lo rcg;ml X as a locus of phcnomcnal cxpcricncc, 
Part of whal il is lo rcg;ml somcùIing as a loms of cxpcricncc is aSClibing 
phcnomcn;ù slalcs (cmotions, moods, pains, ùsual scnsations, Clc,) lo il. Bul ùIis 
iJ1\'oh'cs morc ÙI;u\ mcrc rolc aSCliption of phcnomcnal stalcsj il rcquircs a Idl 
apprcciation of ùlcir qualitati\'c characlcr, For cxamplc, if you don'l know whal il'S likc 
lo CCcl sacl, you GU\' l undcrs[;U\d what il is lo CCcl sad, And if you C;U\' l undcrs l;UlcI 
whal il is lo CCcl sad, you c,U\'l rcg;ml somcùIing as CCcling sad - al/c;L~l, nol in ÙIC rull· 
bloodccl way ÙJal ÙI C phcnomcnal stancc rcquircs, 
(Robbins ;U\dJack 2006, 69-70) 
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bcing" (E3p 7; C I, 499 / G II, 146) - lhal "lwlc slriyc lo promolc lhc cxislcncc 
of whalcvcr wc imaginc Ùlal lcacls lo joy, ancl lo rcmO\"c or dcsLroy whalc,"cr 
wc imaginc is conLrary lo il, or Ùlal buis lo sadncss" (E3p28; C l, 509 / G II, 
161. TranslaLion modificd)" Hcncc, it lüllows from our ,"cry own c\csirc lo 
promolc in oursclvcs aIlccls of joy - and, accordingly, rcsl.rain or rcmo'"c 
aflccls of sadness - Ùlal "wc shall sl.ri,"c lo do 1 ... 1 whalcvcr wc imaginc mcn 
lo look on wiÙl joy, and on Ù1C oÙlcr hand, wc shall bc aycrsc lo doing whal 
wc imagine mcn arc avcrsc lo" (E3p29; C l, 510 / G II, 162). For lhc aflccls 
ofjoy and sadness Ùlal wc ascribc lo oÙlcrs, as wc ha,"c sccn abm"c, are rcally 
Ù1C same alIccls of joy and sadncss Ùlal wc fCcl in oursch-cs. In parLicular, 
Spinoza conlcnds lhal whcn wc arc aflcclcd by sadncss bccausc wc imaginc a 
Ùung like us bcing alTcctcd by sadncss, ùlis sadncss in us can bc callcd "pily 
\commIScr .... zLlol" (E3p27s; C I, 509 / G II , IGO). As a conscqucncc, Spinoza 
argucs Ùlal "as far as we can, wc sl.riyc lo frcc a ùling wc pily from ils sufTering" 
(E3p27c3; C I, 509 / G II, 161), whcn wc dclccl sadncss and sufl"cring in 
somcùung, "providcd Ùlal wc judgc illo bc likc liS" (E3p22s; C l, 507 / G II, 
157). 
Howcycr, as long as Ù1C rccognilion of olhcr pcoplc's lhoughls and 
Icclings - and Ù1C conscqucnl idcnLilication of lhcm as "human bcings" -
relics on an imaginaLiyc proccss by which wc allribulc aflccls Ùlal wc fccl in us 
lo cxlcrnal Ùlings, bascd on ObSClyation and rcplicaljon of lhcir cxlcrior 
bchaviour, Ùus proccss is cxposcd lo crror and failurc. For Ù1C capacily of Ù1C 
human body lo affccl, and lo hc alkclcd by, cxlcrnal bodics in a grcal many 
ways, and lo bc variously mouldcd by dif1"crcnl cxpcricnccs and inlcractions 
with Ù1C exlcrnal cnvironmcnl, brings il aboul Ùlal difl"crcnl sul~jccls will also 
rcacl dilkrcnÙY lo apparcnÙY similar siluaLions, on Ù1C onc hand, and Ùlal our 
own way of bcing aflcclcd by samc ÙlÏngs may also changc in Limc, on Ù1C 
oÙlcr h;'ll1d. Rcgarding ùus, Spinoza \Vl'itcs: 
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Diffcrcnt men can bc aIlcctcd dillercnùy by onc and lhc salllc 
objcct; and onc and ÙIC samc man can bc alfcctcd dillercnlly al 
dinercnt l.Ïmes by onc and Ù1C samc objcct 
(E3p51; C l , 522 / G II , 178) 
IL can happcn, lhereforc, ùlat aIlccl.Ïons Ù1at wc imaginc as producing ccrlain 
af"!Ccls ofjoy or sadncss in "ù1ings like us", bascd on our pcrsonal cxpcricncc 
of similar cascs, may in reality ha,'c a tolally difTercnt nature and cnccl in oÙlcr 
people - or, more generally, in oÙ1cr beings . Indecd, ùle number of 
eireumslances and rcasons Ùlat may dctermine Ù1C naturc or onc's af"!Ccl.Ïons 
and appel.Ïte - and ù1at, consequenùy, determinc why someone aels or rcacls 
in a certain way, whcn compcllcd by extcrnat causcs - generally surpass our 
capability or unclerSl<:mding. Il Hcnce, Spinoza writcs Ùlat "Imlen can disagrcc 
in naturc Ihol71Ù1CS nf/lurf/ disacp;u'c possunt! insof;u' as ÙlCY are torn by 
af"!Ccls which are passions; and to ù1at extent also onc and thc saille man IS 
changeable and inconslant" (E4p33; CI, 561 / G II, 231). 
This "clisagrecmcnt of natures", or "natural discrepancy" betwecn 
indi"icluals, lûllows from Ù1C ract Ù1at Ù1C aI"!Ccls or an incli"idual must also 
difler in nature from ù1e aIlccls or anoÙ1er indi"iclual, as much as each onc's 
appcl.Ïtc, or clesire, is diITcrenùy anccted and dctermincd by apparenÙY similar 
~ I III E3Ad 1 (C l , 53 1 / G II , 190), Spinoza dcfillcs "dcsirc" as "man's \'cry CSSC IlCC, i1lSol;lr as il is 
concci\'cd lo bc dClell11incd, from ,Uly gi\'cn alkction of il, lO do somcÙlillg", addillg Ùlal, sillcc 
"desirc is appetilc logeÙle r \\~Ù1 ùJC consciousness of illcllpidila/ell1 esse appeû"/1I1l1 CUII/ qusdell/ 
cOllsàell/ùJ ", he "really recogllizcJsJ no dilTe rencc bc lwecn humall appel.ite alld desirc" 
(E3Adl cxp; C I, 53 1 / G II , 190). In E3p9d, he also strcsses ÙJal " JlJhc esscllce of Ùle milld is 
COllstiluled by adcqualc ,U1d by iuadequale iclcas". IL fo llows ÙJal Ù1C lirsl rcasoll why wc Ilcccss;u-ily 
misullderst;U1d olhcrs' aIlccls and misalu'ibule alkclS lo oÙlcrs is Ùlal wc ha\'c ail illadequalc 
ulldcrsl,UJdillg o f Ù1C origill and naturc of our YCly own alkclS - Ù10SC Ùlal wc also ascrihe lo "ùtillgs 
likc us". Thal is lo say, ÙJal, dcspilc ùle laCl ÙJal wc arc conscio us of our appetilcs, ÙlOughts, alld 
allccts, illsolill· as our cssence is collstilulcd by inadcqualc idcas wc <10 Ilol kilo\\' why wc !Ccl ccrtaill 
allccts alld ùtink ccrt;tin Ùlings in association WiÙl ccrt..1.in kinds of cmirollmelltal illpUL~ alld 
conscquclll bcha\'ioural rcspollscs. As Spilloza rcpeaL~ scycral times, ail hum<Uls ";u'c cOllscious of 
ÙJcir actio lls <Uld appctilcs, bul Ilo l awarc of Ù1C causcs by which Ù1CY arc delcrmille<l lo w,UJl 
someÙlillg" (E4Prcf; C l, 5t/·5 / G Il ,207). Sec also El App (C l , 410 / G Il ,78), E2p35s (C l, i[7:~ 
/ G II , 117), E3p2s (C l , 496 / G II , 143), and Ep 58 (C II , 428 / G IV, 266). COllcemillg Ùle 
rc.latio llship bClwccll appctilc ami <Ics irc, o r "appetile \~Ùl ÙJC cOllsciouslless o f il", rccall ÙIC 
allalyscs ill sectioll 5 or Ù1C prc\"Ïous chaplcr. 
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things. H owc\'cr, as 1 mcntioncd abo\'c, Spinoza concei\'cs thc appctitc, or 
dcsire, or an indi\'idual, as "ÙIC "cry csscncc, or naturc !csscnlù/ scu naLwr/1, 
o r each Imanl insorar as il is concc i" ed Lo be dCLcrmincd , by whatc\'cr 
constilution hc has, Lo do somcùling" (E3p56d; C l , 527 / G II , (85). 
Thcrclo rc, as wc ha\'c sccn in scctio n 11., Spinoza condudcs Ùlal " lclach afTccl 
or cach incliùdual dil1'crs l'rom Ù1C al1ccl o r anoÙ1er as mu ch as Ù1C csscnce or 
ÙIC onc Ij'om ÙIC csscnce or Ù1C oÙlcr" (E3p57; C l , 528 / G II , (86). In ùlis 
scnsc, Spinoza wrilcs: 
Thc nalurc, o r csscnce, o r Ù1C allCcts cannot bc cxplained ùU'ough 
our csscncc, o r naturc, alonc, bUL musL bc delined by ÙIC powcr, 
i.c ., by ÙlC naturc or cxLcrnal causcs compared WiÙl o ur own. Thal 
is why Ùlcrc arc as many spccics o r cach allccl as Ùlc rc arc spccics 
or ol~jccls by which wc arc allccLcd; Ùlal is why mcn arc aIlcclcd 
dillercnÙY by o nc a.nd Ù1C samc objcCl, and Lo ùlat cxLcnL, disagrcc 
in nalurc. And linally, ùlal is also why o nc and thc samc man is 
allcclccl dillercnùy Loward Ù1C s;unc oqjcCL, and Lo Ùlal cxlcnl is 
changcable, clc. 
Œ4p33d; C l , 562 / G II, 23 1) 
ln othcr words, il is ollen ÙIC casc Ùlal Ù1C bchm'iour ÙlaL wc ObSCITC in oÙlcr 
beings <lacs nol corrcspond lo Ù1C kind o r aHccts, thoughts, and mcnlal slalcs 
Ùlal wc would imaginc and cxpccL, bascd on our own cxpcricncc. 12 This may 
bc lhc causc or incomprchcnsion, mulual misundcrstandings, and can 
c\'cnlually Ieacl human bcings lo be "conLrary lo o nc ;u\o Ùler IÙJlÙ"Clll csse 
con/Jrmil " (E1.p3//.; C 1,562 / G II , 23 1). 
12 \ ViÙl rclcrence to Ùle stary of Ùle fall o r Adam, in Ùle Elhic.5 Spin07A'l also mentions the possibility 
Ùlal we C;Ul judge animais "to hc li ke us", ;Uld allrihute Ùlcm hum;Ul al1CclS ;Uld feelings, Ùlerehy 
gelling to imilale Ùleir hch;l\iour and their (supposed) al1CcL~: 
lAI fie r he helie\'ed Ùle lower ;Ulimals to he like himself 1 brul.1sibi SÙl7lk1 esse ('fedidil!, 
he immedialely hCg;Ul lo imi late Ùleir al1CcL~ (see E3p27) and to losc his freedom. 
(E4p68s; C J, 585 / G II , 262) 
Concellling ùlÎs passage, sec \1onlag 2009, 65·7 1; Sharp 20 Il a, 56-63, and 20 Il h, 20 1·209. 
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According lo Spinoza, howc\"cr, lhcrc is onc case in which our altribution 
of cqual mcnlal slalcs lo "lhings likc us" nc"cr I~lils: lhal is, whcn humans "Iivc 
according lo lhc guidancc of rcason lex due/LI ral/onIs 17·IVIlLl". 
Only insofar as mcn li,·c according lo Ù1C guidancc of rcason, musl 
thcy always agrcc in nalurc Ina/Lira scmpcr ncccssano ("onl/en/unll. 
(E4p35; C l, 563 / G II , 232) 
To Ù1C exlcnl Ùlal human bcings Ùlink and acl according lo rcason, thcy musl 
agrcc in nalurc, and lo lhal cxlcnl, Ùlcir rcspcctivc aOcclS musl also bc 
idcntical. Indccd, according lo Spinoza, lo rcason is nOÙling cise bullo ùunk 
and lo acl on Ù1C basis of adcqualc idcas (E2p40s2; E4p23) - id cas of 
propcrtics Ùlal arc cqual in us as in oÙlcr bcings, Ùlal is, and which arc 
ùlcrcforc common lo ail of Ù10SC who slm-c Ùlcm (E2p38-39) . Hcncc, if wc 
ùunk and acl bascd on idcas which arc "common Lo ail mcn" Œ2p38c; C l , 
474 / G II, 119), Ùlcn Ù1C lhoughlS Ùlal wc ha,·c, Ù1C actions Ùlal wc perlarm, 
and Ùle corrcsponding aOccls Ùlal wc may /Ccl, cannol bc difTcrcnl from Ù1C 
ùlOughls, actions, and al1ecls Ùlal olhcr human bcings would also Ùlink, do, 
and /Cel whcn Ù1CY also rcason. 
vVhcn wc rcason and ael accordingly, 111 oÙlcr words, wc necessarily 
ùunk and do ÙlOSC Ùlings Ùlal ail human bcings would also ùùnk and do, 
should Ù1CY find Ùlcmscl\"cs in our own siluation. PUl oÙlcrwise, actions Ùlal 
arc guidcd by rcason- and Ù1C undcrlying rcasoning proccsscs on which Ùl0SC 
actions arc basccl - arc complelcly l.ransparcnllo ail humans who are capable 
of Ù1C samc rcasoning. Thcrclarc, whcn pcople rcason, and wc rcason along 
WiÙl Ùlcm, wc ncccssarily know wh al Ù1CY Ùlink, why Ù1CY Ùùnk whal lhcy 
llunk, and why Ù1CY do whal Ù1CY do: lar wc Ùlink Ù1C samc Ùùngs and would 
ùlcrclarc do lhc samc Lhings Ùlal Ù1CY also do. Morc imporlc1.nÙy, whcn wc 
rcason, Ù1C kiIl(I of alkels by which wc arc alkclcd musl bc Ù1C sarnc in 
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e\'cryonc. (.3 H cncc, whcn humans li\'c "aceording 10 the guidance o f reason", 
Ù1C kind o f good lhal Ùley scek lo r lhemseh'es is neeessarily a good Ùlal "is 
commo n lo all mcn, and can be possessed equally by ail men insofar as they 
arc o f Ù1C same nalure" Œ1.p36d; C l , 561, / G II , 231.). I l So, Ùle good and Ù1C 
joy Ùlal a human may seck fo r hersclf, whilc she aets aecording lo Ù1C guidance 
of rcason, shc will also dcsirc lhem l'o r ail o ther hum<lns (I.0tp37). 
Thc good which man wanls lo r himsclr and lm'cs, hc willlo\'e morc 
conslanÙY if hc sces Ùlal oÙlcrs lo\'e il. So, he will sLri"c lo ha\'e Ùle 
othcrs lovc Ùle samc Ùlings. And because this good is commo n lo 
aU, and all can cqjoy il, hc will lherclo re (by the same reason) slri\'c 
Ùlal ail may cqjoy iL. 
(E/1-p37d2; C l , 565 / G II,235-236) 
Spinoza calls "moralily IplC:!asl" Ùle "des ire 10 do good gcncralcd in us 
by our li\'ing according lo lhe guidance or reason" (E1,p37s1; C 1,565 / G II , 
236) , and delincs il as a kind o r "courlesy IJllodcsLùl " (EAApp25; C l , 592 / 
G II, 272) , as hc aiso did WiÙl Ùle alfecl or "hum<1nily". Y cl, wheÙlcr our affccts 
of "courlcsy" and our clesire 10 plcase and help ÙlOse Ùl <1l wc rccognise as 
human bcings depcnd on our imagining tlleir possible mcnlal slalcs - and 
acting humanly lowards Ùlem o uI or "pily" - or on our reasoning and wanting 
for Ùlem Ù1C samc Ùlings Ùlal wc also want lo r us, Ù1C possibilily 10 cbdo p 
Ùlcse feelings and desircs lowards oÙlers is always grounded on lhe samc basis: 
il is grounclcd , Ùlal is, on our abilily 10 judge someonc 10 bc likc us and 
(.3 Furl.hcrmo rc, Spinoza mailltaills Ùla t alfec ls ;mJUsed by reaSOll C;Ul llel'c r be rcla ted to sadncss 
Œ3p59). IL fo llo ws ÙlaL, ill o rde r to promoLc OllC'S OIVll a lk cts ol"joy ùlrough cmpaÙlY alld imitatio ll 
o f afkcls , a hwnan be ing actillg accordillg to ÙlC guid;U!cc o f hcr rcaSOll will lleccss<u'ily Slril'C Lo 
makc o Ùlc r pcoplc rcaSOll WiÙl hcr ;Uld fccl cquaJ aJTccts o f joy, Spilloza dclillCS "llo biliLy 
Igcllclvsil..1sl" as Ù1C "dcs irc by which cach OllC sLril 'cs, solcly l'ro m ÙlC dictaLc o f rcaSOll, Lo aiel OÙlc r 
mc n iU1djo ill Ùlc mLo him illli'iclldship" (1-:3p59s; C 1, 529 / C il , 188). 
·~I Illdccd , Spilloza COllLCllds Ùlat "ÙlC good which cI'c ryollc who liI-cs accordillg LO ÙlC dicLaLc o f 
reason wa nls fo r himself is ulldcrsl;Uldillg" (1-:1 p37d ; C 1, 565 / C Il , 2:~5) , ÙlaL is, rcasoning ilsclf, 
whc reas " ÙlC suprcm c good" o f a hum<lll hcillg is " to kno lV Cod " (E1 p36d ; C l, 56t1, / C Il , 23t1.) 
<Ul d , according Lo Spinoza, "iL pcrta ills Lo ÙlC CSSC llCC o f ÙlC hum;ul mimi to hal'c ;Ul aelcquatc 
kno wlcdgc o f Cod 's c Lc lllal <UHI illlilli LC csse llCC" (l·>1.p3Cis; C 1,56 1, / C Il , 235), 
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cmpaÙlisc wiÙl hcr, Ùlcrcby allribuLing hcr mcntal slatcs, ICclings, and 
lhoughls which are cqual lo ours. Thus, in E4p50s, Spinoza concludcs by 
claiming: 
IOlnc who is mm'ed lo aid oÙlcrs nciÙlcr by rcason nor by pit y is 
righÙy called inhuman 1 rerle ùûwmrllws appc/Jalwl. For (by 
E3p27) hc sec ms lo be unlikc a man Ihomùn' dùsùl1JJù esse 
11dclwj. 
(E4p50s; C 1,571/. / G II ,21/-7). 
In oÙJcr words, according lo Spinoza, il is only our capacily to rccognisc othcr 
bcings as "ùlings likc us", and lel Ùlcm, in lUrI1, rccogllisc us as "things likc 
ÙJcm", Ùlal dcnolcs us as propcrly "human" and dclcrmincs ÙIC limits of 
applicabilily of Ùle vcry noLioll of "humanily". Thal is lo say, ÙJal only to thc 
cxlcnl Ùlal we parlakc in ùtis process of mutual rccoglliLion arc wc human, 
and only lo Ùlal exlent can wc also undcrsland whal humanily consisls in. 
7. Conclusion 
Thc analyscs carricd oul so far allow us lo linally proyidc éUl answcr lo 
Wilson's qucsLion, concerning how wc clcfinc spccilically huméUl bchaviour 
ancl mcnlalily in a univcrsc whcrc ail ùtings hayc a mimi and arc ÙJcrcfürc 
"animalc", and wherc, as a conscqucncc, thc prcscnce of mcntalily pel" se docs 
nol accounlfür any spccific behaviour. Gi"cn ùJCSC uncoll\'cnliolléll prcmiscs, 
lhc answcr cannol bUl bc unconycnLionalloo. 
Thcrc is no spccilically huméUl bcha,·iour. Or, bcllcr sLiIl, ÙIC boundarics 
and characlerisLics Ùlal dcfinc spccilically human bchaviour arc traccd by ÙIC 
ycry capacily Ùlal humalls ha, 'c lo imilalc onc anoÙJcr's bcha"iours, and 
collccLi,dy acl in orclcr to promolc onc anoÙlcr's wcllbcing. Thc cxislcncc of 
"humanily" as a specics, ill ùlis scnsc, is a rcsull Ùlal lüllows from ÙIC cxislcncc 
or inlraspccilic social behaviour - éUlcl nol vicc ' ·crsa. 
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In parallcl, on Ù1C mcnlal domain, spccilically human mcnLaliLy can bc 
idcntilicd WiÙl ÙIC cxislcnce o f intraspccilie alleeLs, which dcfinc our vcry 
no tjon of "humaniLy", and by wluch sC"cral indi"iduals Ùlink and l'ccl lhings 
o n ÙIC basis o f wh al Ù1CY assumc o Ùlc r individuals' ùloughLs and feclings mighL 
bc. Thc dcvclopmcnL o f sueh allects, as wc havc sccn, rcquircs no t o nly that 
wc takc an inlcnGo nal slance on somconc clsc's bcha, iour - fo r ÙIC bcha\'iour 
o r any thing, in Spinoza's panpsychisL and d clcrminisl uni\'Crsc, lS 
inLcrprctab\c and ÙlcorcGcally prcdiclab\c as originaGng l'rom "sysLcms of 
intcnGo ns" (DcnncLl [198111 987, 15) - bul also a "phcno mcnal stan cc": wh al 
makcs a human bcing propcrly "human " in Ù1C cycs of somconc clsc, is hcr 
eapaeily Lo havc lCclings and affects cqual lo ÙIOSC o f Ù1C o bscrvcr and , in 
gcncral , lo cxpcricnce ÙIC world in Ù1C samc way l'rom hcr inlcrnal, subjcctjvc 
poinl of , ·icw. Il is only ùtis kjnd o f comprchcnsion o f aJlOÙlcr mind 's naLurc 
ÙlaL allows us lo cmpaùtisc WiÙl o Ùlc r indi"iduals and acl lowaJ-d s Ùlcm in a 
propcrly "human" way, acco rding Lo Spinoza; fo r iL is only ùlis kind of 
comprchcnsion of anoÙlcr indi"idual's natu rc Ùlat arouscs in us lhc will lo 
'1-5 takc carc o f hcr and lrcal hc r as a mo ral agcnt. 
If wc fa il lo access ùlis kjnd o r cmpaùlic <Uld mulual undcrstanding of 
cach oÙlcr's a11e cts , wc canno l bc naLurally \cd lo ael humanly lowards o nc 
<tno Lhcr - by fccling in us ÙIC dcsirc, Ùlal is lo say, Lo prc"cnl and rcmovc 
ano Ùlcr's saclncss and arousc and incrcasc ano lhcr's joy - 101' wc do nol l'ccl 
If> Thal a mcrc st,U!ec conccrning onc's intcntions is no l sullicicnt l'or Ll'Cating somconc as a moral 
suhject, is lruc also l'or Dcnncll, who lVI·itcs: 
O nc is h'l.Iilty o r no monsu'os itics il' one d ismemocrs ÙIC compulcr wiùl \\'hom OIlC 
plays chcss, o r C\'cn ÙIC rohOl wi ùl whom OIlC has long cO I1\'crsatio lls. O IlC ado pLs ÙIC 
illlc lltional sLancc tow;u'd any syslem one assumcs to hc (ro ughly) ratio llal 1 ... 1. IT lo 
adoPl a uu ly moral stancc toward Ù1C syslcm (ÙIUS ù ClVing il as a person) , might o llcn 
tUIll oul to hc psychologically ilTcsistible 1 ... 1. bUl il is IOh>ically distinct. 
(Dcnnclt 11 9731 20 17, 258) 
Conccming ÙIC rUllction o r ÙIC phcllomcnal stallcc in shaping up ÙIC imagc o r a suhjcct o r moral 
COllccrn , \\;ÙI whom \\'c cmpaùlisc and cstablish social rclatiollships, see illslead Rohbins and Ja('k 
2006, 70-72. 
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any sadncss or joy Ihal could alleel us and prompl us lo ael in association lo 
somconc elsc's sadncss or joy. Indccd, whcn wc raillo cmpalhisc, wc do noL 
aclually scc and rccognisc any sadncss or joy in oÙlers - Lo ÙIC poinl Ùlat wc 
may c"cn rcgard Ihosc oÙlcr lhings as "mindlcss". Far l'rom bcing 
contradicLory, ùlis ouleomc is particularly cogcnL in Spinoza's panpsychisL 
uni"crsc, whcrc ÙIC dillercncc bclwccn "ùlings likc us" and "Ùlings unlikc us" 
cannol bc drawn on ÙIC mcrc alLribution or mcnlaliLy and consciousncss 
(which arc uni"crsal ICalurcs), bUl only on Ù1C aLtribution or mentality and 
consciousncss "likc ours", Paradigmatic, in Ùus scnsc, is Spinoza's 
considcration or animal liIC, conccrning which thc ob\'iousncss of Ùlcir 
capacily lo ha"c scnsations and feelings oughl nc\ 'crlhelcss nol lo rcslrain us 
l'rom "killing Ùlcm", "using lhcm al our plcasurc", and "trcating Ùlcm as is 
mosl con"cnicnl lor us", in accordancc WiÙl "ÙIC ratiomù principlc or sccking 
our own ad"anlagc". 
For ÙICY do nol agrcc in nalurc WiÙl us, ancllhcir affects arc dillercnl 
in nalurc l'rom human allecls ! (jurU1do(juidcJJJ nobiscL/171 /Jalura /Jon 
COI1l cniunl cl COrUIJJ aflèclus ab aflècu'bus humr7J/is SUIll nalura 
CIiICI:5'/! (sec E3p57s). 
(E4p37s 1; C 1,566 / G II , 237) 
In a (ew words, whcn wc raillo cmpaùlisc and rccognisc oÙlcr indi\'iduals as 
"ù1ings likc us", wc trcal Ùlcm as inhuman and wc can, in Lurn, bc cqually and 
"righùy callcd inhuman", by lhosc whosc fcelings wc faillo undcrslanc!, 
Hcrc, whcrc ÙICY also appcar lo bc morc important and crucial, ÙIC 
rcasons (or allribuling human or non-human mcntaliLy to somconc elsc couic! 
noL bc any morc prccarious and fragilc, for Ù1CY éU'C bascc! uniquely on an 
indi"idual's capacily to rccognisc, bascd on hcr own pcrsonal cxpcricncc and 
on obscl"yablc cxLcrior traits of anoLhcr indi"idual's bcha"iour, somcÙling ÙlaL 
by dclinition sccms Lo prccludc any possibilily or dirc(t obscr\'ation: ÙlaL is, an 
cqual "subjcctivc characLcr or cxpcricncc". As wc ha"c sccn, Spinoza docs not 
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deny Lhat éUl)' bcha\'iour in nalurc may corrcspond, in principle, Lo somc kind 
of conscious acti\·iLy. ~G Howc\"cr, il is oIlly lo lhc cxLcnL Ùlal 1 can l'ully idcnliry 
mysclr in Ù1C acls and dccisioIls or aIlolhcr indi\'idual, Ùlal 1 will also 
acknowledgc Ùlal indi\'idual as a "Ùling likc mc", cndowcd WiÙl a similar 
menlalily and - morc imporlaIlLly - a similar capacily lo fccl jl>y and sadncss 
when 1 also fccl Ùlcm, in lhc samc way lhal 1 also !Ccl Ùlem. So Ùlal one and 
Ùle same individual will appcar morc or !css human in Ù1C cycs or somconc 
clsc, lo thc cxLcnl Ùlal hcr bcha\'iour will appcar morc or less Euniliar and 
capable of arousing cqual alTccls, !CcliIlgs and lhoughls. ~7 
U; ln ùlis sen sc, ÙIC attribution 0 1" consciousncss - or Lhc daim ÙlaL ail bodics musL hal'c a 
cOlTesponding minci - accorcling Lo Spinoza, is noL and c;ulIlol bc a conscqucncc cnsuing fi"om an 
";U1a10gy iU'gumCnl", as Edg;u' Singer rails il (1 9 11 , 180) . Il is a mclaphysiralncccssily dict.'llcd by 
Gocl's infinite naLurc. Bccausc, [o r carh body cxisting in naLurc Ùlc rc musL bc in Gocl's aluibuLe ÙIC 
coITcsponcling iclca, which acL~ as ÙIC mind 0 1" lhaL bod y, as well as ÙIC corrcsponcling ici ca 01" ÙIC 
minci . Furlhermorc, in ÙIC lighl 0 1" ÙIC prel'ious analyscs, 1 assumc ÙlaL Spinoza 1V0uicl noL bc 
unsympaùlc tic lo Singcr's Ùlcsis, acrording lo \\"hich "our bclic l" in consciousncss is iUl CXpccLation 
0 1" probable bchal'ior basccl on an o bsclyation 01" aclual bch;l\ 'ior, a bclic l" Lo bc conlirmccl or re l"u lCd 
by morc obselyation, as iUly o Ùlc r bclic l" in a I;\(t is lo be u"ied oUl" (1 9 11 , 183) - if by 
"consriousness" we inLcncl lo rcfcr Lo spccilically hum;uI menlalily. YCL, Spinoza's p,Ulpsychism 
presses furllic r cxaeùy ÙIOSC qucstions lo which Singer's behayio urism appcars incapablc o f 
prol'iding iUl iUlswcr - ÙlaL is, disniminating Ùle behal'ioural fcaLurcs ÙlaL o nc is ,villing Lo iclcntil"y 
,vidl human bchal'io ur, hencc ,~i ùl hUIlli/1I C'<lIlscio usness: 
You lvill ask me: "'VhaL aspeCl 01" ùle behm'ior 01" ccrlain objecls lcads us lo cali Ùlem 
conseious? 1 mlswcr, 1 do nol kno\\", and npecLncI'cr surcly Lo know. H acl 1 bccn 
askcd : "'VhaL aspecL o r Ùle behal'ior 01" cCltain o bjects leads us lo cali Ùlem alil 'c ? 1 
musL hal'c rclurnecl ÙIC SiUllC answcr. 
(Singcr 19 11 , 183- 184) 
ln olhcr worcls, rcclucing consriousncss Lo bchal"iour is a tril'ial solution in Spinoza's syslcm, as long 
as ail dlings bchal'c in a ccrtain way ,Uld musL kcl and n pcricncc ÙIC 1V0rid accorclingly. Still, iL 
cloes nol answcr ÙIC qucstions concel1ling whirh behal"iour wc ,U"C kecner on cal ling "humml", ancl 
why IVC conscqucnùy bclicI'c sur h bch;l\iour Lo bc neress;uily associaLecl ,~i ùI a cclta in kiml o f 
speeilicall y human conscious lilc. In ùris scnse, ÙIC reinu'oduction 0 1" a sul~jcctil 'e npelicntial 
clcmcnl ,viùl rcg;u"d Lo o ur conside ration 0 1" Ùle nature 0 1" Ùle menLal, ùl rough Ùle meclliUlism 01" 
ÙIC imiLatio n 01" ÙIC allecls, is aimed aL answeling Ùlese questions. 
~7 As wc haye secn, Spinoza cOlilends Ùlal only reasoning prel'ents us li'om misinLelvrcting oÙ 1er 
pcoplc's aIlccls o r misa LU'ibuting aJkcls Lo lhem ; lil r, when wc rC;L~on , wc musL by nccessily ùJink, 
do ,Uld fccl ÙIC SiU11C ùrings Ùlal o Ùler human bc ings also Ùlink, do and fcel. Yel again, appealing 
lo reason prOlidcs no safc gro und li:>r dCI'clo ping slablc inu'aspccilir alkcls and rCCOh'lrition ofcach 
o Ùler's humanity. For, according lo Spinoza, iL is IlOt in o~lr li'cc power Lo choosc Lo rcason, imd IVC 
,U'C constanÙY under ÙIC c llccl 0 1" p;lssions ÙlaL rail preluilus I"rom reasoning. As hc also \\~"iLeS, " iL 
is impossible Ùlal a m,m 1 ... 1 sho uld bc able lo ulldergo 110 challgcs cxccpl Ùlose whirh GU I bc 
unclersLoocl Ùlro ugh his OIVl I nalure alollc, ,Uld 0 1" which hc is ÙIC adcqualc cause" (E4p/~ ; C l, 548 
/ G Il, 212). For ùlis reason, hc cOlldudes, "mail is lIeressiU'il )' always s u~jerllo passions" (E4p4c; 
C I, 549 / G Il , 213). 
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These consideraLÏons also allow us lo shed more light on Spinoza's 
apparenùy striking asserLÏons concerning Ùle radical sceptics evoked in Ùle 
TIE - according lo which "Ùley musl be regarded as automata, complelely 
lacking a mind" - and his uncompromising Lake on dcccitllIl bchaviour in 
generat 18 As wc havc secn, Spinoza conlcnds lhat ail propcrly human 
relaLÏonships - by which we mutually help each olher and trcat each oÙlcr as 
moral agcnLs - arise in us only bccausc of our capaeily lo rccognise, in other 
individuals, thc prcscnce of cqual ùlOughLs and fCelings in associaLÏon WiÙI 
ccrtain cXlcrior, obscrvable signs. Lics and deccitllIl beha\'iollr sccm inslead 
lo have a contrary eficct Indccd, ÙICY cnlail a delibcralc usc of ÙIC same signs 
lhal we ordinarily adopt to eommllnicalc and sharc our mcntal states (ail of 
our beliefs, inlcnLÏons, and allccLs, Ùlal is lo say) WiÙI ÙIC oppositc purpose lo 
misguide onc's capabilily lo inLcrprcl one's rcal ùlOughts. As Spinoza wrilcs, 
when humans acl dcccptively, ÙICY "agrec only in words, and arc conlrary lo 
onc anolher in (acl" (E4p72d; C 1, 586 / G II, 261.). Lics and dccepLÏon, Ùlal 
is, l1lm Ù1C words thal wc use lo dcscribe our belids, intcnLÏons, and aflccLs 
inlo meaningless sOllnds - as "Ù1C words of a parrol or an aulomalon, whieh 
spcak WiÙloul a mind". Therdore, as (ar as dcccption rcprcsenls an obslaclc 
lo rceognising similariLÏes in our rcspccLÏve ways of lhinking and cxpcricncing 
ÙIC world, it Ù1rcalcns and hindcrs our capabilily of cmpaÙlising WiÙI oÙlcr 
indi,iduals and creaLÏng WiÙl Ùlcm slable social relaLÏonships - Ùlat is, human 
relaLÏonships.19 As Slcven Nadler rcmarks, ÙIC problem WiÙI aets of decepLÏon 
is Ùlal "ÙICy bring about 1 ... 1 division between individuals" (201G, 265), sinec 
ÙICY "pul pcople al oclds WiÙl one anoÙlcr and gcncratc a dillercnce in Ùleir 
18 In E4p72, Spinoza daims ùlata hum,Hl bcing guidcd by rcason allVays, and unconditionally, "acls 
honcsùy, not dcccpti\·cly" (C 1,586 / G II , 264). Conccming ùtis, scc also Garrctt 1990, 221·224. 
19 As IVC ha\'c ;ùso sccn in Ù1C quolation from rlTP XX, 12 - ciled in scction 4 - a society Ùlal docs 
not ;ùlolV humans "lO usc ùlcir rcason I"rccly" and lcad ùlcm instcad lo "clash WiÙl onc anoÙlcr in 
halI'cd, anger or dcccption, or deal incquilably WiÙl OIlC ;moùlcr", is a socicly ùlat "change mcn 1 ... 1 
inlo bcasts or aUlomata". In such a slalc, propcr hum<Ul rclationships hct\\"ccn imhYiduals ;U'C 
disruplcd and lost. 
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nalurcs" (2016, 267). Thc disagrccmcnl bclwccn indi, 'iduals' nalurcs broughl 
aboul by dccepLÏon is, in c1kcl, its mosl dangcrous aspccl, sincc il cnlails lhal 
wc losc lhc capacity lo rccognisc cach olhcr as "hum ans" and 10 ll'cal cach 
olhcr accorclingly. 
Indccd, no l o nly docs dcceilful bcha\'iour clash wilh aCLÏng acco rding lo 
lhc guidance o r reason - by which our ùloughL'i and rcclings arc ncccssarily 
lransparcnt lo ail humans - bul it also undcrmincs our capacily lo nalurally 
/Ccl pily towards oÙlcrs, whcnc, 'cr wc sccm lo dClccl saclncss and sullc ring in 
"ùlÏngs likc us". So, Spinoza wrilcs: 
IHIc who is casily louchcd by ÙIC afrecl o r pily, and mm'cd by 
anolher's surrcring or lears, olk n docs somcùling hc lalcr rcpcnls 
- bolh bccausc, l'rom an alkcl, wc do nOùling which wc ccrlainly 
know lo bc good , and bccausc wc arc casily dcceiycd by l'alsc lcars. 
(E4p50s; C 1,571,/ G II , 211.7) 
Ir our pily gcls rruslralcd Loo many LÏmcs "by l'al sc lcars", wc may c, 'cnlually 
conc\udc Ùlal Ù1C cxlcrio r lraits by which wc rccogllÏse sadncss and sull'cring 
in "somcùling likc us", do no t mark in Ù1C incli\'idual by who m wc arc 
syslcmatically dccci\'cd Ù1C prcscnce o r Ù1C samc allecls ùlat wc /Ccl . This may, 
in lum, undcrminc our rcasons lo bclicyc lhal Ù1C dccc iycr may ha, 'c ÙlC 
capacily al alllo pcrcei,'c ÙIC , 'c ry samc aITccts Ùlal wc pcrcci,'c whcn wc acl 
similarly - lo pcrcei\'c, ÙlaL is, ÙIC samc kind o r joy and ÙlC samc kilHl or 
sadncss, or plcasurc and pain: lo r ÙIC dccci\'cr, apparcnùy, docs nol /Ccl sad 
al ail whcn 1 /Ccl sadlor Jllin. In oÙlcr words, cxposurc 10 syslcmaLÏc dcccpLÏon 
can makc us bclic, 'c Ù1al oÙlcr human bcings arc or a dill'crcnl nalurc, lhcrcby 
UIl\VorÙlY or o ur carc and attcnLÏon, sincc, jusl as animais or o Ùlcr non-human 
Ùlings, "ÙICy do nol a/:,'Tcc in nalurc WiÙl us, and Ùlcir allc cLs arc dil1c rcnl in 
nalurc rrom human alkcls". Thal is to say, Ùlal syslcmaLÏc dccciLliJl bcha\'iour 
can bc ÙIC triggcr lo a proccss o r "dchumanisaLÏo n", by which wc l'ail - or, 
c, 'cn worsc, refusc - lo acknowlcdgc oÙlcr pcoplc's sull'cring and happincss. 
LOS 
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Hcncc, insorar as pcrsislcnl dcccilfui bcha,'iour can bring aboul inhuman 
t'cclings, il sccms l!Jal , accorcling lo Spinoza, syslcmalÏc deceplÏon is lo be 
lrcalcd as oUlrighl inhumall heha,'iour. For ùlis reason, his reaclÏon lo Ù1C 
sccplÏc's lics coulcl Ilol hc morc radical, conscqucnlÏal, and inhum;m. For, by 
invilÏllg us lo rcgard Ù1C sccplÏc as an auloma~on "complclcly lacking a mind", 
hc cll(ls up clehumallising lhe decci,'cr. 
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Networks of Ideas: Spinoza's Conception of Memory 
Chapter Abstract 
The aim of Lhis chapLer is lo olfcr an cxplanation of \l'hal memory is, on Spinou,'s aecounL, 
and how it is underslood lo dclcrl11inc the li fc of an individual by inleracLÎng wiLh Ùle resL 
of her mental conlenl and lilllctions. In ordcr to un pack Spinoza's ùleory of memory and 
assess and situaLe its ro ll' \\'ith rcspecl to his philosophy o r mind, 1 analyse Ùle de/initions 
and descripLÎons of memory lhal Spinoza providcs in lhe Tl'ci/tisc Oll tlic ~Jncndi/lion of' 
UJC Intcllect and in the Elhics. 1 highlight ('ol11l11on Icatures ancl difierences belween Lhe 
Lwo accounls. In my analyses, 1 usc the contemporary disLÎncLÎon beLween "episodic 
memory" ancl "semanlic lllelllory" (Tuking 1972) as a heuristic devicc. 1 sholV Lhal, in Ùle 
TIE, Spinoza presents cases of cpisodic lllelllory - which invoke a LemporalizaLÎon of ùleir 
objecls - as disLÎncl l'rom, and incolllpatible \\'ith, lhe inlellect and ils orcier ancl connecLion 
of ideas . COllverscly, he considers inslan('cs of semantic memory as cases which 1l0L only 
allow l'or Ùle inLclligibilily or nlllelllonic associations, bUl also for a seeming inleracLÎon 
beLween inlellecl and memory. 1 also delllonslrale lhal, in the Etliics, Spinoza delines 
memory as composing nell\'Orks or ideas synchronica lly associated lo each oÙler, thereby 
reducing cases of episodic melllory to cases of semantic me mOly. 1 conclude by showing 
why Spinoza l1eshecl oul his accounl of memOly in this Iray, in orcier Lo allolV for a 
rclationship beLween inlellecl and melllory, and why he deemed il imporlanl for lhe 
inlellecL lo have access lo mnemonic conlcnt. 
1. Introduction 
Spinoza conlcnds Ùlal ail humans "are conscious or lhcir "o litions and Ù1cir 
appctilc" (E1App; C l, 4.1/.0 / G II , 78). He also al1ïnns lhal ùlis appctitc is "ÙIC 
vcry csscncc or man" (E3p9s; C l , 500 / G II , 1/1.7), and Ùlal ail humans arc 
conscious or ùlcir csscncc (E..'3p9d; E3Ad l cx). Thc l'ollowing analyses arc 
aimcd al cxploring and dcscribing one limdamenlal dimcnsion o r Spinoza's 
accounl or ÙIC conscious mimI, which has uccn lraditionally ncglccled uy 
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Spinoza scholars - namely, Ù1C dimension constitutcd by mcmory. 1 will 
inquirc how mncmonic itcms bccomc oqjccls or conscious recollcction in ÙIC 
minci and how mcmory, according Lo Spinoza, is responsiblc lor shaping a 
ccrtain ncLwork or conscious pcrcepLÎons thaL arc ail gi\'cn within a single 
cllchainmcnt or idcas. AL Ù1C samc LÎmc, 1 will considcr how mcmory 
conlribuLcs, in this way, Lo clcLcrmining ÙIC oycrall alTccliyc stalc or thc mind, 
i.c., ils currcnL appeLÎLc - thaL is, whal Spinoza also l'ails its "actual csscncc" 
(E3p7; C l, 499 / G II , 146), Ù1C objcCl or our consl'iousness (E.3p9; C l , 499 
/ G II, 147). 
By Ù1esc analyscs, 1 intcnd lo fill a gap in currenl Spinoza sl'holarship. 
Indccd, many commcnL:,lors mcnLÎon mcmory only to rdale it to Spinoza's 
accounls or pcrsonal idenLÎty and iclcnLÎly ùlrough LÎmc. 1 Only a ICw, howcycr, 
sccm lo considcr Spinoza as ha\'ing a spccific Ùlcory or memory, or an accounL 
capable or playing a loundaLÎonal role WiÙl rcspcct Lo his oycrall philosophy or 
minci, and worÙ1 bcing analyscd scparalely.2 Dctailcd analyscs or Spinoza's 
account or mcmory arc, nC\'crÙlelcss, sLÎ Il wanLÎng. For mcmory looks, Q\'crall, 
likc a marginal Lopic in Spinoza's philosophical systcm. 
Ir wc considcr ÙIC whole corpus or Spinoza's tcxL,>, wc can lind only Lwo 
dcfiniLÎons or mcmory - namely, 111 ÙIC unfiIlishcd T'l'calisc ail UlC 
Lll1clldau'oll al U1C InLcllccL, and 111 ÙIC EUllCS. On both occasions, 
consideraLÎon or ils nalurc and runcLÎoIls sccms Lo bc limitcd. In bOÙl Lcxls 
1 Sec, for cxamplc, Saw (1 969) 1972,9- 10; Hice 197 1,656-657; Domgall 1973, 256-257; \1alsoll 
1977,405; Curley 1988,85-86; Ablondi alld 13arbone 199/~, 84-86; l\adlcr 2001, 126-127, ;U1d 
2006, 270-271; Lin 2005, 251\-258; Della Hocca 2008, 259; \ V;ùlcr 2009, 498- ~99; Thiel 20 II, 63-
64; 
2 \1emory occupies , 'cry lilÙe space in COlllclius De Deugd 's sludy of Spilloza's Ùleory of Ùle lirsl 
kind ofknowledge (1 966, 202-206), Sec ;ùso WOll5011 1931,b, 80-90, alld GueroullI97~, 229-235. 
Laurelll 13O\'e 0 996, 20-24) and Syli;U1e \1alillolVski-Ch;u-Ics (2001.h, 106-107) ;U1alyse ùle role of 
meI1101)' wiùI respecllo Spinoza's ùleol)' of habiL, . \1ore recellùY, l'cler \ Veigcl has poillled oul 
ùle cellu'alily of l11el11ory, in Spinoza, wiùl regard lo his aC('QulIls of il11al,.-inaLi\'e processes, such as 
linhru isLic cogniLion, Ùle fOll11aLion of uIIi, 'ers;ù noLions, amI illducLi,'e reasollillg (2009, 239-24.6). 
Sergio Hojas Peralla (20 (6) has pro"ided a 1110re arLiculale sll1dy of SpiIlOZ<I'S ÙleOlY of l11emory, 
('Ql11p;uing il ",iùI ArisloÙe's ÙleolY, 
108 
Chi/pIC/" 3, ,\ 'cIIrorks o /Ir/cils: SpÙIOZii 's COllccplioll O/ ,I/(,l1 lOn ' 
Spinoza sharply clisLinguishcs bclwccn mcmory and intellcct, cxplieiÙy 
dcnying lhc lallcr any mncmo nie powcr (TIF. §82; E5p23s; E5p:-31,s). By 
co nlrasl, hc grouncls ÙIC human capabilily o r rClaining and rClric, 'ing imagcs 
o r Ùlings in a corporeal lunctio n CriE §§82-83; F.2pI7d2; E2p18d). Yct, 
Spinoza also conlencls Ùlal Ù1C inlcllecl l'an aicl one's mcmory and incrcasc 
ÙIC slrcngùl o r o nc's mncmo nic associatio ns errE §§8 1) . H c also d aims that 
imagcs ancl ùlo ughls, whcn Ù1CY arc conncclccllo cach OÙlcr according lo ÙIC 
ordcr or Ù1C intcllecl, arc capablc o r arousing alTccts which arc strongcr in timc 
(E5 p7; E5plOs) Ùlan Ùl0SC arousecl by imagcs and ùlOughts eonncetcd 
according lo "Ùle o rclc r and conncctio n o r Ù1C alrections or ÙIC human body" 
(E.2pI8s; C l, 465 / G II, 107), which arc dClcrmincd by "ro rluitous cncounlcrs 
WiÙl ùlings" (E.2p29s; C l , 471 / G II , Il /l,). IL rcmains undcar , on ÙIC basis o r 
ÙICSC daims, wheÙlcr ancl how Ù1C inlellect can inlcracl WiÙl mcmo ry - in 
orclcr lo help lhe o rganisatio n, rclcnLÎo n and rccollcction o r inlo rmation 
slorccl in thc bocly - WiÙlOUl assuming any intc rplay bclwccn lunclions or lhc 
mind and runc tio ns o r Ùle body. 
As 1 will demo nst.ralc in Ùus chaptcr, hmvc, 'er, Spinoza puts ronvard a 
sophislicalcd accounl or mcmory, capable o r clisLinguishing bctwccn dilTcrcnl 
runctiolls, such as cpisoclic and scmalltic mcmory. 1 will argu c Ùlal whcn 
Spinoza reICrs Lo cases o r cpisodic mcmory - im-olyillg, Ùlal is, a 
lcmporalizatio n or ùlcir objccts - hc dismisscs Ùlcm as incompalible wilh lhc 
intellecl and ils o rclc r and conncction o f idcas. Co m'crsely, cascs in which 
mcmory is rcduced lo its scmantic runctio ns - cxprcsscd by synchronie 
associations olïdcas, diycslcd or spatial and lcmporal conlcxl- arc eo nsidcrcd 
by Spinoza as instances Ùlal allow lo r ÙIC inlcllihribilily or mncmonic 
associations ancl lo r a sccming inlcracLÎo n bclwccn inlcllccl and mcmory. 1 
will show Ùlal Spinoza has al least lwo rcasons to proposc su ch a model o r 
human mcmory. Thc lirst rcason conccrns Spinoza's way o r dcscribing how, 
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on occasion or any gi"en affection, images recalled by memory delennine Ille 
appelile or an indi\'idual. The second reason is rclaled lo his explanaLÏon of 
how Ille intellcct can inlcract willl memory, in order lo aid and SlrCnglllcn its 
associaLÏons, 
ln scction 2, 1 will pro"ide an o"~r,,iew of IllC t;'L'Xonomy employed in 
contemporary studics on memory, inlroducing the distincLÏon belween 
"episodic" and "scmanLÏc" memory, ln sections 3 and 4. 1 will consider 
Spinoza's dcscripLÏon and ddiniLÏon of memory in the TIL scction 3 analyscs 
aspects or Spinoza's lrcat.mcnl or memory Illat can bc rclalcd lo memory or 
1l1C semantic kind, and section 4. cleals inslead willl episodic memory, ln 
section 5 1 will analysc Ille dcscription and definition of memory Illal Spinoza 
provides in 1l1C L'till'CS, 1 will illuslralc how he concci"cs of mcmory as 
composing nelworks or ideas which are ail synchronically connecled willl each 
olllcr, and ail siIllultancously rccallcd on occasion of an exlernal stimulus, ln 
section G, 1 will show how Spinoza's modcl of mCIllory allows him lo explain 
1l1C associaLÏ,'c 'let by which afrccts aroused by mcmory immcdialcly impacl 
on the affecti"e life or an indi,idual, dClcrmining her currenl Slri,'ing, or 
appeLÏlc (1l1al is, Ille desirc, of which she is conscious). In section 7, 1 will 
explain how Spinoza concci"es or one or Ille powers or Ille mind O\'er one's 
afrccls as 1l1C rearranging or Illnemonic items according lo Ille order or the 
inlellect. SecLÏon 8 concludcs Ille chapler. 
2. Episodic and semantic memory 
IL is cOIllIllonly agrced, aIllong bolll neuropsychologisls and philosophers, Illal 
by 1l1C naIlle or "memory" wc can rder lo a greal variely or aspects and 
difTerenlfunctions or IlIC cogniti"c lilC of an indi,'idual.3 Sincc Ille purpose of 
3 Sec Tull'ing 199 1; Tuh-ing 1983, 6-8; Tuh-ing 2000; SUllon 2009; \1ichacli,Ul and SUllon 20 17; 
\Vellling and Cheng 2017, 
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this ChapLcr is Lo look I()r somc dclinitions and cxplanations or human 
mcmory in Spinoza, 1 shall start by clarirying on which or Ù1C many aspccts of 
memory 1 will focus. 1 will, thcrclorc, introducc and makc usc or somc 
conLcmporary catcgorics and distinctions bcLwccn functions of Ù1C human 
memory, or "kjnds" or mcmorics. Thcsc distincLion". will hclp Lo narrow Ù1C 
scopc of my analyscs, scUing thc limÏls of my inquiry Lo a circumscribcd and 
possibly well-dcfiucd sct or Icalurcs conccrning Ù1C gcncral notion or human 
memory. Thc usc or Ù1CSC catcgorics will also scr"c as a hcuristic dcvice, apL 
Lo dcLccL Ù1C clcmcnls or au articulatcd conccptual framcwork, undcrpinning 
Spinoza's oLhcnvisc rclaLi,'Ciy concisc lrcaLmcnL of mcmory. 
Nowadays iL is hcld lhaL a lirsl linc of distinction bcLwcen kinds or 
memory can bc drawn Lo scparatc "proccdural", rulc-bascd mncmonic 
information and opcraLions, on lhc ouc hrU1d , li-OITI "dcdarati"c" (or c"cn, 
"propositional"), data-bascd OuCS, on Ù1C oÙlcr hand - in a way "which is 
reminiscenL of Ù1C dassical distinction bctwccn 'knowing how' and ' knowing 
Ù1aL'" (Cohcn and Squirc 1980, 209).1 So, lor cxamplc, Larry Squirc \vritcs: 
Thc Im~jor distinclion is bclwccn Ù1C capaciLy lor conscious, 
dcdarati,·c mcmory about racls ancl c\'cnts and a collcction of 
unconscious, noudcclarati"c mcmory abilitics, such as skililcarning 
and habiL lcarning. 
(Squirc 2009, 12711) 
1 Concel'lling Ùle di\'ision belwec n 1l0Ildccl;u, ILÎ\'e - or prorcdural- memory, alld dedat, ILÎ,'e - or 
proposiLÎonal- memory, sec al50 Squire 1987, 152- 169. \ViùI regard lo ùle s;une disLÎllcLÎo n, Enclcl 
Tuhillg miles: 
The lirsl slep IVe Lake ill subdi, 'idillg Ùle domaill or me mOly is lo disLÎllhruish bellVccn 
procedural ;U\d propos iLio llal mcmo rics, \ .. , \ A mrrespo ndillg diùsioll is Ùlaloclween 
skills ,Uld knolVlcdgc, Thc calegor)' or operaLÎoll;ù or proccclurai memory cOlisisls of 
a huge Ilumber or pcrceplual-molor skills alld cogniLÎ,'e skills; ami Ùle lauer calegoly 
\ .. ,\ cOllsisls of ail cqu;ùly huge , 'ariel)' or knolVlcdge Ùlal C;UI be represeliled ,Uld 
cxpressed s)'mbo lically, 
(Tuh'ing 1983, 8) 
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Generally speaking, by Ùle notion of "noncleclarati\"e" or "procedural 
memory" we rcfer lo an individual's abilily lo Ieam complex tasks, or lo have 
her behavioural pallerns modified by experiellce and interactions WiÙl Ùle 
exlernal environrnenl, along WiÙl Ùle relevallt capabilily lo slore ùlis practical 
knowlcdge and rel.rieve il on Ùle occasion of adequate exlernal stimuli. 
OÙlerwise slated, "Inlondeclarative memory IS expressed Ùlrough 
performance" (Squire 2009, 12711). 
Nondeclarative memory rclers lo a helerogeneous collection of 
skills, habits, ;:U1d dispositions Ùlal are inaccessible lo conscious 
recollection, yel are shaped by experience, influencc our beha\'Ïor 
and menlal Lire, and are a fundamenlal part of who we are. 
(Squire 2009, 127 (3) 
By conlrast, "declarative" or "propositional Illemory" deals WiÙl cOllscious 
knowledge, grounded on acquired information aboul oursekes and Ùle world, 
which includes Ùle symbols and signs Ùlal we use lo model and represenl Ùle 
world lo ourselves. 
Now, according lo a distinction firsl proposed by Endel Tulving, wiÙlin 
Ùle functions of the human declarali\'e memory we can furlher distinguish 
between two diiTerenl (albeil nol necessarily separaled) kinds of memory 
syslems - or even, in Tulving's words, "calegories" of memory. On Ùle one 
hand, Ùlere is Ùle "episodic memory"; on lhe oùler hand, Ùlere is Ùle 
" . ,, 5 H . semanlIc memory. e wnles: 
Episodic memory rcfers lo memory for personal experiences and 
Ùleir lemporal relations, while semanlic memory is a syslem for 
recciving, relaining, andlI-ansmilting information about meaning of 
words, concepls, and classification of concepls. 
(Tulving 1972, 402) 
5 Tulùng 1972 ,U1d 1983, 33. See also Squire 1987, 169-1 71\.; Squire and Zola 1998; Tuh-ing and 
'vl;u'kowilsch 1998. 
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As far as Ù1C aims o [ Ùus im'estigation inLo Spinoza's account o r mcmory arc 
concerncd, wc may rctain o nly Ù1C bas ic !Caturcs o r Tuh-ing's distinction 
bcLwccn Ù1CSC Lwo kinds o r dcclaratiyc mcmo ry. 
On Ù1C onc hand, c pisodic mcmo ry is delinablc as an indi"idual's 
capability <>1' rccollccting pasL cvcnls and o bjccts ticd Lo hcr cxpcricncc or thc 
world , o f figuring Ùlcm in tcrms of Ùlcir pcrccptiblc propcrtics, and o r 
collocating Ùlcm wiÙl in a cohcrcnt spatia l-Lemporal framcwork, inyo h'ing Ù1C 
biography of Ùle individual hcrselr.6 On Ù1C o Ùlcr hand, dillc rcnlly l'rom Ù1C 
o bjecLs of cpisodic mcmory, Ù1C o bjcCLS of scmantic mcmory arc no t displaccd 
inLo a Lemporal-spatial rramcwo rk. Objccts rcgistcrcd in and prcscntcd by 
scmantic mcmory may certainly bc rcgarelcel as ha\'ing had an o rigin in timc -
an o rigin which partially o r Lo tally dcpcnelcd o n o nc's pcrsonal cxpcricncc and 
inLeractions with thc exLcrnal wo rlel. Dille rcnÙY put, ol~jccts or scmantie 
mcmory arc usually considcrcd Lo be o bjccts o f lcarning. Whcn thcy bccomc 
acLual objccLs o r conscious rccollcctio n, howc\'cr, ùlcy do not ncccssarily 
cxhibiL diachronie relations WiÙl o Ùlcr iLcms o f scmantic mcmory, nor do ùlcy 
nccd Lo bcar o r display any biographical info rmatio n about thcmsch-cs o r Ù1C 
way in which Ù1CY werc lirsL pcrcci\'cd by Ù1C rccollccting indi"idua1. 7 RaÙlcr, 
6 As Tuh-ing a1so ' HiLes, ,Uly iLem o f episod ic memory "GUl be sLored ill ùle episod ic syslem solely 
in Lerms o f iLs perceptible properties or <I Lu'ibuLes, ,md iL is al ways sLored ill le l'ms of iLs 
aULobiogr<lphical reICrence Lo Ùle already cxisting conLenLs o r Ùle episodic memory SLore" (T uh-ing 
1972, 385-386). T hen, he aclcls: 
Episodic memory is a more or less [;tiùl 1i.I1 record o f a persoll's expericllccs . Thus, 
e"cry ' iLcm' in cpisoclic memory rcpresenLs illlo rm<l tio ll sLorcd aho uL Ùle n periellccd 
OCCUITcnce o f an cpisodc or e,·cnl. 1 .. . 1 Each e"cnl, o r iLs rcprescllla tio ll ill memO\)' 
1 .. . 1 can be reasonably complelely e!escribee! ill le rms o r (a) ils perccptihle properties, 
,Ule! (b) iLs lemporal-spati al relatioll lo oÙler n periellced e,·e IlLs . 
(Tuh-ing 1972,387-388) 
7 Reg;mling Ùlis, T ul\'ing wri lcs: 
Illfo nmltion slored ill Ùle semantic memo ry syslem represenls objecL5 - gelleral and 
specific, li"illg and deacl , pasl and presenl, simple ami compln - cOllccpls, relatio lls, 
qu;ultities, e"enLs , f;lcLs, propOSitiOIlS, ,Uld so 0 11, deladled fi 'om aUlohioh'Taphical 
reICrellce. 
(T ulùng f972, :~89). 
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Lhe mosl important ICalure of objects of semantic memory is thal Lhey allow 
Ùle relrie\'al of synchronie relations a,nd associations between dilkrcnl objects 
of knowledge, such as belween words and Ùleir meanings. In Tul\'ing's words: 
The information Ùley conL-1.in is inlormation about Ùle rcl'ercnl Lhcy 
signify ralher Ùlan inlormation aboul Ù1C input signaIs as such. [ ... 1 
Ir a person possesscs some sematic memory information, he 
ob\'iously musl have learnccl il, eithcr clirccÙy or inclircctly, al an 
carlicr time, buL he neecl nol possess any mnemonic information 
aboul the episode of such learning in orclcr lo rctain and lo use 
semantic inlonnation. 
(Tul\'ing 1972,389) 
ln Ùle lollowing analyses or Spinoza's refcrenccs lo memory 1 will nol 
clirecÙy considcr or look lor aspects relalcd lo whal wc nowadays address as 
"procedural mcmory". The rcason lor tlus choicc, as mentioned abO\'e, lies 
in Ùle characleristics or Spinoza's Ù1COry of Ù1C human mind Ùlal 1 inlcnd lo 
explorc, by approaching his accounl or memory - namely, tllC minci 
underslood as a syslem or conscious pcrceptions or bodily modilications. As 
wc ha\'e juSl seen, proccdural, nondeclarati\'e memory is dcfined as mainly 
opcrating al Ù1C unconscious le\'cl.8 ln Ùus chaplcr, Ùlcre!orc, 1 will focus on 
Ùlose traits of Spinoza's Ùlcory or mcmory Ùlal deal WiÙl conscious 
rccollection, laking inlo accounl aspecls or Ù1C so-callcd "dcclarati\'e memory", 
di\'ided inlo semantic and episodic kincls. 
'1'0 be surc, Ùle Icw delails conccrning Ùle distinction beLween semantic 
and cpisodic mcmory summarisecl abo\'c cannoL be consideree! exhaustive, in 
contcmporary scientilic Lcnns. Morco\'er, Ùley arc nol meanL Lo suggesL a 
comparison -leL alone, an equi\'alence - bctwccn conLcmporary accounts of 
8 See Squire 2009, 12711 ; Squire ,Uld Dedc 2015, 3. 
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rnernory systcms alld Spilloza's thcOl-y o r mcmory.9 H owc\'er, as 1 will 
derno llSlratc, thc maill l'calurcs n I' ùlis c1isLÎllcLÎo ll GUl bc SCCll rc llcclcd in 
Spinoza's admillcdly limilcd rcmarks o n ÙIC lopic. IO ln ùlis scnsc, thc 
disLÎncLÎon bCtWCCll cpisodic alld scmallLÎc mcrnory, uscd as a hcurisLÎc, is 
inlrocluced in ordcr ln l;tci,lilatc obsCryaLÎo Hs cOllcerning how Spinoza 
addrcsscs mcmory ulldcr dilTcrc llt pc rspccLÎ\'cs. Thc prcscnce o r thcsc 
perspccLÎ\'cs - OllC cmphasisillg ÙIC role o r mcrno ry in cnchaining e\'c llls 
accorclillg lo tcmporal SCqUCllCCS, lhc oÙlcr slrcss ing Ù1C synchro llici ly o r 
rnncmonic associatio lls - will cmcrgc in Ù1C ro llowing analyscs o r Spinoza's 
lrealmcnl o r mcmory, alld il will allows us lo lrack clown and analysc sornc 
intcrcsLÎng, alld apparclltly collllictual, aspccls o r his ways o r dcaling wiù1 
rnernory ill ÙIC TIE alld ill ÙIC l~'tiJirs. 
" 
3. Semantic memory in the TIE 
Spinoza proùclcs a lirst dclilliLÎo n o r mcmory ill his TrcaLisc aIl Lhc 
EmcIldaLioIl OrUle IIltellect, al ÙIC Clld o r a c1ih'Tcssio ll "aboul rncmo ry and 
9 An unbridgcablc gap bclwccn Spinoza's approach and conlcmporary ncuropsycho logy is ùlal ÙIC 
lallcr also grounds iLS d is tinctions bcl\\'ccn mcmOI)' syslcms o n cmpiIical , ncurobiological bascs, 
Spinoza had no acccss lo ùtis inl<>rJllation. :\10rcO\'cr, Spinoza sccms lo considcr Ù1C phys iological 
grounds of coq >orcai mcmory usclill only lo ÙIC c:\lcnl ùlal Ù1CY allow him lo con'e1alc a non-
implausiblc model of ÙIC human body WiÙI propcrtics and relations bclwccn idcas , which hc dccms 
cssentiallo his dclinitio n or mcmOl)' as a psychological c\'cnl - namely, rClcntio n, association ,U1d 
rccollcctio n or idcas of coq lorcal imagcs ;Uld a.l1ccLs. 
10 By commcnting o n ÙIC casc or ÙIC ;U1l1lcs ic Sp;Uli sh pocl mcntio ncd br Spinoza in E4p39s, Rojas 
Pcralla gcls lo ÙIC conclusion ùlal Spinoza may hayc cmisagcd a distinctio n akin lo ùlal bctwccn 
cpisodic ;Uld scm;Ultic mcmOl)' (Rojas l'cralla 20 16, 166). Spinoza "l'ilCS: 
I ha\'c hc;ml slOlics 1",1 or a Spanish pOCl who sullercd ;Ul illncss; ùlOugh hc 
rccoycrcd, hc was ICrl so obli\'ious lo is p;lsllilC ùlal hc did nol belic\'c Ù1C lalcs and 
lragcdics hc had wrillcn ,,"crc his O\nI . Hc could surcly ha\'c bccn lakcn 101' a grown-
up inl;Ul l il' hc had also lo rgollcn his nati\'c lan/,'Uagc. 
Œ/~p39s ; C 1, 569 / G Il , 240) 
As Curlcy poinls oul, Spinoza's linal characlcrisation of ÙIC Sp,U1ish pocl as a "grO\\lI-Up infmll il' 
hc had also lo rgollcn his nati\'c lan/,'Uagc" is also bascd o n clymological grounds, sincc Ù1C L'Jtin 
lcrm Ùi/fUiS is cOllllcclcd WiÙI ÙIC \'c rb JiU1; which, in Latin, mcans "lO speak", "so lhal ;Ul inl;U1l is 
lilcrally somconc illcapablc o r spccch" (C I, 569, n. 23). Conccrning Ù1CSC points, sce also 
Zo urabidl\i li 2002, 13 1-1 35. For considcrations ('o nccrning Spinoza's accounl of in1;U1 Ls and Ù1C 
usc ùlal he makcs or ÙIC L .tin tcrms Ùi/Ù/lS and pUCI ; sec :\1 ;U1zi-:\1;U1Zi 20 16 ;tild 20 17. 
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l'orgcLting" ('IIE §81; C l, 35 / G II, 31). Bcl'orc summarising his analyses of 
Ù1C origin and naLurc of fictitious, faIsc, and doubllui idcas, and procccding 
Ù1cn Lo "Ù1c sccond parL or Ihisl mCÙlOd" CrIE §91; C l, 38 / G II, 33), hc 
dccidcs Lo spcnd a lcw words on mcmory, lo considcr Ù1C mcans ù1rough 
which iL can bc strcngùlcncd. 
Spinoza aifirms Ù1aL Ùlcrc arc lwo ways lo impron: onc's mcmory. Onc 
way is ilirough thc aid of Ù1C inLcllccL, sincc "lhc morc intelligible a ùling is, 
Lhc morc easily iL is rctaincd" CrIE §81; C l , 36 / G II, 31). Thc sccond way, 
by conLrast, is "WiÙlouL Ù1C aid of Ù1C intcllccl, by lhc rorcc WiÙ1 which Ù1C 
imagination, or whaL thcy cali Ù1C common scnsc, is atrcctcd by somc 
corporcal ùlings" CrIE §82; C l, 3G / G II, 31). 
ln thc firsL casc, Spinoza sccms to considcr Ù1C intellect as somchow 
capable or acting upon mcmory, by aiding and strcnglhcning ils conncctions 
and associations. In ùlis rcgard, Spinoza providcs an cxample: 
ITlhc more intclligible a Ùling is, Ù1C morc casily il is rClaincd; and 
convcrsely, thc less inLclligible, lhc morc casily l'orgoLLcn. E.g., if 1 
givc somconc a largc numbcr of disconncclcd words, hc will rctain 
Ù1cm WiÙl much morc dil1iculty than if 1 gi"c him Ù1C samc words 
in Ù1e form of a narration lill/am1ri n;uTatiollis I.rrid;unl. 
(TIE §81; C l, 35-3G / G II , 31. Translation modilicd) 
By this cxample, Spinoza SCClns Lo bc claiming lhaL apparcnùy random iLcms, 
such as "a largc numbcr of disconnccLcd words", arc morc casily rClaincd and 
rccallcd, thc morc Ù1C mncmonic associations bcLwccn Ùlcm arc inLelli.!,>ible-
and, con\'ersely, less casily rcLaincd and rccallcd whcn lhcy appcar random 
and disconnccLed. WhaL "inLclligible lù//.{:lbipbIlisl" may mcan in ùlis conLcxL, 
howcvcr, is noL immcdiaLely clcar. Wc may lcnLati\'cly paraphrasc Ù1C passagc 
in qucstion by assuming ÙlaL Ù1C associaLions bclwccn somc .!,>i"cn oqjccLs of 
memory arc sLrongcr, and allow l'or an casicr rclcntion and rccollcction, whcn 
ù1ey rcllccL and follow morc closely whaL Spinoza also calls Ù1C "ordcr of Ù1C 
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inLellect" (E2pI8s; C 1,466 / G II, 107) - to oorrow an cxprcssion lhal he 
uses in Ùle A't.l1Jcs, in a scholium which is preciscly about hU1l1an 1l1C1l10ry. 
Since Spinoza's example or an inLellig-iblc order I()r apparenlly 
disconnecled mnemonic iLems rcfers lo words and narrations, il pâma I;/C/c 
sugg\::sls Ùlal we are here dealing WiÙl wh aL wc would nowadays cali a case or 
semantic memory. Yet, mnemonic acti"ities such as remcmbering ,"ariously 
connecled (or disconnecled) lisls or words arc usually considered, in 
conLemporcu'y neuropsychology, as parLicular cases or episodic memory -
verbal episoclic memory, lo be precise. Il Indeed, although thc ol~jecls or 
mcmory are words, Ùleir mnemonic associations could si1l1ply be 1l1canL lo 
rel1ecl a specilïc lemporal sequencc by which words arc supposed Lo lollow 
each oÙler, or a specific chronological order or appcarance, apprchensioll, 
and recollection or Ùle words Ùlemsclyes. 
In order Lo beLler grasp Ùle sense or ùus example, Lhen, il may bc uscful 
Lo l"urÙler illyestigale Spinoza's daim Ùlal apparenlly disconnected words are 
more easily remembered when Ùley are "giyen in Ùle lorm or a narration IJi1 
101711<1 naJraÛonls l.radaJnl". There is a lexical obser\"ation to bc made, in ùlis 
regard, Ùlal concerns Spinoza's accounl. or "narrations", when rc/crred Lo 
Il 50, for cx;unplc, Tulùng lV\·ilCS: 
Considcr no\V a tl'pical mcmorl' cxpcrimcnl in \Vhich a subjccl is askcd lo sludl' ;Uld 
rcmcmbcr a Iisl of ramili;u' \Vords or pair o f \Yords. This is ;Ul cpisodic mcmory lask. 
Thc OCCUITcncc of a \'crb;ù ilcm in a gi\'cn lisl, al a p;u·tieular timc, ,U1d in spccilicd 
lcmporal relation to othcr ilcms in ÙIC IiSl is an autobioh'Taphical cpisodc h;l\ing no 
ncccssaJ)' cxtra-cpisodic dcnoL-'\ti\·c rcfcrcncc. Thc subjccl has succcssfully rcu'ic\'cd 
inf0ll11ation aboul Ùlis cpisodc ",hclI hc rcs[lOlIds lo ÙIC rcu'ic\';ù qucr)' "iùl ÙIC 
rcproduction of an approprialc co Pl' of ÙIC illpul ilcm. 
rruh'illg 1972, 390) 
Tuhillg wililalcr rcdclillc his position, conccding Ùlal Ebbillghaus.inspircd lcsts - " 'hcrc ÙIC paticlIl 
or lcslcr, Ùlal is , is rcqucslcd lo rccaillisls of words or linguistic ilcms - raÙlcr inwh"c an illtcractioll 
bClWCCII ÙIC cpisodic aJld scmaJ ltic mcmOly syslcms (scc Tuh'ing 1983,3 1, ;U1d 2002, 3·1). Thc 
notioll o f '\ 'crb;ù cpisodic mcmOly" has, nC\'crÙlelcss , pro\'CII 10 hc \'CI)' succcssfui ill 
ncuropsycholoh'Y, ;U1d Ù1C lùnctiolling of \'crbal cpisodic mcmoly has bcc lI ÙIC objccl of mally 
sCpaJ<llC sludics. Concclllillg ùlis, sec for cx;unplc HcrlilZ aJal Viil;UICII 1991; Sh;ùlicc ct al. 199 t; 
S;U1dlini ct al. 2003; Rémy cl ,ù. 2005; 5010111011 cl ;ù. 2007; Lcuhc cl al. 2008; Yslad cl ;ù. 2010; 
Wolk cl al . 2011. 
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mcnlal ol~jccIS. \"'hile Ù1C Latin "crb llarrarc (which gcncrally mcans "lo tcll") 
is ortcn round in Spinoza's works, Ù1C noun narrat/o (which 1 am hcrc 
lranslating as "narralion") appcars vcry rarcly: lwo timcs oycrall, il' wc cxcludc 
thc occurrcnccs lound in Ù1C 77leolo!pc'al-PohiJcaJ TrcatJse and onc letlCr.12 
Thc lirsl occurrence is in Ù1C arorcmcntioncd passagc or Ùle TI E. Thc sccond 
casc, instcad, is round in Ù1C Nlctaphys/caJ 771OUghts. There, Spinoza uses Ùle 
word "narration" lo dcscribe Ù1C nature or any idea, insol~lr as an id ca is 
concei\'cd or as an acl or unclerslanding Ùlal bears inlormation concerning an 
object - and whosc \'cracily can, in ùlis sense, be questionecl. Hc Wl"iles Ùlal 
"icleas are nolhing bUl narrations, ormcnlal hislories or nalure" (CM 1,6; C l, 
312 / G II, 21.6. Translation moclilied). 
lAI narralion was callecl true when il was or a dccd Ùlal had really 
happcncd, and ralsc when il was or a eleed Ùlal had ncycr happcncd. 
Alkrwarcls Ù1C philosophers used iliis meaning lo dcnole Ùle 
agrccmcnl or an idca WiÙl ils objecL ,wei con\'erscly. So an id ca is 
callcd true when il shows us Ù1C Ùung as il is in itsclr, and ralsc when 
il shows us Ùle Ùling oÙlerwise Ùlan il really is. For ideas arc noùung 
bUl narrations, or menlal hislories or nature lùka:: Cllllll Illilli aJ/ud 
SWJ/, qu;U}] llrL1TatJollcs s/t·c Instor/a:.: natur;r mentalesl. 
(CM l, 6; C l, 312 / G II, 2/1.6) 
IL is imporlanllo nole ÙlaL, when Spinoza rdcrs lo an iclea as a "narralion, or 
mcnlal history or nature", Ù1C idea neeel nol be concei\'eel as reproducing a 
particular sequcnce or words or signs. Nor eloes Ùle inrormation conlenl or 
thc idca necessarily ncecl lo bc concci"cd as Ùle clepiction or a chronological 
succession or cpisocles, rclaLccl lo hislorical racts concerning Ù1C objecl or Lhe 
idea. Ir wc look al Ùle AUllc's, we can obser\'e ÙlaL Spinoza also wriles ùlaL an 
idca is nol "someù1Ïng mulc, likc a piclure on a tableL lqwd mutuIll ÙlS/;U' 
12 l\'amcl)', Ep 52 10 Hugo Boxel (G IV, 244a). Thc OCCUITcnccs in ÙIC "j- rp, by conlrasl, arc man)', 
and ùlcy mosùy l'cler Lo Scriplurc and ÙIC Prophcls' words, insolilr as ùlcy do 1I0L ncccss;u'ily 
proùdc lrusLworùlY dcscriptions ;Uld accounls of nalural c\'cnlS or hisLoricall;tcls. 
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piClWrL' i11 tabu/al" (E2p13s; C l, 1.79 / G II, 121.). In (~lcl, Spinoza mainlains 
Ulal ideas lcll sOlllelhing aboul lheir objecls: lhey aIlirm or deny someUling. In 
E2p49s, hc \VI'ilcs lhal "an idca, insofar as il is an idea, invoh'cs an allirmaLÏon 
or negaLÏon lidc;Il11, quatc/Jus ir/ca cst, aflÏI17Jal.io11cm aul. ncgatJo11em 
ù1l"oln:n:j" (C l, 1('8G / G II, 132). Yel, Ulis. information - or narration, as il 
wcre - which any idea rcporls abouL ils oqjecL, by allirming or denying 
someuling aboul il, is Bol meanl Lo pOrlTay U1e nalure of the objecl in 
biographical or lemporal lcrllls. For example, Spinoza mainlains thaL UIC idea 
of a lriangle tells us somcUling aboul Ule nature of the lriangle by nccessarily 
anirming lhal ils Ulree angles are cqual lo lwo righl angles. "This allirmation 
perlains lo UIC essence or lhc idca or UIC Il'Ïangle'', he \VI-iles, "ancl is nou1Ïng 
beyond iL" (E2p1.9d; C l, Il.81.-1(.85 / G II, 130). 
If we conccdc, Ulcrcl'orc, Ulal Spinoza may somelimes rcfer lo 
"narrations" according lo ulis loose sense of U1e notion, U1cn wc are now in a 
posiLÏon lo pro\'ide somc clarifications concerning U1e possible meaning or 
Spinoza's cxamplc in 'l'lE §81. '1'0 say Ulal random words arc more inlelligible 
when prcscntcd "in thc l'orm or a narraLÏon" may noL necessarily mean U1aL 
Uley musl also be remcmbercd according to a cerlain chronological sequencc. 
Nor cloes iL mean Ulal Ulcse words musl rcl'cr lo a lcmporal succession of 
hislorical e\'cllls or cpisodcs. RaLhcr, whal we can rcasonably infCr by 
Spinoza's rcfcrencc Lo narrations - concci\'cd or as signs of inlclligibilily and 
mnemonic de\'iccs al onc and UIC samc timc - is U1aL words are much morc 
easily rcmcmbcrcd if UICy, takcn allogcUlcr, "mean" somcUling. Morc Lri\'ially, 
words arc Illuch bclLcr undcrslood and rccalled whcn UICy makc somc scnsc, 
i.e., whcn UICy signify somcUling. Thcir inlclligibility, in ulis scnsc, is pro\'idccl 
by UIC (act Ulal Ulcy arc cOllllcclcd lo onc anoUlcr in ordcr lo cxprcss in 
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ùlOught, as a wholc, some aspects concellling the nalure or Ùle properties o r 
b' 13 (U1 0 ~ecl. 
Ir ùlÏs inLerprelation is correct, Ùlen the examplc proposed by Spinoza in 
Ùle TIE ean really be La,ken as rclcrring Lo a case or semantie memory - a case, 
ÙlaL is, dlat conccrns synchronie association bcLwcen mnemonic iLems, such 
as words and Ùleir meanings, and wherc chronologieal inrormation is neiÙler 
recalled, nor involvcd as a criLerion or inlelligibility. 
Yet, as we will see in Ùle lü llowing section, Ùle resl or Spinoza's analysis 
on Ù1C nature or memory in Ùle 'l'lE seems to proceecl in a quite ditrcrenL 
direction. 
13 Thal Ùle o rder o r Ù1C words, by which words mcan somcùlÎng inlclli/,riblc, is nol mcrcly a 
chronological o rdcr o r succcssion of Si/,'llS, can aIso bc inICITcd hy \Vhal Spinoza wrilcs in his Ep 40 
lo JarigJellcs: 
1 Il l' 1 scc in Ù1C hands o r ,U1 o rdinary person an cleganlly lVI'illen hook, full o r excellenl 
ùloughls, ,U1d 1 ask him whcrc hc gol such a hook, ,U1d hc replics Ùlal hc copicd il 
l'rom aJlOÙlcr book or aJlOÙlcr ordinary pcrson, who also muId \\lilC clcganùy, and hc 
procccds in ùlis lVay lo infinil)', he \ViII nol satisfy mc, For 1 I\'asn'l asking only aboul 
Ù1C shapc ,U1d o rdcr o r ÙIC ICllcrs (lVhir h \Vas ail hc \Vas rcplying aboul) , 1 \Vas also 
asking aboul Ù1C ÙlOughls and Ùle mcallillg Ùlcir composition illdicalcs, Hc docs Ilol 
/,ri\'c mc ,my ,mswcr lo Ùlal qucstioll hy proccedillg ill lhis lVay lo infillilY, HolV ùlis can 
be applied lo idcas ran eas ily hc scell l'rom whal 1 hal'c explaillcd ill ÙIC llillÙl axiom 
of my gcomcuic dcmonsu, ltioll of Descartes' Pni/ni)les olPhilosoph)', 
Œp 1\0; C II , 3H / G IV, 198b-199b) 
Spinoza's final reICrellcc lo l'PC 1 a9 is, agaill, illuminatillg in ùlis sense, Hc daims Ùlal Ùle ordcr or 
Ù1C composition o r words ,md lexls is 1l0llhc S;UllC ùlÎng as ùle mcallillg o r Ùle words Ùlemsch'cs , 
ln Ùle passagc rccallcd , he lVI'iles: 
Suppose somconc sccs lwo books - Olle Ùle I\'ork of a disti llguished philosophcr, ùle 
o Ùlcr mal of sorne u'ille r, bul bOÙI millen ill ÙIC samc h;U1d , If hc docs nol allclld lo 
Ùle meaJling or Ù1C \Vords (Ùlal is, docs Ilol allelld lo Ùlem illsol;lr as Ùley ,u'e likc 
images), bUl o llly lO Ùle h;U1(h~Titillg alld lo Ùle ordcr of ÙIC lellcrs, he will recognizc 
no incquality bc lwecn Ùlem IVhich compcls him lo look 101' dille renl causcs, T hcy "ill 
sccm lo him lo hal'c procecded Ii'<ml Ùle same causc ill Ùle s;lIl1e way, Bul ifhc allellds 
lo me meaJling o r ÙIC 1V0rds and ÙIC discourscs, he I~i lllilld a !,'l'eal illequalily bellVcen 
Ùlem, And so he will cOlldudc Ùlal ÙIC firsl causc of ÙIC onc book \Vas l'c ry dill'crclll 
l'rom Ù1C lirsl cau sc of ÙIC oÙ ICI', alld really more perle,l Ùlan il in proportion lo ÙIC 
diffcrcnccs hc find s bclwccn Ùle mcaning of Ùle discourscs of e<l,h hook, or bcl\VCCIl 
ÙIC 1V0rds considcrcd as images, 
(l'I'Cla9; C l, 21\5; G l, 156- 157, Translation modilied) 
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4. Episodic memory in the TIE 
Even ùl0ugh, in Ù1e TIE, Spinoza conlends thalthe intellect has thc power of 
inl1uencing and strengÙ1ening one's memory, hc nc\'crtheless conc\udes fo r 
the radical helerogeneity of inlellecl and memory. b 'cn more so - with 
possible reference to scholasLic or Carlesian debalcs on intcllectual memoryl ~ 
- Spinoza asserts thallhe inlellecl, considcred in itselr, has no killCl of memory 
o r mnemonic power at al!. H e Ù1US c\aims: 
Since Ùle memory is slrengùlened OOÙI by ÙIC inlellect and also 
withoul Ùle intellect, wc may inrer ùlal il is someùling dilTcrcnlli'om 
Ùle intellect, and Ùlal concerning ÙIC intellecl considcred in itselr 
Ù1ere is neither memory nor fo rgelLing. 
CrIE §82; C l, 36 / G II,3 1) 
Arter having established ùlis sharp disLincLion belwecn mcmory and intellect, 
Spinoza provides his deoniLion of memory. H e writcs: 
What, then, will memory bc? Nothing bUl a scnsaLion of 
impressions on Ùle brain, logeùler wiùI ùle ùlOught o r a delerminale 
duration o r Ùle sensation, which recollecLion <tlso shows. For Ùlerc 
the soul Ùl inks of that sensaLion, bUl nol under a conlinuous 
duration. 
CrIE §83; C l, ;i6 / G II, 3 1) 
ln ùl is case, as we may notice, ùle kil\(1 of memory which seems lo oe ùle 
object of Spinoza's dcfinition appears lo oe more similar to whal we could 
consider, nowadays, the episodic kind of memory. 
1 ~ For considerations of Dcscartes 's rcICrcnccs lo intcllcclual mcmory, scc Mondollo 1900, 6·1 0; 
Reiss 1996, 599; Joyce 1997; F6ti 2000; Lc\y 20 11 ,316-319; She\tsQ\' 20 11 ; Clucas 20 15, 152- 155; 
T uomo 20 16. For ,malyses thal includc ÙIC rcecption or Dcsc;utcs's notion or inlcllcclual mcmOly 
among Car lesi<lil philosophers in ÙlC 17" ccnlury (in particular WiÙl rcg~Ir(llo Louis dc L, Forgc), 
scc SClib;mo 20 15, 50-54, 86-94. For ;m Q\'cIYicw o r ùle hislorieal dc\'clopmenl o r ùle dehalc 
concerning ÙlC rclationship hetwecn inle llecl and memory bcl'orc Dcsc;utes (l'rom ArisloÙc lo ùle 
c<li'ly modem period), sce J uliào el al. 20 16, 
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lndced - as wc have scen in section 2 - cpisodic memory is dclined as 
Ihe conscious recollecLion of pcrceptiblc qualiLics or objccls thal wc associale 
10 c"cnls Licd lo a parLicular timc and place. Now, according lo Spinoza's 
dclinition, a sensation rccallcd Ihrough memory is associalcd wiÙI ÙIC thoughl 
or ils "clelerminale duraLÏon" - Ùlal is, it is accompanicd by somc conscious 
knowlcdge conccrning where and when that sensation had ils origin, or how 
rar and how long ago with respecl Lo the presenl place and Lime. The lirst 
scntcnce or a roolnole lo Ihe quoled passage, which is mcanl lo explain lhe 
inlroducLion or Ùle notion or Ùle "thoughl of a delerminale duraLion or Ùle 
sensalion [cogi/';/I./olle <'Id deLermù]:lL:lJ1] duraàol)cml" in Ùle dcfiniLion or 
memory, secms also lo suggesl ùlis conclusion - lhal is, Ùlal Spinoza's 
dcliniLion is primarily concerncd WiÙl cases ralling wiLhin Ù1C domain or 
episodic mcmory. In Ùlal noLe, Spinoza adds Ùlal "if Ùle duraLion is 
indeLcrminale, Ù1C memory of Ùle Ùling is imperIecL, as each or us also scems 
10 have lcarncd l'rom nature. For olten, Lo believe someone beller in whal hc 
says, we ask when and where il happened" (TIE §83, nole; C l , 36 / G II, 
31).15 
Things, howevcr, become more complicaLcd whcn Spinoza slarls lo 
dc\'clop ùlis concepl of a "duraLion of Ùle scnsation", which is associalcd WiÙI 
memories. Hc gocs on lo say Ùlal "Ù1C iclea of Ùlal sensaLion is nol Ù1C duraLion 
itsclr of Lhc scnsation, i.c., lhe memory ilscL!" (TIE §83; C l , 36 / G II, 31). 
This clarilication sec ms Lo suggesL Ùle possibility of adopLing two clill'crenL 
pcrspcctives, l'rom which Lo see what memory is and how iL works. 
15 Scc, for comparison, ho\V Tuhing ch;mlCtcriscs Ûle epi50dic mcmory: 
To ;l~k a pcr50n about 50 me item in epi50dic memOly mc;ms to ask him whcn did 
C\'cnt E happcn, or \Vhat e\'cnls happcned al limc T. Reu;c\'al of inlo nmltion of ùtis 
kiml from cpisodic memoly is succcssl'ui if Ù1C pcrson Gm dcscribc ÙlC pcrccptiblc 
propcrtics of ÙlC c\'cnl in qucstion and morc or !css accurately spccify ils tcmporal 
relations 10 oùlcr c\·cnls . 
(Tuhing 1972, 388) 
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On thc onc hand, as wc havc sccn, idcas of mcmory arc scnsations or 
pasl corporcal imprcssions, which aiso bcar inrormation aboul thc 
"dclcrminalc duralion or Ù1C scnsation". Along WiÙl Ù1C sensible qualitics or 
Ù1C imprcssions lhcmsel"cs, Ù1CSC idcas can remind an indiYiduai or when and 
whcrc thc original scnsation occurrccl" WiÙ1 rcspccl lo Ùle moment and Ù1C 
placc in which thc ael or rccollcction happens. In othcr words, thcsc idcas or 
scnsations, whcn associalcd lo Ùle ùlOughl or Ù1cir "dcterminale duration", 
allribulc a tcmporal and spatial positioning lo thc objccts lo which Ù1ey rerer, 
by siluating Ùlcm in a systcm or diachronic relations that involycs thc wholc or 
Ù1C objccts of mcmory, as wcll as Ù1C biography of Ù1C indi\'idual. 
On Ù1C oÙlcr haIl(l, Ù1CSC scnsations or impressions hayc aiso thcir own 
duration in Ù1C minci, as long as Ù1CY arc actively recollcclcd. This is, Spinoza 
wrilcs, "Ù1C duration itself of Ù1C scnsation Ilpsa dura/Jo scnsa/Jollisl", or ils 
"conlinuous cluralion lcoll/JilUa duratlOllel". Il is, in othcr words, thc duration 
or mcmory ilsclr, unclcrslood as a mcnL:'11 phenomcnon - thal is, Ù1C 
pcrsislcncc or idcas of pasl corporcal imprcssions in thc mind or an individual, 
whilc Ù1CY arc consciously pcrcciycd by thc individual hcrself. 
Once again, this rcacling is supportcd by Spinoza's (oolnolc to Ù1C notion 
of "cluration", whosc lirsl parl 1 mcntioned abo\'e. In Ù1C rollowing parl, hc 
wrilcs: 
AlùlOugh Ù1C idcas lhcmsch'es also hayc Ùlcir own duration in lhc 
mind, nc"crÙlelcss, sincc wc hayc bccome accuslomcd lo 
c1clcrminc c1uration WiÙl lhc aid of somc mcasure of motion, which 
is also donc WiÙl Ù1C aicl of Ù1C imagination, wc still obscf\'c no 
mcmory Ùlal belongs lo Ù1C purc mind. 
CrIE §83, nolc; C 1, 36/ G II , 3 1) 
To summarisc, Ù1C ùlOughl of a "dclcrminalc duration" or a scnsation - or in 
oÙlcr words, Ùle abilily lo concciyc of Ù1C objcCl or a prescnl scnsation in 
relation lo a dilTcrcnl time and placc - is a rcsull Ùlal lollows l'rom our 
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mnemonic associations, "donc \Vith thc aid or ùJC imagination". IL rcquires, 
Ù1al is, Ù1e corporcal funcLÏon by \Vhich thc body is afTcclcd by diflCrcnl objccts 
al dillCrcnl tirncs; or cvcn, ta rclain Spinoza's words, il rcquires Ù1C 
mechanism by which "ÙJC imagination, or whalthcy cali Ù1C common scnsc, 
is afTected by somc corporcalthings" (rIE §82; C l, 36 / G II, 0'1). In addition, 
thc acl by which such mncmonic associations, which prcscnl us with a 
temporal overview conccrning thc ol~jccts or our cxpcricnce, are consciously 
recalled and rctained by lhc mind, has itsclr a duralion - for, as Spinoza writes, 
"ideas themselves also havc ÙJcir o\Vn duratioll in ÙJC mind". Hence, only as 
long as memory, undcrsloocl as conscious rccollcction of scnsations, cndures 
uninterrupted uncler a continuous duralion, is Lhe mincl able Lo attribute a 
cleterminate cluration Lo ils scnsaLions and silualc in time and space the objects 
that it imagines. 16 
However, wheÙ1cr by ÙJC notion or "duration" wc understancl the 
pe rsislence of icleas of pasl allCctions in ÙJC minci, or raÙJer Ù1C lcmporal 
relations that, while mcmory endures, arc eslablishccl bclween o bjects of 
memory, Spinoza rcg'ards ÙJC conccpl or duration itsclf as indepenclenl of that 
of a "purc minci", if nol lotally incompatible wiùJ il. Thc inlcllccl does nol 
have Ù1C "powcr of clclcnnining thc cxislcncc of ÙJÏngs by time, éU1cl of 
conceiving them undcr duration", as Spinoza also wrilcs in Ù1C r.,Lhics (ESp23s; 
C l, 607 / G II, 296).17 Sincc such powcr or concciving ÙJings accorcling to 
Ù1eir cluraLÏon is an esscntiallcalurc of memory, on Spinoza's dcfinition, the 
16 III E2a5, Spinoza dclilles "duratioll" ,L~ '';U\ illdclillile cOlltilluatioll o r CXistillg lilldclilllLa cxislcndi 
conlùwatiol" (C l, 447 / G II , 85). COllcelllillg Spilloza's accoulll or time as delermination or 
cluration, seeJaqueL 2005, 149-t 6 1, who also comp,u'cs ami cOllll,lsls Spilloza's lheorics or elelllily, 
cluration ,mcl time WiÙl scholastic accoullls or Ùle same llOtiOllS. 
17 The passage appears ill a scholium where Spilloza discusses Ùle rclatio llship belwecll Ùle elernal 
p,u'l o r Ù1e millcl, which remaills a.fler Ù1C body's desll'uctioll , alld memOly, which illsleacl depencls 
on Ùle bocly's exislellcc. 1 am assumillg, Ùlerclûre, Ùlal Ùle elemal parI or Ù1C millcl , o r which 
Spinoza lVliles in Ùle Filûl Pmt or Ùle EliJics, ,Uld Ùle illlellecl el'Okecl ill Ùle 7Î'Lwüsc rcfer lo Ùle 
same notion. Spinoza expliciùy equalcs ÙJe illlellccl lo Ùle elem,ù p,utor Ùle millcl, by clistinguishing 
illi'om memoly, Lowarcls Ùle end or E5p39s. Sec ,ùso F,,5 p/l.0c: "ùJe elcmal pmt or ÙJe millcl is Ù1C 
inlellect" (C 1,6 15 / G II , 306). 
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intellect can havc no mcmory. Or, at leasl , il is incapable or lllclllory or Ù1C 
cpisodic kind. 
Thcrc are Lwo points ÙlaL 1 lind worlh rurlhcr im'csligalion, rcgarding Ù1C 
way in which Spinoza prcscnts mcmory in thc 'l'lE. Thc lirsl poinL conccrns 
thc relationship bctwcen intcllcct and mcmory, and lllorc gcncrally, bctwccn 
intellect and li.ll1cLions of imagination. Spinoza wholly grounds lhc origin of 
mcmorics in Ùlcir corporcal con-datc, Ùlal is, according lo his tcrminology in 
dlC TIE, "imprcssions on Ù1C brain". Eycn morc so, hc daims lhaL mcmorics 
are noÙung but scnsations of Ù1CSC imprcssions. McmOly, Spinoza sccms to 
arguc, is noùling other dlall ÙlC mcnlal counlerpart of a Ilmction of our 
corporeal imagination. He re/Crs Lo ùlis corporeal Ilmctio n by using a 
vocabulary possibly inspircd by Descartes, who individualed Ùle scaL of 
mnestic traces in Ùle "internai part or thc brain" and idcntilicd corporcal 
imabrination WiÙl "common sense".18 This dcpenclency on thc body and its 
18 Scc Dcscartcs's Ru/es làr die Dli-cc/joll o f/lie ,lI/li/d XII (CS\1 l, 4 1-tl·2 / AT X, 4 14-4 15), his 
Trea/isc on ,Wall (CS\1 l , 106 / AT XI, 176-177) , his Dùcoursc oll/l/e ,lI/ed/OdV (CS\1 l , 139 / 
AT VI, 57 1), his OPÛcs rv (CS \1 l, 16/1-166 / AT VI, 597-600), ,Uld his .Il/cdù;/ÛolIs 0 11 Firsl 
P/uJosoph)' (CS \1 II, 59-60 / AT VII , 86). According to ÙIC inycntory of Spinoza's libriU)' Ùlatwa5 
compilcd artcr his dcaÙ1 , Spinoza owncd a IA,tin copy of ÙIC DÙCOUl 5C IliùI ÙIC Op/lcs (in DCSCiUtCS 
1650), Ùlrcc Latin editions of Ù1e .lI/cdùaûolIs (Ùle earliest or \Vhich is ro und in DCSGutcs 1650), 
and a L,tin yersion or ilie 7Î-ea/lsC 0 11 .Wi/ll (Descartes 166t1.). According to \1i/,'llini 's chronolO!,'Y 
or Spinoza's lire, Spinoza might haye already begun IITiting ùle 'l'lE betwcen Ùle end of 1656 iU1d 
ù1e beginning o r 1657, shorùy alter he \Vas banished li'OITI Ùle .Jel\ish community o f Amsterd,U11 
(\1i/,'llini 2007, L"XXYlII; sec also Spinoza 2007, 5-6). Omero l'roietti ,u1'Ues Ùlat Spinoza must 
haye lVlitten Ùle 'l'lE no later Ù1iU1 in October 1656 {proietti 2010, 108). Should \1i/,'ltini o r Proietti 
be right in ùleir dating or ilie composition of Ùle 'l'lE, it is unlikcly Ùlat Ùle obseryations on memol)' 
iUld commo n sense conl<uned in DesciUtes's 7ÎraÛ~e 0 11 .11;u/ could haye had an impact on 
Spinoza's ICw remiU'ks conceming Ùle physiological bases or memOl)' in Ùle TIL Ho\Vel'er, Ùle 
editors or ùle OP aJlilm Ùla t Spinoza nel'er gal'e up Ùle idca of perfccting ,Uld linishing his 7Î'caÛsc 
(C l , 6 / G II ,4). \1oreOl'er, by some Ictters Ùlat Spin07'<1 c:\changed Iliùl T schilllhaus (Ep 59-60), 
\Ve GUl inICr Ù1at, by Ùle beginning or 1675, Ùle TI E \Vas still reg,u'ded as a tc:\t worÙ1Y of 
consideration, discussion, ,U1d publication, el'en ÙlOugh "not yet IHiUen o ut in ,Ul onlcrly 1;lshion" 
(C II ,433 / G IV, 271) . It could be Ù1C case, Ùlcrclilre, that Spinoza kept cmcnding and improl'ing 
his m;U1usClipt ù1roughout his lilC, el'en ÙlOugh hc \Vas nel'cr able to linish il. As I;lr as ,Uly inlluence 
deril'ing l'rom DesGutes's Ru/cs làr die JJIi -ccu'oll o/d/e .II/Ii/dis con('elllcd, IVC cannot excludc Ùlat 
Ùle young Spin07'<l may hal'e had acccss to a cop)' of Ùle manusClipt of Descartcs's Ùlen unpublished 
tcxt, maybc ùlrough .JiU1 Hcmhiksz Glazcmakcr, Dulch IJ'anslator o f Descarles's Regu/,r (Iirst 
published in Desc;utes (684) iU1d possible co-translalor o f Spinoza's :\S (conccllling ùtis point, sec 
Akkell11iUl 1980,77-185; C l, x, n. 3; Steenbakkers 199 1., G t). On Spin(l7;I's potential rcccption of 
DesciUtes's Regu/;r, sec S;'Ulchez Estop 1987, 57-58. See also Curley 1977, Itl.I-I IJ.2, Il. 2 1; \1 ,uion 
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runclions also explains why, in Spinoza's wo rds, Ùlere is "no memory that 
belongs to a pure mind". As we will see in Ù1e next section, in thc ]jl}ûcs 
Spinoza abandons any rderencc LO DescarLes's physiology. NC"crÙlcless, in 
both thc 'l'lE and Ù1e l:thics, Spinoza idcntilies Ùle source o f memory \ViÙl a 
lunclion of Ù1e human body, respo nsible fo r Ù1e lo rmation, rClcntion, 
association and rcproduction o r somc co rpo real alfections o r impressions o f 
cxtcrnal o~jecls, which are in raet Ù1C images or sensations remembered by thc 
minci. On Ù1e one hand, Ù1e ùlesis Ù1aL Ù1e inLellect can aicl an incli"idual's 
memory, by strcngù1ening her mncmo nic associations, seems III possible 
contradiction wiù1 Spinoza's remarks conccrning Ù1C intcllccL's laek or 
mnemo nic powcrs. On Ù1e oÙ1er hand, if Spinoza is really maintaining Ùlat 
the intellect is capable o f strengù1ening connectio ns between icleas o r 
corporcal images, we might ask what happcns to Ù1e corpo rcal images and Ù1C 
rele"ant corpo rcal lunctions Ù1at Spinoza holds as responsible lo I' Ù1C 
cxistence of memories Ù1emseh-es? Is Ù1e intellect moclilying Ù1C struelurc of 
the brain, when ideas of past impress ions are reallocatecl according to a morc 
intelligible orcier, which allows lo r an easier remembering? Thc mcre qucstion 
seems to force us to admit Ù1e possibility o f a ccrL:1.in interaction belween Ù1C 
mind and Ùle human body - which seems in patent contradiction WiÙl 
Spinoza's rejection of any mind-bocly intcractio nism in Ù1e Etllics.19 
The second point concerns Spinoza's characterisation o r memory and its 
lunctions. We have seen Ù1at Spinoza, in Ù1e 'l'l E, seems to ackllowleclge bOÙl 
a semantic and an episoclic dimension or memory. When he wants to stress 
possible forms o f interaction between memory and intellect, he secms lo lean 
1 99/~, 115, Il . 26; 13arlokk 2005; ~clson 20 15,57·58. A copy o f Ù1C ill\'clllo ry of Spilloza's libr;uy 
is a\'ailablc ill Pozzi 1994. Fo r rUl1hcr collsidcrations rcg;U'Clillg Ù1C possiblc dalc of compositio ll of 
Spilloza's 'l'lE, scc C 1,3-4. For a sludy o f carly modcm physiology, l'rom Dcsc;utcs lo Lcibniz, scc 
Andraull 20 14. 
19 RCh'<lrding Ùlis, scc E3p2: "Thc body c;ulllol dClclminc Ù1C mind lo Ùlinkillg, ;U\d ÙIC mind 
cannol dClcrminc ÙIC body lo motion, lo rcsl or lo anyÙling clsc (if Ùlcrc is <lnyùling clsc)" (C l, 19/1· 
/ G II , 14 1) . 
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towards a modcl or memory where Ùle associatio ns belween mnemo nic ilems 
are comparable to those expressed by mcmory o r Ù1C semantic kind. By 
contras t, whcn Spinoza wanls lo describc mcmory as a product of Ùle human 
imagination, or as ÙIC mcnlal corrclale of bodily functio ns - lolally dislinct 
li'OIn lhe intcllcct and its ordcr of idcas - hc prmidcs a dcscription of memory 
which secms morc litlo explain mcmory o r Ù1C cpisodic kind. This is, I Ùunk, 
a valuable hinl Ùlal we shall kccp in considcration lo r thc lo llowing analyses -
cspecially because in ÙIC definition of mcmo ry pro, 'ided in ÙIC l:.iJu'cs, as we 
shall sec, Spinoza sccms inslcad to conllalc Ùle lwo domains, and lo rcduce 
cpisodic memory lo a casc of scmantic mcmory. 
5. MemoIY in the Ethics 
In Ùle L'tiu'cs', Spinoza idcntilies corporcal imagcs WiÙl "imprcssio ns, orlraces 
lilllfJrcssio/lCS scu l 'csLIgùl " (E3post2; C l , 493 / G II , 139), which arc Icfl on 
sorl parls of Ùle human body by some Iluid parls of Ù1C body, lo llowing a 
contact with an cxlc rnal body. 
Whcn a Iluid parl o f Ùle human body is dClcrmincd by an exlcrnal 
body so Ùlal il frequenùy Ùlrusls againsl a so fi. parl, il changes ils 
surracc and, as il wcrc, impresses cerlain lraces of Ù1C cxle rnal body 
striking againsl il. 
(E2posl5; C l , 462 / G II , 102-1 03) 
Based on his mind-body parallclism Ùles is - according lo which "ÙIC o rder 
and connection o f ideas is ÙIC samc as lhc orcier and connectio n o r Ùlings" 
(E2p7; C l , ;1,5 1 / G II , 89) - Spinoza daims Ùlat, whcn ÙIC conlact WiÙI an 
external body produces a mark on lhc sofi. parts o f ÙIe human body, ÙIC 
human mind has in parallcl an idea o r Ù1C imprcssion lcfi. by ùlis conlact 
(E2p 17s). These impressions, or lraces, are Ùlercforc likc "images" Idl in our 
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body by exlernal bodics/o and Ùlcir idcas, Spinoza wrilcs, "rcprcscnl cxlernal 
bodies as prcscnllo us !cOlpO/ri cx(cmrl ,dut llob/s pra:selltù rcpr,.rsen{f1IlLI 
1 ... 1 cvcn if thcy do nol rcproducc ÙIC ligurcs of Ùlings" (E2p 17s; C l, ;(,65 / G 
II, 106. TranslaLion modilicd). Hcncc, hc adds Ùlal "whcn Ùle mind regards 
bodies in this way, wc shaH say thal it imagincs" (E,2p 17 s; C l, 465 / G II, 106). 
Spinoza also argucs thal, as long as ÙIC sofl parts of thc human body 
rcl..-1.in an impression of an cxtcrnal body, ÙIC Iluid parts l'an inlcracl again with 
the soli: parts according lo a lixcd pattcrn of moycmcnl- rebounding on them, 
as it were, in Ùle samc way as whcn ÙIC trace of an cxlcrnal objcCl was originally 
imprcssed in Ù1C body. This aHows l'or thc samc alTccLion of thc body to bc 
repeatcd ovcr and oycr again. This rcitcration of a pasl alTecLion, Spinoza 
adds, l'an also happcn in ÙIC abscncc of thc cxlcrnal objecl- or thc externat 
sLimulus, that is lo say - Ùlallirsl causcd ÙIC original mark lo bc impressed in 
the human body. This is madc possible, he conlends, Ùlanks to Ùle 
spontancous moLion of thc Iluid parts in ÙIC body, which l'an flow along thc 
soft parts already shapccl by pasl contacts. 
Still in line WiÙI his mi nd-body parallclism ùlcsis, Spinoza mainlains Ùlat 
any Limc that an alTccLion in ÙIC human body is ÙIUS rcpcaled, il must be 
necessarily mirrorcd by ÙIC prcscncc of a corrcsponding id ca in ÙIC human 
mind. This is ÙIC rcason why, hc obscrycs, "la!lÙlOugh Ù1C cxlcrnal bodics by 
which Ù1C human body has oncc bccn alTcclccl nciÙlcr cxisl nor arc prcscnl, 
Ùle mind will sLiH bc able lo rcgard Ùlcm as if lhcy wcrc prcscnl" (E2p 17 l'; C 
1,464 / G II, 105). Thus, Spinoza wrilcs: 
20 In E3post2, Spinoza wrilcs: 
Thc human body can undcrgo m<tny changcs, and nc\'crÙlclcss rcL-1.in imprcssions, or 
traces, of ÙIC objects 10bjec/oruJ/l impressiolles scu 1 CSÙ!P;11, ,Uld conscqucnÙY, ÙIC 
sa me imagcs or ÙlÏnh'S' 
(E3posl2; C 1,493 / G II , (39) 
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While external bodics so dctcrminc thc Iluid parts or Ù1C human 
body Ùlal thcy olten Ùlrusl againsL thc sollcr parts, thcy changc Ùlcir 
surfaces wiÙl thc resull Ùlal Ù1CY arc rcllcctccl rrom iL in anoÙlcr way 
than they us cd to bc bcforc, and stilllatcr, whcn Ù1C f1uid parls, by 
their sponta.ncous motion, cnrountcr thosc ncw SUrl~lCcS, Ùley arc 
rel1ecled in the samc way as whcn thcy wcrc dri,'cn againsl thosc 
surraccs by thc cxlernal bodics. Conscqucntly, whilc, lhus rcllcctcd, 
they conLinue lo movc, Ù1CY will allecl Ù1C human body WiÙl Ù1C 
same moclc, conccrning which lhc minci will Ùlink again, i.e., Ù1C 
mind will again conlcmplalc Ù1C cxLcrnal body as prcscnt [mcns 
iterum corpus ex{cmUl11 ut praCSC/lS cO/ltcmplabitwi; Ùlis will 
happen as often as Ùle l1uid parts of thc human body cncounlcr Ùle 
same surfaces by thcir spontancous moLion. So alÙlOugh Ùle 
cxtcrnal bodies by which Ù1C human body has oncc bccn aflecled 
do not exist, the minci will sLill contcmplalc thcm as prcscnl [mcns 
{amen eadem {oùcs u{ pra.·sc/lûa cO/ltcmplablLwl, as olkll as Ùlis 
acLion of the body is rcpcalcd. 
(E2p 17 cl2; C l, ;t,61) G II, 105. TranslaLion moclilicd) 
This skctchy physiological clcscripLion - which indudcs Ù1C rormaLion of 
corporcallraces in soli. parls of Ù1C body and thcir inlcracLion WiÙl Iluicl parts 
- is usecl by Spinoza Lo cxplain dislinct mncmonic phcnomcna at onc and the 
same Lime. 
Firsl, Spinoza's modcl21 accounts ror Ù1C conscious rctcllLion or images 
of Ùùngs which havc jusl lcli. Ù1C pcrrcpLi,'c Eclel or an indiùdual. Indced, 
Spinoza writcs Ùlat "so long as Ù1C human body is so alleclcd" - Ùlal is, so 
long as thc inleraction bclwccn Iluicl and soli. parts Ùlal gavc origin lo an 
impression persists unmoclilicd - "Ù1C human mind will conLcmplale t11is 
alTection or Ù1C body [mc/ls llL/manrl hanc COl pans aJ!ècÛo/lcm 
21 il is lo be nolcd Ùlal Spinoza is YCl)' prudcnl rcg,mling his physiolof,>ir cxp!;U\alioll of corporcal 
mcmOI)', which is pul rorw;u·d in lcrms of a hYPoÙlcsis. "This C,UI happcllli-om oÙlcr causcs also", 
Spinoza adùœs ÙIC readcr, "bul il is sullicicllllor mc hcrc lo hayc showll OllC Ùlrough whirh 1 can 
cxplain il as if 1 had shown il ùlrough il'i lruc causc" (E2p 17s; C 1, Il.61\'; G Il , 105), 
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COIllcmplabIlwi " (E2p17d; CI, 4M 1 G II, 101,. Translatio n modilicd) . \ 'Vllilc 
ÙIC bodily alTcction pc rsisls, Ùlcrcforc, Ù1C mind will also "conlcmplalc" thc 
imagc of Ù1C cxlcrnal cause Ùlal procluced Ù1C imprcssion in lhc body - il will 
kccp rcgarding, Ùlal is, thc cxlcrnal body rcprcscnlcd by lhc imprcssion as if 
il was presenl \E2pI7) .22 IL will do so, Spinoza aclds, until ÙIC body is alrcctcd 
in somc oÙlcr way which "cxcludcs Ù1C cxislcnce o r prcscncc" o r ÙIC cxlcrnal 
body Ùlal caused Ù1C ftrst imprcssion (E2p17; C I, 1,M 1 G II , 10/l.). 
Sccond, Ù1C rcpctitio n o r Ù1C samc pallc rn of mo\'cmcnt or Ù1C Iluid parts 
againsl Ù1C sofl parls, shaped by somc pasl impressions, allows Ù1C miJl(I lo 
rccollect Ùle idcas thal corrcspond to tllcsc imprcssio ns - so lllal thc miJl(I 
will bc able to ligurc again Ù1C imagcs oncc lefl by cxlcrnal objc(ts, in dillc rcnl 
and scparate momcnls. 
WiÙun ùlis gcncral rramcwo rk, Spinoza undcrstands "mcmory" as 
csscntially a mallcr and produCl o r associations bclwccn idcas - associalions 
which nccessarily rcOecl a corrcsponding o rdcr o f associations or corporcal 
alTcctions. H c slarls by arguing Ùlal " !iU' Ù1C human body has once bccn 
arIcclcd by lwo o r morc bodics al lhc samc timc !sùnuA, lhcn whcn Ù1C mind 
subscqucnùy imagines o nc o f Ùlcm, il will immcdialcly !slaLùn! rccollccl ÙIC 
oÙlcrs also" (E2p 18; C l, 465 1 G II, 106). Thc dcmonslration o r ùlis 
proposition proccccls as fo llows: 
22 ln his Essay COllccming Human [iJ(k'/,slanding JI , 10, 1-2, Lockc distin!,'1.lishcs ùIis function of 
ÙIC m ind - i.c ., "kccping Ù1C iclca 1 ... 1 f'or somc limc aClually in ù cw" (\V 1, 137) -li'Oll1 mcmory 
ilsclr - i,c., "ÙIC powcr lo re\i\ 'c again in our minds ÙIOSC idc;L~ which arlcr implinting ha\'c 
disappcarcd , or hm'c bccn as ilwcrc laicl asiclc o ut o r sight" (\V l , 137). By using a tcrminolo!,'y 
sil11il;u' to ÙIC onc also cmployecl by Spinoza, hc adclrcsscs ÙIC IOlmcr kind of m ncl110nic rctcntion 
by ÙIC namc of "contcmplation". Lockc's and Spinoza's no tions o f nlllcmonic "(,(>ll lcmplation" can 
bc cqualcd , in \'cry gcncral lerms, to our currenl concept o f "working mCl11o ry". Squirc dclincs 
"working I11cmory" as such: 
\Vorking I11CI11Oly l'cie rs la ùle capacily to l11ainlain lcmpor;u'ily a limilcd <Lmounl or 
info llllation in minci , which cali ùlcn bc uscd lo suppo rt \'arious abil itics, including 
Icarning, rcasoning, and prcparation lo I' actio n. 
(Squirc 2009, 127 11\,) 
Fo r a classic in\'cs tigatio ll cOllccming ÙIC nature o f hUI11<ln "working I11CI11Oly", SCC Baddclcy and 
Hilch 1974, 
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Thc mind imagincs a body bccausc Ù1C hum,Hl body is allccLcd and 
disposccl as iL was aflccLcd whcn cerla,in o r its parls wcrc sLruck by 
thc cxtcrnal body itsclr. BuL (by hYPOÙlcsis) Ù1C body was Ùlcn so 
disposcd LhaL Ù1C mimi imagincd Lwo lor morcl bodics al oncc 
ISÙllll~; Ùlcrclorc iL will now also imaginc Lwo loI' morcl aL once 
ISÙllll~, ,wc\ whcn Ù1C minci imagincs onc, iL will immcdiaLcly 
1 sIr/bill] rccollccL Ù1C oÙlcr also. 
(E2p18d; C l, 465 / G II,106) 
By ùlis dcmonsLraLion, wc may scc, Spinoza aims aL cxplaining Ùle associaLi\'c 
ael by which thc mind imagincs aL oncc - or, bctlcr sLiIl, simultancously -
mulLiple iclcas of bodily imprcssions on Ù1C occasion or a single allccLion. 
Oncc again, Ù1C cxplanaLion is groundcd in Spinoza's brier physiological 
accouill. 
Thc human body, Spinoza argucs, can bc allcclcd or disposcd in sueh a 
way ÙlaL mulLiple images or cxlcrnal bodies arc impresscd logcÙlcr on its soll 
parts. Ir Ù1CSC traces arc physically connccLcd lo cach oÙ1cr - say, ir allthesc 
images arc imprcssed on Ù1C sort parls as if Ù1CY wcrc parl or a single picturc 
- Ùlcn, Ù1C Lriggcring or one or Ù10SC traccs, by mcans or Ùle mm'ClTIcnL or Ù1C 
Iluid parts of Ùle body, will also ncccssarily Lriggcr Ù1C whole nctwork or 
imprcssions ÙlaL arc nalurally linkcd lo Ù1C lirsl. Therclore, whcn Ù1C hum;w 
body is aflcctcd in ways which causc an intcracLion bctwccn Iluid parts and a 
prc-cxisLing imprcssion on Ù1C sorl parts (whcÙ1cr by Ù1C conlacl WiÙl an 
cxtcrnal body, or by Ù1C spontancous inlcrnal mm'cmcnL of' Ù1C fluid parts), 
Ù1C minci will also simultancously imagine Ùlat imprcssion, along WiÙl ail Ù1C 
oÙlcr impressions ÙlaL arc naturally associated WiÙl thc lormcr. This proccss 
is Ù1C cause of a killCl or rccollccLion by associaLion, and Ù1C cl1ccL in our minci 
or Ùus recolleeLion is, sLrieÙY spcaking, whal Spinoza calls "mcmory". 
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Afkr having cxplaincd how rccollccLion by associaLion mighl work in 
human bcings, Spinoza prO\'idcs his dcliniLion of memory. In Ù1C fallowing 
scholium, hc \VI-ilcs: 
From ùlis wc dcarly undcrsland whal mcmory is. For il is nOÙling 
oÙlcr Ùl;m a certain conncclion or idcas involYing Ù1C naturc or 
ùlings which arc outsidc ÙIC human body - a connccLion Ùlal is in 
Ù1C mind according lo Ù1C orclcr and cOllnccLion or Ù1C alfcclions or 
Ù1C human body. 
(E2pI8s; C l, 465 / G II, 106-107) 
As wc may noLicc again, Spinoza clclincs mcmory in lcrms of associaLions, or 
connccLions or iclcas, which arc groundcd in lhc cOllsLiluLion or Ù1C bocly. In 
facl, mcmory is nOÙling othcr than a ccrlain connecLion of corporcal 
imprcssions, rcllcclccl in lhoughl as a nclwork or inlcrconncclcd iclcas, cluc lo 
Spinoza's minci-body parallelism. Thcn, hc clislinguishcs bclwccn Ù1C orclcr or 
lhc aJlccLions or Ù1C body and Ù1C orclcr or Ù1C inLellect. 
1 say \ ... \ Ùlal Ùùs conncction happcns accorcling lo Ù1C orclcr ancl 
cOllnccLion of Ù1C affcctions or Ù1C human body in orclcr lo 
clisLinguish iL l'rom Ù1C connccLion or id cas which happcns according 
lo Ù1C ordcr or Ù1C intcllcct, by which Ù1C minci pcrcei\'cs lhings 
ùlrough Ùlcir firsl causcs, and which is Ù1C samc in ail mcn. 
(E2pI8s; C l, ,1.66 / G II, 107) 
In lighl or Ù1C prCVlOUS analysis or Ù1C dcscripLion or mcmory Ùlal 
Spinoza providcd in Ù1C TIE, thcrc is onc aspccl or his trcatmcnL or mcmory 
in Ù1C r.Ü}Jr:5 Ùlal appcars as parLicularly sLriking. DillCrcllùy l'rom Ù1C 
dcliniLion of mcmory ÙlaL Spinoza prcsclllcd in Ù1C TlE, in Ù1C dcfiniLion 
faund in Ù1C EtJJirs wc GUl obscrvc Ù1C lack of any rclCrcncc Lo Lcmporalily -
or lo a connccLccl "thoughl of a clctcnninalc duraLion or Ù1C sClIsaLion", Lo 
rclain Ù1C worcls Ùlal hc usccl ill Ù1C 'l'lE. In Ù1C r.lhics, Spinoza apparcnùy 
clcscribcs thc objccts of mncll10nic rccollccLion as haùng 110 Lcmporal 
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relations to cach oÙ1cr, exccpllor bcing simultancous lo cach oÙ1cr - wlùch 
is also strcsscd by his rcpcalcd usc or thc Latin tcrm sùnul. Hc aflirms Ù1al Ù1C 
idcas of Ù1e imagcs which arc nalurally conncctcd lo cach oÙlcr in Ù1C body, 
arc also recollcclcd immcdiately - or, also, instantancously (slallm, in Latin). 
Thcrdore, ail associations composing a single nctwork of inlcrconneclcd 
aŒcctions musl bc rcgardcd as ha\'ing simulLancous cfTccl. This mcans Ù1al a1l 
mnemonic ilcms includcd in Ù1C samc nctwork or inlcrconncclcd idcas are 
prescnled lo Ù1C mind al onc timc, whcn thc occasion of rccollcction is gi\'cn. 
Wc musl assumc Ù1al Ù1C samc gocs 101' thc corporcal imagcs which arc Ù1C 
objcCl of associativc rccollection: Ù1CY arc ail lriggcrcd simulle1.ncously in Ù1C 
body, as it werc. 
To bc surc, 111 Ù1C Etlu'cs Spinoza also relalcs Ù1C ordcr or onc's 
mncmOIùc associations lo "Ù1C ordcr and conncction of Ù1C alTcctions or Ù1C 
human body". This ordcr is, indccd, what constitulcs Ù1C biography or an 
individual; loI' Ùus order or conncctions or idcas is supposcd lo rcllccl Ù1e 
pcculiar constilution of Cl particular human body as modilicd by "Iorluilous 
cncounlers WiÙ1 lIùngs" ([2p29s; C l, 1/.71 / G II, 114), and il is distincl from 
Ù1C ordcr of conncctions "by which Ù1C mill(l pcrcci\'cs ùlings ùlrough Ù1cir 
lirsl causcs, and which is Ù1C samc in ail mcn" (E2p18s; C l , 466 / G II, 107). 
In Ù1C order of corporcal allcctions , Ùlcrc!orc, is groundcd an indi\"Ïdual's 
powcr of concci,-ing of hcrself and Ù1C cxlcrnal objccts on a tcmporal SCOlie -
or "undcr duration", as Spinoza would also say. Y ct, in 1I1C dcmonslration 
analyscd abm'c, Spinoza dcscribcs lhc ordcr and cOIlllcction or Ù1C allcctions 
or Ù1C human body - which arc Ù1C o~jccl or conscious rccollcction - in lcrms 
or simultancous, synchronie dispositions or Ù1C body. In parallel, on Ù1C 
mcnle1.1 domain, objccts rccalled ùlrough mcmory and Ùlcir associations arc 
concci,-cd or as composing nclworks or idcas, which arc ail simullancous WiÙ1 
cach oÙ1cr and synchronically conncctcd to cach othcr. 
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If this inlcrprctation is truc - lhal is, if Spinoza, in ÙlC j j'tln'cs, is cllectl"cly 
rcducing mcmory lo nctwork.s of synchronic associations of idcas - Ihcn wc 
mighl cxpCCl him lo considcr only insLances of mcmory of thc sClllanlic k.ind, 
in his discussion of memory. Or, allcasl, wc might cxpccl hilll 10 Iry 10 rcducc 
cascs of cpisodic mcmory lo cascs of scmantic mcmory. Indccd, this is cxactly 
whal happcns in thc lwo examplcs Ùlal Spinoza pro\'Ïdcs in thc scholium, aftcr 
his dclinition of memory. 
ln ÙlC lü"sl cxample, hc wrilcs: 
[Fl rom ùus wc clcarly undcrsland why ÙlC mind, l'rom lhc ÙlOughL 
of onc Ùling, immcdialcly passcs [ù/cld;zLllO ÙIC ùlOughl of anolhcr, 
which has no likeness to thc IÏrsl: as, lor cxamplc, li"OIl1 ÙIC thoughl 
of Ù1C word pomUJ77 a Roman will immcdialcly pass lùm(Jct[lo ÙIC 
ùlOughl of Ù1C fruit, which has no similarily lo Ùlal articulatc sound 
and nOÙling in common WiÙl il cxccpl Ùlal Ù1C body of thc samc 
man has o li.cn been afTeclcd by Ù1CSC lwo, i.c., lhat thc man ortcn 
hcard Ù1C word pomum whilc hc saw Ù1C fruit. 
(E2pI8s; C l , 4GG / G II , 107) 
This, 1 argue, can bc safcly considcrcd an cxamplc of scmantic Illcmory. 
According lo Spinoza, a mnemonic association su ch as ÙIC onc bctwccn ÙIC 
word pOlllum and the thoughl of an applc musl ccrtainly havc had an origin 
in timc, groundcd in rllC cxpcricl1cc of lhc indi\'idual. HO\vc\'cr, oncc lhis 
association has bccn esl:.o"lblishcd and apprchcndcd by ÙIC indi\'idual, thcrc is 
no nccd lo rcl'cr lo such cpisodc, or lo concei\'c of Ùlat association as bcing 
dcpcndc l1L on timc and space, in ordcr lor su ch association of idcas to obtain 
again l'rom Ùlcn on. The passagc l'rom onc itcm of mcmory to ÙIC oÙlcr is 
rcgardcd as immcdiatc, or cvcn coincidcnl - if wc cm rcndcr in su rh a way 
ÙIC Latin vcrb illCldcre - and il docs nol in"ol\'c any tcmporal transition. 
Spinoza concedcs Ùlal such conncction bctwccn words and imagcs is 
groundcd in "ÙlC ordcr and conncction of Ù1C affections of ÙIC human body". 
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For Ùlcrc is no similMiLy and nOùung in common beLwccn an "arLiculatc 
sound" whaLsoc\'cr and Ù1C imagc or a fruit. Such associal.Îon, oÙlcnvisc stated, 
is jusL ÙIC rcsult or "forLuiLous encounLcrs WiÙl ùlings", which lerL a 
simultaneous mark on Ù1C sort parts or our body. YeL, e\'cry l.Îmc in which a 
Roman will hcar Ù1C word pOfllum, hc will also immediaLely rccollcct an image 
or thc fruit, WiÙlouL any ncccssary rel'crcncc Lo lcmporal inlormal.Îon 
conccrning ÙIC way in wluch ÙIC lwo imagcs arc connccLee!. 
In ÙIC sccond example, Spinoza wriles: 
!lln Ùlis way cach or us will immcdialely pass lù]('JC!cL! fi'om onc 
ÙloughL Lo anoÙler, as cach onc's associal.Îon has ordcrcd Lhc imagcs 
or Ùlings in Ù1C body. For cxample, a soldier, ha\'ing seen t.raccs or 
a horsc in ÙIC sand, will immcdiaLely pass Ij/lndeL! l'rom ÙIC ÙlOughL 
or a horsc Lo Ù1C ùloughl of a horscman, and l'rom Ùlal Lo Ùle 
ÙlOughl or war, elc. Bul a rarmcr will immedialely pass !ùJCùlcll 
li'OIn ÙIC ÙlOughl or a horsc Lo Ù1C ÙlOughl or a plow, and lhcn lo 
Ùlal or a field. elc. And so cach onc, according as hc has bccn 
accuslomcd lo join and connccL Ùle images of things in Ùlis or Ùlal 
way, will immcdialely pass !ùle/deL! l'rom onc ùloughllo éUlOÙICr. 
(E2p 18s; C l , 1,66 / G II , 107) 
This sccond cxamplc, at lcasl in Ù1C case of ÙIC soldier, coule! bc uscd to Lake 
inlo accounl inslanccs or cpisodic memory. We may ccrlainly assume Ùlal ÙIC 
soldier c\'okce! by Spinoza is aware Ùlat Lhe imagcs or war, objcct or his 
conscious rcmcmbcring, rcler Lo an c\'cnl belonging Lo a dillerenl l.Îmc and 
spacc, relaLcd lo his personal cxpericncc. lne!ced, ùlis parl.Îcular aspcct or ÙIC 
phcnomcnon or conscious rccollccl.Îon sccmce!lo bc csscntiallo ÙIC dclinil.Îon 
or memory Ùlal Spinoza puL lonvard in Ùle TIE. Thc same aspcct, howe\'cr, 
sccms irrclc\'anllo him herc - or, allcasL, iL appcars complcLely O\'crlookcd 
in ÙIC examplc mcnl.Îoncd. Once again, Ù1C associations bctwccn ÙIC soldicr's 
idcas arc prescnLee! as imagcs immcdiaLely rccalling onc anoÙlcr. vVhcn ÙIC 
soldicr imagincs a horsc, because or Ù1C sight of some hoor prinL,> on ÙIC sand, 
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he aiso imagines, at the same moment, Ùle war he foughl. WheÙler the image 
of Ùle war is Ùle image of a past e,"enl or not is irrele'"aIll: Ùle iclea of Ùlal image 
is regarcled in its actuality, whi\c il simullaneously inleracls WiÙl oÙler 
connecled icleas, shaping the soldier's phenomenological horizon. The eflccls 
produccd by Ùle presence of such an image il'l Ùle perccpti,"e field of Ùle 
soldier, WiÙl respect to his alfccti"e lire, arc lo be regarded in Ùle same way: 
Ùlal is, Ùley alllake place actually and simullaneously. 
In Ùle ne xl sections, 1 will suggesl lwo reasons conccrning why Spinoza 
abandons any rclcrence lo lemporalily, or duration, in his description of 
memory in lhe ]'.-lh/cs, and why he opts inslead for a conception oI" memory 
more akin lo a moclel of semantic memory - where associations belween ideas 
arc concei"ed oi" as simultaneous and synchronic lo each oÙler. The lirsl 
reason conccrns Spinoza's way of describing how, on occasion of any given 
allcction, images recalled by memory delennine Ùle appetile of aIl indi,'idual. 
The second reason, instead, deals WiÙl Spinoza's Ùlesis - which wc already 
I"ound in Ùle 'l'lE - concerning the power of Ùle inlellecl of aiding and 
slrengùlening human memory. 
6. Memory, associations of affects, and human desire 
As 1 ha,"e mentionecl al Ùle end of Ùle pre"ious section, lhere arc al\casll'wo 
reasons Ùlal could explain why Spinoza, in Ùle ~Lh/cs, pri,"ileges a model of 
memory based on synchronie relations and associations bclween ideas. The 
(irsl reason is Ùlat such a description of memory seems lo pro\"Ïde him WiÙl 
Ùle means to explain why wc o lkn experience aflCcti, 'e slales - generally 
describab\c as more or \css complcx (orms ofjoy and sadness - in connection 
WiÙl ideas oI" objecls which arc nol eXlernally presenl éU1d arc nol direcÙY Ùle 
cause of eiÙler hann or benclillo oursel"es. In oÙler wards, WiÙl his accounl 
of memory, Spinoza aims al demonslraling why and how pasl experiences aIld 
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abscnL l.hings may influcncc and dClcrminc our prcscnL lifc, by prcscnting 
t.hcmselvcs undcr lhc appcarancc o r ol ~jcc ls o r aclual rccollcctio n. 
As wc havc sccn, howcvcr, Lhc ol ~ j cc ls ÙlaL arc rccollcctcd ùrro ugh 
mcmory, insola r as ùlcy arc o nly rcprcscnlcd by idcas o r imprcssions, o r 
imagcs cxisLing in thc sofL parts o r our body, arc Lo bc rcg;u-dcd undcr ail 
rcspccLs as imaginary oqjcclS. YCI, thc co rrcsponding scnsaLions o r idcas -
Ù1aL is, Ù1e mcmo rics ÙlaL prcscnlly cxist in ÙIC mind and arc conscio usly 
pcrcci\'Cd by iL - arc rcal and aClual, and Ihcy can ha\'c a signilicanL impacL on 
o nc's life, by dcLc rmining an in(hidual's currcnL alTccLs and dcsirc, and, 
Ùlerefo re, hcr disposition Lo ael in a parLicular way. Thcy can deLerminc, Lo 
usc Spinoza's \ 'ocabulary, ÙIC "aclual csscncc" o f an individual (E3p7; C 1,499 
/ G II, 146). W c can Ùlcrclo rc rcphrasc ÙIC slatcmcnL wiùl which 1 co ncludcd 
ÙIC paragraph abovc , by Lurning ils ICrIns around: onc o f ÙIC goals o r Spinoza's 
Ùlcory o f mcmory in ÙIC L'lllc's is Lo show why and how acLual sourccs of 
scnsations o f joy o r sadncss can inl1ucncc and dcLcrminc our prcscnL bc ing, 
by prcscnting Ùlcmselvcs in disguisc, as iL wcrc, undcr ÙIC appcarancc o f 
o bjccLs o f pasL cxpcricnccs and mcmorics o r long gonc cvcnLs. 23 
Spinoza dclincs alTccts as "alrcctio ns o r ÙIC body by which ÙIC body's 
powcr o f acting is incrcascd o r diminishcd , aidcd o r rcsLraincd, and aL Ù1C 
samc timc, ÙIC idcas o rÙlcsc alTcctions" (E::3d3; C l, 493 / G II , 139). Assumcd 
in Ùle ir m osl bas ic lo rms, such alrccls can bc o r lhrcc kinds. AlTccts o fjoy arc 
pc rccivcd whcn an inCTcasc in o nc's powcr o r acting and ùlinking occurs, 
whc rcas affccts o r sadncss relalc to a dCCl'casc in onc's powcr of acting and 
ùlinking (E3p II sand E3ad2-3). Thc Ùlird aflc cL is ÙIC human dcsirc i Lsc ll~ or 
Ù1C "appctiLc", which Spinoza dclincs as "nolhing bUL ÙIC vcry csscncc o r man, 
l'rom whosc naturc Ùlcrc ncccssarily lo llow thosc ùlÎngs Ùlal promotc his 
23 1 assumc Ù1al ùJis is Ù1C righl pc rspccLi\'c from \\'hich lo cxplain Ù1C mcnlal phcno mcna lo which 
Colin Marshall rclers ,LS "llashbacks" (20 12). 
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prCSCTyation" (E3p9s; C l , 500 / G II, 147) , o r clsc as "man's "cry csscncc, 
insola r as il is concei\'cd lo bc dClcrmincd, from any gi\"cn allection or il, lo 
do someu1ing" (E3adl ; C 1,53 1 / G II, 1 90). 2 ~ 
Bascd on his demo nsl.ration o f how associati"c I11cl11o ry works in 
humans, Spinoza main t."lins U1al " Iilf U1C minci has o ncc bccn allectcd by lwo 
affects al once IsùnuA , thcn aflcrwards, whcn il is alleclcd by onc of lhcm, il 
will also bc allCclcd by thc o U1cr" (E3pI 4; C l, 502 / G II , 15 1). This 
obscrvation Icads him lo concludc U1al " Ialny uling can bc lhc accidcntal causc 
o f joy, sadncss, or desire" (E3pI5; C l, 503 / G II , 15 1). Spinoza's 
dcmonstration procecds as l'ollows: 
Supposc U1C mind is <ùlCclcd by lwo allCcts al oncc IsùnuA , onc o r 
which nciU1c r increascs nor climinishcs its powcr of acting, whilc UIC 
oU1cr ciU1cr increases il o r diminishcs iL 1 ... 1 IL is clcar Ulal whcn UIC 
mind is afi.crwards alTcclcd WiU1 U1C f'ormcr allecl as by ils truc causc, 
which (by hypo U1esis) u1rough ilsclf nciUlcr incrcascs nor 
diminishcs ils powcr of Lllinking, il will immcdialcly IslaLùnl be 
alTcctcd wiLl1 Ll1c laLLer also, which incrcascs or diminishcs ils power 
of Ll1inking, i.c., wiLl1 joy, o r sadncss. And so the l'onncr uling will 
bc Ll1e causc o fjoy or sadncss - no l ulrough ilsclf, bUl accidcntally. 
And in Ll1c same way il can cas ily be shown Lllal lhal lhing can bc 
LllC accidcnlal causc of dcsirc. 
(E3pI 5c1 ; C 1,503 / G II , 15 1-1 52) 
IL sccms Ll1al Lllc casc o f Ll1c soldier - mcntioncd by Spinoza al Ll1c cnd o f 
E2p 18s, in Ll1c sccond o f his lwo cxamplcs illuslraling lhc lunclioning o r 
2 ~ i'iOLC ùlat 1 am not considcling hcrc ÙIC distinction bc twccn "appetite" alld "dcsire" ùlat Spilloza 
makes in E3p9s o n account of ùle prcscllce of consciousncss. III 1-:3ad 1 ex Spinoza allirms ùlat he 
"rcally rccognizcs no dilTcrcncc bctwccn human appetitc ancl dcsirc" (C 1, 53 1 / G II , 190) . Ail 
dcsircs arc appctitcs, illsof,u' as ÙIC millcl is consiclercd to he conscious or ùlem, IVhcrcas Ùlcrc is 
110 appctite Ùlat is not also a desirc, sincc Ù1C millcl has idcas ;Uld perceptions or all of ils idcas, or 
alTcctÎons (as per E2p20, E2p2 1, E2p22, and E2p23, also rccalled ill 1-:3ad1 cx). III chaptcr 1 1 
exprcsscd at lcngùl ÙIC rcasons why, 0 11 Spilloza's aCCoullt, dcsircs, or cO lIscious appctÎLcS, arc Ilo t 
Lo bc cons iclcrcd as a subsct o r appctiLes. Rq,rarcling ùlÎs point, scc also Lc Bullc 20 1 Oa, 130. 
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associaLi\'c mcmory, analyscd in t.hc prc\'ious sccLion - can oc casily adaplcd 
to IiI wilh Ùûs dcmonsl.ration. Lcl us supposc, fo r cxample, lhat thc soldicr has 
sad alTccts bound lo Ù1C imagcs of diC war Ùiat hc foughl; affccls which, 
pcrhaps, wcrc causcd by and arc rclalcd lo miscrics and sullCrings lhal hc had 
10 go ùlrough, whJc al war. IL lollows dlal ÙiC mcrc sighl of somc horsc's llOof 
prinls acls for lhal soldicr as Ù1C accidentai causc of sadncss. To hc surc, lhis 
is a rcsull of a conncclÏon bclwccn imagcs (as wcLl as bclwccn rclc\ 'anl all'ccL,,) 
cslablishcd accorcling to dlC pcrsonal expcricnces of Ù1C soldicr - il dcpcnds 
on his biography, so lo spcak, and on Ù1C orcier and connccLion or ÙIC 
alfccLions or his body, as il was all'cctcd by rortuilous cncounlcrs wiùI lhings . 
y cl, il is a rcsull which oblains al any timc in which ÙIC soldicr sccs imagcs 
rccalling horscs, and il obtains immediatcly and ncccssarily. Thc l;lCllhat ÙIC 
war rccalled by ÙIC solclicr and ÙiC rclevant all'ccl or sadncss re/Cr to a pasl 
C\'cnt- and, lelus add, Ù1C raCl Ùlal Ùie soldicr is awarc Ùlal hc is not prcscnÙY 
lighLing any war, and Ùlat noùung is prcscnùy harming him - c<tnnol prc\'cnl 
lhal ùlOught and Ùial afTccl l'rom prcscnting Ùlcmsel"cs again, atlhc sighl of 
ÙIC hoor prinls, and such awarcncss cannot do much to hcal ÙIC soldicr's 
prcscnl pain. 
Spinoza is consistent on Ùus point. Indcccl, hc mainlains Ùlal a "man is 
alTcclcd WiÙl ÙIC samc all'ccl of joy or sadncss l'rom ÙIC imagc of a pasl or 
rulurc Ùling as l'rom ÙiC imagc or a prcscnl Llung" (E3p 18; C l , 501\· 1 G II, 
151\.). Hc wrilcs: 
So long as a man is a/l'cclcd by Ù1C imagc or a Llling, hc will rcgard 
ÙIC Ùung as prcscnl, C\'cn if il docs not cxisl; hc imagincs il as pasl 
or futurc only insolar as ils imagc is joincdlo ÙiC imagc of a pasl or 
fulurc Limc. So ÙiC imagc of a thing, considcrcd only in ilsclr, is ÙIC 
samc, whcÙlcr il is rclalcdto timc pasl or fulurc, or 10 ÙIC prcscnl, 
i.c., ÙiC constilution or ÙIC body, or all'ccl, is Ù1C samc, whcÙlcr ÙIC 
imagc is of a Ùûng pasl or lulure, or or a prcscnl Lliing. And so, ÙIC 
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alfccL ofjoy or sadness is the same, wheÙler Ùle image is of a ùling 
pasl or fulure , or of a presenl Ùling. 
(E3pI8d; C l , 504-505 / G II , 154) 
ln ùlis passagc, we may linally wilness Ùle relurn of Ùle notion or Ùle 
"connected lhoughl of a delerminale dU l=ation of Ùle scnsation" - which 
explained episodic Illemory in Ùle TIE - appearing here in Ùle shape of a 
"joinl image of a pasl or fulure time". This implies Ùlal Spinoza does nol 
simply forgel to take Ùle episodic dimension of memory inlo accounl in his 
description of memory in Ùle l..lhjes. H e has il weil presenllo his mind, bUl 
he cleems il irrelevanl in order lo explain how memory alTecls Ùle conative, or 
affccli,'e lifc of an individual. 2.5 Each time in which an image is impressed or 
aroused in indi,'iduals capable or semantic memory, it will immedialcly recall 
a rcleyanlnelwork of inlerconneclccl ideas. Allogcther, Ù1CY contribulc boù1 
lo shaping Ù1C perccplual landscapc of Ù1C indi,'idual and dClcrmining, 
simultancously, a connecled allccti"c slalc which delermincs her currcnl 
dcsire. This desire, as wc havc seen, is the appctile of which ail humans are 
25 Hc dccms il ilTelC\',Ull, albt<;l, al ùIis s[;lgc of his anall'sis of memOl)'. 1 do nol mc,m here to 
arguc Ùlal images relatccl lo pasl ùling - concei\'cd, Ùlal is, as abscnL o r non-presenùl' existing -
ancl imagcs relalccl lo prcscnl ùIinb'S mal' ha\'e Ù1C s,mlc cllccls on Ù1C indi\'idual , if wc arc lo 
considcr ÙIC inlcnsill', or l'oree, o f ÙIC ,L<;socialed a..ll'ccl. This is also denied bl' Spinoza in E4p9s, 
whcrc hc c\;uilies ùle scnse of ÙIC dcmonstration quoled abO\'e (namell', E3p 18d). He stalcs Ù1al 
an ,ùl'ccl ticd lo ÙIC image of a ùling "is of ÙIC samc nalurc" (E4p9s; C l , 55 1 / G II , 2 16) wheÙlcr 
wc imab';nc ÙIC ùIing as prcscnl, pas l, or fulurc - i.e. , wc still fcel Ùle samc kind ofjoy or sadness. 
YCl, if wc imab';nc ÙIC ùIing Ùlal eauscs Ùlal alkCl as absenl (as non-prcscnÙl' cxisting, or as cxisting 
in ÙIC pasl or ÙIC fulurc), Ùlcn ÙIC reb ',lIIl all'ccl ofjoy and sadncss is also Icss powerful Ùlall if il 
was conneclcd lo ÙIC S,U11e ùIing imaginccl as prescnl. Thc appcara.ncc o f ùle idea of ail imagc in 
one's mimI (wheÙler il is concci\'cd of as presenl, pasl, or fu!mc) , along WiÙl a connected all'ccl, 
rcmain nc\'e rÙlclcss a mallcr of simultaneous connections of idcas. FurÙlcr, ÙIC ;m~u'eness Ù1al Ù1C 
image is ail image of a pasl ùIing - amI ùle ensuing soflening of Ù1C rele\';lIIl affecl associalcd lO Ùlal 
imagc - is again lo hc undcrslood as ÙIC rcsull of synchronic, simullalleOuS associations of ideas, 
whi<:h cxdudc Ùle cx islcnce of ÙIC eXlcrnal source ofjol' or sadness al thc S;UIIC vine Ii] whieh Illc 
alli.xl is pcrecller/. The imporl,lIIl ùling lo noticc herc is Ùlal ÙIC associations o f idcas bl' which an 
objccl o f memOl)' is concci\'cd as abscnl do nol prC\'Clll mcmorics Ji'om reappe,u'ing in onc's mind, 
as ùlcy do nol prc\'cnl ÙIC conncclcd allccls from bcing percci\'cd again. ' nle aWal'eness of ÙIC non-
cxislencc o f ÙIC objecl of memol)' is, indeed, Ùle rcsull o f ;UI additional alld simullallCOUS 
enchainl11cnl of oùlcr ideas Ùlal in\'Oh'e ùle recollceled idca and a/l'ccl, wiÙloul eliminating Ùlcm. 
For sludies eonccrning Spinoza's cxplanation o f ho\V ÙIC human mind GlII concei\'c of non-exislcnl 
objccls, sec :vJ.alino\Vski-Ch;u-Ics 20 12; \1arr,mla 2016; L-x:rkc 20 17. 
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COllSClOUS (EIApp; FA·Prc/) - lhal is, "man's ,"cry CSSCIKC, insorar as iL is 
concci,"ed Lo bc clclcnnincd, rrom any gi,"cn allccLÎoll of il, lo cio somcÙling" 
(E3acll; C 1,531 / G II, 190). 
7. A remedy for the affects: rearranging one's own memories 
LcL us focus, now, on ÙlC sccond rcason why Spinoza, in Ù1C .tUl1es, clcvclops 
a Ù1COry of mcmory bascd on a scmanLÎc, synchronie aceounL or ils associaLÎYc 
proccsses. This rcason is in eonLÎnuily WiÙl Lhc formcr, ancl il clcals wiÙl 
Spinoza's thcOI"y or "ÙIC rel11edies ()J" ÙIC aIlccls" (ESp20s; C l, 605 / G II, 
293) - inclucling whaL an individual's mind can cio, by ils own powcr alonc, Lo 
opposc thc affcets ÙlaL arc broughl aboul by ils mcmorics. 
In Ùle Fifùl P;ut of ÙIC 1'.-'tJ1l('S, Spinoza a/lïnns ÙlaL onc of Ù1C "powcrs of 
Ù1C mind oycr Ù1C a/lcels" consisls in "thc ordcr by whieh ÙIC minci ean order 
its affects and conncet ùlcm to onc anoÙlcr" (ESp20s; C l , 605 / G II, 293). 
Hc wriLcs: 
So long as wc ;UT noL tom by al1ccls contrary Lo our naLurc, wc ha,"c 
Ùle powcr or ordcring and connceLÎng Lhc anceLÎons or Ù1C body 
aeeording Lo ÙIC orcier or ÙlC intcllcct. 
(E5pl0; C l, 601 / G II, 287) 
Spinoza grounds ùlis scminal daim or his sysLcm on his mind-body parallclism 
ùlcsis. "In jusL ÙIC samc way as lhoughts ancl iclcas of ùungs arc ordcrcd and 
connceLccl in Lhc mind", Spinoza argucs, "so Lhc a/lceLÎons or ÙIC body, or 
imagcs of ùlings arc ordcrcd and conncelcd in Ù1C body" (ESp 1; C l, 597 / G 
II , 281) . 
Wc havc sccn ùlaL, in his deseripLÎon or mcmory, Spinoza rcgarclccl Ù1C 
ordcr ancl eonnccLÎon or ideas or images in ÙIC mind as mirroring ÙIC ordcr 
éUld eonllceLÎon of corrcsponding eorporeal a/lceLÎons. Now, Spinoza aflïrms 
Ùlal Ù1C orclcr and eOllnceLÎon or corporcal imagcs and a/rccLÎons of Ù1C body 
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musL also reOecL Lhe order or Ùle corrcspollding icleas in lhe mind. Spinoza 
apparenùy conceives ülÏs passage as unprob!cmalic: 
UlusL as Ùle order and connection or idcas happens in Lhe mimI 
according Lo ùle order and connection or alleclions or lhc body, so 
"ice versa, Ùle order and connection or allecLions or thc body 
happcns as ùloughLs and ideas or ùlings are orclerecl ancl connecLecl 
in Ùle minci . 
(E5pld; C l, 597 / G II, 281) 
The consequences or this apparenùy sLraighLlorwarcl reslalemenl or ÙIC mind-
bocly parallelism are quite remarkab!c - and, Lo some cxLenl, decisi"e. Ir Ùle 
mind, by its own power, is crrecti"c1y capable or rearranl:,'Îllg a gi" cn order or 
idcas or impressions, ùlen ùle relevanL affections in Ùle body musL, in parallcl, 
assume a new corresponding configuration, rellecting ÙlC new conncctions or 
ideas now existing in Ùle mind. The challcnge lor Spinoza is, or course, Lo 
maintain this conclusion while rejccLing any action or ùle minci upon ùle body 
;) la DescarLcs,26 and WiÙlOUL resorting Lo ÙIC inlroduclion or any rrec 
causation27 or creation ex 1lI1JJlo in Ùle exLcnded realm or bodies.28 
The solution Lo ùlÎs problem, 1 ùlink, rcquires taking inlo accounL Ùle 
notion or "adequaLe, or lormall adécquala, scu làl7l1i1Jisl" (E5p31d; G II 299) 
causation. Spinoza dclines "adequale" ÙlaL causc "whose c1fccL can bc c!carly 
and disLinctly perceivcd ùlrough iL" (E3c1 1; C l, 492 / G II, 139) . 13y using ÙlaL 
26 The Preface to ùle Filûl Part or Ùle LUllés, which introduces Ùle Ùleses Ùlal IVe ;u'e presenÙY 
discussing, is in raet ,Ul claborate elitieism or Desc;utes's Ùleor)' or mind-hody interaction. 
27 Aceording to Spinoza, "God aets li"Om Ùle la\Vs or ILs nature" (ElpI7; C l, Il.25 / G Il ,6 1) ,Uld 
"does llotproduee ,Ulyellèct by freedom orÙle will" Œ lp32c; C l, 435 / G Il , 73). See also Elpl7s. 
28 The rejeetion of causation ex ni/111o, ill Spilloza, lakes Ùle IOlTIl or a p;u·ticul;u-Iy strong 
rormulation of Ùle principle of sullieiellt reason, which is loulld ill El P II d2: "For caeh Ùtillg Ùlere 
must he assiglled a cause, or reaSOll leausa, seu muaI, as much lo r iL~ existellce as fo r iL~ 
nonexistellcc" (C 1,417 / G II , 52). For studies Oll Spillm.a's 10lmulatioll alld implcmelllatioll of 
ùle plilleiple of sulTieient reason, see Della Rocca 2002; Della Rocca 2003; Della Rocca (2006) 
20 II ; Della Rocca 2008; Lill 2017; Mcl,uned alld Lill 2018, Discussiolls eOllcelllillg Ùle 
appreciation or Ùle Plinciple of sulliciellt reaSOll ill illlerpreting Spilloza call he 10u11(1 ill L c rke 
20 14, Della Rocca 20 15, and G,u'ber 2015, 
142 
Chapler 3. .Vt'lll'ods 0 /1r/c"'5: Spilloza 's COIICt'pÛOII of.lIClI/OIl ' 
notion,29 1 argue, il is possible l'or Spinoza lo consislenÙY con tend that the 
sa me cJTecl obl.cï.ins simullaneously in Ùle mind and Ùle body, without any 
interacLion belween Ùle two, when raLion;ùily (or an intelligible order or causes 
and cJlccls) is foreseen ùu'ough memories. Lel us recall that Ùle intellect, l'or 
Spinoza, is nol rree,30 it does nol ('[eale Ùle objects of its understanding31 and, 
more imporlanÙy, il cannot delermine Ùle body lo do anything. The acli\"ily 
or which Ùle inlellect is Ùle adequale cause, raÙler, is understanding things 
"lhrough Ùleir (ïrsl causes" Œ2p 18s; C l, 466 / G II, 107), deducing one 
aclequale idea from the oÙ1er.32 This acLi"ilY, Spinoza maintains, is lhe origin 
of acLions Ùlal can be undersloocl ù1rough Ùle nalure of lhe agent ;done. For 
example, in E4p23d, Ùle noLion or adequale cause is recalled to demonslrate 
Ùlal when an indiviclual "is clelermined lo cio something l'rom lhe raet Ùlal he 
29 Thc notion of "adcquatc causc" is prim,uily uscd by Spinoza to de/inc "action", Ùlat is, "whcn 
somcùling in us or outsidc us follows li'om o ur naturc, which C;Ul bc d carly ,Uld distincÙy 
understood Ù1rough italonc" (E3d2; C l, ~93 / G Il , (39). Spinoza rccalls ÙlC two de/initions sCI'cr;ù 
timcs, in ordcr to dcsClibc ÙIC actilitl' o f ÙlC mind insofar as it has adcquatc idcas - ;Ul actility 
whosc e/lCcts GUl bc undcrstood ùlrough ÙlC naturc of ÙlC minci alonc (scc EBpld; El\.pl 5d; 
El\.p23d; E4p35d; El\.p35cl; E4p52d; E4p59d; E/~p6Id; ESp3Id). For ;Ul insightJ"ul ;Ulall'sis of 
Spinoza's accounulI1d usc of ÙIC notion of "adcquatc, o r IOlm;ù" causation, scc Hühncr 2015. 
30 As pcr El p32 ;Uld Ù1C lollowing IWO coroll;uics, as wcll as pcr E2pl\.9c and ÙlC rclel';Ult 
dcmonsu'ltion. 
31 ln I::lpI7s, Spinoza dcnics Ùlat God's intellect might bc "prior in causality" (C l, 1\.27 / G Il, 63) 
to its objccts of undCrS!;Ulding. For ùlis rcason, ùle intellect c;umot hc said to im'cnl or (Tealc any 
rational ordcr in naturc, on Spinoza's accounl: itlinds it or, bcttcr still, itlollows il, nccess;u·ily. For 
idcas musl procccd in God's inlinitc inlc llccl as ùleir corresponding objccL~ follow li'om onc 
,UloÙlcr in cach of God's in/initc atuibules, according to Ùle ncccssily of ÙlC laws of God 's nalurc 
(scc Elpl6, E2p3s, ,md E2p7cl. lndccd , God's inlinilc intc llccl is itselfa modc of God, follOl~ing 
l'rom ÙlC nalurc of God's attributc o f ùloughL Concell1ing ùlis point, sec Kol'ré 1950 ,Uld :vIal1<lI11a 
2014,95·97. Sec also E2p6c, where Spinoza stalcs: 
ITlhc lonnal bcing of ù1ings which ;U'C not modcs of ùlinking docs not f(>lIow l'rom 
ÙlC dilinc naturc bccausc IGodl has lirst knO\VIl Ùle ùIings; raÙlcr ÙIC ohjccts of idcas 
lollow ;Uld arc inlClTcd fi 'om ùlcir atlributcs in ÙlC s,mlC \Vay ;Uld bl' ÙlC s,mlC nccess ily 
as ÙlalwiÙl which 1 ... 1 idcas 1 ... llo llow li'om ÙIC atUibutc o f ÙlOughl. 
Œ2p6c; C l, 4.'i0-1\51 / G Il , Hm 
32 ln El\.p26d , Spin07.a wlilcs Ù1al "ÙIC esscncc of rcason is noÙIing bUl our mimi, insol;lr as il 
understands dc;u'ly and distincùy 1 m/jollù CSSCII/ia 11/1111 a/illd cs/, qU;lIl1 m ClIs lias/ni, qua/cllus 
(ùJ"c, c/ dùlJiIC/c ùJ/e/b~Ti~ " (C 1, 559 / G Il , 227). ln E2p38c Spinoza idcntilies idcas Ùlal ;U'C "cbu'ly 
;Uld distincÙy" pcrccil'cd WiÙl adcquate ideas (C l, 1.74. / G Il, (1 9). ln E2p W, Spinoza contcnds 
Ùlal " lwlhalcI'cr idcas lollow in ÙIC mimi l'rom ideas Ùlat<u'C adcquatc in ÙlC mind arc also adcquatc" 
(C 1,475 / G Il , (20) . 
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undcrslands IÙJ/clligùl, hc 1 .. . 1 docs somcÙung which is pcrcci"cd Ùu'ough his 
csscncc étlonc" (C l, 558 / G II, 226).33 H cncc, in E5p 1 Od Spinoza wrilcs: 
ISlo long as wc arc nol lorn by aITccLs conl.rary lo our nature, Ù1C 
powcr or lhc mind by which il sl.rivcs lo undcrstand Ùungs ImenliS 
POLCll/ia, qua J'cs illlclligcrc conatwi is no l hindcrcd. So lo ng, Ùlcn, 
ÙIC mind has ÙIC powcr or fOl'ming d car and distincl id cas, and of 
dcducing somc from oÙlcrs. And hcnrc, so long do wc haœ Ù1C 
powcr o f ordcring and connecting Ù1C anectio ns o r Ù1C body 
according lo ÙIC ordcr o f ÙIC inlcllccL 
(E5pIOd; C l, 60 1/ G II, 287) 
Whal is happcning Ùlcn, in Ùle corporeal do main, whcn Ù1C inlellect is said lo 
rCOl'dcr o r rCéuTangc idcas of bodily aficctions (induding mncmonic itcms, 
imagcs and al1ccts) according lo its own ordcr? Simply pul, Ù1C inlc llccl is 
willlcssing ÙIC momcnl in which images imprcssed in ÙIC body lcnd, by lhcir 
OWlI (o rcc alonc - by Ùlcir mcrc bcing therc, Ùlal is, nol o bst.ruclcd by cxlcrnal 
forccs - lo assumc a ncw disposition, meaIll lo rcflecl and exprcss a rational 
ordcr and cOIlncction of causcs, or a certain "(o rm".31 Such bodily allc ctions 
producc an cllccl which dcpcnd on Ùlcm alonc and can bc underslood 
lhrough Ùlcm alonc, not dcpcnding on any cxlcrnal causc.3.S This is whcn 
33 ln EIj-p35d , Spinoza ;ùso IH;tcs Ùlat: "whatcI'c r fo llolVs rrom hum,U1 natu rc, insof,u' as it is dclincd 
br rcason 1 qua/L'nus rilÛon L' dclini/lIIl, must bc understood ùlrough human naturc alone" (C l, 563 
/ G II , 233). In E5p59d, hc simil;u'ly allirms ùlat " Iaicting rrom rcason lex rillionc agerd is nOùl ing 
but doing ÙIOSC ùlings whieh ro llow li'om ÙIC ncccssity o f our naturc, considcrcd in ilSclf alonc" (C 
1,579 / G II , 251). 
31 Simil;u'ly, by rclc rring to E.5pl O, Picrrc·François Ylorcau contcnds Ùlat it is by Ùlcir OInl 
mOl'cmcnt Ùlat imagcs in ÙIC body tend to ordcr ;U1d conncct to one iUloÙlcr according to ÙIC ordc r 
or ÙIC intcllcct, ;Uld not bccausc thcy arc caused by ÙIC intc llcct. T his cxdudcs ;U1y mind,body 
intcractio n. Indced , Mo rcau ;u'gucs, thc body always slri\'cs to producc Ù10SC cllcclS Ùlat adcquatcly 
lü llow rro m iL~ naturc (Ylorcau 1994,3 18). T hc intcllcct is simply Ù1C ncccssary undcrstanding in 
onc's mimi or ùlis natur;ù mO\'CI11cnt in onc's body. 
3.5 How ÙIC no tion or adcquatc causc CiUl apply to Ùle body, ir wc concci\'e or ÙIC actions o r Ù1C 
body as dctermincd by Ù1C naturc of Ù1C humiUl body alo ne, is cxplaincd by Spinoza IV;ÙI an 
cx;unplc in E4p59s: 
T hc aet or bcating, insol;u' as it is considcrcd physic;ùly, ;U1d insol;lr as IVC attend only 
to Ù1C l;lCt Ùlat Ù1C miU l raiscs his arm, d oscs his list, and mOl'cs his wholc ;Ul11 
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adequalc, or formai, causallon kicks in. vVhcn, in Ù1C absence of extcrnal 
opposing forccs, ail thc clcmcnts suflicicnl for a cerlain clTecl lo oblain are 
prcsenl, Ù1C cllect ncccssarily obtains, and Ùùs ellecl is undcrslood and 
dcduced by ÙIC intcllccl through ÙIOSC foundaLional clcmcnts alonc - as a 
nccessary conscqucncc musl füllow fi-om its prcmijCs, oncc thc prcmiscs arc 
gl\'cn. 
Thc inlcrcsLing Ùling thal 1 would likc lo slrcss hcrc, is lhal the daim 
cxpresscd in E5p 1 Od - according to which "wc ha\'c ÙIC powcr of ordcring 
and connccLing ÙIC aflCclions of thc body according lo !.hc ordcr of Ùle 
inlellecl" - is also uscd by Spinoza to supporl ÙIC ùlcsis, found in !.he TIE, 
l'rom which our discussion dcpartcd. Thal is, Ùlal Ù1C inlcllccl C,Ul aid onc's 
mcmory by slrcngùlcning ÙIC associaLions bclwccn idcas - or raÙlcr, that Ùle 
inlelligibilily of ÙIC associaLions bclwccn imagcs is Ù1C causc of ùlcir casicr 
rclcntlon and rccollccLion. VV c may nol noLice il al lirsl sighl, bccausc ùlis 
ùlcsis is nciÙlcr cxpliciùy rccallcd, in lhc Eihic5, nor furÙlcr claboralcd. As a 
maller or raCl, wc may find il immcdiatcly al work, wiÙlin Ùle mcchanism of 
Spinoza's ÙICOI)' or thc hcaling or ÙIC soul. 
VVhal is csscnLial, for Spinoza, is lo hayc rcduccd ail mcmory lo 
simullancous associalions or idcas, on ÙIC onc hand , and lo havc 
dcmonslralccl Ùlal lhc ordcr or lhc aflecLions or Ù1C body musl rcllccl and 
follow Ù1C ordcr of lhc idcas in thc minci, on ÙIC oÙlcr hand. For if Ùle mind 
can eSlablish causal conncclions bclwccn idcas of allecLions of Ù1C bocly 
according lo ÙIC ordcr of thc inlcllccl, lhcn ÙIC minci can also rcarrangc ÙIC 
ordcr or lhc conncctcd afTccts orjoy and sadncss in a morc raLional way.36 "By 
rorccru lly up ami down, is a \'irtuc, \\'hich is concci\'cd l'rom thc slructurc or Ù1C human 
body. 
n:4p59s; C 1,580 / G Il , 255) 
36 It is a1so important to notc Ùlal Spin07.a considcrs ùlis acti\'ity, by which thc minci ordcrs its idcas 
according to Ù1C ordcr or ÙIC intcllcct, as capablc or arousing aJlccL<; or joy by itsclr (scc E3p53 ,Uld 
I-.:3p58-59), or raÙlcr as bcing, in Gcnc\'ic\'c Lloyd's \Yords, "inhcrcnùy joyrul" (1996,81; scc a1so 
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litis power of righùy ordering and connecting the alTcctions of lhe body", 
Spinoza argues, "we can bring il aboulthal wc arc not easily alTccled WiÙl evil 
affecls" (ESpl0s; C l, 601 / G II, 287). Then, he continucs: 
For a grealer (orce is required lor restraining allccts orclerecl and 
connected according lo lhe order of Ùle illtellectthan (or rest.raining 
Ùlose which are unccrt.-1.in and randolll. 
(ESp lOs; C l, GO 1 / G II, 287) 
ln this passage, 1 argue, we may see quite clcarly a rcformulation of lhe Ùlesis 
first expressed in Ù1e TIE. Inlelligible cOllnc(tiollS belween icleas - thal is, 
connections agreeing WiÙ1 Ùle orcier of Ùle inlellecl - are stronger Ù1an 
connections belween random oqjecls. Thal is lo say, lhal ùley are more easily 
retained and remembered. Hence, also Ùle allccts associatecl lo Ùlese ideas 
will be stronger, or more diflicull lo reslraill. Üne importalll Ùlillg lo notice 
here, however, is that Spinoza underst.-1.mls this concept of lorce, or Ùle 
slrength of such connections or associations of ideas, as timc relaled. 
Here Spinoza, amazingly, lurns back lo a lemporal perspecti"e o"er 
memory, and describes Ù1e action of Ùle intellecl UpOll memory as haùng 
cfTecl in time. "AlTecls Ù1at arise from, or arc aroused by, reasoll", he wriles, 
"are, if we t.-1.ke accounl of time, more powerful Ùl<ln Ùlose Ùl<lt are relatedlo 
singular ù1Ïngs which we regard as absenl" (E5p7; C l, GOO / G II, 285). Indeed, 
Spinoza aOirms Ù1al connections of ideas Ùlallollow Ùle order of Ùle inlellecl 
are slronger in time, sincc ideas of reaSOll are concei\'ecl as being always 
presenl - or "under a cerlaill species of elelllity" (E2p/l./f,c2; C l, 481 / G II, 
126). Hencc, ù1ey can be associalecl WiÙl allccls and images Ùl<ll ne, 'e r change 
in one's mind (and, in parallel, in one's bocly).37 
Lloyd 1994,94). This aspect of Spinoza's Ù1COI)' or adcC(uatc um!crstanding has bccn ,Ulalyscd by 
Sus,U1james (1 997, 200·207), 
37 Temporal relations belwccn imagcs or things can be considcrcd supcraddcd connections or idcas, 
which mulually cxclude or POSil Ùle exislcncc or Ù1C extcrnal causc or an image, wh en ÙJal image 
presents iL,clf la an incli\'iclual's mind. As 1 mentioncd bclore (scc 100U10lC 25 or ùlÎs chapler) , 
14G 
Ch1ptcr 3, .\'ctll'orks o/ldc;/s: SiJÙlOZa ~5 CO/Jccptio/J ot,llclllO/r 
So such an all'ccL will always rcmain thc Séllnc, and hcncc, thc an'cds 
rl1aL arc conlréll'y to iL, ancl Ù1aL arc noL cncouragcd by thcir cxtclllal 
causcs, will have to accommoclaLc Ùlcmsch'cs to it morc and morc, 
until Ù1CY arc no longer cont.rary Lo il. T o ÙlaL cxtcnt, an all'cct arising 
From rcason is more powcrltil. 
(ESp7d; C l, 600 / G II ,285-286) 
ln orcier l'or Ùlesc connections o r ici cas Lo rcmain always the same, and Lo be 
always prcscnL Ù1rough timc, as wc ha\'C secn, Spinoza contcnds that ÙIC 
inLcllccL can always rcgard ÙIC ordcr ,U1d conncctions or thc allCctions or ÙIC 
body - which memory concci\'cs unclcr duratio n, as a kind o r tcmporal 
dcœlopmcnL or c\'cnLs l'rom a horizontal, synchronie pcrspccti\ 'c: a 
perspectivc whcrc su ch conncctio ns and Ùlcir cllCcls takc place 
simull.c'lneously, according Lo an o rdcr o r causcs which docs no t dcpcnd on 
time. A pcrspcctivc, iliaL is, accorcling Lo which ÙIC ordcr and conncction 
bcLwecn objects o r mcmory docs no L clcpend o n Lcmporal relations, o r on ÙIC 
biography or Ù1e individual. An o rclcr, hc aclds, "by which ÙIC mimI pcrcci"cs 
ÙIOSC conncctions of idcas GUl bc pOlVcr·dccrcasing 101' a COl lllCCtcd aJlccl, il' ÙIC imagc ,Uld ÙIC 
allèct arc pcrcci\'ed in connection "iÙl an idca which) cxcludcs ÙIC prcscnt cxistcnrc or ùlc ir 
cx tClllai causc (WiÙIOut howner, climinating ÙIC imagc and ÙIC allect Ùlcmsch'cs, which Ùting, as 
wc h",'c sccn abO\'e, is impossiblc; scc also E4p9d) , :\ow, idcas of rcasons, hcing COllCCi"cd "undcr 
a spccies o r c te rnity", do not allow lor ùlis kind o r relations ,Uld conncc tio ns \\'iÙI o Ùlcr idcas, For 
cxamplc, in E4p62 Spinoz,1. aIlinllS Ùlat " Iilnsorar as ÙIC mind concci"cs Ùlings li'Oll1 ÙIC dictatc of 
rcason, it is allècted cqually, whcÙlcr ÙIC id ca is or a ruturc o r past ùting, or o r a prcscnt onc" (C l , 
58 1 / G II , 257), ln Ù1C lo llowing dcmonstration, hc writcs: 
\ Vhatc\'c r Ùle minci concci\'cs under ÙIC guidancc o r rcason, it concci"cs undcr ÙIC 
samc spccics of ctcrni ty, or ncccssily ;Uld is allectcd WiÙI ÙIC S,UllC ccrtainty, So 
whcùlcr Ù1C idca is or a futurc or a past Ùting, or of a prcscnt o nc, ÙIC mind conrci\'cs 
Ûlc ùting wiùl Ù1C samc ncccssity ,Uld is aJlcctcd wiùl ÙIC S,UllC rcrlainty, And whcthcr 
Ù1C idca is of a futurc o r a past ùling o r o f a prcscnt onc, it willnc\'c rÙlcless hc c<]ually 
truc, i,c" it will nC\'CrÙleless always ha\'c Ù1C samc propcrtics o f ,Ul adc<]ualc idca, And 
50, insola r as Ù1C mind concci\'cs ù1inh'S li'om Ù1C dictatc or rcason, it is aJlcctcd in ÙIC 
samc way, whCÙlcr Ù1C idca is o r a future o r a past Ùting, o r o r a prcscnt onc, 
Œ4p62d; C l , 58 1 / G II , 257) 
Hcncc, aJlccts rclatcd to idcas of rcasons arc concci\'cd as bcing "more intense, or su'ongcr 
IÙ71cnsiOl; scu làrûod" in timc, lor, whcn ÙICY arc COllCCi\'cd , ÙIC idcas to \\'hich ÙICY arc aU;lChcd 
completcly O\'cn 'idc tcmporal rclations ,Ule! conncctions WiÙI o Ùlc r idcas which could hc powcr 
dccrcasing, As wc GUl scc, Ùle ellcct in timc of ÙIC intcllcrt can still hc cxplaincd l'rom a S}11Chronic, 
non.tcmporal standpoinl. 
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lhillgS lhrough lhcir lirsl causcs, and which is ÙIC samc in ail mcn" (E2p 18s; C 
l, IlGG / G II , 107). 
8. Conclusion 
\ Vc havc SCCll ùlal, in ÙIC dcscripLion and cxamplcs of mcmory providcd ill 
thc 'l'lE, Spilloza alLributcs ÙIC possibility of lracking inlclligible connccLions 
or associaLions bclwcCll ideas lo inslances of mcmory or Ù1C scmanLic kind. By 
conlrasl, hc cxcludcs any kind or relationship bclween illlcllccl and mcmory 
or ÙIC cpisodic kind. FurÙlcr, wc havc seen Ùlal, in ilic samc lcxl, Spinoza also 
dislillguishcs bclwccn lwo ways of conceiving of Ùle duraLion in tirnc or our 
scnsaLions, whcn aLtribulcd lo cpisodic mcmory. On thc onc hand, mcmory 
pro\'idcs ÙIC mimi wiùI lhc powcr of imagilling absenl ùlings under duraLion, 
as belongillg lo a ccrlain Limc and place. On Ùle oÙler hand, mcmory has a 
duraLion iL'ielr, ùlal is, ÙIC unf"olding or Ù1C vcry acl or rcmcmbering and 
imagining Ùlings alld ÙIC cxlcnsion in Limc of a ccrtain conscious rccollccLion 
or ol~jcclS. 
An illdi\'idual who rcmcmbcrs Ùungs, imagines Ù1C ù1Ïngs - as well as 
hcrself, alollg wiùI ÙIOSC ùlings - as unl"olding in Limc, and ha\'ing cach onc ils 
own duraLioll. Thal individual , in oÙlcr words, imagincs ùlings as bcing 
prcscnl or abscnl al dillcrcnl Limes and placcs, according lo ÙIC way in which 
ÙIC connccLions bclwccn hcr idcas respccLi\-cIy posil or cxcludc Ù1C cxislcncc 
or ÙIC oqjccls rcprcscnlcd by Ù1C imprcssions rccolleclcd. According lo 
Spinoza, howc\'cr, ÙIC capabilily of lhc human mind of undcrslanding ÙIC 
O\'CI"all duraLion or ils OWll mcmory is \ 'cry Iimiled. "Our mind", Spinoza 
wrilcs, "can bc said lo cndurc, and ils cxislcncc can bc dclillcd by a ccrlaill 
Limc, ollly illSol~lI" as il invol\'cs ÙIC actual cxislcnce of Ù1C body, and lo Ùlal 
cxlcnl ollly docs il havc ÙIC powcr of dClcnnining Ù1C cxislcnce of Ùlings by 
Limc, and or concciving Ùlcm ulldcr duraLion" (ESp23s; C l, 608 / G II ,296) . 
148 
Chi/pIc/" 3, I\ à,mrks oUdci/s: SiJùJOza 's Conccpûon ot,I/CJ1l011' 
y cl, Spinoza also daims lhat "wc can only ha\'c an cnLirely inadcqualc 
knowlcdgc of thc duratioll of our body" Œ2p30; C I, tI.71 / G II , 114). IL 
follows, Ùlcrcforc, thal wc cali onl)' ha"c an cnLirely inadcqualc knowledgc of 
Ù1C duraLion of our milld , inducling mcmor)'. Hcncc, lo undcrstanel how 
memory ilself ullfolds in timc - dctcrmilling how long Ù1C vision of an cxtcrnal 
worlel, shaping itself aroulld us in Limc and spacc, has laslcd in absolulC lcrms 
- rcmains an impossiblc task l'or thc huméU1 mincl. 
Ey conlrast, Ù1C intellect, which cannol dClcrmine Ù1C cxislcnce of ù1Îngs 
ùlrough Limc, sccs Ù1C acl of rccollccLion ilself - by which Limc ilself unl'olds 
in Ù1e imaginaLion of Ù1C indi"idual- "in onc glancc ! LIllO ùllwLLI! " Œ2p40s2; 
CI, 478 / G II , 122). IL sccs thc ulll'oiding of mcmory, Ù1al is , in onc instanl-
or raÙ1cr, "ulldcr a spccics of ctcrnily" (ESp29; C 1, 609 / G II , 298) - by 
pcrcciving cOllllccLiolls hclwccll idcas in Ùlcir simultancily, or synchronicity, 
while Ù1CY ail concur to Ù1C producLion of a single cflccl - which cffecl may 
also bc, as wc havc SCCIl, ail aflccl. 
To eoncludc, 1 arguc that il is l'rom ùlÎs slr1.ndpoinl on mcmory - a 
slanclpoint, Ùlat is , which rcduccs mcmory lo ils scmanLic limcLions, or lo ils 
synchronie associalions thal lhc inlcllccl, by looking al Ù1C 
phcnomcnological horizon composcd by onc's imagination anel onc's 
mncmonic associaLions, is able to lind al any gi\ 'cn momcnl Ù1C sam c ordcr of 
causcs and lhc samc conncclions bctwccn lhings, or imagcs of lhings, Whcn 
Ù1CSC ncw associaLions arc sccn by Ù1C mincl, a ncwly composcd cnchainmcnl 
of idcas of imagcs is cncodcd in lhc body of lhc indi\'idual, madc in such a 
way as lo hc mcaningful , as il wcre - capable, Ùlal is, of rcllccLing and 
rcproducing a raLional ordcr and connccLion of aflccLions al any Limc in which 
cxlcrnal cvcnls will dclcrminc Ù1C body to rcmcmbcr lhc samc imagcs.38 For 
38 Inlercslingly, altcr haYing dcmonslratcd ùlal "wc ha\'c ÙIC powcr o r ordcring and cOl1l1ccling ÙIC 
aJlCclio ns OfÙIC body according lo ÙlC ordcr Or ÙIC inlcllcct" (ESp 10d; C 1,60 1/ G Il ,287), Spinoza 
slarlS rocusing on aspccts of IlIcmory ùlal wc ma}' rcg;ml as "proccdural" (scc E5p lOs, ESp Il , 
SpillOZ:/ 'S 17/co/y of/hc HIIIl/;1JJ ,\lù,,!: COlis";OIl,mess, ,Ilcli/()/~ ; alid R caso li 
Ùle capacily lo remember ÙÙllgs ùlrough lime remaills a fUIICLio ll of memo ry, 
underslood as a produCl ofhumall corporeal imagimlioll. Illdeecl, Ùle inlellecl 
has no memory, and il cannollrigger or recall corporeal memories. Whal Ùle 
inlellecl can do, raÙler, is lo wiUless al ally momeill lhe presence of some 
elernal raLionalily in apparellùY discollllecied aild fo rluilous images of Ùle 
wo rld, and Ùlen let memory remember such a visioll by recalling connecLiolls 
between images now made inlelligible. 
E5pl 2 and E5p( 3), ThaL is, hc Sl<uts ro cusing on holV images C;Ul bc cOllllCCLcd and cnchaincd in 
such a way Lo rc flccL and c:\1Jrcss rational prccepls ;Uld maxillls, whirh C;Ul bc implcmc nLcd aL ;my 
occasion o r rccollcctio n, H c also im'cstigaLcs how such associations or imagcs can bc arrangcd in 
o rdcr to inCl'casc Ù1C occasions o f rccollcction ÙJaL onc's cxpcricncc and ro rLunc lllighL b ring abo uL, 
in ordcr l'o r Ù1C rational prcccpL ÙlaL lhcy express lo bc reca11cd ;Uld implcmcnLcd in as m,UlY 
occasio ns as possible, 
Thc bcSL ùling, Ùlcn, Ù1aL IVC can do, 50 long as IVC do noL hayc pc rlccL knolVlcdgc o f 
our ,Ù1CCLs, is Lo concci\'c a corrcrL principlc o r li\ 'ing, or surc maxims o r li IC, Lo commiL 
Ù1cm Lo Illcmory, and Lo apply Ùlcm conslanÙY Lo ÙIC p.u,ticular cascs rrcqucnùy 
cncounLcrcd in lilC, In ùlis lVay our imahrination \\~ 11 hc exLcnsi\'cly allccLcd by Ùlcm , 
allCl IVC shall always ha\'c Ùlcm rcady, 1",1 And hc who \~11 ObSCIYC ÙICSC lrulcs l 
carc rully 1",1 and practicc Ùlcm , \~11 soon bc ahlc Lo dirccL mosL o r his actions 
acco rding Lo Ù1C command o r rcason, 
(E5pI Os; C 1,60 1-602 / G II , 287-289) 
T his aspccL o r Spinoza's Ùlcory o r mcmory \\i11 hc 'Ulalyscd in ÙIC ro llO\\ing chapLcr. 
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ChapLer 4 
"The Habit ofVirtue": Spinoza on Reason and Memory 
Chapter Abstract 
ln ùus chaptcr 1 explain how, accord ing to Spinoza, wc can acquirc the "habil of virtue" 
from "falalnecessity". Spinoza maintains Ùla't there can hc no dccision of lhc mind if there 
is no memory of the decision Ùlat wc want to take. MoreO\'er, Spinoza's rcjection of li'ee 
will implies Ùlat nobody can frecly select the nmcmonic conlcnt Irhich is lhc oqjcct o[ 
retrieval and present awarencss. It sccms, therclorc, that it is not in thc power of an 
individual to act virtuously. Nevertheless, Spinoza also conlends lltat lltc acquisition o[ Ùle 
habit of virtue is a goal Ùlat aU humans can acltieve hy employing lhcir powers alone. To 
solve ùlis puzzle, 1 [ocus on thc way in Il'hich memory interacts with rcason , in Spinoza's 
system. 1 argue that this interaction gives rise lo what wc may cali "discursive reasoning", 
Ùlat is, the un[olding in time of reasoning proccsses. In ùlis sense, reasoning can bc 
understood as a kind of habil, wltich generates virtuous behaviour. Firsl, 1 darily Il'hat lhe 
notion of "habit of virlue" signilies loI' Spinoza. Then, 1 lll'ielly revicII' his account of 
memory. exl, 1 show how reason can be understood as an actil~ly by Irhidl nmemonic 
associations arc reconligured. To further cluciclate his conception of reason, 1 analyse his 
accounl of "common notions", which he calls Ùle "Ioundations of our reasoning". Finally, 
1 point out how reason rclies on memol1' to preserve itsclf in lime, delermining the virtuous 
habil. 
1. Introduction 
ln lhis chaplcr 1 wi ll locus on Ù1C way in wlùch mcmory inlcracls wilh rcason, 
in Spinoza's syslcm. 1 arguc t.hal ùlis inlcractio n bclwccn mcmory and rcason 
gi\'cs risc lo whal wc may cali "cliscursi,'c rcasoning", that is, the unlolding in 
Limc or rcasoning proccsscs . FurÙlcr, discursi\'c reasonillg can bc undcrsloocl 
as a habil, which is iclcntical, on Spinoza's accoulIl, WiÙl , 'irluous behaviour. 
Thc impclus for ùlis im'csligation is pro\'idcd by a qucstion Ùlal Ù1C 
Gcrman maÙlcmaLician Ehrcnl"ricd vValÙlcr , '0 11 Tschirnhaus poses in a !eLLcr 
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aclclressecl lo Spinoza, around lhe end 01" 1674. 1 ln his leller, T schirnhaus 
expresses perplexities aboul Spinoza's necessilarianism and his rejection 01" 
I"ree will. He asks him: 
II" we were compelled by exlernal ùlings, who cou Id acquire Ùle 
habil of" virlue [hnbÙus lù"lul1s[ i) [ ... [ [lin how many ways does ilnol 
happen Ùlal if" we are delermined lo someùling by exlernal ùlÎngs, 
we resisl ùlis WiÙl a lirm and conslanl healt? 
(Ep 57; C II, 425-1.26 / G IV, 2G1.) 
Spinoza's answer lo T schirnhaus's question is raÙler clusive: 
As lor wh al he has mainlained 1 ... 1: "Ùlal if" we were compelled by 
exlernal causes, no one could acquire the habil 01" virlue", 1 don'l 
know who has lold him Ùlal il can't happen from a f"a.lal neccssily 
1 ex 1i,{;Ji llcccssi!.nlc[, bul only from a free decision 01" the mind, Ùlal 
we should havc a (inn and const..-1.lll disposition. 
(Ep 58; C II , 4.30 / G IV, 2(7) 
This reply suggesls Ùlal an individual can acquire Ùle "habil of virtue" I"rom a 
"I"alal nccessily". Y cl, Spinoza docs nol demonsLrate how, on !lis accounl, il 
can actually happen Ùlal one acquires ùlis "linn and conslanl disposition" lo 
acl virluously. In Ù1C resl of ùlis chaplcr 1 will l.ry lo address Tschirnhaus's 
question, providing a series of argumcnls compatible WiÙl Spinoza's o\"erall 
philosophical I"ramework. My aim is lo dcmonsl.rale Ùlal Ùle acquisition of lhe 
habil 01" , ·irlue, in Spinoza's lerms, is intimalely connecled lo precise accounls 
01" reason and memory, and il dcpcnds on Ùlcm. 
Incleecl, for Spinoza Ùle c1Tccls 01" bOÙl reason and memory are 
necessarily delcnninccl. Our power lo reason depends only on Ùle laws of" our 
nalure; in ùlis sense, 1 shaH argue, ils eflccls GlIl be underslood as originating 
1 Thc lcttcr (Ep 57) lVas handcd in by Tschill1haus 1.0 Ùlcir C0l11111011 f,;cnd Gcorg Schullcr, alld 
dcli\·crcd to Spilloza by Jan RiculVc rLsz, Ù'C publishcr ill Amstcrùam of Glazcmakcr's Frcnch 
[j, Ulslatiolls of DCSGutcs ;Uld of ail Spilloza's 1V0rks. 
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from a killCl of "free nccessity". IL cxprcsscs itself as Ù1C powcr of ordcring and 
connccLÏng images according lo Ù1C ordcr of lhc inlellecl. Thc imagcs 
Ùlcmsel\'cs, which wc percci\'c in our mind and which our rcason orc\crs 
according to ÙIC order of thc inlellecl, arc pro\'idcd by mcmory. Yel, Ù1C way 
in which wc comc tü pcrcci\'c, rClain, and rccollcct imagcs in our mind is not 
in our powcr: it is dClcrmincd, raÙlcr, by ÙIC way in which cxternal causes 
nccessarily arouse in us parLÏcular nclworks of mcmories raÙlcr ÙlaIl oÙlcrs. 
Hcnce, ÙIC acquisiLÏon of a "habil of \'irluC" - which 1 idcnLÏfy WiÙl Ù1C 
pcrmancnce and Ilourishing in ÙIC mind of trains or idcas ordcred accorcling 
lo ÙIC ordcr of ÙIC intcllccl- insofar as il also relics on mcmory, rcmains also 
dcpcndcnlon e1cmcnts of "1~llalncccssily". 
'1'0 support ùlis ùlcsis, 1 will begin, in sccLÏon 2, by c1arifying whal Ù1C 
noLÏon of "habil of \'irtuc" sih'1lilics lor Spinoza. In sccLÏon 3, 1 will cxplain 
Spinoza's accounl of mcmory: ùlis cnlails ÙIC prcscncc, in Ù1C hUmaIl minci, 
of nclworks of idcas which arc conslanùy dClcrmincd by Ù1C way in which ÙIC 
human body is al1cclcd by cxtcrnal objccts. In sccLion4, 1 will show how rcason 
- Ùlal is, ÙIC acLÏvily by which ÙIC mind undcrslands propcrLics of Ù1C Ùlings 
and joins imagcs lhrough thcm - CaIl bc undcrslood as a kincl of 
rcconliguraLion of mncmonic associaLÏons. In sccLÏon 5, 1 will analysc how, on 
Spinoza's accounl, wc gcl lo pcrcci\'c adcquatc ideas of common propcrLÏcs 
of lhings - Ùlal is, in Spinoza's lcnninoloh'Y, "common noLÏons" - which 
pro\'idc us WiÙI ÙIC "loundaLÏons of our rcasoning" (E2p1,Os 1; C l, 475-1.76 / 
G II, 120). In scctions G, 1 will poinl oul how rcason relics on mcmory and 
organiscs il in ordcr lo prCSCITC itself in LÏmc, lo gi\'c risc lo discursivc 
rcasoning. In sccLÏon 7, which concludcs Ù1C chaplcr, 1 will show how rcason 
and mcmory concur lo dClcrminc Lhc acquisiLÏon of onc's virluous habils. 
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2. Human virtue: actions VoY passions of the mind 
To beller undersland Spinoza's rcply to Tschilllhalls, we can slarl by c1arilying 
whal Spinoza underslands by "habil or \'irtue". Thc expression "habil or virlue 
1 H'rtulJs habÙLlsl" is rarely used in Spilloza's works.2 In Ùle ThcologJC."aJ-
PoùlJc"':11 Treatisc, Spinoza expliciùy menLions "habil or \'irlue" a (cw Limes. On 
one occasion, he idenLifies "acquiring Ù1C habil or\'irlue" WiÙl "gaining control 
over Ùle passions" rrTP III , 12; C II, 113 / C III , 46). Spilloza also adds Ùlal 
Ùle means lo acquire Ùle habil or \'irlue depellds "chicl1y Oll our power alone, 
or on Ùle laws ol" hllman nalurc ,donc". For ùlis reaSOll, he conclllcles Ùlal 
"Ùlese gil"ts 1.,.1 have always beell common lo the wholc human race" (TTP 
III , 12; C II, 114 / G III, 46-1.7),3 SLiIl, lhis power, common lo ail humans, is 
nol conceivecl by Spinoza as dctermined by any rreedom or the will. By 
cont.rasl, it is concei\'ecl as sul~ject to Ù1C same "lIl1i\'ersal laws ol" nature 
according to which ail Ùlings happcn alld are delermined" O'TP III , 8; C II, 
1 12 / G III , 46) . ~ 
2 \ViÙI rcgard lo Spinoza's gcncral lcnninolo),'y for "hahiL~", scc Malinowski-Charlcs 2004b, 10 l. 
Thc notion of "habil" was widcly discusscd Ùlroughoul ÙIC Middlc Agcs, From ÙIC 13· ccntUly, 
spccific debales on ÙltuC, undcrslood as a kil\{1 of "hahil" and "sccond nalurc", \Vcre promplcd 
and inlluenccd by Ù1C appc<u';U\cc of Rohcrl GrossclcSlc's full U<ll\slation of Al;SlOÙC's 
Xico/11nchcan ~ÎiJics (rcg<U'Cling (JrC\;OUS dcbalcs, scc :\cdcrm;U\ 1990), ln ÙIC l'crsion of ArisloÙc's 
.\ïco/11nchcan EtJJJ'cs oWllcd by Spinoza (in ArisloÙc I.S/~8, III , 1-86, lranslaled by loannis 
Argyropoulos), Ù1C translalor rcndcrs ÙIC Grcck ~eoÇ ("hahiludc") W;ÙI ÙIC L'itin nssue/udo (scc, 
lo r ex;unple, ArisloÙc 1548, III , 9) and ÙIC Grcck ËÇIÇ ("hahil") W;ÙI habitus (scc Al;slOÙC 15'1,8, 
III , 5-1 2), Syli<Ule Malinowski-Ch;uks highlighL~ ÙIC dilTcrcnccs bclwccn ÙIC Al;slolclian 
conceptions of virtuc ;U\d habits ;l~ a "sccond nalurc" ;U\d Ùlal or Spinoza, who inslcad idcntifics 
\'irluC WiÙl one's l'cry oml nalurc (Malinowski-Charlcs 200 ~h, 102), 
3 Bcsidcs Ùùs passagc, Spinoza mcntions "hahil or \'irluc" ilnoÙlcr ÙIl'CC timcs in "I~rp, ln "I~rp V, 
4, Spilloza rcfcrs lo ÙIC "habil or \'irluC or or good a('tions l ,ùtutis sil e bOl/arum nctionu/11 usu scu 
hnbiwl" lo strcss Ù1C unil'crsalily or Isaiah's lcaching, which cXlcnds lo ail hum<Uls (C II , 139 / G 
III , 69, Translation modilicd), On ;u\oÙlcr occasion, in lTP XV, 4/1" Spinoza mcntions how 
dillicull il is lo acquirc ÙIC "habilorl'irluc", wiùl ÙIC purposc 10 highlighl Ù1C imporla ncc orScriplUrc 
and obcdicnce when IVC c<Ulllol lil'c in accord;U\('c lo ÙIC di('lalcs or our rcason (C 1 l, 281-282 / G 
III, 188), ln Trp XVI , 6-7, Spinoza allillllS Ù\al, in a slalc o r nalurc, hum;ms Ùlal do nOlli\'c undcr 
Ù1C gU iC!<lllCC or rcason, or do nol ha\'c ÙIC "habil of \'irluc", ha\'c a suprcmc righllo do whalc\'cr 
Ùlcir appctile urgcs Ùlcm lo do (C II , 28:1 / G III , 190), 
~ ln Ùle same passagc Spinoza adds lhal ÙICSC "Ia\\'s o r nalurc IICl!'CS I/a/U/,~i " arc "noÙling bUl Ùle 
clcrnal dccrccs or God, which always inl'Oh'c clcmallruÙI ;U\d ncccssily" (TrI' III , 8; C II , 112 / 
GIll, 46) , For Ùlis rcason, Spinoza ('ails whalc\'cr lüllows rrom ÙIC powcr or hum;U\ nalurc alonc 
1511. 
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In a similar way, in Ù1e l-üûC5 Spinoza dclines "\'irlue" as Ùle power by 
which we cause e lTecls that can be underslood lhrough lhe laws of human 
nature ajonc. H e wriles: 
By virtue and power 1 undersland Ùle same Ùling, i.e. , virlue, insofar 
as il is rclaled to man, is Ù1e very essence, ornalure, of man, insofar 
as he has Ù1e power of bringing aboul cerlain lhings, which can be 
underslood ù1rough Ù1e laws of his nalure alone. 
(l-Ad8; C 1,51.7 / G II , 210) 
ln Spinoza's terms, lo be able lo bring aboul Ùlings which can he underslood 
ùlrough one's own nature alone means, fo r an individual, lo be Ùle "adequale 
cause" of Ùlose ùüngs (E3d 1).5 \ t\fhen an individual is Ùle adequale cause of 
eflccls, Ù1al individual is also said lo acl (E3d2) .G Expressions of our \'irlue arc, 
therefore, ÙlOse aflcctions in us lhal Spinoza identifies wiùl "actions", as 
opposed lo "passions" (E3d3).7 Actions, Ùlal is, arc ÙlOse aflccljons in us Ù1al 
can be entircly underslood ùlrough Ùle laws of our nalure, as el1ccls or which 
"Cod's inlcmal aid" (Trp III, 9; C II, 11 3 / C III, tj.(j). O n ùlÏs basis, hc conlcmls Ùlal "no onc 
docs anything cxcepl according lo ÙIC prcdclcrmincd ordcr o r nalurc, i,c" acconling lo Cod's 
elernal guid,mcc and dccrce" (TfP III , 10; C II , 11 3 / C III , 46). 
5 ln his dcliniLion of "adcqualc causc", Spinoza m 'ilcs: 
1 cali Ùlal cause adequalc whosc cIl 'cCI C;UI bc d carly and disLincLil 'cly pcrccil'cd 
ùlrough il. Bull cali il partial, orinadcqualc, ir ils cllCcl GUlllOl bc undcrslood Ùlrough 
il alonc. 
(E3dl ; C l, Il.02 / C Il , 139) 
6 By rccalling E3d l , in E3d 2 Spinoza wrilcs : 
[ say thal wc acl whcn somcÙling happcns, in us or oulsidc us, or II'hich wc arc ÙIC 
adcqualc causc, i,e., wh en somcùlÏng in us o r oulS idc us lü llows rrom o ur nalurc, 
which Gm bc c1carly ,mcl distincÙ)' undcrslood ùl rough il ;Jonc. O n ÙIC oÙlcr halld, [ 
say Ùlal wc iU'C aCled on whcn somcÙù ng happcns in us, or somcùlÏng lü llolVs rrom 
our nalurc, of which wc ,U'C o nly a parLial causc. 
(E3d 2; C [, 493 / C II, 139) 
7 [n E3d3 Spinoza m 'ilcs: 
By all'ccl [ unclcrsumd allCctions or ÙIC body by which ÙIC body's powcr o r acting is 
increascd or diminished , aidcd or rcslraincd, ;Uld al ÙIC samc Limc, ÙlC idcas or ÙICSC 
all'ccLions, 
T hcrcfo rc, if wc CiUl bc ÙIC adcqualc causc or iU l)' o r ÙICSC an'cctions, [ 
undcrsliUld by Ù1C afTccl an action; o Ùlcn visc a passio n, 
(E3d3; C [, t\D3 / C II, 139) 
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wc arc ÙIC adcqualc causc. They originalc in and depcnd o nly Oll oursck cs, 
raÙlcr lhan on Ù1C inOucnce or cxlcrnal caus cs acling upo n us. Passions, by 
colllrasl, arc lhosc alTcctions o r ÙIC mind and Ù1C body Ùlal arc produccd ill 
us as a rcsull or exlcrnal causcs acting upon us. 
Thc lirsl Ùùng to notice, Ùlcrdorc, is Ùlal Spinoza cloes nol absolulcly 
dcny Ùlal ÙICIT can bc somc clTcclS in us Ùlal arc nol caused by cxlcrnal causcs. 
Quilc ÙIC opposilC, cxprcssions or our virtuc arc, by clcfinition, ÙIOSC aclions 
lhal dcpcncl on our nalurc alonc and can bc unclcrslood ùlrough our naturc 
alonc. Y cl, ÙICSC actions, insofar as they ncccssarily rollow li-OITI ÙIC laws or 
our Jlaturc, arc no less neccssary Ùlan ail Ùle oÙlcr effecLs which arc compclled 
in us by exlcrnal causes. As Spinoza writcs lo Tschirnhaus in ÙIC samc lettcr, 
thc liteL Ùlal somcùling "cxisLs ancl acts solcly l'rom Ù1C nccessily or its own 
Jlaturc" is ÙIC only way in which hc conceives or rrecdom: il is, in Spinoza's 
words, "rree nccessiLy [ilbera Ilccessi&1LeI " (Ep 58; C II, Il.27 / G IV, 2(5).8 
' '''hal Spinoza mcans to clcny, in his rcply lo Tschirnhaus, is Ùlal whal 
dclcnnincs an iJlclividual lo acl virluously - or lo produce ccrtain cl1ccls Ùlal 
GUI bc unucrslood ùlrough ÙIC laws or he r nalure alonc - musl dcpcJld on a 
rrcc uccision or ÙIC minci, or o n Ù1C rrccdom o r our will. 
8 ln his rcply lo Tschimhaus, Spinoza milcs Lhal, aceording lo his ddiniLion of li·ccdom, "a ÙlÏng is 
frcc if il cxists and aeL~ solcly from Ù1C ncccssily of ilS oml nalurc, and compcllcd if il is dClcrmincd 
by somcÙlÏng clsc lo cxisl and producc clIeets in a lixcd and dclcrminalc lVay" Œp 58; C II , 427 / 
G IV, 2(5). In Eld7, hc ddincs "fi 'ccdom" as follolVs: 
Thal ùlÏng is c;ùlcd frcc whieh cxisL~ l'rom Ù1C ncecssity or ilS nalurc aJonc, and is 
dClcrmincd lo ael by iLscl f aJonc. Bul a ù1ing is caJlcd ncccssal)', or raÙlcr eompcllcd , 
whieh is dClcrmincd by anoÙ1cr lo cxisl and lo produce an c ITeel in a ccrl<\in and 
dclcrminalc mannCL 
(Eld7; C l , /1.09 / G II , 1.6) 
Spinoza's aecounl of l'rccdom ,Uld ilS rclationship lViù1 his ncccssit;uianism ha,·c allraclcd a h'lTal 
dcal of allcntion, ;Uld Ù1C sehol,u'ly lilcralurc conecll1ing ùlis lopie is ,·asl (scc, l'or cxamplc, 
Hampshirc 11 9601 1973 and 197 1; :\a:ss 1969 and 1974; Parkinson 197 1; SokolO\· 1977; Benncll 
1984,3 15-328; Russcll 1984; Kashap 1987; ] ;UllCS 1996 and 2009; :\Ch'li 2000; Luecro-Y1ont;uio 
2003; Stcinbcrg 2005; Arola 2007; Scrib,u lo 2009; Kisncr 2010 ;Uld 20 11 ; Fr;Ulkcl 2011; 
Sangia{'omo 2011 b; [; \urcns 2012; :\adlcr 20 1.5; Lenz 20 17; Boros 2018). 
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In this rcgard, in ÙIC l '-lhics, Spinoza im'okcs Ù1C role of mcmory lo daim 
Ùlat ÙICIT would bc no c1ccision in thc mind - Ùlal is, Ù1CIT woulcl bc no 
disposiLion or an indi\'idual lo do or will anyùlÎng - if Ùlcrc was no memory 
of ÙIC ùling lhat wc wanl to cio, or of Ùle acLion Ù1al wc waHL to perform. 
Consislent wiùI his rcjecLion of free wi ll, Spinoza adcls Ù1al il is not in thc free 
power of the mind to eiÙlcr rccollecl a ùung or fOl-ge l il. Hencc, it is not by an 
acl or free willlhal wc c1ccide whallo cio or nollo do. 
IWIc can do noÙùng rrom a decision or Ù1e minci unless wc 
rccollecl il. E.g. , wc cannol speak a worcl unless wc recollect il. And 
il is not in ÙIC rree power or ÙIC minci lo ciÙ1er rccollecl a ù1ing or 
lorget il. 
(E.3p2s; C l, 497 / G II , (44) 
IL lollows Ùlalno \'irluous decision or disposiLion lo acl can arise in Ùle mill(1 
or an indi\'idual , ir mcmory is nol pre-empLi\'c1y set to recollccl ideas Ù1al arc 
capable or arousing, somehow, \'irl1l0us decisions ancl actions in Ùle 
incli\'idual. Therclorc, in order lo understand how memory can c1elerminc 
onc's dccisions, and e\'enlually delcrmine Ù1e acquisition of ÙIC habit or \'irtue, 
il will bc uscfullo look al Spinoza's clescripLion or hum;m memory. 
3. Spinoza's account of associative memory: images, affects, and decisioDS 
ln Ùle ELlJics, Spinoza iclenLifies Ùle source or memory WiÙ1 a function or ÙIC 
human body Ùlal. is responsible lor Ù1e formaLion, retenLion, associalion and 
rcproducLion or some corporcal alTcctions, or impressions of exlernal objects. 9 
H e conlends Ùlat, rollowing a conL-1.cl wiùI an external body, ÙIC fluid parLs of 
Ùle human body GUI inlcracl wiùI Ùle sofi. parts, andlea\'e "traces l "CSÙgIfII or 
9 The cOlllclIl o r lhis SCCtiOIl rccalls ,Uld summ;u'iscs IVhal has bcen cxplaillcd , ill gI'calc r dClail , ill 
SCCtiOIlS .5 ;Uld fi or lhc prc, 'io us chaplcr. \1alillowski-Charlcs COITCCÙy slJ'CSSCS Ù1C rolc or mcmory 
in dClCIlllillillg lhc rcpctiti"c ualurc orhabiluaJ bcha,'iour (2004b, 106- 107). \1y aim, hc rc, is inslcad 
rclalcd lo cxplaillillg holV mcmOly accoulIls l'or Ù1C prcscnce or absellcc or idcas alld all'ccls ill olle's 
mimi - dclermillillg, Ùlcrc!ore, ,Ul illdiùduaJ's appctilc ,Uld decisio lls, 
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thc cxtcrnal body" on Ùlcm (E2post5; C l, Il,62/ G II , 103). Whcn Ù1C body 
is so aflèctcd or moclilicd, thc mincl has, in parallcl, idcas of such cOl-porcal 
alrcctions. lo Thcsc affections arc in factthc "imagcs" which arc pcrcci\'ccl and 
remcmbercd by Ù1C mincl. 11 Accorcling to Spinoza, Ù1CY "rcprcscnt cxtcrnal 
bodics as prcscntto us 1c0l]J0/;;1 cx/cmrt , 'clul nabis prrrscJJu;" rcpra'SCJJIr1ntl" 
(E2pI7s; C l, 465/ G II , 106. Translation mocli licd). 
As long as Ù1C sort parts of the human body rctain Ù1CSC traces, or 
imprcssions, Ù1C fluid parts cm intcracl. with thcm according to Ù1C samc 
pattcrn of movcmcnl.. This allows boclily affcctions to bc rcpcatcd as Ù1CY 
originally happcncd, whcn an impression was lirst crcatcd .12 Accorcling to 
Spinoza, Ù1C rctcntion and repctition of thc samc intcraction bctwccn l1uicl 
parts and sort parts of Ù1C body can cxplain how Ù1C minci is capable of 
rctaining ancl rccollccting icleas of past imprcssions and rcprcscnting tllcm 
again, in cliflercnt and scparate momcnts. This is becausc Ù1C rcitcration of 
thesc aIlcctions in Ù1C human bocly must, in parallcl , bc mirrorcd by 
corresponding iclcas in Ù1C human minci. Hc contcnds, on ùlÎs basis, Ùlat 
"!al!ùlough Ù1C cxtcrnal bodics by which thc human body has oncc been 
afTectccl nciÙlcr cxist nor arc prescnt, Ù1C mimi will still bc able to rcgard Ùlcm 
as if thcy wcrc prcscn t" Œ2p 1 7 c; CI, 1\61\/ G II , 105) . 
10 This is a consequence orSpinoza's so-called "mind-bod)' piu'allclism", accorcling 10 which: " Itlhe 
orcier and connection ofïdeas is Ùle S,Ul1e as Ùle order ,U1d cOIUlection or Ùlinl,'S" (E2p7; C l , 45 1 1 
G II , 89), AnoÙler fOlmulation or Ùle same Illinciplc can be lound in E3p2s: "Ùle order or actions 
and passions or our bod)' is , b)' nalure, al one wiùl Ùle order or actions ,md passions or Ùle minci" 
(C l, 494 / G II , 143), 
I I ln E3posI2, Spinoza \\Tiles : 
The hum,m bod)' c,m unclergo m;ul)' ch;U1ges, ;U1d ne\'erÙlcless retain impressions, or 
traces lùnp/c,5.5JoIlCS scu l 'CslJ81~11. or Ùle objects, and consequenÙ)', ùle SiUl1e images 
or ù1ings I/c /Vln ùnagùlCsl , 
(E3posI2; C l, 493 1 G II , 139) 
12 This reileration or a bodil)' allcction ma)' also occur in Ùle absence or Ùle e.'\lellliù objecl Ùlat 
caused Ùle firsl impression - ÙliUlks, Spinoza m'ites, to Ùle "spont,U1eous motion" or Ùle lIuid p,uts 
;ùong ùle sorlparts ,ùread)' shaped bl' Ùle paslcontacl(E2pI7d2; C l, tf,M I G II, 105), 
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Wc sec, Ùlcrclo re, how il can happcn (as il o rtcn docs) Ùlal wc 
regard as prcscnl Ùùngs Ùlat do no l cxisl. This can happcn from 
othe r causcs also, bUl il is sullïcicnt lo r mc hcrc lo havc shown onc 
ùlrough which 1 can cxplain il as if 1 had shown il lhrough its truc 
cause. 
Œ2p17s; C l , Il.(j/1.j G II, lOS) 
Building on ùlis model, Spinoza spccilïcally undcrslands "mcmory" as Ù1C 
rcsull of associaLio ns bctwccn idcas 13 - associaLions which ncccssarily rcllccl, 
in Ù1C mind, a corresponding ordcr o f cxisling associalions or corporcal 
affccLions Œ2p18s; C l, 465 / G II , 10G-I07). Hc argucs Ùlal " [ilrÙlC human 
bocly has once bccn afTeclecl by lwo or mo rc bodics al ÙIC samc Limc [ sùnu~ , 
thcn when thc mind subscqucnùy imagincs o nc o f Ùlcm, il will immcclialcly 
[slaùin[ rccollecl Ù1C oÙlers also" (E2pI8; C l , /1·G5 / G II , lOG). 
The human body can bc alfcclcd in such a manncr Ùlal se"cral imagcs 
or cxlcrnal bodics arc imprcssccl logcÙlcr on ils sofl parts. Ir ÙICSC lraces arc 
physically conncclccllo each olhcr in ÙIC body, lhc inlcraclion of onc o f Ùlcm 
WiÙl Ù1C lluicl parts of ÙIC body will in\'o lyc thc wholc nclwork of 
inlcrconneclccl imprcssio ns.1 ~ Thus, whcn ÙIC human body is alfcclccl in ways 
which causc Ù1C fluicl parts lo inlcracl WiÙl a prc-cxisLing imprcssio n, ÙIC minci 
will also imaginc Ùlal imprcssio n, along WiÙl ail ÙIC imprcss ions Ùlal arc 
13 Harry Parkinson writes Ùlat when Spinoza, in F.2pI 8s, "speaks of \Vhat he r;ùls IllCl/Jo /ù, 1 ... 1 he 
. seems to undcrsland, nol memOl)' in Ùle usual sense of Ùle telm, but Ùle association o f ideas" 
(11 9691 1973, 74). 
1 ~ L'lurent BO\·c argues Ùlat ÙIC capacity of Ùle hum;m body to haye intcrconnected imprcssions of 
cOlv oreai aJlections is a result of Ùle \·el)' slri\ing o f Ùle lx)(ly to pcrse\ne in ilS being. He ùlercfore 
identilics ÙIC hum;m cOl/alus wiùl what he c;ùls H .7bitude (in French, capi l<ùised) , conlending Ùlat 
Habtiude constitutes ùle lo undation of memOl)' i L~cf f (BO\·c 1996, 20). He mainlains Ùlat ùle body 
"esl<lblishes" connectio ns between corporcal U'aces whcn Ùley arc simull<lneously impressed on its 
sofi. parts (BO\·c 1996,20), and he distinguishes ùlen ùlis "aptitude, or spontancous power laplilude 
ou /. . ./ puissancc spont.wéci " (BO\·e 1996,24) o f one's body, fi 'om Ùle repctition o f ÙIC allcctions 
Ùlemseh·es, which en sucs from memOl)' and which he l'ails habitudes (in Frcnch, no n-capilalised) . 
For reasons of clality, 1 prcfer to stick to Spinoza's telminoloh'Y, and retain Ùle telm "habit", " i ùl 
rclereJlcc to one's \'irtue, to address what Spinoza cxpliciùy dclines, in his Ep 58 to Tschil1\haus, 
as "a finTI ,mcl const;mt disposition l/ùllIalo, cl cOI/sial/Ii ... fIl/linol" to opposc ùle powcr o f ÙIC 
pass io ns (C II, 430 / C IV, 267). 
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nalurally associalcd with thc formcr. This, Spinoza conlcnds, allows thc mind 
to simullaneously pcrcci\"e multiple ideas of bodily impressions on thc 
occasion or a single affection (E2p 18d; C l, 465 / G II, 106). In ùlis scnsc, thc 
notion or "memory" put forÙl by Spinoza inc\uc\es Ùle whole spcct.rum of 
scnsations and images ilial are prcsenLcd aL one time Lo an individual, lûllowing 
an cxLcrnal stimulus. 15 
The same associative mechanism, on Spinoza's accounl, also explains 
how afrccts of sadness and joy - which Spinoza identilies with affections 
rcspecLivcly relaLed to a decrease or an increase in one's powcr of actingl6 -
arc joincd Lo cach other and Lo Ù1C imagcs which arc prcscnLcd lo onc's 
mcmory.17 Spinoza maint..-1.ins Ùlal "Iii l' thc mind has once bccn aOcctcd by lwo 
al"!Ccls al once [sùnuA, thcn aflcrwards, whcn il is aOcclcd by onc of ùlcm, il 
will also bc aflcclcd by Ù1C oÙlcr" (E3p 14; C l , 502 / G II, 151) . This 
obscryation leads him to conduc\c Ùlal " [a[ny ùùng can bc ÙIC accidcnlal causc 
orjoy, sadncss, or dcsire" (E3p 15; C l, 503 / G II, 151) . 
On ùus basis, Spinoza conceives mcmory as ÙIC mcchanism by which, al 
any gi\'cn timc, a whole nelwork or interconncclcd ideas is immcdialcly and 
ncccssarily prcscnlcdlo Ù1C mind or Ùle indi\'idual, fûllowing a single allcction 
produccc\ by cxlcrnal causes. Thc samc mcchanism also brings aboul a 
corrcsponc\ing conncction or aflccls, which nccessarily c\clcrminc lhc actual 
disposition of an inc\i\lduallo aCl, or rcacllo ÙlC sourccs ofjoy and sadncss 
thal shc imagincs as prcscnL - dClcrmining, Ùlcrc!ûrc, hcr currcnl appctilc, 
dccisions and actions. 
15 For, IVhcn an aIlCcLÎon pro\"okcd by sornc extclllal cause arouses in Ù1C body a nCllVork of 
inlcrconneclcd impressions - acLÎng, Ùlcrc!orc, as Ù1C occasion of rccollccLÎon - ail Ùle idcas of Ù1C 
imprcssions nalurally conneclcd lo one ilJlOÙ1Cr in Ùle body iU'C rccollcclcd immcdialcly and 
simultlJlcously lo cach où1er (as cmphasiscd by Spinoza's use of Ù1C IA,LÎ n le rms slilù/n ;lJld sùnu! 
in E2pl8 and ils dcmonslraLÎon). 
16 RccaIl E3d3, quolcd abo\"e in footnole 7. In E3plls, Spinoza idcnLÎlics aJl'rcts of sadness wiùl 
piL~s ions Ùlal in\"Oh'c a dccreasc in one's powcr of acLÎng. Con\"erscly, hc idcnLÎlics aIlCcL~ ofjoy WiÙl 
passions Ùlal in\"Oh'c ilJl inCl"casc in onc's powcr of acGng. Sec aIso E3ad2-3. 
17 Conccrning ù1is poinl., scc also Shapiro 2017, 215-2 19. 
160 
Cïl:lplcr 4, "77lc HabJi oF 1 iilllc": SpÙIOL:I 01/ RC:Json :Jnd .l lcl7lOl.1' 
Indccd, according to Spinoza, "lhc dccisions or Ù1C minci arc noùling bUl 
ÙIC appctitcs Ùlcmsclvcs, which Ùlcrcforc \,try as Ù1C dispositlon or ÙIC body 
varics" ([3p2s; C 1,497 / G II, 143). Thc hum,w appctllc, in lurn, is "noùling 
butthc Ycry csscncc or man, l'rom whosc nalurc lherc ncccssarily follow ÙIOSC 
Ùlings Ùlal pr01l10lc his prcscl'ratlon" (E3p9s; C l, 500 / G II, 147).18 Il is, 
ùlcrclorc, by ÙIC nalurc or our appctllc Ùlal " Iwlc slri"c lo pro1l10lc ÙIC 
cxistcnce or whatcycr we imaginc Ùlallcads lo joy, and lo rcmo"c or clcslroy 
whalc\'cr wc imaginc is conlrary lo il, or thal lcacls to saclncss" (E3p28; C l, 
509 / G II , 161. Translatlon 1l10diliccl). Hcncc, insofar as Ù1C way in which our 
mcmory is constltulcd, along W1Ùl Ù1C way in which il can be arouscd by 
cxtcrnal causcs, dClcrminc al cach momcnt o nc's imagcs ancl alTecls, mcmory 
can also dClcrminc one's clccisions - by bringing about aflccls or joy ,wcl 
saclncss Ùlal dClcrmine onc's appCtllC or, in Spinoza's lcnns, "Ùle slri"ing by 
which cach lhing su"i"cs lo pcrsc, 'crc in ilS bcing" (E3p7; C l , 499 / G II, 146). 
4. Reason and its power over the affects 
According lo Spinoza, Ù1C ordcr ancl conncctlon 111 which idcas arc 
im1l1cdialcly associalccl in onc's mcmory rcflccl Ù1C way in which an incliviclual 
"is dClcrmincd cXlcrnally, l'rom forluilous cncounlers WiÙl ù1ings, lo rcgard 
this or Ùlal" ([2p29s; C l, 170 / G II, 11 /1,). 
IMlcmory is 1 ... 1 nOÙling oÙlcr tilan a cerlain conncctlon or iclcas 
involving lhc nalurc or Ùlings which arc oulsidc Ù1C human body -
a conncctlon Ùlal is in ÙIC minci according lo ÙIC o rclcr and 
conncctlon or ÙIC allcctlons or Ù1C hU1l1an body. 
(E2pI8s; C I, 465 / G II , 106- 107) 
18 SpillOu\ cOllcei,'es hum;U\ des ire ;LS "appeLile logelher WiÙl Ùle consciouslless o r it" (E3ad l exp; 
C I, 53 1 / G 1 l, 190), From ùlese assumpLiolls il fo llolVs, l'or Spinoza, Ùlal desire ilSclr nUl be dclilled 
as "mall 's , 'cry esse lice, illsol;\r as il is cOllcei,"ed lo he delermincd, from ;Uly gi,"ell aflccLio ll o r il, 
lo do someùtillg" (l;;3ad 1; C 1,53 1 / G II , 190), The relaLionship bellVeell appeLile ;Uld desi rc is 
allalysed ill chapler l , secLioll 5, 
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Spinoza, howcvcr, dislinguishes thc order and conncclÏon of Ù1C iclcas 
pro\'iclccl by onc's corporcal mcmory from Ù1C conncclÏon of Ù1C idcas which 
follows Ùle ordcr of Ùle intellecl, and which is cqual in aIl humans. Hc 
Ùlcrcforc adds: 
1 say [ ... [ Ùlal ÙtÎs conncction happcns according lo Lhc order and 
conncclÏon of Ù1C alTcctions of Lhc human body in order Lo 
dislÏnguish iL from Ù1C conncclÏon of ideas which happcns according 
lo Ùlc ordcr of Ù1C intcllcct, by which Ù1C mind pcrccivcs Ùlings 
ùu-ough Ùlcir firsl causcs, and which is Ù1C samc in ail mcn. 
(E2pI8s; C l , 466 / G II, 107) 
ln Ù1C Fifùl Parl of Ù1C ElllJcs, Spinoza conlcnds ÙlaL Ù1C mind, so long as il is 
noL di\'erled by alTccLs conlrary lo ils own nalurc, has "Ù1C powcr of ordcring 
and conneclÏng Lhc allcclÏons of Ù1C body according lo Lhc ordcr of Ù1C 
inleLlecl" (ESp 1 0; C l , GO 1 / G II , 287). Spinoza grouncls ùlis daim on his 
mind-body p<u"alleLism ùlcsis. "In jusl Ù1C samc way as ùlOughlS and idcas of 
Ùlings arc ordcrcd and connccted in thc minci", hc argucs, "so Ù1C aITcclÏons 
of Ù1C body, or imagcs of ùlings are ordcrcd and conncclcd in Ù1C body" 
(ESpl; C 1,597 / G II, 281). IL lo llows Ùlal, ifùlC mind, by ils own powcr, can 
rcarrangc a givcn ordcr of idcas of imprcssions, Ùlcn Ù1C reLcvanl imprcssions 
in Ù1C body must, in paralleL, assumc a ncw corrcsponding configuralÏon.19 
Accordingly, if Ù1C minci GUl reordcr Ù1C ici cas of Ù1C alfcclÏons of Ù1C body, 
Ùlcn Ù1C mind can also rcarrangc Ù1C rclevanl allccts ofjoy and sadncss ÙlaL 
Lhosc afTcclÏons bring about. 
Spinoza also argucs Ùlat, by titis powcr, an indi"iclual can acqUlrc an 
incrcasing capabilily of clclcncling hcrsclf li"om Ù1C influcncc of passions and 
cvi l allccls. Indccd, hc contends Ùlal onc of "Ù1C rcmcdics lor Lhe allccLs" 
19 ln section 7 of Ùle prelious chapler, 1 louched on how Ùle rearr;Ulgemenl of bodily aflCetions 
according lo Ùle order of Ùle intellect may happen WiÙlOUl implying ;my inleraction belween mind 
and body. Conceming ùIis poinl, see also Moreau 199/1.,3 18. 
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(ESp20s; C l , 605 / G II, 293) consists in "the order by which thc mind can 
ordcr its affects and conncclthem to onc another" (E5p20s; C l , 605 / G II , 
293) . Hc wrilcs: 
By this power of rightly ordering and connecting Ùle aOcctions of 
the body, wc can bring il aboul Ùlat wc arc not casily al1cclcd witll 
cvil aIlccts. For a grcaler lorcc is required lor rcstraining aflccts 
ordered and conncclcd according lo tllC ordcr or thc inlcllcct ÙlaJl 
lor restraining ÙlOse which arc uncertain and random. 
(E5pIOs; C l , 60 1 / G II , 287) 
Spinoza demonslralcs ùlis Ùlesis by rclcrring to anoÙlcr proposition (ESp7), 
whcre he identilics ÙIC affccls Ùlal arc ordcred according lo ÙIC inlcllccl, as 
aIlccts "arising from, or arouscd by rcason". 
AITects thal arise l'rom, or arc aroused by, reason arc, if wc Lake 
accounl of time, morc power/il 1 than ÙlOSC Ùlal arc relaled lo 
singular things which wc rcgard as abscnt. 
(E5p7; C l , 600 / G II , 285) 
IL is lo be noled hcrc Ùlal tllis powcr, conccrning lhc allccts arising from 
reason, is only dclincd as more power/ill, comparcd to oÙlcr allCcts, insofar 
as il has aJl cfTcCl ùU'ough time - Ùlal is, insol;tr as il is capable or pcrsisting in 
onc's memory. 
Spinoza allirms Ùlal connections or ideas Ùlal lollow Ùle order of Ùle 
inlellecl are sLronger in timc, since ÙICY allow lor morc, and morc slable, 
associations belween Ùlemseh'es. Imagcs (and rele',lI1l allccts), associalcd 
according to Ù1C orcier of Ùle inlellect, Ùlal is, [T"cal Ùlcmsch'cs lo be more 
easily rel:.:1.ined and recollecled - gi"cn I;n-ourable circumstanccs. Hc wrilcs: 
Things wc underslalld clearly and distinctly arc ciÙlcr common 
propcrties of Ùlings or dcduccd l'rom thcm, anc! conscquenùy aJ'C 
arousec! in us more ollen. And so it can morc casily happcn Ùlal wc 
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consider o lher lhings logel.her with them raÙler Ùléln with IÙlings wc 
cio not understancl clearly ancl distincùyl. 
(ESp12c1; C l , 603 / G II , 289) 
Accorcling to Spinoza, ÙIe hUmall reason concci,'es "common properties of 
things", or ù1ings inkrrecl fro m Ùlese common properties. These ideas, he 
argu es, allow associations WiÙl allcl between all images that share such 
properties.20 H encc, the more Ùlese icleas will be associal.ed WiÙI images that 
share ùlose properties, the mo re likcly it is Ùlat ÙIese ideas will he arollsed in 
the minci , accorcling to Ùle exte rnal circumsl.ances (ESp Il , E5p 13) - Ilamcly, 
they will be arollsecl in one's minci each time in which an image associated to 
the iclea of one of ùlese properties is recollected by memo ry, fo llowing an 
affectio n o f Ùle body.21 
Therefore, to cluciclate wh al Spinoza lIncierstands by "reason", and by 
lhose clear and distinct ideas Ùlal allow fo r stable and resilienl 11lIlemOllic 
associations, 1 now lurn lo analyse Spinoza's accounl of "common notions": 
lhal is, adequale icleas o f "commoll properties o f ùIillgS" and ail the ideas 
"dedllced li-Olu ùlem". 
20 Spin07~, a1so mainL-LÏns ùlal the objccLs of such idcas of rcason, bcing \Ol11mon lo ail ùlings, arc 
concci\"cd as bcing always prcsenl - o r also, ùlcyarc pcrcei"cd "undcr a ccrtain spccics o r clcl1Iily 
IDe lIa/ura mÙ"ollis C5" / res sub quadam a:/cmi!aÛ5 .\pecie p crn ix "J"(:I" Œ2p ~ k2; C 1,48 1 / G Il , 
126). Hcncc, hc Wli lCS: 
IAin alTccL ù,al alises from rcason is nccess;u'ily rclalcd lo ÙIC common propcrLics of 
ùlÏnhrs, which wc al ways rcgard as prcscnl (fo r ùlcrc can hc nOùling ùlal c:\dudcs ùlcir 
prcscnl cxislcnce) and which wc always imaginc in ÙIC s;unc way. So such ;U1 allccl I ~i ll 
al ways rem,lÏn ÙlC sam e, and hcncc, ÙIC allccLs ùlal arc conlr;u-y lo il, and ùlal arc nol 
cncouragcd by n lelllal causcs, wi ll hal'e lo accommodalc ÙICI11SCh"cs lo il morc and 
morc, unLiI ÙlCY are no longcr conlr;u-y to iL. To ùlal c:\lcnl, ;U1 ,ùlecl ,lIising l'rom 
rcason is morc powcrful. 
(E5p7d ; C 1,600 / G Il ,285-286) 
T hcsc idcas, ùlcrclo rc, can bc cqual ly rclalcd lo al l ÙIC imagcs of ùlinhrs ùlal ,lI'C prcscnl lo onc's 
\Onsciousncss - if ÙlCSC ùling5 sh;lI"c ÙlCSC properLics - rcg;u'dlcss of whcùlcr ÙIC objcclof an imagc 
is concci\"cd of as bcing prescnL or abscnl, cxisLing or no n-c:\isLing, or rclalcd lo a p,L~l or fulu rc 
Li mc. 
21 Rcg;lrding ùlÏs aspccl o f Spinoza's ÙICOlY o f ÙIC powcr of allccL<; rclalcd lo adcqualc idcas, scc 
also Malinowski-Charlcs 2004b, 11 3. 
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5. Common notions, the "foundations of our reasoning" 
ln Ù1C Sccond Parl of Ù1C l"ÜlI(:s, Spinoza dclincs "common notion" as thc 
"!"ôundalions of our rcasoning" Œ2p40s1; C l , -1.75-476 / G II, 120). Thcy 
includc "adcquatc idcas of Ù1C propcrtics of Ùlings" (E2p40s2; C l , 478 / G II, 
122) and ail oÙlcr adcqualc iclcas Ùlat can bc inICrrccl from Ùlcm (E2p-1.0s 1) .22 
Thc dcmonstration Ùlal Spinoza prm'iclcs in o rclcr lo cxp1ain lhcir cxislcncc 
in Ù1C mind rclics on Ùle cxislcncc of common propcrtics of boclics (E2p38d 
and E2p39d). H c allirms Ùlal lhcsc idcas do nol havc csscnces of singular 
Ùlings as Ùlcir ol~jccls (E2p37). Thcir objccts, raÙlcr, consisl in propcrtics Ùlal 
arc common lo ail ùlÏngs - hcncc, aiso "common lo ail mcn" (E2p38c; C l, 
-1·7//. / G II, 11 9) - and cqually prcscnt "in Ù1C parl and in Ù1C wholc" (E2p38), 
or in propcrtics Ùlal arc coml11on lo cerl.r1.in spccilic Ùlings ancl our body, and 
which arc cqually prcscnl in Ù1C parl and in Ù1C wholc of Ù1CSC ùlings and our 
body (E2p39).23 
Somc scholars havc analysccl Spinoza's accounl of common notions 
againsl Ù1C background or ArisloÙc's Ù1COry or knowlcclgc.2 ~ Thcy ail SCCI11 to 
22 ln E2d1 ;Uld ÙIC lo llowing cxpl<lilaLion, Spinoza dclincs adcquatc idcas as fo llolVs: 
I3y adcquatc idca 1 undcrsland ;U I idca which, insof;u' as il is considcrcd in ilself, 
lVilhoul rel a Lion lo ;U\ objcct, has ail ÙIC propcrLics, or inl.rinsic dcnominaLions of a 
l.ruc idca. 
1 say inu'insic lo cxdudc ",hal is cxu'insic, \·iz. ÙIC agrccmcnl of ÙIC id ca wiùl ils 
objcct. 
(E2d4cxp; C 1,117 / G II , 85) 
23 Common noLions, ùlcrclorc, C;U1 bc gC llcraJly dclincd as adcqualc idcas of conUl1on propcrLics 
pcrlaining lo scls of ùIings (induding ÙIC lo lality of ùIillhrs). H<liTy \ Vollson cOlllcnds ùlal "Spinoza's 
commonnoLions arc ÙIC prim;u)' principlcs o llly ofù1c scicncc ofbodics o r of phys ics" (1 931, 125). 
Cdw;ml Schocn (1 977, 545-547) ;U'b'1lCS againsl ùIis rcducLio nisl rcading, which hc also ascribcs lo 
Sluarl H;U1lpshirc (1 970, 95) and Edwin Curlcy (1 973, 49-52). Schocn, howc\'c r, also dcnics Ùlal 
ÙIC ir/Cillii of common noLions C<li1 bc propc rLics (1 977, 515). By conu'ast, :vI;u'Lial Gucroull ;U'h'1lCS 
ùlal common noLiolls mirror in ÙIC mimi ÙIC propcrLics of ÙIC objccts o f lhc idcas, ,Uld Ùlal ùlcy 
conccrII wh al is common bclwccn modcs ;Uld ù1c ir relc\, ull aluibulCs (hcncc bclwccn modcs of a 
samc aluibulc), wiÙ\Oul rcsu'icLio ll lo ÙIC solc aLUibulc of cxlension (Gucroull 1974,326-328). YCl, 
hc rcckons ùml ÙIC dcmonsu'aLions of C2p38-39 rcfcr only lo common noLions pcrl;ùning lo ÙIC 
coqlorcal dom;ùn (GucroultI 974, 365-370). Conccll1ing Ù1CSC po ints , scc also :vIarsh;ùI20 14, 32-
31, ;U1d Lc BulTc 20 17, 86-92. 
2 ~ Scc, in p;u'Licul;u', Wollson 1 93/~ , 117-1 30; Scll;u's 2002, 2!j.1-245; :vIanzilli 2009, H 6-1 G9. 
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agrcc on onc rcspcct: C011111101l Ilotions corrcspond lo uni"crsal principles of 
dcmonslrati"c rcasollillg, which arc inslantialcd in Ù1C Ùlings and rcflcclcd in 
ÙIC conlcnl of our idcas,25 Illtcrpretations o f ùlis kind also sharc Ù1C fcaturc or 
shilling Ù1C lypical Aristotelian problem conccrning Ù1C cpislcmic origin or Ù1C 
firsl principles of dcmonsLrati"c knowledgc inlo Spinoza's Ù1COl)' or common 
no tio ns,26 As to ÙIC allswcr lo Ùlal puzzle, howcvcl', Ù1C opinions o r 
commcnLalors di"crgc, rcllccting morc or less closely ÙIC difl'crcnl ways in 
which ÙICY inlcrprcl ÙIC lasl chaplcr or ÙIC Sccond Book or ArisloÙc's 
Poster/or AJ1alylJrs - whcrc thc problcm is cxpoundcd in ils classic rorm.27 
Bccausc or ÙIC common dillicultics relalcd lo inLcrprcting ArisLoÙc's thcO\)', 
on Ù1C onc hand, and lhc pcculiariLy or Spinoza's own ÙICOl)', on Ùle o Ùlcr, 
Ù1CSC rcadings do 1Iol sccm lo prO\'idc conclusi\'c solutions Lo Ù1C issuc Ùlal 
Ù '28 lCy raIsc. 
A diITcrcnl pcrspccti\ 'C 011 thc SaInc Lopic has bccn rcccnùy put ro rward 
by Eugcnc Marshall. Hc draws on a problcm ÙlaL Michael Dclla Rocca 
ronnulalcd in ÙICSC Lcrms: 
25 See, fo r ex,mlple, Vlanzini 2009, 16 1-162, 
26 See VI;mzini 2009, 163; see also Vlalhel'On 1988b, 103- 101\" 
27 See AlistoÙe 1993, 72-74, Harry \ Vo1l50n and \Vilflid Sell;u's ho ld Ùlat conml0n notions ;u'e 
apprehended by ùle human mimi following a sort or ahslracti\'e process, which originates in our 
sense perception or sinh'll l;u' objecL~ and deals wiùl Ùle content or Ù1e cOITesponding ideas (see 
W ol(<;on 1934, 125- 129, ,md Sellars 2002, 2!J,2), 011 Ùle oÙler h,md, Frédéric M;Ulzini (2009,169) 
suggests ùlat commoll 1I0 tio ns ;u'e raÙler h'Tasped Ùlrough Ùle "Ùlird kiml of knowledge", ùlat is, 
"imuiti\'e knowlcdge" (E2p/l,Os2; C l, 478 / G Il , 122), 
28 Interpretations based 011 abstraction of uni\'crsal notions l'rom sellse perception or singul;u' 
objects require a problematic distinctio ll betweell acts of ÙlOught ;md Ùle content or ùlOught (see 
\Vo1l50n 1934, 127, ,md Sellars 2002, 21,2), which seems at odds \viùI Spinoza's identi lica tion or 
Ùle cogniti\'e content or Ùle ideas wiùI Ùle acti\ity by which Ùle ideas Ùlemseh'es afiill11 ùleir positi\'e 
contelll in our mind (see E2p49 alld ilS demollsu'atioll) , O n ùlÎs basis, Ferdinand Alquié (1 98 1, 
193) ;uld M,UTO Vlesseli (1 990, 247, and 25 1-252) coll\'incingly argue against such readings, 
Interpreliltions based 011 intuitioll or common notiolls must deal wiùl Spinoza's peculi,u' 
ch;u<lctelisation of intuiti\'e knowlcdge, accordillg to which inluiti\'e knowlcdge seems not to appe;u' 
lirsl eiùler in ùle order of meùlOd CrI E ~§30-31), or 10l,'Îcally or epislemologically (see E2p!J.7s ;uld 
E5p28), Edwill Curley (1 973, 52) also argues aga illsl Ùle Ùles is Ùlal common notions mighl deri"e 
l'rom intuition 011 Spilloza's accoulIl. 
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In orcier [or a cerlain idea thaL Lhc human minci has lo be adcquale, 
Ùle human minci musl illclude ail thc ideas thal are Ùle causal 
anlececlenls or ùlis idea. How cauld Lhe human minci, in any 
particular case, have ail these ie!casi> 
(Della Rocca 1996a, 183, n. 29) 
To aclclress this question, Marshall identilies "two crileria for aclequacy" WiÙl 
which common nOlions havc to campI)' (Marshall 2014, 2/1.-30). He calls tlle 
f- .. "ù . ." 29 1 Ù cl "u al Irsl cntenon le conlall1menl reqlllrcmellL " ane le secon ' le caus< 
requirement".30 On accounL of Lhese lwo criLeria, Marshall conc\ucles Ùlal 
common notions musl corrcspond to "ideas olïnlinile modes" (2014, 31.) ancl 
Ulal Ùley are to be regarded as ideas Lhal arc "Iatenl in Ùle minci, yet innale" 
(2014,53). This inlerprelation has Ùle aeh-antage or highlighting one imporlant 
realUre conccrning Ùle nalure of cammoll notions: Ùlal is, lhal Ule aclequale 
icleas Ulal we can cleduce by means of analysis or a comp!cx idea musl 
somehow originale [rom wiÙlin ÙIC mind (or ill Ùle comp!cx idea). This cloes 
nol make Ùle case, howeycr, for admiUillg Lhc exislence or lalenl - i.e., 
unconscious - icleas in Ùle milld, wiÙlin Spinoza's framework, as Marshall 
woulcl ha\'e il (2014, 138).31 Nor does il require Ùlal we iclentify common 
notions ancl properties of Ùlings WiÙI inliniLe modes or GOd.32 
Spinoza's worcling seems Lo show somc allinities WiÙI ÙlaL of Descarles, 
who sometimes treals "commoll notions" and "axioms" as analogous and 
29 See \1,u'shall 20 l /~ , 26: "Idea x as il c:\iSL~ in God's mimi is adequale in hum,Ul mind ); ilSclf a 
complcx idea, ilr x as a wholc is a p;ut or J". 
30 See \1arshalI201 4, 28: " ldea xis adequale in mimlyill'yalso has an adequale idea of.is cause". 
31 Spinoza's con cep Lion or God's inlinile inlellecl, or IVhich our mimi is onl)' a linile ]J<u"l exisLing in 
acl Œ2pllc; see a1so TIE §73), seems lo pro\'ide sullicicnl /,'Toumls 101' accommodaLing in God's 
inlellecl any idea which is nol consciously percei\'cd h)' our mimI, ami nol presenùy dClermining 
our appeLile. Furùlermore, il sm'cs us li'om ÙlC necessily or rcduplicaLing in earh linile human mind 
ùle existence of idenLical, inlinilc sels or "latent" adequate ideas or inlinite modes. For more 
arb'1lmenlS against ùle exislence of unconscious ideas in Spino,~'l's philosophy or mind, see chapler 
1. 
32 \1 ;m;hall himsclf concedcs ùlat ùIis idenLilicaLion docs nol hold ail ÙlC Lime (20 1 /~ , 33, n. 37). 
Concell1,ing Spinoza's accounl of inlinitc modes, sec \1clamcd 2013h, 11 3- 136. 
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inLcrchangcable Lc rms.33 If Lhis is thc casc, lhcn furÙIcr c\"idcncc may suggcsL 
ÙIal Spinoza is somctimes willing Lo prcsenL co mm on no tjons as axioms and 
scl(~e\'idenl truÙ1S, and someGmes as propos iGo ns and Lhcorems dcduced in 
lum by o ther axioms and lruc idcas - disGnguishing bcLwccn thcm only (o r 
pcdagog'ical o r cxpositio nal reasons.3 ~ This way of proccccling secms 
consisLenl WiÙ1lwO SpinozisGc daims. According lo ùIe (irst daim, " Iwlhalcvcr 
idcas fo llmv in Ù1C mind from ideas ù1al are adequaLc in thc minci are also 
adequalc" (E2p40; C l, 475 / G II, 120) . This propositjon grouncls 
mcLaphysically Ù1C validily o f infcrcnGal rcasoning: aclequatc ideas (o llow from 
cach où1er and can be the rcfo re adequalcly undersLoocl Lhrough each oùler. 
Thc second claim aflïrms thaL " Ihl e who has a true idea al ÙIC same Gmc knows 
ÙIal. he has a truc idca, and cannol clo ubl ÙIC truùl o f ÙIC ùIing" (E2p/l3; C l , 
479 / G II, 123). This propos iGon implies ÙIaL aclequale ideas - ail o f which 
33 Dcsc;utcs idcntilics "common notions and axioms IcOl17mull/s IlOÙ'o, sil e a_n'om al" in his 
PâllCJiJles olPhilosoph)' [,49 (CS M [,209 / AT VillA, 23). According lo Murray ~1ilcs (20 15, 
138· 139), Dcscarlcs's "commoll no tions" dcri,-c Ùlcir n;un c fi-om ÙIC KOtVa! EwOlm or Eudid 's 
l./el17en /s, which C[;l\; US lranslalcd in Latin as " coml17u/J(:s lloù'ol/eS, sin: ;m 'om ala" (1 574, 15a). 
Scc also Ariew cl al . 20 10, 63. Descarlcs was also aw;u'c o r ÙIC Ùlcor)' or "mm mon no Lions" pul 
l'orw,ml by Herbcrl or Chcrbury in his D e Ven lale (1 624, lirsl cdition; Dcs('arlcs mm cd ÙIC Ùlird 
cdition, ill French, 1639): hc discusscs ,U1d criti('iscs il in a ICllcr lo Mcrscllllc (dalcd 16 Odobcr 
1639; CS MK 139·1 40 / AT II , 596-599). Conccming ùl is, scc Popkin 2003, 13 1- 135, ,Uld W ild 
(2008) 2009, 225. Thc conncctions bClwccn DCSC;U-lCS's ;uld Spinoza's lcrmino logies (',Ul mosÙY bc 
apprecialcd in Spinoza's lreatisc D escarles's "p/ù7CJiJ!cs oIPlllïosOflh)"~ [n ÙIC l'rc!;l('c lo ùle l'l'C, 
Lodcwijk Mcijcr also idcntilics " lplostulalcs;u1d a,ioms, or ('ommon notions of lhe mi IHllposlulala 
f .. .f el axiol17ala, seu commulles .1111ini noù'onesl" (C [, 225 / G l, 127). \ Vilh rcgard lo Spinoza's 
OWII use, based on E l p8s2, E2p40s l , ;uld Ep 4, Manzini s uggcS L~ ùlal whal Spinoza underslands by 
",L, ioms" is al lcasl a subscl o r cOIIUllonnotio ns (M,Ulzini 2009, 166· 168). O Ùlcr aUÙlors allo,,- l'or 
a sU;clcr corrcspondcncc bClwccn ax ioms ,Uld common notions in Spinoza (sec, l'or CX,U11plc, 
Gueroull 1968,85·92, ,md DelailUnly 1985, 74-78). H; o n Spinoza's a('counl , ail 'L,ioms can bc 
assumcd as exprcssing coml11on 1l0 tiOIlS, Ù1Cll sc,-cral 'L,ioms of ÙIC f..iltio · (al lcasl E lal ·7 , E2a l· 
3, E4a l , ,md ESal ·2) show Ùlat commOllllo Lions do nol ollly refer lo laws ofphysi('s . 
3 ~ 13csidcs sc,-cral cascs in ilic PPC, in Ù1C Elltic.5 WC may obselYc ùtis ill E lp8s2 ,md E2p/l-Os l. [Il 
E21cm3, Spinoza's ycrsion or Ù1C law of inertia or bodics is lirsl dcmollsU-alcd by mealls of a 
proposition !,'lu unded on purely melaphys ical principlcs (E 1 ( 28); Ùlcn, in Ùle 1()lIo\\"illg ('Qroll,ul ', 
Spinoza slalcs ùlal Ù1C s;une "Iaw" is "also known ùlrough ilself Iper se llo luml " Œ2lem3c; C [,459 
/ G Il , 98). E3posLl is also cal led "axiom Iposlulfl lum scu axiom al" (C l, 493 / G Il , 139) , ,Uld is 
dcmonsU-alcd ùl rough E2posll , E2lcm5, ,Uld E2lcm7. ESa2 is considercd "c,-iclellllpfl IC/I " bc('ausc 
of E3p7 (C 1 597 / G Il , 28 1) . 
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arc truc (E2p34) - arc also co ncei"ccl o r as "sclr,c\'iclcnl".35 Takcn allogcthcr, 
thcsc lwo principles (i.c. , clcducibility and sclf-c\'Îdcncc o r adcquatc id cas) 
cnlail Ùlal adcqualc iclcas can bc graspcd ciÙlcr ùlrough o Ùlcr iclcas, by mcans 
or dcductivc rcasoning, o r bccausc o f Ùlcir sclf~c\ 'idcnce alo nc.36 Thal is la say, 
Ùlal aclcqualc idcas nced no t ncccssarily hc concei"cd o r unclcrstoocl Ùlrough 
oÙlcr ici cas and "anlccedcnl causcs" - in o rdcr fo r Ùlcm ta hc, ancl lo bc 
concci\'ccl o f as, adcquatc and truc in onc's mind - if, hy an "anlcccclcnl 
causc", wc mcan somcÙling dirtercnlli-om ÙIC power o f ÙIC minci itsclf'. 
Inclccd, whcn ÙIC minci has aclcqualc iclcas, il is ÙIC adcqualc causc o r 
ÙICSC iclcas. Vice versa, adcqualc iclcas - Ùlal is, clcar ancl distinct ici cas - arc 
crtccls in o nc's minci Ùlat can bc adcqualely unclc rsloocl ùlro ugh lhc laws or 
human nalurc alone. In o Ùlcr wo rcls, ÙIC powcr of ÙIC minci , by which ÙIC 
minci unclcrslancls and connccls ùlÎngs accorcling lo ÙIC ordcr or ÙIC inlellecl 
- o r "ÙIC powcr of fo rming clear ancl clistincl idcas, and or clcducing somc 
li-om o Ùlcrs", in Spinoza's words (E.5plOcl; C 1, 601 / G II , 287) - is nolhing 
o Ùlcr Ùlan ÙIC nccessary actiùly in which ÙIC minci cxprcsscs its nalurc.3i 
H cncc (as wc havc sccn in scctio n 2) il is idcntical WiÙl ils virluc . As Spinoza 
wrilcs in E1.p23c1: 
35 Thc sclI:cI'idc llcc of u'uc idcas, which Spilloza <l1so Gùls "ce rtain t y !ccrlùudol", applics lo ;ùl 
adcqualc idcas, sillce "!cil'e l)' id ca lhal in us is absolulc, or adcqualc alld pc rlccl, is U'UC" Œ2p31\.) , 
COlII'c rsely, ÙIC scl/:cl'idence of an adcqualc idea docs no l depend ilselr on ùle U'UÙI o r ùle idca, o r 
Oll ÙIC COITCspolldcncc o r an idca WiÙl ils idcalum, which Spinoza reg'<lI'ds as all cxu'illsic lCalurc o r 
ideas (El a6; E2d4cxp; sec also T IE §35), Concerning Ù1C self-cl'idellce of adequalc idcas, 
collreil'cd o f as "no Lions whose u'uili is 50 fi lm and slcady ùlalno power can bc o r bc COllccil'ed by 
which ùley cou Id be changed " (el'cn if wc did nol know ùlal God cxisled), ;Uld by whirh ùle 
cxiSlCIlCC o f God ilsel f can bc infelTed , see ill paI'Licular 'n ' p VI , 17 aIlCl ùle allached AD:\' VI (C 
II , 1.56 / G Ill , 84), COllceming Spinoza's "absolule confIdcnce in rcasoll", rClf<lnlcd as his "Iirsl 
cpislcmic prillciplc" 101' Ù1C acquisiLion o r U'llC knolVlcdge, see Schncider 20 13, 
36 As a rurÙICr proof of Ù1 C inlCrchaIlgcabilily bclwccn scll:cI'idclll U'UÙI aIld dcmollsU'alcd U'llÙIS, 
IVC may ObSCIYC ùlal bOÙI ùle Ù1CSCS quolcd l'rom Spilloza's EiJJirs - ùlal is, "dcducihili ly" and "sell: 
clidc llrc" o r adcqualc idcas - appe;u' ill ÙIC leXl ill ÙIC lo rm of propos iLio lls dcduccd l'rom 
;Ullcccdclll prillciplcs, and ;U'C held al ÙIC S;U1lC Limc as "cI'idcllllpalcll ", ÙIC fo rmcr (E2ptl.Od; C l, 
475 / G II , 120), and "sullicicnùy m;U1ilCs l by ilsel r Ipcr sc sau's esse m aJJi!l:slaml", ÙIC laller 
Œ2p43s; C l, 479 / G II , 124), 
37 "For ÙIC milld", Spilloza also m i les, "has 110 oÙ 1er powcr ÙlaJl ùlal o r ùtillkillg ami lo mtillg 
adequale ideas" (E5p4; C l, 599 / G II , 280, 
169 
SfJiIlO7."~< :tl/co/.1 ' oFthe HIIII/:111 .Ilil/(/: COlIscioIlSIICSS, .IlcmO/v, :U/cl Rmsoll 
IIlnsol~ll' as la manl is dClcrmincd lo do something l'rom Ù1C lacl 
Ùlal hc undcrslands, hc aels, i.c., docs somcÙling which is pcrcci"ccl 
ùlrough his csscncc alonc, or which l'ol\ows adcqualcly l'rom his 
virluc. 
(E4p23d; C l, 558 / G II, 226) 
How ean wc ddinc rcason, lhcn, and whal arc common notions, on Spinoza's 
accounl? My suggcstion is lhal rcason can bc undersloocl as Ù1C activity by 
which ranclomly rccci"cd cnvironmcnlal inpuls - which are proviclccl lo our 
minci, in lcrms of imagcs, by our imagination ancl memory - arc nalurally ancl 
ncccssarily rcarrangcd in onc's mind, accorcling to thc orclcr of Ù1C inlcl\ccl.38 
Taking inlo accounl Ù1C body's parallcl activity, reason can furÙlcr bc 
unclcrslood as a nalural and ncecssary activily in Ù1C bocly - rcl1cclccl in Ù1C 
minci - Ùlal hingcs on common propcrtics of boclily aflections ancl Ù1C 
inlcractions Ùlal Ù1CSC allcctions cnlcrL-'1in with cach oÙlcr, basccl on such 
propcrtics. J\ccorclingly, il is possiblc lo unclcrsL-'1nd whal common no tions arc 
along Ù1C lincs proposccl by Robcrl Abraham, in his (unctional inlc rprclation 
or Spinoza's accounl of common nolions: Ù1CY are "knowlcdgc of Ù1C clynamic 
rclatiollships wiÙlin Ù1C body" (1977, 32), ancl Ù1CY acquainl us WiÙ1 "thc 
38 Bascd on Ù1C problcm of Ù1C causal hislOl)' of adcqualc idcas raiscd by Dclla Rocca - mcntioned 
abo\'c - VI ;u'tin Lin gCl'; lo Ù1C conclusion Ùlal " Iain idca is adcqualcjusl in casc Ù1C hum;m mind 
possesscs il indcpcndclll o f ally causal inpulS l'rom Ù1C Cll\'irOllmenl" (2009, 265). 1 Ùlink ùlis Ùles is 
is cOlllradiclcd by lcxlual c\idcncc. III E2p39d, Spinoza cxpliciùy a11irms Ù1al wc hayc adcqualC 
idcas of propcrtics Ùlal arc common lo our body ;md oÙlcr spccific bodics whcn "ÙIC hum;m body 
is allcclcd by;m cXlclllal body ùlrough \Vhal illl<L<; in common wiùl il" (C l, 475 / G Il , 11 9), Thc 
unjustilicd scparation bclwccn Ù1C acquisition of scnsc data, on ÙIC onc hand, ;md Ù1C acquisition 
o f adcquatc idcas, on Ù1C OÙlcr hand, is Ù1C rcason why Lin's intcqJrcta tion o f Ù1C rolc ;md powcr 
of rcason o\'cr Ù1C allccls gcts C\'clltually cntanglcd in numcrous problcms, btding him to asserl 
Ùlat Spinoza's accounl of ÙtC powcr of rcason O\'cr Ù1C passions is "doomcd to liUlurc bccausc ÙIC 
basic daim Ùtat hc sccks to justify Ii,c., "Ùlal acquiring knowlcdgc will rcordcr our dcsircs" l is laIsc" 
(Lin 2009, 282), 1 do not inlcnd to disputc whcthcr this daim is true or litlsc (Colin VI ;u'shall ;U'h'lles 
Ùlal it is u'uc 12012, 1391) . 1 simply do not considcr it as a Spinozist claim, if by Ù1C acquisition of 
rational knowlcdgc wc undcrsland somcùJing Ùlat must prccedc Ù1C acquisitioll of scnsc data and 
Ù1C rcorganisation of onc's dcsircs, or somcÙling Ùlat happcns indcpcndenùy of Ùlcm, Quitc Ù1C 
oppositc, 1 ;U'h'llC Ùlat acquisition of ration;tl kllowlcdgc, according lo Spinoza, is idcntical WiÙl 
rcordcling onc's olVn scnsc dala ;md - as a ncccss;u')' COllscqucncc - onc's aJkcls ;Uld dcsi rcs, 
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principal virlue of Ùlings having somcthing III common, namely Ùleir 
compelling causal relationship" (1977, (5). 
6. The "habit of virtue" as discursive reasoning 
The facl thal Ùle human body is capable of a greal méU1y alTections or 
modifications al oncc Œ2pl1.) ,39 on ùlis accounl, represenls bOÙl a means and 
an obsl<:1.cle lo acquiring Ù1C habil of , 'irtue. On Ùle one hand, haùng a body 
capable of "being acled upon in many ways al oncc" Œ2p 13s; C l, 458 / G II, 
97) - Ùlat is, having a body lhal is capable of such imaginative and mnemonic 
povvers as ilie human body - allows our mind lo have al its disposai , al any 
given time, a high number of idcas of bodily allcctions, \'ariously composed 
and inlerconnecled , of which reason can "unclerstand Ùleir agTeements, 
dilTerences, and oppositions" (E2p29s; C l, / G II , /14). wOn Ùle oÙler héU1d, 
Ùle same capacily of our body lo be allcctecl by external bodies in many ways, 
brings il aboul Ùlal our pcrcepti"c field and our appetile are constanÙY 
exposedlo greal variations, 
lndeed, accorcling lo Spinoza, il is impossible f'or a human being nollo 
be exposedlo Ùle c1kcts of lhe exlcrnal worlel in ways which are beyond our 
control, or power. In E4»1" he daims: 
It is impossible Ùlal a man shoulel nol be a parl of nature, and Ùlal 
he should be able lo undergo no changes exccpl Ùlose which can be 
39 Spinoza grounds ÙIC eapabilily o f ÙIC hllrnan body "of pcreci\ing a grcal mally ÙJillgs" (E2pI 4; 
C 1,462 / G II , 103) 0 11 lwo poslllialcs, Accordillg lo 1-:2posI3, " Illhc il\(hiduals composing ÙIC 
hllllliUl body, and conscqllcnÙY, ÙIC hllm,lII hody iL~clf, arc alkclcd by cXlcrnal bodics in \'CI)' m,u ly 
ways" (C l , 462 / G II , 102) , According lo 1<:2posl6, " Illhc hllm;lII body G UI mO\'c ,Uld disposc 
CXlClllal bodics in a grcal m,UlY ways" (C l , Ij,G2 / G II , 103), 
W Spinoza dcscribcs in ÙICSC lCll11S ÙIC po\\'cr o f ÙIC mind "as il is dClcrmincd inlcll1al ly", ÙIal is 
whcn il aets aeeording lo ÙIC laws of ils nalurc ajonc, nol dclcll11incd by cxlcmaJ causcs ,Uld 
"lo rtllilo liS cncollnlcrs wiùl ÙJinh'S, lo rcg,ml ùJis or Ùlal", This is, in oÙ ICI' words , ÙIC aeu\'ily o r Ù1C 
mind whcn il l'casons, " Fo r so o l'tcn as il is disposcd inlcrnally, in Ùlis or ano Ùlcr way", hc adds, 
"Ùlcn il rcgards ùJings clc;lI 'ly ,Uld disun('Ù)''' 0-:2p29s; C l, / G II , Il lj,), 
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undcrslood through his own nalurc alonc, and or which hc is thc 
adcqualc causc. 
(E4p;l.; C 1, 5/1.8 / G II ,2 (2) 
Accorcling lo Spinoza, "!Orom lhis il foLlows thal man is ncccssarily al ways 
suojccllo passions" (E4.p;l.c; C 1,5;1.9 / G II, 2(3). As long as an indi"idual is 
ali"c, Ùlal is, hcr imagination ancl mcmory will conslanLly and ncccssarily bc 
alTcclccl in multiple ways which cio Ilol clcpcnd on hcr powcr, and which arc 
unknown ancl unpreclictable lo r hcr, ycl ncccssarily dctcrmincd by Ù1C 
immulable laws or nature, i.c. , "Ù1C clcrnal clccrccs or God" nTP III, 8; C II, 
112 / GIll, 46). U The ways in which our body is constanlly modificcl by 
exlernal causcs, lol<:î.Lly unknOWll lo us, dClcrminc multiple imagcs lo alTccl our 
minci, cach timc causing cliiTcrcnl nclworks or id cas lo bc rccallcd by mcmory 
ancllo allccl us with afTects orjoy and sadncss - dClcnnining in lUrIl our aclual 
appctilcs and dccisions. ~2 
In L1lis scenario, whal a human bcing nccessarily slri, 'cs lor, whcn shc 
rcasons, is nol only to unclcrslancl c\'cryLlling L11al shc is capable or al any gi\'cn 
timc, bUl also lo keep unclcrslancling L11C lhings L11al shc undcrslands, 
throughoullhc variations lo which our imag-ination is Ilcccssarily cxposcd. 
~ I In E4plk, Spinoza calls Ùle way in which our imagination ami mcmOl'y arc ncccss;uily alkclcd 
in unknown ;Uld unprcdictable ways by cxlcl'llal causcs - ycl accOI'ding lo Ù1C ncccssal)' and 
immutablc laws o r nalurc - Ùle "common ordcr o r naturc larda COIllIllUlJÙ llalula:l" (C l , 5 ~9 / G 
II, 2(3). Scc al50 E2p29c (C l, 47 1 / G II , 111.), E2p30d (C 1,47 1 / G II , Il.'i), F!l.p.'i7s (C 1,578 / 
G II , 252), and E4App7 (C l, 589 / G II , 268). 
~2 This is Ù1C rcason wh y, Spinoza al1,'lIcs, ail humans "Ùlink Ù1ClllSCh'CS l'l'CC"; 
II3(ccausc Ù1CY ;U'C conscious or Ùlcir mlitions ,Uld Ùlcir appctilc, and do nol ùtink, 
C\'cn in Ùlcir drcams, of Ùle causcs by whi"h Ù1CY arc disposcd lo lVanting and willing, 
bccausc Ù1CY ill'C ignor;Ult of IÙlosc causcsl. 
(El App; C l, tj·tj·O / G II , 78) 
This is a poinl Ùlal Spinoza also makes in his Icllcr lo TschilllhilUS (Ep 58; C II , 428 / G IV, 266). 
Sec also E2p35s (C l, 473 / G II , (1 7), E3p2s (C l, 1~96-tj.97 / G II, 1 tj.3) , ,Uld E1l'rcf (C l, 515 / G 
II ,207). 
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Whal wc slriyc lor fi"om rcason is nOÙling bUl unclcrslanding; Bor 
clocs Ù1C minci, insofar as il uscs rcason, juclge anyùling elsc usdul 
lo ilself cxccpl whal leacls lo undcrslancling. 
Œ4p26; C 1,559 / G II, 227) 
Il musl bc our ,"cry own rcason, Ùlcrclorc, Ùlal, by Ù1C ncccssily of ils own 
laws, crcalcs Ù1C conditions lor ils pcrscvcring in ils aCLÎng and cxisling. In ùlis 
scnsc, Ù1C human capabilily of rClaining ancl rClricving imagcs Ùlal are already 
ordcrcd and conncclcd according lo Ù1C orclcr of thc inlellcct, rcycals ilself 
csscnLÎallor our rcason lo bccomc discursi,'c, as il wcrc: lo bccomc, lhal is, a 
lrain of adcqualc idcas thal prcscrvcs and f"urùlcr incrcascs ilself" in LÎmc. 
MOI"COVer, sincc rcasoning - as wc ha,'c sccn - is our virluc ilselr, mC11l0ry is 
also csscnLÎal for our ,irluc lo bccome a "habil": mcmory, ùlal is, is csscnLÎal 
lor iclcas and afTccLs "arising from, or arouscd by, rcason" lo bccol11c thc 
common moLÎYc ùlat dclcrmincs our clccisions and guidcs our thoughlS and 
aCLÎons, clcspilc Ù1C powcr of Ù1C passions lo which wc arc always cxposcd and 
by which wc arc conslanùy alrcclcd. 
Thus, wc can unclcrs[,.ï.ncl human rcason - Ùlal is, a nalural and ncccssary 
acLÎyily by which Ù1C human minci acLs accorcling lo ils own laws - as 
pcrlorming Ùlrcc luncLÎons: 
1. il looks lor an ordcr of inlelligible causal connecLÎons, bascd on common 
propcrLÎcs bctwccn ilcms of memory, cach LÎmc ùlal mcmory proyidcs 
Ù1C minci WiÙl a new nclwork of imagcs and rcb'anl alTccls (E2p29s; C 
1, / GII,(14); 
2. il ordcrs ancl connecLs afTccLÏons ancl afTccls according lo Ù1C ordcr of Ù1C 
inlellccl (E,5p 10; E5p20); 
3. il providcs mcmory WiÙl Imagcs or icleas or allccLÎons rcarrangccl 
accorcling lo such ncw configuralion, lor fulurc rccollccLÎon and 
implcmcnlaLÏon (E5p lOs). 
173 
SfJitJ07.i/~~ 'il/l'on ' oF/he HII/1Ii/JI .l/iIJd: COl/scio l/sl/ess, ,1/('1710/11, (Illd Rcasoll 
Thc lasl poillt is particularly imporlanl, as far as Ù1C acquisition of Ù1C 
"habil or "irtue" is conccrncd. As wc havc SCCII in scction 2, Spinoza holds 
Ùlal "it is 1I0l in thc rrcc powcr or Ù1C millcllo ciÙlcr rccollccl a Ùling or forgcl 
il" (E3p2s; C 1,497 / G II , 144). Indccd, rcason is jusl Ù1C acti,'ily by which 
Ù1C mimi understands and orgalliscs Ùle conlcnl proviclccl by onc's mcmory. 
This acti,'ily, howc"cr, is 1I0l a kincl of mcmory ilsclf - Ùlal is, il clocs nol rCla,in 
or rcmcmbcr ally image by itsclf, ancl il is nol capable or lriggcring any kind of 
mncmonic rccollcctioll in OIlC'S mincl.13 lcmory - and, along with mcmory, 
lhc possibilily to rclain alld rccollccl imagcs orclcrccl accorcling lo Ù1C ordcr of 
Ù1C illlcllccl- is always dcpcndcnlon Ùle affcctions Ùlata[(ccl Ù1C human bocly 
from lhc cxtcrnal cm'ironmcnl. Hmveœr, as wc havc jusl secn, thc ways in 
which our mcmory can bc variously arousccl ancl aJleclccl, al cach timc, WiÙl 
imagcs and allccts producccl in us by stimuli coming from Ù1C cxlcrnal worlcl, 
arc unknown lo us. ConscqucnÙY, our appctile and clcsirc arc cons[..1.nÙy 
suqjecl lo unpredictable changcs, rcflccting how our body is afTeclccl by Ù1C 
cxlcrnal world ill ways which arc bcyoncl our conlrol. This implics Ùlrcc 
ùùngs, conccrnillg lhc acti"ily or rcason, accorcling lo Spinoza: 
1. il is crucial Ùlal Ù1C rcsults Ùlal wc allainccl by rcasoning - knowleclgc of 
common notjons, adcqualc iclcas of propcrtics of Ùlings - can bc kCpl 
prcscnllo onc's consciousncss, or bc rccalled as casily and as frcqucnÙy 
as possible, in orcier lor reason lo kccp pcrforming ancll1ourishing. IL is 
of Ùle essence or reason, Ùlcrclore, lo strive lo enchain and orcier images 
in such a way lhallhcy (';111 appear immedialcly mcaninglul and uscfullo 
us, whcn rccollccled - capable, Ùlal is, of casily cxprcssing and showing 
lo our understanding ÙlOSC common nolions, rational prcccpts and "sure 
13 Conccllling this point, sec also 'l'lE §R2 ;Uld §83, nole. 
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maxims of liIC ker/a nile d o,gllla/al " (E5pl0s; C I, 601 / G II , 287) Ùlat 
wc nced la rclain, recollect, and implement; ~I 
2. such associations or images must also be arranged III a way Ùlal can 
inCl'case Ùle occasions o r recollection Ùlal onc's cxperience and ro rlune 
mighl bring about, in order l'o r Ùle rational conlenl Ùlal Ùley express la 
be recalled and implemented in as many occasions as possible. Thal is, 
reason will su'i"e ta associate adequale ideas (expressed by means of 
images ordered according to the a rder of Ùle inlellect) la as many images 
as possible; IS 
~I ln ESpl Os, Spinoza m'iles: 
The best Ùling, Ùlen, Ùlal wc can do, so long as we do nol ha\'e a perleel kllowledge or 
our alTCelS, is Lü coneei"e a correct principle o f hing, or sure maxims or life Ircc/am 
lil 'Clldi raÛOIlCIIl scu ccrla lita: dO!JlIlalai, lo comm il Ùlem lo memory 1 ... 1. 
(ESplOs; C I, 60 1 / G II , 287) 
T he firsl slep, ùlerclo re, consisls also in de\-cIoping proper S)lllbolie syslems, Ùlal allow us lo easily 
undersland ,U\d relrie\'e - by Ùle way in which s)~nhols, or images, are conneeled WiÙI each o Ùler 
- rational conlenl (Ùlal is, common notions and oÙ 1er adequale ideas dedueed o r dedueible fi 'om 
Ùlese). O f course, I;mguage plays a rundamenlal role in ùlis sense, Yel, language, as any oÙler 
sym bolic syslem Ùlal IVe may de\-cIop lo r ùlis purpose, rem,ùns, on Spinoz,'1's aCCOWll, noù1ing cise 
bul a mnemonic de\'ice (see, for example, TIE §88 and E2p Ws2 ). Like any oùler mnemo nic 
clemenl, I,Ulguage is neccss;uily and ille\'ilahly exposed lo Ùle inlerlerences of Ùle exlell1alworld , il 
G UI ,u'ouse pass ions in us, and lead an indi"idual inlo erroI'. Indeed, Spinoza m;ùnlains Ùlal "mosl 
errors consisl only in our nol righlly applying n;unes lo ùli llhrs" (E2p47s; C 1, 483 / G II , 128). For 
lwo Opposile ù ews eonceming Spinoza's accounl or language and il, power o r be<uing adequale 
knowledge, see Sa\',UI (l 9S8) 1973, ami Parkinson (1 969) 1973. 
IS Still in ùle SiUlle scholiwn (~~5p l Os), Spinoza canies on br <U'h'1l ing Ùlal Ùlose n1<Lxims <Uld 
precepls, which we commilled lo memory, are lo he applied "consl<UIÙY lo Ùle p<u'tieul<u' cases 
frequenùy encounlered in lifc". 
ln ùlis way our imahrination \ ~i ll he n lcnsi\-cIy alleclecl by Ùlcm, ,U\d we shall always 
ha\'e Ùlcm ready. 
(ESpI Os; C I, 60 1 / G II , 287) 
IL is lo be lloticed Ùlal Spinoza, hcre, does nolmcan lo exclusi\-cIy rcler la Ùle implcmellla tion of 
a maxim in real circumslallces. He is also SUggCStillg Ùlal, by using our imahrinati\ 'e resources, we 
builcl up ;ùl possible scen,u-ios Ùla l wc C,U\ lih'1l rc oul in which such a m;L'l:im could lum oul lo be 
userul or applicable, in order lo r us lo "always ha\'c il reacly". In one or Ùle ex,mlplcs Ùlal he 
pro\'ides in Ùle scholium, he miles: 
I\Vle ha\'e laid il dO\m as a maxim or li te Ùlal halc is lo be conqucred by lo\'e, or 
llobilily, no l by rcpayi llg il wiùl hale in relu Ill . Bul in order Ùlal wc ma)' always ha"e 
ùlis rule o r reason ready when il is nccdcd, we oughl la Ùlink aboul <U lcl medilale 
li'equellÙY on Ùle cam mon wrollhrs or men, ,ual holV Ùley may be warded a il besl by 
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3. most importanùy, Ù1CSC idcas must bc associalcd ill such a way as to 
always (as f~1.r as possible) dctcrminc us lo dceidc lo pursuc rcasoning and 
ael accordingly - in orclcr fo r us to bc able lo mainlaill lraills of adcquatc 
iclcas or rccall thosc thal havc Lccn tcmporarily aballdollcd. Hcncc, 
rcason will strivc to assoeialc imagcs in sueh a \Vay Ùlat Ùlcir rccollcction 
will arousc in us alfects ofjoy, capable or oriclllalillg our appctilc towarcls 
actions Ùlal agrec wiÙl Ù1C "prcccpls or ÙIC rcason \ralioIlJs prr7xcpla\" 
(E4p18s; C l , 555 / G II, 222), and or o\'cnvhclming potcntial passions 
Ùlat may disl.ract or divcrl our dctcrmillatioll lo ael aeeording lo Ù10SC 
Ui prccepts. 
At the encl of Ù1c scholium or ESp 1 0, allcr ha\ 'ing prm'idcd a scrics of 
cxamples aimed at concretcly showing Ù1C rcadcr ho\V ÙICSC activities can bc 
pcrformcd, Spinoza conc\udcs : 
nobility. For ir wc join Ù1C imagc o r a wrong to ÙIC imagination or ùJis maxim, it will 
always bc rcady [or us when a wwng is donc to us. 
(E5pIOs; C l, 60 1-602 / G II , 287-288) 
16 Hcncc, in ESp lOs, Spinoza writcs: 
Illt should bc noted lliat in o rdering our ÙlOughls ;Uld imagcs, we must al\\~lys attclld 
to Ù10SC ùJinb'S which ,u'c good in cach ù1illg SO Ùlat in ùJis way we are ;ùways 
dctcrmincd to acting l'rom ail aJlcct orjoy. 
(E5pIOs; C l, 602 / G II , 288) 
To bc surc, Spinoza contcnds lliat " Ialmong all ÙIC aJrccL~ Ùlat arc rclalcd to ÙIC mind insol;u' as it 
acts, Ùlerc <U·c none Ù1at are not rclatcd to joy or desirc" (E3p59; C 1,529 / G II , 188). lndced, 
whcn ùle mind is llic adequatc causc o f its 01~11 allcctions, Ùlose alkctiolls arc, hy dclinition, actions 
or Ù1C minci (E3c13). Thcrc/ore, ù1ey can o nly he rclatcd to a perm;Ulcnce or ;UI increasc in onc's 
powcr or acting. Hcncc, Ù1ey C<U1 o llly arousc in us allccls ofjoy <Uld, as a consequcnce ÙlcrcOr, a 
desirc to perscI'crc in ù1is acting (E3p28). il [o llows, lo r Spilloza, Ùlat ÙIC actil'ity or Ùle reasoning 
milld is allVays, if Laken by itself, a sourcc orjoy Ùlat lCeds on iL~cl r, as it werc (more on ùJis aspect 
of Spinoza's philosophy can be ro und illJames 1997,200-207; see also Malinowski-Charlcs 2004a, 
222-224, ;md 2004b, lll) . :\'el'crÙlcless, Spin07A' is also ad,un,Ull in colllcndillg Ùlat ùJisjoy C;U1 be 
easily QI'en vhclmed by passions, sincc "ÙIC powcr or cxtclllai causes 1 ... 1 comp,u'cd WiÙI ours 1 ... 1 
indclillitcly surpass lesl our powcr", (E4pl5d; C l , 551\· / G II , 220). Thcrclorc, Spilloza miles: 
A clesire which ;uiscs l'rom a lrue kllowlcdge or good ami cl'il c,UI he extinguished or 
reslTainccl by m;U1Y oÙ1cr dcsircs which ;u'isc l'rom allccL~ hy which wc are lOlmcntcd. 
(E4pl5; C l , 553 / G II , 220) 
As a conscquencc, it is pcrfccÙY rcasonablc to reinlo rcc our dctcrmillatioll to act accordillg lo Ù1C 
preccpts or rcason by joining additiollal sources of joy to our moti"c, as long as Ùley ;u'e not 
excessil'c. In oÙ1cr words, wc gil'C ourseh-es lreats (also in tcrms or rcasollahle cxpeclations or fulure 
joy). 
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IHIc who will obscrvc lhcsc lrulesl cardully - for they arc nol 
diflicull- and practicc tllcm, will soon bc able lo dircct mosl of his 
actions according to tllC command of rcason. 
(E.5p lOs; C l, 601-603 / G II, 287-289) 
Thc lisl of "rules" and examples tllal Spinoza prm'idcs in ESp 1 Os as rcmcdics 
againsl tlle powcr of passions may sccm, al firsl sight, to cxprcss moral 
prcccpls, and havc a normativc valuc. As a mallcr of l~lCl, as long as tllCSC 
prcccpts arc aU dcduccd from tllC naturc of reason, and arc intcndcd lo 
promole the 110urishing of rcasoning itsclf, tllCy arc sim ply mcanllo dcscribc 
whal tllC primary activily of our rcason ncccssarily consists in. 17 
Indcecl, tllis is what wc aIl conslantly do, in our c\'cryday lilc, as much as 
wc can, as rational beings: wc slrivc lo organisc our mcmory and tllC cxlcrnal 
worlcl tllal, tllrough our mcmory ancl imagination, wc imaginc "as prcscnl to 
us" Œ2p 17s; C l, 465 / G II, 106), in ordcr lo kccp t.rack of our tllOughts and 
actions. 
7. Conclusion 
To condude, acquiring tllC habil of \'irlUc, for Spinoza, is a eomplex proecss, 
lolally delerminccl by Ù1C way in whidl nalural powcrs, eommon lo aIl human 
bcings, necessarily interael witll tllC various circumslanccs and siluations 
broughl aboul by thc cxlcrnal world. On tllC mcnlal le\'Ci, il rcC]uircs tllC 
inlcrplay of lwo functions of tllC minci, cach of whieh <lels according to ils own 
ncccssary mcehanism. 
On tllC onc hand, thcrc is mcmory, which passi\'Ciy recci\'cs stimuli from 
tllC cxlcrnal world and conslantly fCcds lhc minci Witll nclworks of images of 
17 Il is ta bc naticcd hcrc lhat ÙIC word "IUleS", wiùl rclcrcncc la Spino~.a 's lisl or prcccpts in 
ESplOs, is an addition madc by Curlcy in his u'anslatian, Il is prcsclllnciÙlcr in ÙIC OP (which 
simply rclers lo k l.·c, "ÙICSC"; scc OP 245), Bor in Ù1C :\S (ÙIC Dulch word uscd is dtilg'ClI, "ùlings" ; 
scc :\S 278), 
177 
SfJÙ/OJ::I~\' Theo/J' orthe HIII1I:lfI ,IIi fiel: COIISciOIISIICS5; ,lIcl1Io/v, ;Ulr! R CilSOII 
cxtclllai ol~jecls \'ariously associalcd WiÙl cach othcr. On thc oÙlcr hand, Ùlcrc 
is Ù1C stri\'ing or Ù1C mind lo rcason - lhal is, Lo undcrsland ùlÎngs and ordcr 
lhem according to Ù1C ordcr or Ù1C inlellecl. By lhcsc mcans, mcmory 
bccomcs Ù1C nccessary background lhal allows rcason lo unfOid and Oourish 
in timc and bccomc discursivc rcasoning, by allowing conclusions or righl 
inlercnccs lo bc rctaincd, rccalled and implemenlcd llirough mncmonic 
dcviccs. As long as mcmory allows ùlis rclcntion and rClricval of inlelligible 
conncctions bclwccn imagcs in Ù1C mind, il also allows Ù1C pcrmancnce in 
timc or Ù1C relric\'al or rcasoning proccsscs. This, e\'CnluaUy, pro\'idcs an 
indi\'idual WiÙl lhc mcans by which shc can acquire thc "habil or virluc", or a 
"finn and constanl disposition" lo ovcrcomc Ù1C powcr of passions and sad 
affccts by rcasoning. 
y cl, Ù1C capacily lo havc ùlis or Ùlal nclwork of imagcs prcscnl lo oncselr 
al a givcn timc, is cntirely dClcrmincd by our memory, also undcrslood as a 
producl or cxlclllai causcs aOecting Ù1C human corporeal imagination. For 
whal Ù1C mind can or cannol rcmcmbcr al a ccrtain gi\'cn limc is always 
dClcrmincd by Ù1C anections Ùlal, coming rrom Ù1C cxlcrnal cl1\'irOnmcnl, 
lriggcr in onc's body ccrtain prc-cxisting nctworks of imagcs or oÙlcrs. For ùlis 
rcason, Ù1C proccss by which wc bccomc virluous l'Cluains always cxposcd lo 
Ù1C risk of failurc: ror lhc powcr by which wc slrivc to kecp rcasoning can bc 
casily ovcrwhelmcd by Ùle rorcc WiÙl which random cncounlcrs conslanÙY 
afl'ccl and variously disposc Ù1C human body, causing a conslanl mutation of 
imagcs and mcmorics, allecls and dcsircs. For Ùus rcason, in Ù1C 17Jco!o,gù:-..7.I-
Po!iLira! Trcalùc, Spinoza concludcs Ùlal "only a vcry lew (comp(U"cc! WiÙl Ù1C 
whole human racc) acquirc a habil of virLuc l, ùtulJs habùuslfi-Oln Ù1C guidancc 
or rcason alonc" nTP xv, 45; C II , 282 / G III , 188). 
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BricOy put, wc nccd to gel lucky, at !cast a biL, and bc pul inLo Ù1C righL 
conditions and circlIlllstanccs, in ordcr to acquirc a \"irLlIous habit. 18 BuL iL is 
human rcason, which is cqllal in ail humans, ÙlaL stri\'cs, by ils own powcr and 
as much as iL can, to (Tcatc and pro\"okc such propcr conditions. 
18 In Ù1C rl~rp, ;ùl C"Onditions prO\"idcd by lhc cxlcm;ù c ll\"ironmcnl Ùlal cncouragc ,md promolc 
our powcr of bcing acti,"c, rcasoning, ami acquiring Ù1C "habil of ,"inuc" ;U"C c;ùlcd by Spinoz..'l 
"God's cxlcrnal aid" (TTl' III , 9; CIl, 11 3 / G 1II, 46), Among Ù1C cxlcll1al faclors Ùlal ;ÙlCCl Ù1C 
way in whidl our anCCL<; arcjoincd and arouscd in our mind, wc musl indudc Ù10SC dClcrmincd by 




ln Ù1C introcluction 1 listcd four qucstions to which this tcxt was intcndcd lo 
provide answcrs. Whal is consciousncss, and what arc thc causcs thal 
dClcrminc thc prcscnce or consciousncss innaturc? How can human and non-
human individuals bc distinguishcd on accounl or Ùlcir mcntality, if ÙIC 
prcscnce of mcntaLily and consciousncss is a fCalurc Ùlal can cxtcnd lo ail 
cxisting entitics? How can Spinoza conccivc of ÙIC human mind as a nclwork 
of idcas consisting cntirely or conscious pcrceptions? And how, according lo 
Spinoza's mind-body parallclism, is the conlcnl or consciousncss dctcrmincd 
so Ùlal il reOccts in ùl0ughl ÙIC ordcr ancl conncction or ÙIC actions and ÙIC 
passions of thc body? 
To Ù1C firsl qucstion, Ù1C answer is ÙIC following: conSCIousncss, on 
Spinoza's accounL, is noÙ'ùng bUl knowlcdgc of an cntily qua modc of ùlOughL, 
and Ù1C origin of such knowlcdgc lies in Ù1C facl Ùlat for cach cxisling Ùling 
Ùlcre musl bc in God's allribulc of ùloughl ÙIC corrcsponcling idca, which 
mirrors in Ùlought everYÙling ÙlaL happcns in its o~jccl. So Ùlat, for cach 
cxisting body in cxlension, Ùlcrc musl bc an idca Ùlat acls as ÙIC minci of ÙIC 
body and which involves, in Gocl's allribulc of ÙlOught, knowlcdgc of thc body; 
accordingly, for cach mind, or iclca in gcncral, Ùlcrc musl also bc in Goel an 
iclca, which accounts for its knowlcdgc (Ùlat is, consciousncss). In Ùlis scnse, 
ÙIC firsl chaplcr has bccn clc\"olcd lo clcmonstrating Ùla! Spinoza's 
panpsychism is a direcL cxprcssion of his rigorous undcrstancling of God -
Ùlal is, nalurc itsclf - as an infinilcly Ùlinking bcing, which can lhink infinilcly 
many ùlÏngs, in infinilcly many ways - Ùlal is, ail ÙIC ùlings Ùlal cxist in nalurc. 
Along Ù1CSC lincs, 1 havc poinlcel oul Ùlal much of ÙIC conlcmporary e1cbalc 
conccrning Ù1C apparcnL lack of a sclccli,"c Ihcory of consciousncss in 
Spinoza's philosophy of minci fundarncntally bcgs ÙIC qucstion. Spinoza ncvcr 
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inlcndcd lo disLinguish mimIs in nalurc on accounl of Ùlcir capability of bcing 
conscious of lhcir mcnlal slalcs. 
This answcr raiscd Ù1C sccond qucsLion, conccrning how human and 
non-human indi\'iduals can bc disLinguishcd on accounl of Ùlcir mcnlalily in 
Spinoza's panpsychisl uni\'crsc. Thc answcr lo lhis qucsLion is Ùlal spccilically 
human mcnlalily can bc idcnLilicd WiÙl Ù1C cxislence of inlraspccilic allecls, 
by which sc\'cral inclividuals Ùlink ,:U1c1 l'ccl Ùlings on Ù1C basis or whal Ù1CY 
assumc oÙlcr ilHli\'iduals' ùlOughls ancl leclings mighl bc. ApprcciaLion of 
Ù1CSC inlraspccilic aIlecls rcquircs Ùlal wc aclopl a "phcnomcnal stance" on lhc 
nalurc of somconc clsc's minci. IL 101l0\\'s Ùlal Ù1C spccilic characlcrisLÏcs of a 
"human" mind can only bc clisccrnccl l'rom a subjccLi\'e poinl of \'icw, by Ù1C 
mcmbcrs of a communily who mulually rccog11ise each oÙlcr as "humans". 
Thcsc characlcristics arc idcnLificcl with Ù1C capacily to havc cquallCclings ancl 
arlCcts in concomilancc WiÙl cqual bcha\'ioural patlcrns, ancllo coliccLi\'cly acl 
in ordcr lo promolc onc anoÙlcr's wellbcing undcr Ù1C impulsc of Ù10SC 
sharcd allecls. The scconcl chaplcr has Ùlcrc!orc bccn clevolccllo cxpounding 
Spinoza's ùlcory of Ù1C imilaLion of Ùle allecls, ùlrough which membcrs or a 
communily gcl lo rccognisc onc anothcr as "humans" and allribulc lo cach 
olhcr Ù1C samc subjccLivc characlcr of cxpcricnce, basccl on obscr\'aLion of 
bcha\'ioural similariLics. 
Thc ùlird qucsLion askccl how Spinoza can concei\'c of Ù1C hUl11<Ul minci 
as cnLircly consisLing in conscious pcrccpLions. In orclcr lo aclclrcss ùlis 
qucsLion, in Ù1C Ùlircl chapler 1 locuscd on Spinoza's accounl of memory. 1 
dcmonslralccl Ùlal, in Ù1C l-lhics, Spinoza concciœs human memory as 
consisLing in nclworks of conscious icleas. AIl Ù1C iclcas bclonging lo a single 
llclwork arc synclu"onically associalecl lo cach oÙlcr - as in Ù1C casc or 
semanLic memory - ancl simullancously prcsenlecl lo Ù1C minci on Ù1C 
occasion of rccol\ecLion. Thcsc nclworks of iclcas min"or in lhe minci Ù1C 
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parallcl cxislcncc of nclworks of eorporcal all'ceLÏons, wlùch arc cncodcd and 
slorcd in Ù1C body according lo Lhc way in which Ù1C body is modilied by ilS 
inLeracLÏons wiLh Ù1C cxlcrnal cnyironmcnL. Thc acLÏ\'aLÏon of onc of Ù1CSC prc-
cxisLÏng ncLworks of corporcal aITccLÏons, by mcans of physical stimuli, 
dcLcrmincs Ù1C phcnomcnon of rccollccLÏol . and thc parallcl pcrccption, in 
one's minci, of Ù1C corrcsponcling nclwork of menlal aIIccLÏons. Spinoza's 
concepLÏon of mcmory is, in lhis scnsc, mcanL Lo rcOccL in Ùle mind Ùle wholc 
rangc of allCcljons produccd by inLcracLÏons WiÙl Ù1C cxlcrnal cl1\'ironmenL 
which arc currcnÙY allccLÏng Ù1C body. IL follows Ùlat mcmory can bc regard cd 
as idenLÏcal WiÙl Ù1C wholc of Ù1C pcrccptuallandscapc prcscnLcd aL onc LÏmc 
Lo an indi\'iclual. 
Thc fourÙl qllcsLÏon conccrnce! how Ù1C conlcnL of consciousness is 
consLÏLuLce! in ordcr lo rcllccl in Ù1C minci Ù1C acLions and Ùle passions of Ùle 
body. To answcr ùlis qllcsLÏon, in Ù1C fourÙl chaplcr 1 ha,'c furÙlcr im'csLÏgaLcd 
Spinoza's ùlcory of mcmory ane! Ù1C way in which mcmory inlcracts WiÙl 
spccific opcraLÏons of Ù1C minci. Insofar as mcmory mirrors Ù1C aITccLÏons 
broughl aboul in onc's body by inlcracLÏons WiÙl Ùle cxlcrnal cnvironillcnL, iL 
also rcllccls a ccrlain disposilion of Ù1C body lo do somcLlùng bccausc of Ùle 
way in whieh il is dClcrmincd by cxlcrnal causcs - a disposition of which Ù1C 
mind is consciolls in lcrms of "dcsirc" and "dccision". Al Ù1C samc LÏmc, 
mcmory also dclincs lhc amounl of allCeLions lo which a spccilic intcrnal 
acLÏ"ily of Ù1C milHl and, in parallcl, of Ù1C body, can apply ilsclr. Thjs inlcrnal 
acLÏ\'ily is callcd "rcason", and il eonsisls in a sponlancous rcarrangcmcnl of 
Ù1C alkcLÏons, bascd on lhcir C01111110n causal propcrLÏcs. i\OècLÏons 
rcarrangcd in su eh a way arc, in lurn, cncodcd and slorcd inLo corporcal 
111cmory, and ÙlUS madc a"ailablc lor fulurc rceollecLÏon, should 
cnvÎronmcnlaI inputs lriggcr again nclworks of allccLÏons wlùch indudc Ùlcm. 
By Lhcsc mcans, mcmory rcprcscnls lhc background Lllal allows rcason lo 
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unrold and Oourish in Lime - becoming, that is, "discursiye" - by allowing the 
reLention, recollcction and consequent implementation or clecisions following 
l'rom aIrections already rearranged by reasoning. 
In conclusion, Lo recall Ùle research goals ouùined in ùle introduction, 
WiÙl these four studies l hope Ùlal l have succeedecl in proyicling the reader 
WiÙl a convincing inlerprelation or ·Spinoza's theory of the human mind, 
coherenl WiÙl his ùlOughL-exlension parallclism, his rejection or free will, and 
his panpsychism. In particular, 1 hope Ùlat these sludies have hclped lo shed 
sorne Light on how the nature, fllnetions, and speeilic beha\'iour of Ù1e human 
mind can be consislenùy concei\'ed, on Spinoza's accounl, as entircly 
deLermined by ùle sum of its conscious perceptions and mental operations -
ùlal is, in Spinoza's words, as expression of a spiritual aulornaLon. 
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Spinoza's Theorie van de Menselijke Geest Bewustzijn, Geheugen, en Rede 
Spinoza beweerl dat "de volgorde en hel verband \'an de ideeën is hetzellde 
ais de volgorde en het verbancl \"<ln de dingcn" (E2p7). Op gTOnd van deze 
claim Lrekl hij lwee conclusies: dal cr niels kan gebeuren in ecn lichaam dal 
cle geest niel waarneeml (E2p 12) en dal aile clingen, hocwcl "in yerschillende 
gradaLies", "bezielcl" zijn (E2pI3s). Het blijfi. echter onduidelijk wat hel \'oor 
iels besla,ands belekent om een geest le hebben die allcs waarneeml cial 
plaaLsvindt in hel corresponderende lichaam. Hel is met namc onduiclelijk 
welke roi hel bewustzijn speell in de defïniLie yan iemands bezieldheid omclat, 
gezien het reit clal alles bezield is, hel zells van eenmudige monvcrpen ais 
slenen gezegcl kan worden cial ze zich bewuSl zijn van wal cr in hcn omgaal 
(Ep58) . 
Om ccn geloofwaardige lheorie le hebben clic ons "mar de kCllIlis yan 
dc menselijke geesl en zijn hoogSlc gelukzalighcid kan leidcn" (E,2Prcl), mocl 
Spinoza's filosofie anlwoorcl kunnen gc\'cn op dc \'olgendc nagen: wal is 
bcwustzijn, en wal veroorzaakl hel bcslaan hicn'an ill dc naluur? Hoc kunncn 
mcnselijke en niel-menselijkc incli\'iclucn \ ';'lIl elkaar ondcrschcidcn worden 
op basis van hun bezielclhcicl, ais dc aanwczighcid yan bczieldhcid cn 
bcwustzijn ieLs is clal zich uiLslrckt oycr allc b 'cndc wczcnsi) Hoc kan Spinoza 
clc menselijke gcesl zicn ais een nelwerk van icleeën cial gchcel bcstaal uil 
bewuslc waarnemingcn? En hoc is, \'olgens Spinoza's lichaam-geesl 
parallelismc, dc inhoucl \'an hel bewuslzijn zodanig clat hcl in dcnkcn dc 
volgordc en hcl verbancl van de hanclclingcn cn passics \ ',1ll hel lichaam 
" This scction is il Dulch summary or ÙJC ÙJcsis, Ail iJlro rmatioJl prcscJllcd herc is ;n'ailablc iJl 
EJlglish in ÙJC InlroductioJl , 
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rellecleerl? Aan de hand V;'U1 deze 'Tagen richt dil onderzoek zich op 
Spinoza's opvalling van de bewusle geesl en zijn luncLioneren. 
Hel onclerzoek bouwt "oorl op de hypolhese dal Spinoza's 
pan psychisme geïnlerpreleercl kan worclen aIs een nauwkeurige, consislenle 
lilosolische positie. Om clil le lalen zien zaJ ik bepalcn wal hel begrip 
'bewuslzijn' volgens Spinoza inhoucll en hoc hij dil gebruikl. Veryolgens 
onderzoek ik or hij een ùleorie "all herkenning hedl die in slaal is om 
speciliek hel mensclijk geclrag en cie menscl\jke menlalileil le yerkJaren. 
Daarna analyseer ik Spinoza's beschrijving van de menscl\jke geesl aIs een 
nelwerk yan bewusle ideeën en belqjk ik cie roi clic cle inhoucl van hel 
geheugen specll in hel vormen "an hel raamwerk van hel bewusle clenken yan 
de mens. Tenslolle ga ik op zoek naar een begrip van cliscursid recleneren dal 
in slaal is om hel beslaan van acLivileil van cie geesl, clic mel behulp \'an hel 
geheugen behouclen blijflle miclclen \'an Lijcl en verallclering le ,·erkJaren. 
In hel eersle hooldstuk, genaamd "Consciousness, Icleas or Ideas, and 
Animation in Spinoza's AUJJcs', richl ik me op Spinoza's "ocabulaire 
aangaande "bewuslzijn". Ik beargumenleer dal, voor Spinoza, hel begrip 
"bewusLzijn" neerkoml op de kennis clic we wellicht , ';'111 onze geesl hebben ais 
wc hel ais een "ais een moclus Vall denken zonder rclatie lol een object" 
beschouwen (E2p21 s) - cial wil zeggen, dat hel algescheiclen en onalhankclijk 
"an hel lichaam kan worden beschouwd. Ik laal zien dal hel gebruik van hel 
begrip "bewuslzijn" lwee doclen client.: om ons rouLieve gcloor in hel beslaan 
van de vrije wil uil le leggen en om le "erwijzen naar cie kel111is clic wc hebben 
van onze geesl ais ieL'i eeuwigs. Ik maak onclerscheicl lussen Spinoza's 
lechnische gebruik van "bewuslZijn" en cie '\'Crschillencle graclCll \'an 
beziclclheicl" die hij ook in cie EthàL (E2p 13s) gebruikl. Dil yorml de 
grondslag \'Oor mijn beloog cial Spinoza's begrip yan bewuslzijn niel is bedocld 
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om dc aard yan dc gccst tc karaklcriscrcn in lcrmcn , 'an hCl bewustzijn yan dc 
cigcn idccën. 
In hCllwccdc hooldstuk, gcnaamd: '''A Thing Likc s': Human Mincis 
and Dcccilful Bchaviollr in Spinoza" ondcrzock ik of Spinoza, onclanks zijn 
panpsychismc, ycrschillcn locslaal tusscn mcnscLijkc cn nicl-mcnsclijkc 
bczicldhcid. Ik analysccr Spinoza's \'crwijzingcn naar aulomata zoncler gccsl 
cn aulomata mcl gccsl in dc Vedl;uldeling QI 'er de VerbeLenilg Fan heL 
Versl;UJrl Ik bcargumcntccr cial Spinoza naar indi,'iclucn aIs "zonclcr gccsl" 
rcfcrccrl om ccn soortbczicldhcid lc bcsclu"ij,'cn waarmcc wij ons nicl kunncn 
iclcnlÏficercn. Ook bcloog ik cial , 'oor Spinoza dc (on)mogelijkhcid , 'an hel 
herkcnncn van ccn O\'crccnkomcndc bczicldhcicl in anclcrcn gcbasccrel is op 
gcclrag dal hij "imitalÏc yan gcvoclcns" nocml (E3p27s 1). Ik \"Ccg loc dal dil 
ccn ,'an dc rcdcncn zou kunncn zijn voor Spinoza's compromislozc hOllcling 
lcgcnovcr mislcidcnd gcdrag. 
In hcl dcrclc hoo[dstuk, gclitcld: "Nclworks of Iclcas: Spinoza's 
ConceplÏon of Mcmory", onlralC! ik Spinoza's Ù1coric , 'an hcl gchcugcn cn 
bcschouw ik haar [unclic aangaandc zijn bcgrip , 'an dc mcnsclijkc gecsl. Ik 
analysccr dc clc!ïnilics \'an hcl gchcugcn dic Spinoza , 'crschafl in clc 
VedliUldcJillg QI 'cr de Verbelenilg 1,711 heL VersL;uld cn dc Edûcr1. Ik gcbruik 
hClonclcrschcid tusscn "cpisodisch gchcugcn" cn "scmanlÏsch gchcugen" aIs 
ccn hcurislÏsch hulpmiddcl. Ik laal zicn dal, wannccr Spinoza , 'crvvijSl naar 
gc,'allcn \'an cpisodisch gchcugcn - hctgccn ccn lÏjelsgcbondcn karaktcr "cUl 
dc bctrcflcndc oqjcclcn implicccrl - hij ze , 'crwcrpl aIs ondcrschciclcn Yan, 
cn nicl compalibcl mct, hcl inlcllcct cn zijn \'olgorclc cn \'crband , '(ll1 idccën. 
Andcrzijds lijkl hij gcvallcn "cm scmanlÏsch gchcugcn lc bcs('houwcn aIs 
gcvallcn dic ogcnschijnlijkc intcraclÏc lusscn inlcllccl cn , 'crbcclcling locstaan. 
Ik laal zicn dal Spinoza hcl gchcugcn om lwcc rcdcncn bcschouwl aIs ccn 
nclwcrk van bcwustc synchronc idccën: om uillc lcggcn wal l'oor impacl hcl 
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geheugen hecfl in hel bepa1cn yan onze huiclige begcertcn en om hel speclrum 
van ideeën waarop hel inlellect zich kan tocpassen te dcliniëren. 
In hel vierde hoofdsluk, gcnaamcl "'Thc Habil of Virlue': Spinoza on 
Reason and Memory", richl ik me op dc manier \Vaarop, in Spinoza's sysleem, 
hel geheugen in wissclwerking staat met hct intellect. Ik beloog dal deze 
wissclwerking leidl lol wat we "discursief rcclcnercn" zouden kunnen noemen, 
dal wil zcggen, hoe redcncerproccsscn zich in de loop der Lijcl onlwikkclen. 
Derhalve moel recleneren \Vorden bcschouwd ais cen soorl gewoonle, die 
deugclzaam geclrag voorlbrcngt. Ik \cg uil \Val hcl idcc van "deugdzame 
gewoonlc" (Ep 58; ~r-rp III , 12) voor Spinoza bctckcnl. Ik val z(in theorie van 
hel geheugen samen en laal zien hoc clc rcdc gezien kan worden ais een 
acLivitcil waarbij associaLies in hclgchellgen \Vordcn geherstructurcerd. Ik Loon 
hoe deze activileil van de geesl sleunl op hcl gchcugcn om zichzelf door dc 
tijd heen te behouden, tcrwijl hel dellgclzame gc\Voonlen bepaalt, of\vcl dc 
"ferme en consL-1l1lc disposiLie van dc gecsl" (Ep 58), waal' Spinoza op 
zinspecll. 
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